But he committed the indiscretion of washing in them first, for which Nero had banished him.
[103] Both the Junii and Antonii could claim as an ancestor Augustus" sister Octavia; and the Junii were also connected with M. Junius Sila.n.u.s, Augustus" great-great-grandson, whom Nero had put out of the way.
[104] See chap. 12.
[105] They had already incurred the disgrace of betraying first Galba, then Otho.
[106] Rimini.
[107] Now admiral of the Ravenna fleet (see chap. 12).
[108] See ii. 16, note 247.
[109] Monaco.
[110] See ii. 12.
[111] Cp. ii. 67.
[112] Frejus.
[113] iles d"Hyeres.
THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES
With the capture of Valens the tide had now fully turned in favour 44 of Vespasian. The movement had been begun in Spain by the First legion _Adjutrix_,[114] whose reverence for Otho"s memory made them hate Vitellius. They carried the Tenth and the Sixth[115] with them. The provinces of Gaul soon followed suit. Britain was bound to his cause by the favour felt for one who had been sent there by Claudius in command of the Second legion, and had fought with great distinction in the war. But the adherence of the province was to some extent opposed by the other legions, in which many of the centurions and soldiers had been promoted by Vitellius. They were used to their emperor and felt some doubt about the change. This quarrel between the legions and 45 the constant rumours of civil war, encouraged the Britons to take heart. Their chief instigator was one Venutius. He was of a ferocious disposition and hated the name of Rome, but his strongest motive was a private quarrel with Queen Cartimandua, a member of a powerful family, who ruled the Brigantes.[116] Her authority had lately increased, since she had betrayed King Caratacus into the hands of the Romans, and was thus considered to have provided Claudius Caesar with material for his triumph.[117] Thus she had grown rich, and with prosperity came demoralization. She threw over Venutius, who was her husband, and gave her hand and kingdom to his squire, Vellocatus. This crime soon proved the ruin of her house. The people supported her husband: she defended her lover with pa.s.sionate ferocity. Venutius therefore summoned a.s.sistance and, aided by the simultaneous revolt of the Brigantes, brought Cartimandua into dire straits. She pet.i.tioned for troops from Rome. Our auxiliaries, both horse and foot, then fought several engagements with varying success, but eventually rescued the queen. Thus the kingdom was left in the hands of Venutius and the war in ours.
Almost simultaneously a disturbance broke out in Germany, where 46 the inefficiency of the generals, the disaffection of the troops, the strength of the enemy, and the treachery of our allies all combined to bring the Roman government into serious danger. The causes and history of this protracted struggle--for such it proved--we must leave to a later chapter.[118] Amongst the Dacians[119] also there was trouble.
They could never be trusted, and now that the army was moved from Moesia they were no longer under the restraint of fear. At first they remained quiet and awaited developments. But when they saw Italy in the flames of war, and found the whole empire divided into hostile camps, they fell upon the winter-quarters of the auxiliary infantry and cavalry and began to occupy both banks of the Danube. They were on the point of storming the Roman camp as well, when Mucia.n.u.s, who knew of the victory at Cremona, sent the Sixth legion[120] against them.
For the empire was in danger of a double foreign invasion, if the Dacians and the Germans had broken in from opposite directions. But here, as so often, Rome"s good fortune saved her by bringing Mucia.n.u.s on the scene with the forces of the East just at the moment when we had settled matters at Cremona. Fonteius Agrippa, who had for the last year been pro-consul in Asia, was transferred to the government of Moesia. His forces were strengthened by a draft from the defeated Vitellian army, for in the interest of peace it seemed prudent to distribute these troops over the provinces and to keep their hands tied by a foreign war.
The other peoples soon made their voices heard. Pontus[121] had 47 suddenly risen in a general rebellion at the instigation of a foreign menial, who was in command of what had once been the royal fleet. He was one of Polemo"s freedmen, by name Anicetus, who had formerly been influential and resented the change which had converted the kingdom into a province of the Roman empire. He accordingly enlisted the maritime tribes of Pontus in Vitellius" service, attracting all the neediest ruffians with promises of plunder. At the head of no mean force he suddenly fell upon Trapezus,[122] an ancient and famous city, founded by Greek settlers on the frontier of the Pontic kingdom. There he cut to pieces the auxiliaries, who had once formed the king"s Body Guard, and, after receiving the Roman franchise, had adopted our ensigns and equipment, while still retaining all the inefficiency and insubordination of Greek troops. Anicetus also set fire to the fleet[123] and thus enjoyed complete mastery of the sea, since Mucia.n.u.s had moved the pick of his cruisers and all his troops to Byzantium. The sea was overrun by natives too, who had hurriedly built themselves boats. These, which they call "arks",[124] are broad-bottomed boats with low sides, built without any bra.s.s or iron rivets. In a rough sea, as the waves rise higher and higher, the height of the sides is raised by the addition of planks which, in the end, enclose the whole boat under a sort of roof. They are thus left to toss up and down on the waves. They have bows at both ends and the paddles can be used on either side, since it is as easy and as safe to row in one direction as in the other.
This state of things attracting Vespasian"s attention, he was 48 obliged to send out a picked force of detachments from the legions under Virdius Geminus, a soldier of tried experience. He attacked the enemy while they were dispersed in all directions in quest of plunder, and drove them back to their ships. He then had some Liburnian cruisers hurriedly constructed and ran Anicetus to ground in the mouth of the river Chobus,[125] where he had taken refuge with the King of the Sedochezi tribe, whose alliance he had purchased by bribes. At first, indeed, the king endeavoured to protect his pet.i.tioner by using threats of violence, but he soon saw that it was a choice between making war or being paid for his treachery. The barbarian"s sense of honour was unequal to this strain. He came to terms, surrendered Anicetus and the other fugitives, and thus put an end to "the slaves"
war".
This victory delighted Vespasian: everything was succeeding beyond his hopes: and to crown all the news of the battle of Cremona now reached him in Egypt. He hurried forward all the faster towards Alexandria with the object of bringing starvation[126] upon Vitellius" defeated troops and the inhabitants of Rome, who were already feeling the pinch of diminished imports. For he was at the same time making preparations for an invasion of the adjacent province of Africa[127] by land and sea. By cutting off their corn supply he hoped to reduce the enemy to famine and disunion.
FOOTNOTES:
[114] The marines (see ii. 67, i. 6).
[115] X Gemina, VI Victrix.
[116] They occupied a large district of the north of England, from the Trent to the Tyne.
[117] As a matter of fact his triumph took place in 44.
Caratacus was brought to Rome in 51. Perhaps Tacitus regards this in itself as a "triumph", or else he makes a venial mistake.
[118] The rebellion on the Rhine is described in Books IV and V.
[119] In Roumania.
[120] Ferrata. Cp. ii. 83.
[121] This little kingdom west of Trebizond was left to Rome by Polemo II, A.D. 63. Nero made it a Roman province under the name of Pontus Polemoniacus.
[122] Trebizond.
[123] Mucia.n.u.s had "ordered the fleet to move from Pontus to Byzantium" (ii. 83). This leads some editors to change the text, and others to suppose that a few ships were left behind.
[124] Literally, arched boats. Tacitus describes somewhat similar craft in _Germania_, 44.
[125] The Khopi, which flows from the Caucasus into the Euxine.
[126] Cp. chap. 8.
[127] Africa came next to Egypt in importance as a Roman granary (cp. i. 73).
ANTONIUS" ADVANCE FROM CREMONA
Thus[128] a world-wide convulsion marked the pa.s.sing of the 49 imperial power into new hands. Meanwhile, after Cremona, the behaviour of Antonius Primus was not so blameless as before. He had settled the war, he felt; the rest would be plain sailing. Or, perhaps, in such a nature as his success only brought to light his greed and arrogance and all his other dormant vices. While harrying Italy like a conquered country, he courted the goodwill of his troops and used every word and every action to pave his way to power. He allowed his men to appoint centurions themselves in place of those who had fallen, and thus gave them a taste for insubordination; for their choice fell on the most turbulent spirits. The generals no longer commanded the men, but were dragged at the heels of their caprices. This revolutionary system, utterly fatal to good discipline, was exploited by Antonius for his own profit.[129] Of Mucia.n.u.s" approach he had no fears, and thus made a mistake even more fatal than despising Vespasian.[130]
His advance, however, continued. As winter was at hand[131] and 50 the Po had inundated the meadows, his column marched unenc.u.mbered by heavy baggage. The main body of the victorious legions was left behind at Verona, together with such of the soldiers as were incapacitated by wounds or old age, and many besides who were still in good condition. Having already broken the back of the campaign, Antonius felt strong enough with his auxiliary horse and foot and some picked detachments from the legions. The Eleventh[132] had voluntarily joined the advance. They had held back at first, but, seeing Antonius"
success, were distressed to think they had had no share in it. The column was also accompanied by a force of six thousand Dalmatian troops, which had been recently raised. The ex-consul, Pompeius Silva.n.u.s,[133] commanded the column, but the actual control was in the hands of a general named Annius Ba.s.sus. Silva.n.u.s was quite ineffective as a general, and wasted every chance of action in talking about it.
Ba.s.sus, while showing all due respect, managed him completely, and was always ready with quiet efficiency to do anything that had to be done.
Their force was further increased by enlisting the best of the marines from the Ravenna fleet, who were clamouring for service in the legions. The vacancies in the fleet were filled by Dalmatians. The army and its generals halted at Fanum Fortunae,[134] still hesitating what policy to adopt, for they had heard that the Guards were on the move from Rome, and supposed that the Apennines were held by troops.
And they had fears of their own. Supplies were scarce in a district devastated by war. The men were mutinous and demanded "shoe-money",[135]
as they called the donative, with alarming insistence. No provision had been made either for money or for stores. The precipitate greed of the soldiers made further difficulties, for they each looted what might have served for them all.
I find among the best authorities evidence which shows how 51 wickedly careless were the victorious army of all considerations of right and wrong. They tell how a trooper professed that he had killed his brother in the last battle, and demanded a reward from his generals. The dictates of humanity forbade them to remunerate such a murder, but in the interests of civil war they dared not punish it.
They had put him off with the plea that they could not at the moment reward his service adequately. And there the story stops. However, a similar crime had occurred in earlier civil wars. In the battle which Pompeius Strabo fought against Cinna at the Janiculum,[136] one of his soldiers killed his own brother and then, realizing what he had done, committed suicide. This is recorded by Sisenna.[137] Our ancestors, it seems, had a livelier sense than we have both of the glory of good deeds and the shame of bad.[138] These and other such instances from past history may be appropriately cited, whenever the subject seems to demand either an example of good conduct or some consolation for a crime.
Antonius and his fellow generals decided to send the cavalry ahead 52 to explore the whole of Umbria, and to see whether any of the Apennines were accessible by a gentler route; to summon the eagles and standards[139] and all the troops at Verona,[140] and to fill the Po and the sea with provision ships. Some of the generals continually suggested obstacles. Antonius had grown too big for his place, and they had surer hopes of reward from Mucia.n.u.s. He was distressed that victory had come so soon, and felt that, if he was not present when Rome was taken, he would lose his share in the war and its glory. So he kept on writing to Antonius and Varus in ambiguous terms, sometimes urging them to "press forward on their path", sometimes expatiating on "the manifold value of delay". He thus managed to arrange that he could disclaim responsibility in case of a reverse, or acknowledge their policy as his own if it succeeded. To Plotius Grypus, whom Vespasian had lately raised to senatorial rank and put in command of a legion, and to his other trusty friends he sent less ambiguous instructions, and they all wrote back criticizing the haste with which Antonius and Varus acted. This was just what Mucia.n.u.s wanted. He forwarded the letters to Vespasian with the result that Antonius"
plans and exploits were not appreciated as highly as Antonius had hoped. This he took very ill and threw the blame on Mucia.n.u.s, 53 whose charges he conceived had cheapened his exploits. Being little accustomed to control his tongue or to obey orders, he was most unguarded in his conversation and composed a letter to Vespasian in presumptuous language which ill befitted a subject, making various covert charges against Mucia.n.u.s. "It was I," he wrote, "who brought the legions of Pannonia into the field:[141] it was my stimulus which stirred up the officers in Moesia:[142] it was by my persistence that we broke through the Alps, seized hold of Italy and cut off the German and Raetian auxiliaries.[143] When Vitellius" legions were all scattered and disunited, it was I who flung the cavalry on them like a whirlwind, and then pressed home the attack with the infantry all day and all night. That victory is my greatest achievement and it is entirely my own. As for the mishap at Cremona, that was the fault of the war. In old days the civil wars cost the country far more damage and involved the destruction of more than one town. It is not with couriers and dispatches that I serve my master, but with my sword in my hand. Nor can it be said that I have interfered with the glory of the men who have meanwhile settled matters in Dacia.[144] What peace in Moesia is to them, the safety and welfare of Italy are to me. It was my encouragement which brought the provinces of Gaul and of Spain, the strongest parts of the whole world, over to Vespasian"s side. But my labours will prove useless, if the reward for the dangers I have run is to fall to the man who was not there to share them." All this reached the ears of Mucia.n.u.s and a serious quarrel resulted. Antonius kept it up in a frank spirit of dislike, while Mucia.n.u.s showed a cunning which was far more implacable.
FOOTNOTES:
[128] The narrative is here resumed from the end of chap. 35.
[129] Would-be centurions doubtless bribed him to influence the soldiers in their favour.
[130] Vespasian was too big to mind being despised; Mucia.n.u.s was not, and eventually retaliated (cp. iv. 11).
[131] November.
[132] From Dalmatia (see ii. 11, 67).