Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not take place in the person. For the Person of G.o.d is not distinct from His Nature, as we said (I, Q. 39, A. 1). If, therefore, the union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the person.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ"s human nature has no less dignity than ours.
But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (I, Q. 29, A.
3, ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ"s should have its proper personality.
Obj. 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of G.o.d a.s.sumed an individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person.
_On the contrary,_ We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act.
5): "We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of G.o.d." Therefore the union took place in the person.
_I answer that,_ Person has a different meaning from "nature." For nature, as has been said (A. 1), designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the species.
Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature (as in G.o.d), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called "nature" as it is an essence, and a suppositum as it is subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than "an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to G.o.d the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Although in G.o.d Nature and Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of G.o.d took place in the person, and not in the nature.
Reply Obj. 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something n.o.bler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union with the n.o.bler form which perfects the species, is more n.o.ble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.
Reply Obj. 3: The Word of G.o.d "did not a.s.sume human nature in general, but _in atomo_"--that is, in an individual--as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of G.o.d, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 3]
Whether the Union of the Word Incarnate Took Place in the Suppositum or Hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion x.x.xv, x.x.xviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of G.o.d, but they are one thing (_aliud_) by reason of the Word and another thing (_aliud_) by reason of the man." And Pope Leo says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with miracles, the other succ.u.mbs under injuries." But "one"
(_aliud_) and "the other" (_aliud_) differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Obj. 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these.
Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word.
Obj. 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any genus or species, as is plain from the First Part (Q. 3, A. 5). But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our nature He came, Who far surpa.s.ses the whole order of nature supersubstantially." Now nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of G.o.d; and hence the same conclusion follows as above.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4, 5): "In our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis."
_I answer that,_ Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of G.o.d and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous.
First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), "a person is an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: "If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, G.o.d the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence." Now "subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a suppositum, because he underlies (_supponitur_) whatever belongs to man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of G.o.d, and some of them (as if they could be used of G.o.d alone) only to the Word of G.o.d the Father, let him be anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: "If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both--to wit, G.o.d and man--let him be anathema."
Reply Obj. 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other"
(_alterum_), so essential difference makes "another thing" (_aliud_).
Now it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of nature. Hence Gregory n.a.z.ianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say "one thing and another"; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another."
Reply Obj. 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz.
the whole Christ, as He is G.o.d and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.
Reply Obj. 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature a.s.sumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 4]
Whether After the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ Is Composite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what has been said (A. 2).
But in the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from First Part (Q. 39, A. 1). Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown above (I, Q. 3, A. 7), it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composite.
Obj. 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.
Obj. 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be h.o.m.ogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed.
Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to A. 2.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4, 5), "In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis composed from both."
_I answer that,_ The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.
And thereby the solution to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: This composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not verified in every composition, that the thing composed is h.o.m.ogeneous with its component parts, but only in the parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and neither of these is an animal.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 5]
Whether in Christ There Is Any Union of Soul and Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was not the hypostasis of G.o.d the Word, for It is eternal.
Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to AA. 2, 3.
Obj. 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that "we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ."
Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the Word of G.o.d Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life.
Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.
_On the contrary,_ The body is not said to be animated save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin" [*Feast of the Circ.u.mcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in Christ there was a union of soul and body.
_I answer that,_ Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7), "being made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not const.i.tute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ"s humanity.
Reply Obj. 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz.
lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something n.o.bler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals const.i.tutes the species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and n.o.bler perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above (A. 2, ad 2).
Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the Son of G.o.d did not a.s.sume human nature as it exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would not have a.s.sumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of G.o.d would not have a.s.sumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Luke 24:39), "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have." Neither can it be said that the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have a.s.sumed all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He a.s.sumed human nature _in atomo,_ i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of G.o.d.
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature (viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds: "For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who from the G.o.dhead and manhood, and in the G.o.dhead and manhood, is perfect G.o.d and perfect man."
Reply Obj. 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way the Word of G.o.d is the principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 6]