Berkeley denies that we have ideas of pure extension or motion, because, although we do actually _deal_ with these and find them intelligible, we can never obtain a state of mind in which they appear as the content. He applies this psychological test because of his adherence to the general empirical postulate that knowledge is limited to the individual content of its own individual states. "It is a universally received maxim," he says, "that _everything which exists is particular_." Now the truth of mathematical reckoning is not particular, but is valid wherever the conditions to which it refers are fulfilled. Mathematical reckoning, if it is to be particular, must be regarded as a particular act or state of some thinker. Its truth must then be construed as relative to the interests of the thinker, as a symbolism which has an instrumental rather than a purely cognitive value. This conclusion cannot be disputed short of a radical stand against the general epistemological principle to which Berkeley is so far true, the principle that the reality which is known in any state of thinking or perceiving is the state itself.
[Sidenote: The Transition to Spiritualism.]
- 132. This concludes the purely phenomenalistic strain of Berkeley"s thought. He has taken the immediate apprehension of sensible objects in a state of mind centring about the pleasure and pain of an individual, to be the norm of knowledge. He has further maintained that knowledge cannot escape the particularity of its own states. The result is that the universe is composed of private perceptions and ideas. Strictly on the basis of what has preceded, Hylas is justified in regarding this conclusion as no less sceptical than that to which his own position had been reduced; for while he had been compelled to admit that the real is unknowable, Philonous has apparently defined the knowable as relative to the individual. But the supplementary metaphysics which had hitherto been kept in the background is now revealed. It is maintained that though perceptions know no external world, they do nevertheless reveal a spiritual substance of which they are the states. Although it has. .h.i.therto been argued that the _esse_ of things is in their _percipi_, this is now replaced by the more fundamental principle that the _esse_ of things is in their _percipere_ or _velle_. The real world consists not in perceptions, but in perceivers.
[Sidenote: Further Attempts to Maintain Phenomenalism.]
- 133. Now it is at once evident that the epistemological theory which has been Berkeley"s dialectical weapon in the foregoing argument is no longer available. And those who have cared more for this theory than for metaphysical speculation have attempted to stop at this point, and so to construe phenomenalism as to make it self-sufficient on its own grounds. Such attempts are so instructive as to make it worth our while to review them before proceeding with the development of the spiritualistic motive in subjectivism.
The world is to be regarded as made up of sense-perceptions, ideas, or phenomena. What is to be accepted as the fundamental category which gives to all of these terms their subjectivistic significance? So far there seems to be nothing in view save the principle of relativity. The type to which these were reduced was that of the peculiar or unsharable experience best represented by an individual"s pleasure and pain. But relativity will not work as a general principle of being. It consigns the individual to his private mind, and cannot provide for the validity of knowledge enough even to maintain itself. Some other course, then, must be followed. Perception may be given a psycho-physical definition, which employs physical terms as fundamental;[282:12] but this flagrantly contradicts the phenomenalistic first principle. Or, reality may be regarded as so stamped with its marks as to insure the proprietorship of thought. But this definition of certain objective ent.i.ties of mind, of beings attributed to intelligence because of their intrinsic intelligibility, is inconsistent with empiricism, if indeed it does not lead eventually to a realism of the Platonic type.[283:13] Finally, and most commonly, the terms of phenomenalism have been retained after their original meaning has been suffered to lapse. The "impressions" of Hume, _e. g._, are the remnant of the Berkeleyan world with the spirit stricken out. There is no longer any point in calling them impressions, for they now mean only elements or qualities. As a consequence this outgrowth of the Berkeleyanism epistemology is at present merging into a realistic philosophy of experience.[283:14] Any one, then, of these three may be the last state of one who undertakes to remain exclusively faithful to the phenomenalistic aspect of Berkeleyanism, embodied in the principle _esse est percipi_.
[Sidenote: Berkeley"s Spiritualism. Immediate Knowledge of the Perceiver.]
- 134. Let us now follow the fortunes of the other phase of subjectivism--that which develops the conception of the perceiver rather than the perceived. When Berkeley holds that
"all the choir of heaven and furniture of the Earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a Mind,"
his thought has transcended the epistemology with which he overthrew the conception of material substance, in two directions. For neither mind of the finite type nor mind of the divine type is perceived. But the first of these may yet be regarded as a direct empirical datum, even though sharply distinguished from an object of perception. In the third dialogue, Philonous thus expounds this new kind of knowledge:
"I own I have properly no _idea_, either of G.o.d or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms _I_ and _myself_; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound."[284:15]
The knowledge here provided for may be regarded as empirical because the reality in question is an individual present in the moment of the knowledge. Particular acts of perception are said directly to reveal not only perceptual objects, but perceiving subjects. And the conception of spiritual substance, once accredited, may then be extended to account for social relations and to fill in the nature of G.o.d. The latter extension, in so far as it attributes such further predicates as universality and infinity, implies still a third epistemology, and threatens to pa.s.s over into rationalism. But the knowledge of one"s fellow-men may, it is claimed, be regarded as immediate, like the knowledge of one"s self. Perceptual and volitional activity has a sense for itself and also a sense for other like activity. The self is both self-conscious and socially conscious in an immediate experience of the same type.
[Sidenote: Schopenhauer"s Spiritualism, or Voluntarism. Immediate Knowledge of the Will.]
- 135. But this general spiritualistic conception is developed with less singleness of purpose in Berkeley than among the _voluntarists_ and _panpsychists_ who spring from Schopenhauer, the orientalist, pessimist, and mystic among the German Kantians of the early nineteenth century.
His great book, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," opens with the phenomenalistic contention that "the world is my idea." It soon appears, however, that the "my" is more profoundly significant than the "idea."
Nature is my creation, due to the working within me of certain fixed principles of thought, such as s.p.a.ce, time, and causality. But nature, just because it is my creation, is less than me: is but a manifestation of the true being for which I must look _within_ myself. But this inner self cannot be made an object of thought, for that would be only to create another term of nature. The will itself, from which such creation springs, is "that which is most immediate" in one"s consciousness, and "makes itself known in a direct manner in its particular acts." The term _will_ is used by Schopenhauer as a general term covering the whole dynamics of life, instinct and desire, as well as volition. It is that sense of life-preserving and life-enhancing appetency which is the conscious accompaniment of struggle. With its aid the inwardness of the whole world may now be apprehended.
"Whoever has now gained from all these expositions a knowledge _in abstracto_, and therefore clear and certain, of what everyone knows directly _in concreto_, _i. e._, as feeling, a knowledge that his will is the real inner nature of his phenomenal being, . . . and that his will is that which is most immediate in his consciousness, . . . will find that of itself it affords him the key to the knowledge of the inmost being of the whole of nature; for he now transfers it to all those phenomena which are not given to him, like his own phenomenal existence, both in direct and indirect knowledge, but only in the latter, thus merely one-sidedly as _idea_ alone."[287:16]
The heart of reality is thus known by an "intuitive interpretation,"
which begins at home in the individual"s own heart.
[Sidenote: Panpsychism.]
- 136. The panpsychist follows the same course of reflection. There is an outwardness and an inwardness of nature, corresponding to the knower"s body on the one hand, and his feeling or will on the other.
With this principle in hand one may pa.s.s down the whole scale of being and discover no breach of continuity. Such an interpretation of nature has been well set forth by a contemporary writer, who quotes the following from the botanist, C. v. Naegeli:
"Sensation is clearly connected with the reflex actions of higher animals. We are obliged to concede it to the other animals also, and we have no grounds for denying it to plants and inorganic bodies. The sensation arouses in us a condition of comfort and discomfort. In general, the feeling of pleasure arises when the natural impulses are satisfied, the feeling of pain when they are not satisfied. Since all material processes are composed of movements of molecules and elementary atoms, pleasure and pain must have their seat in these particles. . . . Thus the same mental thread runs through all material phenomena. The human mind is nothing but the highest development on our earth of the mental processes which universally animate and move nature."[288:17]
According to panpsychism, then, physical nature is the manifestation of an _appetency or bare consciousness generalized from the thinker"s awareness of his most intimate self_. Such appetency or bare consciousness is the essential or substantial state of that which appears as physical nature.
[Sidenote: The Inherent Difficulty in Spiritualism. No Provision for Objective Knowledge.]
- 137. We must now turn to the efforts which this doctrine has made to maintain itself against the sceptical trend of its own epistemology. For precisely as in the case of phenomenalism its dialectical principle threatens to be self-destructive. Immediate presence is still the test of knowledge. But does not immediate presence connote relativity and inadequacy, at best; an initial phase of knowledge that must be supplemented and corrected before objective reality and valid truth are apprehended? Does not the individuality of the individual thinker connote the very maximum of error? Indeed, spiritualism would seem to have exceeded even Protagoreanism itself, and to have pa.s.sed from scepticism to deliberate nihilism. The object of knowledge is no longer even, as with the phenomenalist, the thinker"s thought, but only his _thinking_. And if the thinker"s thought is relative to him, then the thinker"s act of thinking is the very vanishing-point of relativity, the negative term of a negating relation. How is a real, a self-subsistent world to be composed of such? Impelled by a half-conscious realization of the hopelessness of this situation, the exponent of spiritualism has sought to universalize his conception; to define an _absolute or ultimate spirit_ other than the individual thinker, though known in and through him. But it is clear that this development of spiritualism, like all of the speculative procedure of subjectivism, threatens to exceed the scope of the original principle of knowledge. There is a strong presumption against the possibility of introducing a knowledge of G.o.d by the way of the particular presentations of an individual consciousness.
[Sidenote: Schopenhauer"s Attempt to Universalize Subjectivism.
Mysticism.]
- 138. Schopenhauer must be credited with a genuine effort to accept the metaphysical consequences of his epistemology. His epistemology, as we have seen, defined knowledge as centripetal. The object of real knowledge is identical with the subject of knowledge. If I am to know the universal will, therefore, I must in knowing become that will. And this Schopenhauer maintains. The innermost heart of the individual into which he may retreat, even from his private will, is--the universal. But there is another way of arriving at the same knowledge. In contemplation I may become absorbed in principles and laws, rather than be diverted by the particular s.p.a.cial and temporal objects, until (and this is peculiarly true of the aesthetic experience) my interest no longer distinguishes itself, but coincides with truth. In other words, abstract thinking and pure willing are not opposite extremes, but adjacent points on the deeper or transcendent circle of experience. One may reach this part of the circle by moving in either of two directions that at the start are directly opposite: by turning in upon the subject or by utterly giving one"s self up to the object. Reality obtains no definition by this means. Philosophy, for Schopenhauer, is rather a programme for realizing the state in which I will the universal and know the universal will. The final theory of knowledge, then, is mysticism, reality directly apprehended in a supreme and incommunicable experience, direct and vivid, like perception, and at the same time universal, like thought. But the empiricism with which Schopenhauer began, the appeal to a familiar experience of self as will, has meanwhile been forgotten. The idea as object of my perception, and the will as its subject were in the beginning regarded as common and verifiable items of experience. But who, save the occasional philosopher, knows a universal will? Nor have attempts to avoid mysticism, while retaining Schopenhauer"s first principle, been successful. Certain voluntarists and panpsychists have attempted to do without the universal will, and define the world solely in terms of the many individual wills. But, as Schopenhauer himself pointed out, individual wills cannot be distinguished except in terms of something other than will, such as s.p.a.ce and time. The same is true if for will there be subst.i.tuted inner feeling or consciousness. Within this category individuals can be distinguished only as points of view, which to be comparable at all must contain common objects, or be defined in terms of a system of relations like that of the physical world or that of an ethical community. The conception of pure will or pure feeling inevitably attaches to itself that of an undivided unity, if for no other reason because there is no ground for distinction. And such a unity, a will or consciousness that is no particular act or idea, can be known only in the unique experience which mysticism provides.
[Sidenote: Objective Spiritualism.]
- 139. The way of Schopenhauer is the way of one who adheres to the belief that what the thinker knows must always be a part of himself, his state or his activity. From this point of view the important element of being, its very essence or substance, is not any definable nature but an immediate relation to the knower. The consequence is that the universe in the last a.n.a.lysis can only be defined as a supreme state or activity into which the individual"s consciousness may develop. Spiritualism has, however, other interests, interests which may be quite independent of epistemology. It is speculatively interested in a kind of being which it defines as spiritual, and in terms of which it proposes to define the universe. Such procedure is radically different from the epistemological criticism which led Berkeley to maintain that the _esse_ of objects is in their _percipi_, or Schopenhauer to maintain that "the world is my idea," or that led both of these philosophers to find a deeper reality in immediately intuited self-activity. For now it is proposed to _understand_ spirit, discover its properties, and to acknowledge it only where these properties appear. I may now know spirit as an object; which in its properties, to be sure, is quite different from matter, but which like matter is capable of subsisting quite independently of my knowledge. This is a metaphysical spiritualism quite distinct from epistemological spiritualism, and by no means easily made consistent therewith. Indeed, it exhibits an almost irrepressible tendency to overstep the bounds both of empiricism and subjectivism, an historical connection with which alone justifies its introduction in the present chapter.
[Sidenote: Berkeley"s Conception of G.o.d as Cause, Goodness and Order.]
- 140. To return again to the instructive example of Bishop Berkeley, we find him proving G.o.d from the evidence of him in experience, or the need of him to support the claims of experience.
"But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on _my_ will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of _my_ will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series--the admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called _the laws of nature_."[294:18]
Of the attributes of experience here in question, independence or "steadiness" is not regarded as _prima facie_ evidence of spirit, but rather as an aspect of experience for which some cause is necessary. But it is a.s.sumed that the power to "produce," with which such a cause must be endowed, is the peculiar prerogative of spirit, and that this cause gives further evidence of its spiritual nature, of its eminently spiritual nature, in the orderliness and the goodness of its effects.
"The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the goodness that perfects all things is the Supreme Being."[294:19]
That spirit is possessed of causal efficacy, Berkeley has in an earlier pa.s.sage proved by a direct appeal to the individual"s sense of power.
"I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than _willing_, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words."[295:20]
Although Berkeley is here in general agreement with a very considerable variety of philosophical views, it will be readily observed that this doctrine tends to lapse into mysticism whenever it is retained in its purity. Berkeley himself admitted that there was no "idea" of such power. And philosophers will as a rule either obtain an idea corresponding to a term or amend the term--always excepting the mystical appeal to an inarticulate and indefinable experience. Hence pure power revealed in an ineffable immediate experience tends to give place to kinds of power to which some definite meaning may be attached. The energy of physics, defined by measurable quant.i.tative equivalence, is a case in point. The idealistic trend is in another direction, power coming to signify ethical or logical connection. Similarly, in the later philosophy of Berkeley himself, G.o.d is known by the nature of his activity rather than by the fact of his activity; and we are said "to account for a thing, when we show that it is so best." G.o.d"s power, in short, becomes indistinguishable from his universality attended with the attributes of goodness and orderliness. But this means that the a.n.a.logy of the human spirit, conscious of its own activity, is no longer the basis of the argument. By the divine will is now meant ethical principles, rather than the "here am I willing" of the empirical consciousness. Similarly the divine mind is defined in terms of logical principles, such as coherence and order, rather than in terms of the "here am I thinking" of the finite knower himself. But enough has been said to make it plain that this is no longer the stand-point of empirio-idealism. Indeed, in his last philosophical writing, the "Siris," Berkeley is so far removed from the principles of knowledge which made him at once the disciple and the critic of Locke, as to p.r.o.nounce himself the devotee of Platonism and the prophet of transcendentalism. The former strain appears in his conclusion that "the _principles_ of science are neither objects of sense nor imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to truth."[297:21] His transcendentalism appears in his belief that such principles, partic.i.p.ating in the vital unity of the Individual Purpose, const.i.tute the meaning and so the substantial essence of the universe.
[Sidenote: The General Tendency of Subjectivism to Transcend Itself.]
- 141. Such then are the various paths which lead from subjectivism to other types of philosophy, demonstrating the peculiar apt.i.tude of the former for departing from its first principle. Beginning with the relativity of all knowable reality to the individual knower, it undertakes to conceive reality in one or the other of the terms of this relation, as particular state of knowledge or as individual subject of knowledge. But these terms develop an intrinsic nature of their own, and become respectively _empirical datum_, and _logical_ or _ethical principle_. In either case the subjectivistic principle of knowledge has been abandoned. Those whose speculative interest in a definable objective world has been less strong than their attachment to this principle, have either accepted the imputation of scepticism, or had recourse to the radical epistemological doctrine of mysticism.
[Sidenote: Ethical Theories. Relativism.]
- 142. Since the essence of subjectivism is epistemological rather than metaphysical, its practical and religious implications are various. The ethical theories which are corollary to the tendencies expounded above, range from extreme egoism to a mystical universalism. The close connection between the former and relativism is evident, and the form of egoism most consistent with epistemological relativism is to be found among those same Sophists who first maintained this latter doctrine. If we may believe Plato, the Sophists sought to create for their individual pupils an _appearance_ of good. In the "Theaetetus," Socrates is represented as speaking thus on behalf of Protagoras:
"And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which are and appear to a man, into goods which are and appear to him. . . . I say that they (the wise men) are the physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants--for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil seem just to states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state, while sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil, both in appearance and in reality."[299:22]
As truth is indistinguishable from the appearance of truth to the individual, so good is indistinguishable from a particular seeming good.
The supreme moral value according to this plan of life is the agreeable feeling tone of that dream world to which the individual is forever consigned. The possible perfection of an experience which is "reduced to a swarm of impressions," and "ringed round" for each one of us by a "thick wall of personality" has been brilliantly depicted in the pa.s.sage already quoted from Walter Pater, in whom the naturalistic and subjectivistic motives unite.[299:23] If all my experience is strictly my own, then my good must likewise be my own. And if all of my experience is valid only in its instants of immediacy, then my best good must likewise consist in some "exquisite pa.s.sion," or stirring of the senses.
[Sidenote: Pessimism and Self-denial.]
- 143. But for Schopenhauer the internal world opens out into the boundless and unfathomable sea of the universal will. If I retire from the world upon my own private feelings, I am still short of the true life, for I am a.s.serting myself against the world. I should seek a sense of unison with a world whose deeper heart-beats I may learn to feel and adopt as the rhythm of my own. The folly of willing for one"s private self is the ground of Schopenhauer"s pessimism.
"All _willing_ arises from want, therefore from deficiency, and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new one, both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification; it is like the alms thrown to the beggar, that keeps him alive to-day that his misery may be prolonged till the morrow. . . . The subject of willing is thus constantly stretched on the revolving wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the Danaids, is the ever-longing Tantalus."[300:24]
The escape from this torture and self-deception is possible through the same mystical experience, the same blending with the universe that conditions knowledge.
[Sidenote: The Ethics of Welfare.]
- 144. But though pleasant dreaming be the most consistent practical sequel to a subjectivistic epistemology, its _individualism_ presents another basis for life with quite different possibilities of emphasis.