7. The allied and a.s.sociated Governments, taking cognizance of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia, in its note of February 4, in regard to its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet governments and the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign States parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such States. Detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany by the Allies to be regarded as partial payment of the portion of the debt due from the soviet republics of Russia.
The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April 10, 1919.
In regard to the second sentence in paragraph 5, in regard to "giving help to Soviet Russia" I may say that I was told that that was not a sine qua non but it was necessary in order to get the proposal through the Russian executive committee, which it had to pa.s.s before it was handed to me. I was also handed an additional sheet, which I refused to take as a part of the formal doc.u.ment, containing the following:
The Soviet Government is most anxious to have a semiofficial guaranty from the American and British Governments that they will do their utmost to see to it that France lives up to the conditions of the armistice.
The Soviet Government had a deep suspicion of the French Government.
In reference to this matter, and in explanation of that proposal, I sent a number of telegrams from Helsingfors. I feel that in a way it is important, for an explanation of the matter, that those telegrams should be made public, but, on the other hand, they were sent in a confidential code of the Department of State, and I do not feel at liberty to read them unless ordered to specifically by the committee.
I should not wish to take the responsibility for breaking a code which is in current use by the department.
Senator KNOX. I should think your scruples were well founded. I should not read those telegrams.
Mr. BULLITT. I can simply inform you briefly of the nature of them.
Senator KNOX. You might give us the nature of them. To whom were they sent?
Mr. BULLITT. On reaching Petrograd I sent Capt. Pett.i.t out to Helsingfors after I had had a discussion with Tchitcherin and with Litvinov with a telegram, in which I said I had reached Petrograd and had perfected arrangements to cross the boundary at will, and to communicate with the mission via the consul at Helsingfors; that the journey had been easy, and that the reports of frightful conditions in Petrograd had been ridiculously exaggerated.
I described the discussions I had had with Tchitcherin and with Litvinov, and said they had a.s.sured me that after going to Moscow and after discussion with Lenin, I should be able to carry out a specific statement of the position of the Soviet Government on all points.
On reaching Helsingfors I sent a telegram to the mission at Paris "Most secret, for the President, Secretary Lansing, and Col. House only," in which I said that in handing me the statement which I have just read, Tchitcherin and Litvinov had explained that the Executive Council of the Soviet Government had formally considered and adopted it, and that the Soviet Government considered itself absolutely bound to accept the proposals made therein, provided they were made on or before April 10, and under no conditions would they change their minds.
I also explained that I had found Lenin, Tchitcherin, and Litvinov full of the sense of Russia"s need for peace, and that I felt the details of their statement might be modified without making it unacceptable to them, and that in particular the clause under article 5 was not of vital importance. That, on the other hand, I felt that in the main this statement represented the minimum terms that the Soviet Government would accept.
I explained that it was understood with regard to article 2 that the allied and a.s.sociated countries should have a right to send inspectors into Soviet Russia and see to it that the disposition of supplies, if the blockade was lifted, was entirely equitable, and I explained also that it was fully understood that the phrase under article 4 on "official representatives" did not include diplomatic representatives, that the Soviet Government simply desired to have some agents who might more or less look out for their people here.
I explained further that in regard to footnote No. 2, the Soviet Government hoped and preferred that the conference should be held in Norway; that its preferences thereafter were, first, some point in between Russia and Finland; second, a large ocean liner anch.o.r.ed off Moon Island or the Aland Islands; and, fourth, Prinkipos.
I also explained that Tchitcherin and all the other members of the government with whom I had talked had said in the most positive and unequivocal manner that the Soviet Government was determined to pay its foreign debts, and I was convinced that there would be no dispute on that point.
Senator KNOX. Do you know how these telegrams were received in Paris, whether favorably or unfavorably?
Mr. BULLITT. I can only say, in regard to that, there are three other very brief ones. One was on a subject which I might give you the gist of before I go on with it.
Senator KNOX. Go ahead, in your own way.
Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent me a message of congratulation on receipt of them, and by one of the curious quirks of the conference, a member of the secretariat refused to send the message because of the way in which it was signed, and Col. House was only able to give me a copy of it when I reached Paris. I have a copy of it here.
Senator HARDING. Would not this story be more interesting if we knew which member of the conference objected?
Mr. BULLITT. I believe the objection was on the technical point that Col. House had signed "Ammission" instead of his name, but I really do not know which member of the conference it was that made the objection.
I then sent another telegram, which is rather long, too long to attempt to paraphrase, and I will ask that I may not put it in, because the entire substance of it is contained in briefer form in my formal report. This telegram itself is in code.
Senator BRANDEGEE. Are there any translations of those of your telegrams that are in code?
Mr. BULLITT. No; I have given you the substance of them as I have gone along.
As I said to you before, Secretary Lansing had instructed me if possible to obtain the release of Mr. Treadwell, our consul at Tashkent, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 miles from Moscow. In Moscow I had spoken to Lenin and Tchitcherin and Litvinov in regard to it, and finally they said they recognized that it was foolish to hold him; that they had never really given much thought to the matter; that he had been held by the local government at Tashkent, which was more than 4,000 miles away; that raids were being made on the railroad constantly, and they might have some difficulty in communicating.
However, they promised me that they would send a telegram at once ordering his release, and that they would send him out either by Persia or by Finland whichever way he preferred. I told them I was sure he would prefer to go by way of Finland. Here is a copy of their telegram ordering his release, which will not be of much use to you, I fear, as it is in Russian. They carried out this promise to the letter, releasing Treadwell at once, and Treadwell in due course of time and in good health appeared on the frontier of Finland on the 27th of April. All that time was consumed in travel from Tashkent, which is a long way under present conditions.
Senator NEW. I saw Mr. Treadwell here some time ago.
Mr. BULLITT. I then sent a telegram in regard to Mr. Pett.i.t, the officer of military intelligence, who was with me as my a.s.sistant, saying I intended to send him back to Petrograd at once to keep in touch with the situation so that we should have information constantly. I will say in this connection that it was not an extraordinary thing for the various Governments to have representatives in Russia. The British Government had a man in there at the same time that I was there. He was traveling as a Red Cross representative, but in reality he was there for the Foreign Office, a Maj. A.R. Parker, I believe. I am not certain of his name, but we can verify it.
I also sent a telegram from Helsingfors, "strictly personal to Col.
House," requesting him to show my fifth and sixth telegrams to Mr.
Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George"s secretary, so that Mr. Lloyd George might be at once informed in regard to the situation, inasmuch as he had known I was going, and inasmuch as the British had been so courteous as to offer to send me across on a cruiser. When I got to London and found that the torpedo boat on which I had expected to go was escorting the President, Mr. Lloyd George"s office in London called up the Admiralty and asked them to give me a boat in which to go across. Incidentally I was informed by Col. House, on my arrival in Paris, that copies of my telegrams had been sent at once to Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour.
Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I do not think we need to go into quite so much detail. You have told us now with what instructions you went, what the British att.i.tude was, what the American att.i.tude was, and what the Soviet Government proposed. Now, let us have your report.
Mr. BULLITT. All right, sir. This was my report--
Senator BRANDEGEE. What is the date of that, please?
Mr. BULLITT. This copy does not bear the date on it. On the other hand I can tell you within a day or two. The date unfortunately was left off of this particular copy. It was made on or about the 27th or 28th day of March, in the week before April 1.
Senator BRANDEGEE. 1919?
Mr. BULLITT. 1919. I unquestionably could obtain from Secretary Lansing or the President or some one else the actual original of the report.
Senator BRANDEGEE. I do not care about the precise date, but I want to get it approximately.
Mr. BULLITT. It was about the 1st day of April.
Senator KNOX. To whom was the report made?
Mr. BULLITT. The report was addressed to the President and the American Commissioners Plenipotentiary to Negotiate Peace. I was ordered to make it. I had sent all these telegrams from Helsingfors, and I felt personally that no report was necessary, but the President desired a written report, and I made the report as follows:
MR. BULLITT"S REPORT ON RUSSIA
ECONOMIC SITUATION
Russia to-day is in a condition of acute economic distress. The blockade by land and sea is the cause of this distress and lack of the essentials of transportation is its gravest symptom. Only one-fourth of the locomotives which ran on Russian lines before the war are now available for use. Furthermore, Soviet Russia is cut off entirely from all supplies of coal and gasoline. In consequence, transportation by all steam and electric vehicles is greatly hampered; and transportation by automobile and by the fleet of gasoline-using Volga steamers and ca.n.a.l boats is impossible. (Appendix, p. 55.)
As a result of these hindrances to transportation it is possible to bring from the grain centers to Moscow only 25 carloads of food a day, instead of the 100 carloads which are essential, and to Petrograd only 15 carloads, instead of the essential 50. In consequence, every man, woman, and child in Moscow and Petrograd is suffering from slow starvation. (Appendix, p. 56.)
Mortality is particularly high among new-born children whose mothers can not suckle them, among newly-delivered mothers, and among the aged. The entire population, in addition, is exceptionally susceptible to disease; and a slight illness is apt to result fatally because of the total lack of medicines. Typhoid, typhus, and smallpox are epidemic in both Petrograd and Moscow.
Industry, except the production of munitions of war, is largely at a standstill. Nearly all means of transport which are not employed in carrying food are used to supply the army, and there is scarcely any surplus transport to carry materials essential to normal industry.
Furthermore, the army has absorbed the best executive brains and physical vigor of the nation. In addition, Soviet Russia is cut off from most of its sources of iron and of cotton. Only the flax, hemp, wood, and lumber industries have an adequate supply of raw material.