Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud observe other people"s conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.
Obj. 3: Further, pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of G.o.d, according to Ecclus.
10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from G.o.d."
Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appet.i.te, cannot extend to G.o.d and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.
Obj. 4: Further, as stated in Prosper"s _Liber Sententiarum,_ sent.
294, "Pride is love of one"s own excellence." But love is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible.
_I answer that,_ The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of one"s own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appet.i.te, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te.
Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective appet.i.te, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to G.o.d and the angels, not as a pa.s.sion, but as denoting the sentence of justice p.r.o.nouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 82, A. 5, ad 1 and 2).
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appet.i.te might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appet.i.te. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appet.i.te, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appet.i.te.
Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
For the proud man subjects not his intellect to G.o.d, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matt. 11:25, "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 161, AA. 2, 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appet.i.te is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other people"s failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy men, by a like observation of other people"s virtues, set others above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appet.i.te, but also as having a more general signification, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one"s own excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 4]
Whether the Four Species of Pride Are Fittingly a.s.signed by Gregory?
Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly a.s.signed by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from G.o.d, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of pride.
Obj. 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 2; Q. 112). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride.
Obj. 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that "nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different species of pride.
Obj. 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm [*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride, saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one"s sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be a.s.signed unfittingly.
_On the contrary,_ The authority of Gregory suffices.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), pride denotes immoderate desire of one"s own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that his appet.i.te tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one has not."
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appet.i.te is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one"s own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from G.o.d," or "when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."
Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appet.i.te is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous."
Reply Obj. 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to unbelief to a.s.sert universally that there is a good which is not from G.o.d, or that grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one"s own excellence, to boast of one"s goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one"s own merits.
Reply Obj. 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.
Reply Obj. 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingrat.i.tude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.
Reply Obj. 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above (Q. 161, A. 6). For the first degree of humility is to "be humble in heart, and to show it in one"s very person, one"s eyes fixed on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed "arrogance,"
whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is "to confess one"s sins," to which is opposed "defense of one"s sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circ.u.mstances," to which is opposed "deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh degree of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one"s own desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear of G.o.d": to this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of G.o.d.
In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated above with regard to humility (Q. 161, A. 6).
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 5]
Whether Pride Is a Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my G.o.d, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely, the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would every sin be.
Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of G.o.d, nor as to the love of one"s neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to G.o.d"s honor, or our neighbor"s good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xiv, 23) that "pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect." But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.
Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
_I answer that,_ Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure of the rule which G.o.d hath measured to us." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from G.o.d" because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to G.o.d and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to G.o.d is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from G.o.d: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin.
Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2) pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of G.o.d, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.
Reply Obj. 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in _Phys._ viii, 1.
Hence some are even proud of their humility.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 6]
Whether Pride Is the Most Grievous of Sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
Obj. 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good,"
as the Philosopher a.s.serts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q.
61, A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of G.o.d, murder, and so forth, are more grievous sins than pride.