Your article and many others that I have seen a.s.sumes that it was a part of Hardee"s Corps that struck Blair"s front--that is, his front that was towards Atlanta; but that is not so. Cleburn"s Division was the left Division of Hardee"s Corps. There were three other Divisions. Maney"s (Cheatham"s old Division), Bate"s, and Walker"s. Walker was the next to Cleburn and attacked Fuller. Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn"s Division was in front of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and he had refused it from Leggett"s Hill towards my right. What saved Blair was that Cheatham, who commanded Hood"s old Corps, whose orders were to attack Blair"s front at the same time Hardee struck his rear, in accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did not attack because Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them as well as to me, and when Cheatham got ready to attack Blair"s front, hitting Leggett"s Division, and on down the Fifteenth Corps, two Divisions, Bate"s and Walker"s, had been whipped, and were virtually out of the fight, because after the third attack upon me, and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they did not come again in any force. They went back to the road on the ridge, just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of the road, but it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they intrenched, and when I pushed forward my skirmishers I found them in force. Between 3 and 4 o"clock Maney"s Division left my front and went around to help Cleburn.
There have also been many statements that in the first attack two Divisions of Hardee"s Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and two the Seventeenth, Blair"s. This is not correct. Three Divisions struck my Corps, and one Division, Cleburn"s, struck Blair"s Corps, and caught his left and rear; but after the third attack on my front Maney"s Division was sent around to join Cleburn, and joined in the fiercest attack of the day, about 4 p. m., upon Leggett"s and Smith"s Divisions after their line had been refused and formed almost at right angles at Leggett"s Hill, and reaching out towards me, with Waglin"s Brigade on their left. From all accounts this attack was a fearful one, Maney"s men reaching and holding the outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair"s men. This line faced almost due south, and both forces fought there off and on until about 7 p. m., some of the enemy remaining in the outside intrenchments until Mercer"s Brigade of the Sixteenth Corps went in at near midnight to support that line.
Again, many records have it that Blair was forced back early in the battle. This is a mistake, as his Fourth Division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left, held most of his original intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o"clock, when the attack of Cheatham from the Atlanta side forced them to take a new position to keep them from being crushed by Cleburn in the rear and Cheatham"s attack from the Atlanta front.
There is another thing that does not seem to be fully understood, and that is that when Blair got his left refused so as to face Maney and Cleburn in his front they were unable to gain any headway on him in their attacks. In fact, they suffered great loss, and they only damaged Blair when they got in behind his left. Blair had three Regiments there refused at right angles to his front, and it was a portion of two of these Regiments that Cleburn picked up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A.
Smith"s Division, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in behind them before they knew anybody was on them. In fact, Blair"s men had to turn around and fight towards their rear, and, as I have stated, Cleburn got past Fuller"s right and commenced shooting into his flank.
Just after Walker was killed there was a lull, and Fuller turned two regiments right into Cleburn"s main line, and, as Captain Allen of the Signal Corps, says, and my records show, captured that skirmish-line that killed McPherson, and brought it in.
To show McPherson"s feeling about Blair"s left flank, I sent Fuller"s command to that flank the night before on a request from McPherson, who felt anxious about Blair"s position, that flank being in the air; but Blair camped Fuller near where he opened the battle in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his left with it. They camped about a quarter of a mile to his rear and a little back from his extreme left. Blair, no doubt, thought that would protect him, as well as put them in line, but he took one of my batteries (Murray"s) and put it in his front line. Now this battery was on the way from Blair to report to me, coming down just as McPherson was going up the road, and the same skirmish-line that killed McPherson killed the horses of that battery and captured a portion of the men, and McPherson really almost fell upon the limber of one of the guns. This was Murray"s United States Battery of four pieces. I do not know as I have seen this mentioned in any of the reports, unless it is in mine; but these are the facts of the matter. That is the way a battery of my Corps was reported lost or captured by the enemy. It was pa.s.sing from Blair to myself, and not captured in line of battle or fighting, as a great many have stated and supposed to be the case.
In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Sixteenth Corps and leading it, as though it was right on my front, and then speak of him as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps that had been broken through on the Decatur road back into position. The facts are that it was about 4 o"clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me and asked me to send any force I had free to help retake the line that General John C. Brown"s Division had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer"s Brigade of the Second Division, and with it sent Captain Jonas of my staff. (See his statement copied in my address.) Logan followed with the command, and it double-quicked the whole distance without stopping. As soon as it got there it found Lightburn"s Division drifted back, but holding their line behind the trees, and the enemy in possession of DeGresse"s Battery; and as Mercer"s Brigade went in on the front, Williamson"s Brigade of Wood"s Division, which Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving, and they both reached the works together. The men of Mercer"s Brigade got hold of DeGresse"s guns (see report of Eighty-first Illinois) and turned them on the enemy. There has always been a contest between these two Brigades as to which got there first, but that does not matter, for they got in together and retook the line. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate Division, was with me afterwards for many years on the Texas and Pacific Railway, and has given me a full account of his attack, and the fury with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank by Wood and the direct a.s.sault by Mercer. Mercer in going in had his horse killed under him.
Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all pretty much after the fighting on my front was over, because when General Logan came to me for aid I was intrenching the new line made by the refusal of Blair"s left, and took Mercer"s Brigade right out of my front to go with him. The fact is I did not happen to have a single man in reserve. Every man I had on the field was in line from the commencement of the fighting.
Sweeney"s Division stood right up in the road it was marching on, and the two batteries were in the center of his division; the position was a very strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could not have found a stronger one. It was the first time I ever saw such execution done by artillery. They used canister against those columns with terrible effect.
To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the prospects in a battle, one of Hardee"s Divisions coming towards me got entangled in something--at that time I could not tell what, but on going to the ground afterwards I found that it was a mill-pond--that exposed the flank of Maney"s Division that was next to Walker"s. Seeing this, I rode down to Mercer and told him to take his Brigade and charge right into it, which he did. It was quite a time before I could tell what the result was, but I soon saw prisoners coming back and knew then that Mercer had them. He had that Division at a great disadvantage, and captured a great many prisoners out of it and several battle-flags. See report Second Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450, Army Records.
That charge, no doubt, saved my line, because I had a very thin line, and with the most of Hardee"s Corps coming at me in double column, as it was, I have no doubt that if it had reached me it would have given me trouble; but they never got to me on any of their attacks. We were fortunate enough to break them before they could reach the line, though on Fuller"s front they were right up to it when Walker fell.
There was a great dispute between Hood and Hardee about this movement to the rear, Hood claiming that Hardee should have reached there early in the morning, while Hardee claimed he did not receive the order in time to get there before he did--a very fortunate fact for us, for if he had reached the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart had attacked in the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army of the Tennessee; but no doubt they would have come out of it with honor in some way.
I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed--it was just about two hours after the battle had opened. Of course there are all kinds of time given, but the fact of the stopping of the watch of the signal officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the tree at two minutes past two, is almost conclusive evidence. See his statement, volume 11-13, page 242, records Society Army of the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself, because even before McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as Strong says, watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to ride from near Sherman"s headquarters up there, a distance of two to three miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending you, and the report Blair made--also the address of Strong--I think you will come to the same conclusions I give you. An article on the death of General McPherson, by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, California, Signal Officer of the Army of the Tennessee, appeared in an issue of the National Tribune some time this year, but of what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time and the hour McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish-line that killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are misleading as to time, and it is only by these circ.u.mstances that we can judge definitely. I notice it was 12:20 o"clock, according to Allen, when they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery.
When you have read Allen"s article please return it to me. I will be very glad to give you any further information you may need if it is possible for me to do so.
Truly and cordially yours,
GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM. GRENVILLE M. DODGE.
_Chicago, Ill._
[Ill.u.s.tration: OLD FORT KEARNEY, NEBRASKA
In the Indian Campaign of 1865.]
THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS 1864 AND 1865
WRITTEN IN 1874 BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE AND READ TO THE COLORADO COMMANDERY OF THE LOYAL LEGION OF THE UNITED STATES, AT DENVER
APRIL 21, 1907.
In December, 1864, I was a.s.signed to the command of the Department of the Missouri. In January, 1865, I received a dispatch from General Grant asking if a campaign on the plains could be made in the winter. I answered, "Yes, if the proper preparation was made to clothe and bivouac the troops." A few days after I received a dispatch from General Grant ordering me to Fort Leavenworth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas was merged into the Department of the Missouri, placing under my command Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and all the country south of the Yellowstone River, and embracing all the overland mail-routes and telegraph-lines to the Pacific.
On reaching Port Leavenworth I found that General Curtis, the former commander of that department, had reported against any campaign during the winter; that the Indians had possession of the entire country crossed by the stage-lines, having destroyed the telegraph-lines; and that the people living in Colorado, Utah, California, Western Nebraska and Western Kansas were without mails, and in a state of panic; that the troops distributed along the routes of travel were inside their stockades, the Indians having in nearly every fight defeated them. This success had brought into hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of Indians from Texas on the south to the Yellowstone on the north. It was a formidable combination, and the friendly Indians were daily leaving the reservations to join their hostile brethren. Two thousand Indians had destroyed over one hundred miles of telegraph, and were in possession of the country between the Arkansas and the North Platte Rivers.
The opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived was that it was impossible to make a successful campaign against these Indians during the winter and successfully open these lines of communication. There were two Regiments of Cavalry in Kansas, mostly idle. There was no communication with any of the posts except by messenger. A dispatch from Colorado showed a panic there, and the people demanded that troops of the Department be stationed there to protect the citizens, instead of their organizing and fighting the Indians, and that martial law had been declared.
I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that it was necessary to change the depressed feeling and temper existing among the troops and the citizens throughout the department. I sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of the overland stages, and Edward Craighten, general manager and superintendent of the overland telegraph, and consulted fully with them. I selected from my old guides some of the most trusted men, and some of the trusted Indians that I had known, and sent by them to each district commander who could be reached, these two short dispatches:
1. What measures are you taking to keep open the route and protect it?
What Indians are engaged in the struggle? Where are their villages? Do their families travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What action have you taken to repair telegraph-lines? Give me all particulars.
2. Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte Route.
Repair telegraphs; attack any body of Indians you meet, large or small. Stay with them and pound them until they move north of the Platte or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two Regiments of cavalry to the Platte line and will open and protect it, and whip all the Indians in the way.
I also found that the plains were covered with Indian traders who had permits, under the guise of which they were stealing from the Indians, both friendly and hostile, and were selling them arms and ammunition. I immediately revoked all these permits, and ordered the arrest of all traders who had in their possession Indian or Government stock. I also immediately wired to Major Frank North, who was the interpreter of the p.a.w.nee Indians, and also to the Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom had been with me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most trusted men and send them on the plains to ascertain for me the purpose of the hostile Indians, and whether they would head towards the settlements, or if their movements indicated they would attack only the lines of communication and the trains crossing the plains. At the same time we stopped all trains on the plains and ordered them to the nearest military post, instructing the officers to arm and organize them in companies, and place a United States officer over them, and have them move with the army trains.
Having perfected the preliminary organization for moving upon the stage- and telegraph-lines, we saw it was necessary to concentrate on one line.
At this time the stage- and telegraph-lines on the north ran from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Kearney, and from Omaha to Fort Kearney, where they were consolidated, running up the Platte Valley to the mouth of the Lodge Pole, the stage-station at that point being known as Julesburg. The lines here separated again, the main telegraph-line running to old Fort Laramie, thence up the Sweet.w.a.ter through South Pa.s.s and thence to Utah. The stage-line ran up the South Platte to Denver, then by the Cache La Poudre to Laramie Plains, over them to Fort Halleck and Bridger, and on to Utah.
I concluded to concentrate all our efforts to open the line from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha to Kearney, thence to Denver and on to Utah, known as the South Platte Route.
The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha crossing the continent had a stage-station about every twelve miles. The troops along the lines were posted at the forts and stockades about every hundred miles, with a few soldiers distributed at each stage-station. Then scattered along the road were ranches, and relay- and feeding-stations for the regular commercial and supply-trains that were continually on the road. The great mining-camps, and all the inhabitants of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho, were dependent upon these trains for their supplies. In winter these trains were generally mule-trains of twenty wagons each, and during the summer were generally ox-trains of fifty to a hundred wagons each.
They were in the habit of straggling along through the country, taking care of themselves. Their stock had to be herded at night, and it was a great temptation to the Indians to steal, and a great deal of this had been done, but no actual fighting or attacking of trains or troops occurred until the winter of 1864-65. The stopping of these trains, mail, and supplies, and the destruction of the telegraph wires, caused great consternation in that country and on the Pacific Coast, and the demands upon the Government to open and maintain these lines were persistent.
At Fort Leavenworth there appeared to have been no systematic effort to reopen these lines. It seemed that the troops were taking care of the posts and resisting attacks. They did not seem to appreciate the Indian character; that the only way to strengthen and protect the lines of communication was to go for the Indians. What troops had been sent against the Indians were small and weak parties, and had evidently gone out with the intention of locating the Indians and avoiding them.
Along the south emigrant line from Kansas City, following the Arkansas River to New Mexico, was the line of supplies for all of New Mexico and Southern Colorado. The Indians here were in possession. The travel and traffic along it were not to be compared with that along the northern lines. Then again the citizens of Kansas and Nebraska had settled along these routes as far west as the 100th Meridian, obtaining their living from this great traffic, and the Indians in their raids had picked them up, a family at a time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly women and children, the men being generally ma.s.sacred when captured.
I found the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry at Fort Riley, and the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immediately placed them _en route_ for Fort Kearney. All the posts were, unfortunately, short of subsistence, forage, and ammunition. The three-months" Regiments enlisted in Colorado for the Indian service had been discharged, their time having expired, and there had been no troops sent to take their places. My only resource was to utilize the Colorado Militia until I could send troops 600 miles to take their places.
I immediately started for Fort Kearney, taking with me a few soldiers in the stage and one of my staff. It was the opinion of all the officers at Fort Leavenworth that it would be impossible for me to make the trip, but I knew it required personal presence among the troops to bring about quick results. The troops that I had ordered to march from Fort Riley refused to march in the winter. I answered to place under arrest all officers of the companies and Regiments that refused to obey the order, and have them report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to replace them with veteran officers of the department whom I knew would move, no matter what the hardship. The next morning I received a report from Fort Kiley that the troops would move. The Regiment that marched from Fort Riley to Fort Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, as the weather was very severe, and while they were properly clothed, they did not know how to protect themselves from the weather.
On my arrival at Fort Kearney I immediately notified Mr. Hughes, agent of the stage-lines, that I was prepared to protect his stages, and called upon him to replace his stock immediately, ready to start out his stages.
I also notified Mr. Craighten, superintendent of the telegraph-lines, to replace his operators, for I would have his lines open in a few days. Both of these orders were made known to the public. I also notified the "press"
at Omaha and Fort Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the plains would be moved to their destinations during that month. We found it necessary to inspire energy and confidence in these three great interests, as not one of them even thought we would succeed, and, in fact, the "press" comments on our orders showed that they had no faith in them. I found on the line of the Platte the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and at Fort Laramie and on the Sweet.w.a.ter the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry.
When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops were prepared to fight us, thinking it was a band of Indians. We discovered that the troops were depressed from the success of the Indians and the murder and mutilation of their comrades, and that they hardly stuck their heads out of the stockade. Having had experience with Indians, I called the troops together and instructed them how to handle and to fight Indians, telling them that an aggressive war would be made against the Indians, and no matter how large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that hereafter they must stand and fight; that if they did the Indians would run. If they did not, the Indians would catch and scalp them, and even if they had to retreat, they must do so with their faces to the enemy.
The Indians, after the Chivington fight on Big Sandy, had concentrated upon the South Platte and on the Sweet.w.a.ter. The reports showed that they held possession from Julesburg to Valley Junction and to Mud Springs, and held the telegraph-line west of Fort Laramie. They had with them 2,000 head of captured stock and had captured all the stage-stations and many trains, devastated the ranches, butchered many men, women, and children, and destroyed 100 miles of telegraph.
To show more plainly than I can describe the condition of the country, I give the reports of the three commanding officers along the South Platte Route, in answer to the dispatches which I sent by messenger to all commanders the day I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These answers met me at Fort Kearney.
General Robert Mitch.e.l.l, who commanded the territory from Omaha to Lodge Pole, replied as follows:
The telegraph from Lodge Pole Creek, twenty-five miles west to Julesburg, on Laramie Route, is destroyed for fifteen miles. Poles cut down and destroyed on the Denver line beyond Julesburg for the first fifty miles. The telegraph is destroyed about ten miles north. We are compelled to haul poles from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power is used to have the lines fixed. All the available troops I have at my disposal are in the vicinity of Julesburg, except some small garrisons at posts required to be kept up on the Denver route. My district only extends to Julesburg. I have sent some troops, however, up that route fifty miles since the outbreaks and find everything destroyed. We have no communication with Denver, and have not had since the last outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort Laramie in consequence of the lines being down. I have been traversing the country constantly on and adjacent to the mail- and telegraph-lines during the past four months, sending guards on the stages, and, when deemed necessary, mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of the road through my district.
This plan succeeded until an overpowering force attacked Julesburg and drove the troops inside of their works and burned the stage- and telegraph-station, destroying a large amount of stores for both companies. The overland stage cannot run through until they can provide for supplies for stock from Julesburg to the Junction, where overland stage leaves Denver route, everything belonging to the stage company, citizens and government being entirely destroyed. The Indian villages are unknown to us. From the best information I have I believe them to be on the Powder River. I know certainly there is a large village there. There have been no squaws in the country, to my knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, a portion of the Blackfeet, and a large portion of what is known as the Missouri River Sioux, the same Indians General Sully made the campaign against last summer. From 3,000 to 5,000 additional troops will be needed to punish the Indians.
One column will never be able to overtake them, unless they are willing to give battle. I think three columns of men, 1,000 strong each, with ample garrison on the overland-mail and telegraph lines, well mounted and supplied, can clear out the country of all hostile Indians, if done before gra.s.s comes. After that time, in my judgment, it will take twice that number of men.
In addition to the troubles west, I would not be surprised any day to hear of an outbreak in the northern part of my district. I am informed by Indian scouts that there is a large encampment of Indians on the Running Water that are ready to engage in the war against the whites.
Among them are some of the Yanktonais Sioux.
Colonel R. R. Livingston reported as follows: