Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps by one-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg.
The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminary reconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick"s centre by a vigorous a.s.sault; and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touch of the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets in our front.
"Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to the broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of ascertaining the disposition of the enemy"s forces." (Lee.) But more or less steady skirmishing had been kept up all day,-to cover the disposition of the Confederate line, and if possible accurately to ascertain the position and relative strength of the ground held by Sedgwick"s divisions.
Not until six were Lee"s preparations completed to his satisfaction; but about that hour, at a given signal, the firing of three guns, a general advance was made by the Confederate forces. Early, on the right of the line, pushed in, with Hoke on the left of his division, from the hill on which Downman"s house stands, and below it, Gordon on the right, up the hills near the intrenchments, and Hays in the centre.
On Early"s left came Anderson, whose brigades extended-in order, Wright, Posey, Perry-to a point nearly as far as, but not joining, McLaws"s right at about Shed"s farm; Mahone of Anderson"s division remained on McLaws"s extreme left, where he had been placed on account of his familiarity with the country in that vicinity; and Wilc.o.x occupied his ground of Sunday.
Alexander established his batteries on a prominent hill, to command the Union artillery, which was posted in a manner to enfilade McLaws"s line. It was Alexander"s opening fire which was the signal for the general a.s.sault.
The attack on the corner held by Brooks, was not very heavy, and was held in check chiefly by his skirmish-line and artillery. "The speedy approach of darkness prevented Gen. McLaws from perceiving the success of the attack until the enemy began to re-cross the river." "His right brigades, under Kershaw and Wofford, advanced through the woods in the direction of the firing, but the retreat was so rapid, that they could only join in the pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity, and rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision between our own troops. Their movements were consequently slow." (Lee.)
Early"s a.s.sault on Howe was made in echelon of battalions, and columns, and was hardy in the extreme. It was growing dark as the attack began, and Hays"s and Hoke"s brigades (says Early) were thrown into some confusion by coming in contact, after they crossed the plank road, below Guest"s house. Barksdale remained at Marye"s hill, with Smith on his left in reserve.
The weakness of Howe"s long line, obliged that officer carefully to study his ground, and make arrangements for ready withdrawal to an interior line, if overmatched by the enemy; and he stationed his reserves accordingly. To the rear of the centre of his first line, held by Gen. Neill"s brigade, and two regiments of Grant"s, was a small covering of woods; here a portion of his reserves, and sufficient artillery, were concentrated. The main a.s.sault was made upon his left by Hoke and Hays. Their first onset was resolutely broken by Howe"s firm front, though made with easy contempt of danger. The simultaneous attack upon his right was by no means so severe. It was speedily dashed back, and, by suddenly advancing this wing, Howe succeeded in capturing nearly all the Eighth Louisiana Regiment; but the gap produced by the over-advance of our eager troops, was shortly perceived by Gordon"s brigade, which was enabled to move down a ravine in rear of Howe"s right, and compelled its hasty withdrawal.
Meanwhile Neill"s brigade, on Howe"s left, was overpowered by Early"s fierce and repeated onslaughts; but no wise disordered, though we had lost nearly a thousand men, it fell slowly and steadily back to the previously selected rallying-point, where, on being followed up by Hoke and Hays, the Vermont brigade, two regiments of Newton"s division and Butler"s regular battery, sent to Howe"s support by Sedgwick, opened upon them so sharp a fire, that they retired in headlong confusion, largely increased by the approaching darkness. This terminated the fight on the left, and Howe"s line was no further molested during the night.
Howe is clearly mistaken in alleging that his division was attacked by McLaws, Anderson, and Early. The position of these divisions has been laid down. It is one of those frequent a.s.sertions, made in the best of faith, but emanating solely from the recollection of the fierceness of a recent combat and from unreliable evidence.
x.x.xI. SEDGWICK WITHDRAWS.
Foreseeing from the vigor of Lee"s attack the necessity of contracting his lines, as soon as it was dark, Newton"s and Brooks"s divisions and the Light Brigade (Col. Burnham"s), were ordered to fall rapidly back upon Banks"s Ford, where they took position on the heights in the vicinity, and in Wilc.o.x"s rifle-pits. Howe was then quietly withdrawn, and disposed on Newton"s right.
In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen. Howe appears to think that he was unfairly dealt with by Sedgwick; in fact, that his division was intentionally left behind to be sacrificed. But this opinion is scarcely justified by the condition of affairs and subsequent events.
Following are the important despatches which pa.s.sed, during the latter part of these operations, between Hooker and Sedgwick:-
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 9 A.M.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks"s Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday morning was twenty-two thousand men. I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I cannot use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing upon Fredericksburg.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
SEDGWICK"S HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BANKS"S FORD, VA., May 4, 1863, 9.45 A.M.
GEN. HOOKER.
The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river wherever (? whenever) necessary.
J. SEDGWICK, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 4, 1863, 10.30 A.M.
GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps.
The commanding general directs that in the event you fall back, you reserve, if practicable, a position on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock, which you can hold securely until to-morrow P.M. Please let the commanding general have your opinion in regard to this by telegraph from Banks"s Ford as soon as possible.
S. WILLIAMS, a.s.sistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11 A.M.
MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK.
The major-general commanding directs me to say that he does not wish you to cross the river at Banks"s Ford unless you are compelled to do so. The batteries at Banks"s Ford command the position. If it is practicable for you to maintain a position south side of Rappahannock, near Banks"s Ford, you will do so. It is very important that we retain position at Banks"s Ford. Gen. Tyler commands the reserve artillery there.
J. H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.
SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 11 A.M.
MAJOR-GEN. b.u.t.tERFIELD AND GEN. HOOKER.
I hold the same position. The enemy are pressing me hard. If I can hold until night, I shall cross at Banks"s Ford, under instructions from Gen. Hooker, given by Brig.-Gen. Warren.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
SEDGWICK"S HEADQUARTERS, May 4, 1863, 11.15 A.M.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad for such attack. It was a.s.sumed for attack, and not for defence. It is not improbable that bridges at Banks"s Ford may be sacrificed. Can you help me strongly if I am attacked?
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
P. S.-My bridges are two miles from me. I am compelled to cover them above and below from attack, with the additional a.s.sistance of Gen. Benham"s brigade alone.
J. S.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 4, 1863, 11.50 A.M.
MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK.
If the necessary information shall be obtained to-day, and if it shall be of the character he antic.i.p.ates, it is the intention of the general to advance to-morrow. In this event the position of your corps on the south side of the Rappahannock will be as favorable as the general could desire. It is for this reason he desires that your troops may not cross the Rappahannock.
J. H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 4, 1863, 1.20 P.M.
GEN. SEDGWICK, Commanding Sixth Corps.
I expect to advance to-morrow morning, which will be likely to relieve you. You must not count on much a.s.sistance without I hear heavy firing. Tell Gen. Benham to put down the other bridge if you desire it.
J. HOOKER, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, May 4, 1863, 1.40 P.M.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
I occupy the same position as yesterday when Gen. Warren left me. I have no means of judging enemy"s force about me-deserters say forty thousand. I shall take a position near Banks"s Ford, and near the Taylor house, at the suggestion of Gen. Warren; officers have already gone to select a position. It is believed that the heights of Fredericksburg are occupied by two divisions of the enemy.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
May 4, 1863. (Hour not stated.) MAJOR-GEN. SEDGWICK, Banks"s Ford, Va.
It is of vital importance that you should take a commanding position near Fredericksburg, which you can hold to a certainty till to-morrow. Please advise me what you can do in this respect. I enclose substance of a communication sent last night. Its suggestions are highly important, and meet my full approval. There are positions on your side commanded by our batteries on the other side I think you could take and hold. The general would recommend as one such position the ground on which Dr. Taylor"s is situated.
GEN. HOOKER (?) May 4, 1863, 2.15 P.M.
GEN. HOOKER.
I shall do my utmost to hold a position on the right bank of the Rappahannock until to-morrow.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
BANKS"S FORD, VA., May 4, 1863, 11.50 P.M. (Received 1 A.M., May 5.) GEN. HOOKER, United-States Ford.
My army is hemmed in upon the slope, covered by the guns from the north side of Banks"s Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would withdraw it to-night. Do your operations require that I should jeopard it by retaining it here? An immediate reply is indispensable, or I may feel obliged to withdraw.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
BANKS"S FORD, VA., May 5, 1863. (Received 1 A.M.) GEN. HOOKER.
I shall hold my position as ordered on south of Rappahannock.
SEDGWICK.
HEADQUARTERS, May 5, 1863, 1 A.M. (Received 2 A.M.) GEN. SEDGWICK.