Despatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge this.
By command of Major-Gen. Hooker.
DANL. b.u.t.tERFIELD HEADQUARTERS, May 5, 1863, 1.20 A.M.
GEN. SEDGWICK.
Yours received saying you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both.
GEN. HOOKER BANKS"S FORD, VA., May 5, 1863, 2 P.M. (should be 2 A.M.).
MAJOR-GEN. b.u.t.tERFIELD.
Gen. Hooker"s order received. Will withdraw my forces immediately.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, May 5, 1863, 7 A.M.
GEN. b.u.t.tERFIELD.
I recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock last night, and am in camp about a mile back from the ford. The bridges have been taken up.
JOHN SEDGWICK, Major-General.
These despatches explain themselves, if read, as is indispensable, with the hours of sending and receipt kept well in mind. No fault can be imputed to either Hooker or Sedgwick, in that the intention of the one could not be executed by the other. The apparent cross-purpose of the despatches is explained by the difficulty of communication between headquarters and the Sixth Corps.
The order to withdraw, though sent by Hooker before the receipt of Sedgwick"s despatch saying he would hold the corps south of the river, was received by Sedgwick long before the countermand, which was exceptionally delayed, and was at once, under the urgent circ.u.mstances, put into course of execution.
As soon as the enemy ascertained that Sedgwick was crossing, Alexander"s artillery began dropping sh.e.l.ls in the neighborhood of the bridges and river banks; and Gen. Wilc.o.x, with his own and Kershaw"s brigades, followed up Sedgwick"s movements to the crossing, and used his artillery freely.
When the last column had almost filed upon the bridge, Sedgwick was taken aback by the receipt of Hooker"s despatch of 1.20 A.M., countermanding the order to withdraw as above quoted.
The main portion, however, being already upon the left bank, the corps could not now re-cross, except by forcing the pa.s.sage, as the Confederates absolutely commanded the bridge and approaches, and with a heavy body of troops. And, as Lee was fully satisfied to have got rid of Sedgwick, upon conditions which left him free to turn with the bulk of his army upon Hooker, it was not likely that Sedgwick could in any event have successfully attempted it. The situation left him no choice but to go into camp near by. An adequate force was sent to watch the ford, and guard the river.
The losses of the Sixth Corps during these two days" engagements were 4,925 men. Sedgwick captured, according to his report, five flags, fifteen guns (nine of which were brought off), and fourteen hundred prisoners, and lost no material. These captures are not conceded by the Confederate authorities, some of whom claim that Sedgwick decamped in such confusion as to leave the ground strewed with arms, accoutrements, and material of all kinds. But it is probable, on comparison of all facts, and the due weighing of all testimony, that substantially nothing was lost by the Sixth Corps, except a part of the weapons of the dead and wounded.
Gibbon"s division, about the same time, crossed to the north bank of the river, and the pontoon bridge at Lacy"s was taken up. Warren says, "Gen. Sedgwick was attacked very heavily on Monday, fought all day, and retreated across the river that night. We lay quiet at Chancellorsville pretty nearly all day." This Warren plainly esteems a poor sample of generalship, and he does not understand why Hooker did not order an a.s.sault. "I think it very probable we could have succeeded if it had been made." "Gen. Hooker appeared very much exhausted,"-""tired" would express it."
Lee"s one object having been to drive Sedgwick across the river, so as to be relieved of the troublesome insecurity of his rear, he could now again turn his undivided attention to his chief enemy, who lay listlessly expectant at Chancellorsville, and apparently oblivious of his maxim enjoined upon Stoneman, "that celerity, audacity, and resolution are every thing in war."
Early and Barksdale were left, as before, to hold the Confederate lines at and near Fredericksburg, while McLaws and Anderson were at once ordered back to the old battle-field. "They reached their destination during the afternoon (Tuesday, 5th) in the midst of a violent storm, which continued throughout the night, and most of the following day." (Lee.)
Wilc.o.x and Wright lay that night in bivouac on the Catherine road; Mahone, Posey, and Perry, along the plank road.
Kershaw was sent to relieve Heth at the crossing of the River and Mine roads, and the latter rejoined his division.
The night of Tuesday Lee spent in preparations to a.s.sault Hooker"s position at daylight on Wednesday. The Confederate scouts had been by no means idle; and the position occupied by Hooker, in most of its details, was familiar to the Southern commander. He was thus able to develop his plans with greater ease than a less familiarity with the terrain would have yielded. He was satisfied that one more vigorous blow would disable his antagonist for this campaign, and he was unwilling to delay in striking it.
x.x.xII. HOOKER"S CRITICISMS.
Let us now examine into Hooker"s various criticisms upon Sedgwick"s conduct.
Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, baldly accuses Sedgwick of neglecting to keep him advised of his movements, the inference being that he was debarred thereby from intelligently using him; and states that when he sent Sedgwick the despatch to join him at Chancellorsville, "it was written under the impression that his corps was on the north side of the Rappahannock." But could Hooker rationally a.s.sume this to be the case when he had, five hours before, ordered Sedgwick to cross and pursue a flying enemy, and well knew that he had a portion of his forces already guarding the bridge-heads on the Fredericksburg side?
"The night was so bright that... no special difficulty was apprehended in executing the order." In the vicinity of Fredericksburg, shortly after midnight, a fog appears to have arisen from the river, which considerably impeded the movements of the Sixth Corps. This Hooker knew from Sedgwick"s report, which he was bound to believe, unless evidence existed to show the contrary. "As will be seen, the order was peremptory, and would have justified him in losing every man of his command in its execution."
Hooker also states that Warren was sent to Sedgwick on account of his familiarity with the ground, and to impress upon the latter the necessity of strict compliance with the order.
"I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that, if Gen. Sedgwick"s men had shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would have encountered less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was, it was late when he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was in readiness to attack the heights in rear of the town, which was about eleven o"clock A.M. on the 3d, the enemy had observed his movement, and concentrated almost their entire force at that point to oppose him." "He had the whole force of the enemy there to run against in carrying the heights beyond Fredericksburg, but he carried them with ease; and, by his movements after that, I think no one would infer that he was confident in himself, and the enemy took advantage of it. I knew Gen. Sedgwick very well: he was a cla.s.smate of mine, and I had been through a great deal of service with him. He was a perfectly brave man, and a good one; but when it came to manoeuvring troops, or judging of positions for them, in my judgment he was not able or expert. Had Gen. Reynolds been left with that independent command, I have no doubt the result would have been very different." "When the attack was made, it had to be upon the greater part of the enemy"s force left on the right: nevertheless the troops advanced, carried the heights without heavy loss, and leisurely took up their line of march on the plank road, advancing two or three miles that day."
Now, this is scarcely a fair statement of facts. And yet they were all spread before Hooker, in the reports of the Sixth Corps and of Gibbon. No doubt Sedgwick was bound, as far as was humanly possible, to obey that order; but, as in "losing every man in his command" in its execution, he would scarcely have been of great eventual utility to his chief, he did the only wise thing, in exercising ordinary discretion as to the method of attacking the enemy in his path. Hooker"s a.s.sumption that Sedgwick was on the north side of the Rappahannock was his own, and not Sedgwick"s fault. Hooker might certainly have supposed that Sedgwick had obeyed his previous orders, in part at least.
Sedgwick testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I have understood that evidence has appeared before the Committee censuring me very much for not being at Chancellorsville at daylight, in accordance with the order of Gen. Hooker. I now affirm that it was impossible to have made the movement, if there had not been a rebel soldier in front of me."
"I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes time in taking the heights of Fredericksburg."
Sedgwick did "shoulder arms and advance" as soon as he received the order; but the reports show plainly enough that he encountered annoying opposition so soon as he struck the outskirts of the town; that he threw forward a.s.saulting columns at once; and that these fought as well as the conditions warranted, but were repulsed.
It is not intended to convey the impression that there was no loss of time on Sedgwick"s part. On the contrary, he might certainly have been more active in some of his movements. No doubt there were other general officers who would have been. But it is no exaggeration to insist that his dispositions were fully as speedy as those of any other portion of the army in this campaign.
Hooker not only alleges that "in his judgment, Gen. Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of his order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it," but quotes Warren as saying that Sedgwick "would not have moved at all if he [Warren] had not been there; and that, when he did move, it was not with sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manoeuvre his troops." It is very doubtful whether Warren ever put his opinion in so strong a way as thus quoted by Hooker from memory. His report does speak of Gibbon"s slowness in coming up, and of his thus losing the chance of crossing the ca.n.a.ls and taking the breastworks before the Confederates filed into them. But beyond a word to the effect that giving the advance to Brooks"s division, after the capture of the heights, "necessarily consumed a considerable time," Warren does not in his report particularly criticise Sedgwick"s movements. And in another place he does speak of the order of ten P.M. as an "impossible" one.
Gen. Warren"s testimony on this subject is of the highest importance, as representing Gen. Hooker in person. As before stated, he carried a duplicate of Hooker"s order of ten P.M., to Sedgwick, with instructions from the general to urge upon Sedgwick the importance of the utmost celerity. Moreover, Warren knew the country better than any one else, and was more generally conversant with Hooker"s plans, ideas, and methods, being constantly at his side. "Gen. Sedgwick was ordered to be in his position by daylight: of course that implied, if he could be there."
"If Sedgwick had got to Chancellorsville by daylight, I think we ought to have destroyed Lee"s army. But it would depend a great deal upon how hard the other part of the army fought; for Gen. Sedgwick, with his twenty thousand men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he became isolated."
Moreover, Hooker in this testimony says: "Early in the campaign I had come to the conclusion that with the arms now in use it would be impossible to carry works by an a.s.sault in front, provided they were properly constructed and properly manned;" and refers to the Fredericksburg a.s.sault of Dec. 13, to ill.u.s.trate this position, saying that they (the enemy) "could destroy men faster than I could throw them on the works;" and, "I do not know of an instance when rifle-pits, properly constructed and properly manned, have been taken by front a.s.saults alone."
And yet his order to Sedgwick was (as he construes it), blindly to throw himself into this impossible situation, and lose every man in his command rather than not make the attempt at once, and without waiting properly to dispose his men, or feel the enemy.
As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we have seen how Brooks"s march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and how his attempt to force a pa.s.sage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men.
There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movement of the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately after the campaign, states facts dispa.s.sionately, and is to the point and nothing more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to his superior. It has but one error of consequence, viz., the a.s.sumption that the three divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under command of Gen. Lee, attacked his line, leaving no force in front of Brooks and Newton. It was Early alone, or Early a.s.sisted by a brigade of Anderson, who attacked Howe.
But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, cannot be commended as dispa.s.sionate, and contains serious errors. Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towards Chancellorsville was received "just after dark, say eight o"clock," whereas it was not sent until nine P.M. from Chancellorsville, and ten P.M. from Falmouth; nor did Sedgwick receive it until eleven P.M. Howe evidently remembered the order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road, as the one to march to Chancellorsville,-when speaking of time of delivery. The deductions Gen. Howe makes from errors like this are necessarily somewhat warped. But let us give all due weight to the testimony of an able soldier. He states that his attack on Marye"s heights was made on a mere notice from Sedgwick, that he was about to attack, and desired Howe to a.s.sist; that he received on Sunday evening a bare intimation only from Sedgwick, that the left of the corps must be protected, and that he consequently moved his own left round to the river; and later, that Sedgwick sent him word to strengthen his position for defence; but complains that Sedgwick did not properly look after his division. "Not receiving any instruction or a.s.sistance from Gen. Sedgwick, I felt that we were left to take care of ourselves. It seemed to me, from the movements or arrangements made during the day, that there was a want of appreciation or a misunderstanding of the position which we held." Sedgwick"s entire confidence in Howe"s ability to handle his division, upon general instructions of the object to be attained, might account fully for a large part of this apparent vagueness. But Howe does not look at it in this light. His opinion was, that no necessity existed for the Sixth Corps to fall back across the river.
Gen. Howe"s testimony is very positive as to the possibility of the Sixth Corps complying with Hooker"s order as given. He thinks a night attack could have been made on the Fredericksburg heights, and that they could have been speedily carried, and the corps have been well on the road to Chancellorsville long before daylight. He also is of opinion that Brooks"s division could have forced its way beyond Salem Church, with proper support. But we also know how gallant an attempt Brooks made to do this very thing, and how hard he struggled before yielding to failure.
It is in no wise intended to begrudge Gen. Howe his opinion; but he has certainly arrived at some of his conclusions, from premises founded on errors of fact.
The testimony of Col. Johns, which follows Gen. Howe"s before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, bears only the weight to which the report of the commander of a brigade is ent.i.tled, whose duties allowed him to have but a partial view of the general features of the march. Though his opinion agrees with Gen. Howe"s, he, too, mistakes the hour of the urgent order; and it is difficult to see why he was summoned before the Committee, unless as a partisan.
"My object" (continues Hooker) "in ordering Gen. Sedgwick forward at the time named, was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at Chancellorsville on the night of the 2d of May." This statement is not only characteristic of Hooker"s illogical method, but disingenuous to the degree of mockery. For this position, it will be remembered, was a strongly intrenched line, held by eighty thousand men, well armed and equipped, having in their front less than half their number of Confederates. In view of Hooker"s above-quoted opinion about rifle-pits; of the fact that in his testimony he says: "Throughout the Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of an encounter;" of the fact that the enemy in his front had been cut in two, and would so remain if he only kept the salient, just seized by Sickles and Pleasonton, at the angle south-west of Fairview, well manned; and of the fact that he had unused reserves greater in number than the entire force of the enemy,-is it not remarkable that, in Hooker"s opinion, nothing short of a countermarch of three miles by the Sixth Corps, the capture of formidable and sufficiently manned intrenchments, (the work of the Army of Northern Virginia during an entire half year,) and an advance of nearly twelve miles,-all of which was to be accomplished between eleven and daylight of a day in May,-could operate to "relieve him from the position in which he found himself on the night of the 2d of May"?
"I was of the opinion, that if a portion of the army advanced on Lee"s rear, sooner than allow his troops to remain between me and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road Jackson had marched over on the morning of the 2d, and thus open for me a short road to Richmond, while the enemy, severed from his depot, would have to retire by way of Gordonsville." Well enough, but was Sedgwick"s corps the only one to accomplish this? Where were Reynolds, and Meade, and Howard, forsooth?
There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick"s authority to withdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for his so doing. And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwick had really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasons existed, and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised him to do so. But Hooker states that "my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick retain a position on the south side of the river, in order that I might leave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force re-cross the river, march down to Banks"s Ford, and turn the enemy"s position in my front by so doing. In this, too, I was thwarted, because the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick to withdraw and cover Banks"s Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who bore the order countermanding the withdrawal."
Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold a position at Taylor"s, the point where the Fredericksburg heights approach the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heights were by that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges there, the proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously entertained, with two-thirds of Lee"s whole army surrounding his one corps, though he did reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry out his chief"s suggestions.
But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson"s corps in his front,-some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,-to move upon his enemy, "attack and destroy him," and himself fall upon Lee"s rear, while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks"s Ford? And Hooker had all Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange for attempting this simplest of manoeuvres.
It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could lack the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one indicated. From the stirring words, "Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" of April 12, to the inertia and daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. And yet Hooker, to judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfied himself that he did all that was to be expected of an active and intelligent commander.