The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among many of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "Question.-Can you tell why it was not ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third Corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick"s engagement with the enemy? Answer.-I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to re-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive. I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have withdrawn. I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were."
"Question.-Is it your opinion as a military man, that, if our army had been ordered to take the offensive vigorously, we would have gained a victory there? Answer.-I think we should have taken the offensive when the enemy attacked Gen. Sedgwick."
Again Hooker: "During the 3d and 4th, reconnoissances were made on the right," (i. e., at Chancellorsville,) "from one end of the line to the other, to feel the enemy"s strength, and find a way and place to attack him successfully; but it was ascertained that it could only be made on him behind his defences, and with slender columns, which I believed he could destroy as fast as they could be thrown on to his works. Subsequent campaigns have only confirmed the opinion I then ascertained."
Now, Hooker, at the time of giving this testimony, (March 11, 1865), had had nearly two years in which to become familiar with the true state of facts. He must have known these facts from the reports of his subordinates, if not from the accounts of the action in the Southern press. He must have known that all day Monday, he had only Jackson"s corps opposed to him. He must have known that these troops had time enough to erect none but very ordinary intrenchments. And yet he excuses himself from not attacking his opponents, when he outnumbered them four to one. Would not his testimony tell better for him, if he had said that at the time he supposed he had more than eighteen thousand men before him? It is a thankless task to pursue criticism upon such capricious and revocatory evidence.
Sickles also, in his testimony, states that from our new lines we felt the enemy everywhere in his front, and that Gen. Griffin with his entire division made a reconnoissance, and developed the enemy in great force on our right flank. This work of reconnoitring can scarcely have been done with great thoroughness, for we know to a certainty what force Lee left behind. It would be well to say little about it. But it is not strange that the purposelessness of the commander should result in half-hearted work by the subordinates.
The following extract from the evidence of Gen. Sedgwick before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, compared with Hooker"s and the actual facts, shows palpably who is in the right.
"At nine A.M., May 4, I sent this despatch to Gen. Hooker: "I am occupying the same position as last night. I have secured my communication with Banks"s Ford. The enemy are in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg in force. They appear strongly in our front, and are making efforts to drive us back. My strength yesterday, A.M., was twenty-two thousand men: I do not know my losses, but they were large, probably five thousand men. I can"t use the cavalry. It depends upon the condition and position of your force whether I can sustain myself here. Howe reports the enemy advancing from Fredericksburg."
"Question.-When you were in the position on the 4th, to which you have referred, were you where you could have co-operated with the army at Chancellorsville in an attack upon the enemy?
"Answer.-I could not proceed in that direction. I think Gen. Hooker might have probably relieved me if he had made an attack at that time. I think I had a much larger force of the enemy around me than Gen. Hooker had in front of him. There were two divisions of the enemy on the heights of Fredericksburg, which was in my rear; and they would have attacked me the moment I undertook to proceed towards Chancellorsville. About one A.M. of May 5, Gen. Hooker telegraphed me to cross the river, and take up the bridges. This is the despatch: "Despatch this moment received. Withdraw; cover the river, and prevent any force crossing. Acknowledge receipt."
"This was immediately done: as the last of the column was crossing, between three and four o"clock, the orders to cross were countermanded, and I was directed to hold a position on the south bank. The despatch was dated 1.20 A.M., and was received at 3.20, as follows:-
""Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both."
"In explanation of this I should say that I had telegraphed to Gen. Hooker that I could hold the position. He received it after he had ordered me to cross over. But, receiving his despatch to cross, I had commenced the movement; and, as I have said, I had very nearly taken my force over, when the order to cross was countermanded. To return at that time was wholly impracticable, and I telegraphed that fact to Gen. Hooker."
To place in juxtaposition Hooker"s testimony and Sedgwick"s, in no wise militates against the latter.
There is one broad criticism which may fairly he pa.s.sed upon Sedgwick"s withdrawal across the Rappahannock. It is that, with the knowledge that his remaining in position might be of some a.s.sistance to his chief, instead of exhibiting a perhaps undue anxiety to place himself beyond danger, he could with his nineteen thousand men, by dint of stubborn flghting, have held the intrenchments at Banks"s Ford, against even Lee with his twenty-four thousand.
But if he attempted this course, and was beaten, Lee could have destroyed his corps. And this risk he was bound to weigh, as he did, with the advantages Hooker could probably derive from his holding on. Moreover, to demand thus much of Sedgwick, is to hold him to a defence, which, in this campaign, no other officer of the Army of the Potomac was able to make.
Not but what, under equally pressing conditions, other generals have, or himself, if he had not received instructions to withdraw, might have, accomplished so much. But if we a.s.sume, that having an eye to the numbers and losses of his corps, and to his instructions, as well as to the character and strength of the enemy opposed to him, Sedgwick was bound to dispute further the possession of Banks"s Ford, in order to lend a questionable aid to Hooker, how lamentable will appear by comparison the conduct of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, under the general commanding, bottled up behind their defences at Chancellorsville!
x.x.xIII. HOOKER"S FURTHER PLANS.
Hooker states: "Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwick had said he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some position, and hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate front. I proposed to leave troops enough where I was, to occupy the enemy there, and throw the rest of my force down the river, and re-enforce Sedgwick; then the whole of Lee"s army, except that which had been left in front of Sedgwick, would be thrown off the road to Richmond, and my army would be on it.
"As soon as I heard that Gen. Sedgwick had re-crossed the river, seeing no object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing it would be more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at Franklin"s Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army on the right was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the night between the 5th and 6th of May."
Now, the Franklin"s Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried by Burnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it had been fully canva.s.sed and condemned as impracticable, before beginning the Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve no purpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, if made, is the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the open country he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1.
"Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4th and 5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a council of war, but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I considered a desperate move against the enemy in our front." Be it remembered that the "desperate move" was one of eighty thousand men, with twenty thousand more (Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, against at the outside forty-five thousand men, if Early should be ordered up to re-enforce Lee. And Hooker knew the force of Lee, or had as good authority for knowing it as he had for most of the facts he a.s.sumed, in condemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from the statements of prisoners we had taken, very nearly an exact estimate could be made of the then numbers of the Army of Northern Virginia.
All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Sloc.u.m, who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except Sickles; while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to advantage under Hooker. Hanc.o.c.k, (testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,) says: "I understood from him" (Couch) "always that he was in favor of fighting then." Hooker claims Couch to have been for retreat; but the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, goes to show the council to have been substantially as will now be narrated.
Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and, with one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack, in full force,-Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent to this purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressed himself, confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint. He allowed the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestly refrained from putting his opinion against that of men trained to the profession of arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment. But he claimed, with some reason, that the political horizon was dark; that success by the Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidance of disaster. If, he alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would be the last one the country would raise. Washington might be captured; and the effect of this loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to be greatly dreaded. The enemies of the administration were strong, and daily gaining ground. It was necessary that the Army of the Potomac should not run the risk of destruction. It was the last hold of the Republican party in Virginia. Better re-cross and recuperate, and then attempt another campaign, than run any serious risk now. These grounds largely influenced him in agreeing with the general-in-chief"s determination to retire across the river. But there were other reasons, which Sickles states in his testimony. The rations with which the men had started had given out, and there had been no considerable issue since. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a rule, unusually careful in such matters,) there had been no provision made for supplying the troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday noon till Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, with communications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for a ten-days" absence from our base. This circ.u.mstance wears the look of almost a predetermination to accept defeat.
Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing over supplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm. Parts of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends of the others were under water, and their entire structure was liable at any moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware of these circ.u.mstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as he might judge it better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from the possibility of victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to cross again so as to join the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be in condition to count on for heavy service. The Richmond papers, received almost daily through channels more or less irregular, showed that communications were still open, and that the operations of the Cavalry Corps had not succeeded in interrupting them in any serious manner. On the coming Sunday, the time of service of thirty-eight regiments was up. Many of these conditions could have been eliminated from the problem, if measures had been seasonably taken; but they now became critical elements in the decision to be made. And Hooker, despite his well-earned reputation as a fighting man, was unable to arrive at any other than the conclusion which Falstaff so cautiously enunciated, from beneath his shield, at the battle of Shrewsbury, that "the better part of valor is discretion."
x.x.xIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES.
Orders were accordingly issued with a view to re-crossing the river; and during the 5th, Gen. Warren and Capt. Comstock of the engineers prepared a new and shorter line, in the rear of the one then held by the army, to secure it against any attempt by the enemy to interrupt the retreat. Capt. Comstock supervised the labor on the west side, and Gen. Warren on the east, of the United-States Ford road. "A continuous cover and abattis was constructed from the Rappahannock at Scott"s Dam, around to the mouth of Hunting Run on the Rapidan. The roads were put in good order, and a third bridge laid. A heavy rain set in about 4.30 P.M., and lasted till late at night. The movement to re-cross was begun by the artillery, as per order, at 7.30 and was suddenly interrupted by a rise in the river so great as to submerge the banks at the ends of the bridges on the north bank, and the velocity of the current threatened to sweep them away." "The upper bridge was speedily taken up, and used to piece out the ends of the other two, and the pa.s.sage was again made practicable. Considerable delays, however, resulted from this cause." "No troops took up position in the new line except the rearguard, composed of the Fifth Corps, under Gen. Meade, which was done about daylight on the 6th." "The proper dispositions were made for holding this line till all but the rearguard was past the river; and then it quietly withdrew, no enemy pursuing." (Warren.) The last of the army re-crossed about eight A.M., May 6.
Testimony of Gen. Henry J. Hunt:-
"A storm arose soon after. Just before sunset, the general and his staff re-crossed the river to the north side. I separated from him in order to see to the destruction of some works of the enemy on the south side of the river, which perfectly commanded our bridges. Whilst I was looking after them, in the darkness, to see that they had been destroyed as directed, an engineer officer reported to me that our bridges had been carried away, or were being carried away, by the flood. I found the chief engineer, Capt. Comstock; and we proceeded together to examine the bridges, and we found that they were all utterly impa.s.sable. I then proceeded to Gen. Meade"s camp, and reported the condition of affairs to him. All communication with Gen. Hooker being cut off, Gen. Meade called the corps commanders together; and, as the result of that conference, I believe, by order of Gen. Couch at any rate, I was directed to stop the movement of the artillery, which was withdrawn from the lines, and let them resume their positions, thus suspending the crossing. On my return to the bridges, I found that one had been re-established, and the batteries that were down there had commenced re-crossing the river. I then sought Gen. Hooker up, on the north side of the river, and proposed to him to postpone the movement for one day, as it was certain we could not all cross over in a night. I stated to him that I doubted whether we could more than get the artillery, which was ordered to cross first, over before daylight: he refused to postpone the movement, and it proceeded. No opposition was made by the enemy, nor was the movement disturbed, except by the attempt to place batteries on the points from which our bridges could be reached, and to command which I had already posted the necessary batteries on my own responsibility. A cannonade ensued, and they were driven off with loss, and one of their caissons exploded: we lost three or four men killed, and a few horses, in this affair. That is about all that I remember."
Gen. Barnes"s brigade a.s.sisted in taking up the bridges; and all were safely withdrawn by four P.M. on Wednesday, under superintendence of Major Spaulding of the engineer brigade.
All who partic.i.p.ated in this retreat will remember the precarious position of the ma.s.ses of troops, huddled together at the bridge-heads as in a cul-de-sac, during this eventful night, and the long-drawn breath of relief as the hours after dawn pa.s.sed, and no further disposition to attack was manifested by Lee. This general was doubtless profoundly grateful that the Army of the Potomac should retire across the Rappahannock, and leave his troops to the hard-earned rest they needed so much more than ourselves; but little thanks are due to Hooker, who was, it seems, on the north side of the river during these critical moments, that the casualties of the campaign were not doubled by a final a.s.sault on the part of Lee, while we lay in this perilous situation, and the unmolested retreat turned into another pa.s.sage of the Beresina. Providentially, the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had expended almost its last round of ammunition previous to this time.
But several hospitals of wounded, in care of a number of medical officers and stewards, were left behind, to be removed a few days later under a flag of truce.
The respective losses of the two armies are thus officially given:-
FEDERAL LOSS.
General Headquarters and Engineers... 9 First Corps ........ 299 Second Corps........ 1,923 Third Corps ........ 4,119 Fifth Corps ........ 700 Sixth Corps ........ 4,610 Eleventh Corps........ 2,412 Twelfth Corps........ 2,822 Pleasonton"s Brigade...... 202 Cavalry Corps under Stoneman.... 189 --- 17,285
CONFEDERATE LOSS.
Jackson"s Corps,- Early"s division....... 851 A. P. Hill"s division...... 2,583 Trimble"s (Colston) division.... 1,868 D. H. Hill"s (Rodes) division.... 2,178
Longstreet"s Corps,- Anderson"s division...... 1,180 McLaws"s division ...... 1,379 Artillery......... 227 Cavalry......... 11 --- 10,277 Prisoners......... 2,000 --- 12,277 Both armies now returned to their ancient encampments, elation as general on one side as disappointment was profound upon the other.
Hooker says in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I lost under those operations" (viz., the Chancellorsville campaign) "one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance. Of course, many of the Eleventh Corps lost their arms and knapsacks."
The Confederates, however, claim to have captured nineteen thousand five hundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and much ammunition. And, while acknowledging a loss of eight guns, it is a.s.serted by them that they captured thirteen.
The orders issued to the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia by their respective commanders, on the return of the forces to the shelter of their old camps, need no comment. They are characteristic to a degree.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 6, 1863.
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 49.
The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on the achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resources.
In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it represents.
By fighting at a disadvantage we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, to our cause, and to our country. Profoundly loyal, and conscious of its strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may command it.
By the celerity and secrecy of our movements, our advance and pa.s.sage of the river were undisputed; and, on our withdrawal, not a rebel dared to follow us. The events of the last week may well cause the heart of every officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride.
We have added new laurels to our former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments; and whenever we have fought, we have inflicted heavier blows than those we have received.