These three corps camped that night without fires, and the pontoons were carried to the river by hand to insure secrecy.
At daybreak, Wednesday, Russell"s brigade crossed in boats at Franklin"s with little opposition. The bridges were then constructed; and Brooks"s division pa.s.sed over with a battery, and established itself strongly on the south side.
At the lower crossing, Reynolds"s attempts to throw the bridges early in the morning were defeated by sharpshooters and a supporting regiment. But about half-past eight, the fog, which had been quite dense, lifted; and under fire of the artillery the Confederates were driven away, and the crossing made by Wadsworth.
During Wednesday and Thursday the entire command was held in readiness to force a pa.s.sage at any time, the bridge-heads being held by Brooks and Wadsworth respectively.
VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING.
Hooker was a master of logistics. The forethought and excellent judgment displayed in all orders under which these preliminary moves of the army-corps were made, as well as the high condition to which he had brought the army, cannot elicit higher praise than to state the fact, that, with the exception of the Cavalry Corps, all orders issued were carried out au pied de la lettre, and that each body of troops was on hand at the hour and place prescribed. This eulogy must, however, be confined to orders given prior to the time when the fighting began.
On April 26 the commanding officers of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were directed to march Monday morning, the 27th, towards Kelley"s Ford, on the Rappahannock,-some fifteen miles above its junction with the Rapidan,-Howard leading.
As much secrecy as possible was enjoined, and the men were not to be allowed to go down to the river. Eight days" rations to be carried in the haversacks. Each corps to take a battery and two ambulances to a division, the pack-train for small ammunition, and a few wagons for forage only. The rest of the trains to be parked in the vicinity of Banks"s Ford out of sight. A sufficient detail, to be made from the troops whose term was about to expire, to be left behind to guard camp, and do provost duty.
Meade was ordered to march the Fifth Corps in connection with the Eleventh and Twelfth, and equipped in similar manner.
The three corps to be in camp at Kelley"s Ford, in positions indicated, by four P.M. on Tuesday.
The first day"s march was to the vicinity of Hartwood Church. Next day, at four A.M., the head of the column was in motion; and at four P.M. the three corps were in camp at Kelley"s Ford.
At six P.M. the pontoon-bridge was begun, under charge of Capt. Comstock of the engineers, by a detail mostly from the Eleventh Corps. Some four hundred men of Buschbeck"s brigade crossed in boats, and attacked the enemy"s pickets, which retired after firing a single shot. About ten P.M. the bridge was finished, and the troops crossed; the Eleventh Corps during the night, and the Twelfth Corps next morning. The Seventeenth Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment was sent out as flankers to prevent the Confederate scouting-parties from annoying the column. In this they failed of entire success; as the rear of the Eleventh Corps was, during the day, sh.e.l.led by a Confederate battery belonging to Stuart"s horse artillery, and the Twelfth Corps had some slight skirmishing in its front with cavalry detachments from the same command.
As soon as Hooker had seen to the execution of his first orders, he transferred his headquarters to Morrisville, five miles north of Kelley"s Ford, and superintended the execution of the crossing and advance. Urging Meade to equal celerity and secrecy in uncovering United-States Ford, he instructed Sloc.u.m, should Meade"s crossing at Ely"s be resisted, to push a column on the south side of the Rapidan to open the latter ford.
At Germania Ford, on the Rapidan, previously seized by an advance party of three or four smart marching regiments, a small body of one hundred and twenty-five Confederate infantry, guarding the supplies for the rebuilding of the bridge, then in progress, was captured.
The cavalry and artillery crossed at once by the ford, as well as a portion of the infantry, the latter wading almost to the armpits. But the construction of the bridge was soon temporarily completed by Gens. Geary and Kane; and the rest of the troops and the pack-mules pa.s.sed safely, by the light of huge bonfires lighted on the banks. The men were in the highest possible spirits, and testified to their enjoyment of the march by the utmost hilarity.
At daylight the Twelfth Corps led the column, Geary in advance. Near the Wilderness, the head of column was attacked from the south by some cavalry and a couple of guns. Stuart had come up from Racc.o.o.n Ford the day previous. But a slight demonstration cleared the road; and Stuart retired, sending part of his force to Fredericksburg, and accompanying the rest to Spotsylvania Court House.
About two P.M., Thursday, these two corps, under command of Sloc.u.m, reached Chancellorsville, and found a portion of the Fifth Corps already in position there. The Twelfth Corps was deployed south of the plank road, with left at the Chancellor House, and the right near Wilderness Church, which line the Eleventh Corps prolonged to the vicinity of Hunting Creek.
The Fifth Corps had marched to Kelley"s Ford, and crossed in rear of the Twelfth Corps. From here, Sykes"s and Griffin"s divisions marched towards Ely"s Ford, preceded by Col. Devin"s Sixth New York Cavalry, which surprised the pickets at that place. The troops crossed by wading. Humphreys remained behind to cover the pa.s.sage of the trains, and after followed the column.
On crossing the Rapidan, Sykes was pushed towards United-States Ford, to dislodge the Confederate force there, by thus taking in reverse their position, while Griffin marched to Chancellorsville. The whole corps soon after united at the latter place, and was located with its right joining Sloc.u.m, and the left extending towards the river, facing Mine Run.
A skirmish of no particular moment had occurred between Griffin and Anderson, as the former reached Chancellorsville. Anderson had been retiring before the Federal advance, on the plank road towards Fredericksburg. His rear guard made a short stand at the crossroads, but withdrew after a few rounds; and Anderson took up a position near Mine Road, where numerous ravines, perpendicular to the river, afforded excellent successive lines of defence.
On reaching Chancellorsville, Sloc.u.m took command of the three corps there a.s.sembled. He was ordered to ascertain, by a cavalry party, whether the enemy were detaching any considerable force from Fredericksburg to meet his column. If not, an advance at all hazards was to be made, and a position on the plank road which would uncover Banks"s Ford to be secured. If the enemy were in strong force, Sloc.u.m was to select a position, and compel his attack. Not a moment was to be lost until the troops were concentrated at Chancellorsville. "From that moment all will be ours," said Hooker.
The inconsistency of these orders can be explained only by marked ignorance of the country. To secure a position which would uncover Banks"s Ford was certainly a great desideratum; but the possession of Chancellorsville was far from accomplishing this end, as we shall see.
So admirably planned and executed were all orders up to this time, that on Thursday, by two P.M., three corps of nearly forty thousand men were concentrated on Lee"s flank, while the latter was still unaware of the presence of any considerable Federal force in this vicinity.
On Monday Couch had been ordered to march two divisions of his (Second) corps to Banks" Ford, but to keep back from the river, and to show no more than the usual pickets. One brigade and a battery to be sent to United-States Ford, there to relieve an equal detail of the Eleventh Corps, which would rejoin its command. All their artillery to move with these two divisions, and to be ready to cover a forced crossing. The division whose camps at Falmouth were most easily seen by the enemy from across the river (it happened to be Gibbon"s) to be left in camp to do picket and provost duty. The Third Corps would be available in case the enemy himself attempted a crossing. Gibbon to be ready to join the command at any time.
On Thursday, as soon as Anderson withdrew Mahone"s and Posey"s brigades from United-States Ford, which he did when Meade"s crossing at Ely"s had flanked that position, Couch, whose bridge was all ready to throw, was ordered to cross, and march in support towards the heaviest firing. This he did, with French and Hanc.o.c.k, and reached Chancellorsville the same evening.
Swinton, rather grandiloquently, says, "To have marched a column of fifty thousand men, laden with sixty pounds of baggage and enc.u.mbered with artillery and trains, thirty-seven miles in two days; to have bridged and crossed two streams, guarded by a vigilant enemy, with the loss of half a dozen men, one wagon, and two mules,-is an achievement which has few parallels, and which well deserves to rank with Prince Eugene"s famous pa.s.sage of the Adige."
However exaggerated this praise may be, Hooker nevertheless deserves high encomiums on his management of the campaign so far. Leaving Stoneman"s delay out of the question, nothing had gone wrong or been mismanaged up to the present moment. But soon Hooker makes his first mistake.
At 12.30 on Thursday, the Third Corps, which lay near Franklin"s Crossing, on the north side of the river, received orders to proceed by the shortest route, and concealed from the enemy, to United-States Ford, to be across the river by seven A.M., Friday; in pursuance of which order, Sickles immediately started, in three columns, following the ravines to Hamet"s, at the intersection of the Warrenton pike and United-States Ford road. Here he bivouacked for the night. At five A.M. Friday he marched to the ford, and pa.s.sed it with the head of his column at seven A.M., Birney leading, Whipple and Berry in the rear. Leaving Mott"s brigade and a battery to protect the trains at the ford, he then pushed on, and reported at Chancellorsville at nine A.M. Under Hooker"s orders he ma.s.sed his corps near the junction of the roads to Ely"s and United-States Fords, in the open near Bullock"s, sending a brigade and a battery to Dowdall"s Tavern.
Hooker, meanwhile, had arrived at Chancellorsville, and taken command. He at once issued this characteristic order:-
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., April 30, 1863.
GENERAL ORDERS, No. 47.
It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the commanding general announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences, and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.
The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements.
By command of Major-Gen. Hooker.
S. WILLIAMS, a.s.sistant Adjutant-General.
Pleasonton, during Thursday, pushed out towards Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Court House to observe the enemy.
Fitz Hugh Lee had bivouacked this evening at Todd"s Tavern. Stuart, with his staff, had started towards Fredericksburg to report the condition of affairs to Gen. Lee. It was a bright moonlight night. A mile or two on the road he ran against a party of Federal hors.e.m.e.n, the advance of the Sixth New York Cavalry, under Lieut.-Col. McVicar. Sending back for the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, Lee attacked the Federal troopers, leading in person at the head of his staff; but, being repulsed, he sent for the entire brigade to come up, with which he drove back McVicar"s detachment.
The combat lasted some time, and was interesting as being a night affair, in which the naked weapon was freely used. Its result was to prevent Pleasonton from reaching Spotsylvania Court House, where he might have destroyed a considerable amount of stores.
The position on Thursday evening was then substantially this. At Hamilton"s Crossing there was no change. Each party was keenly scanning the movements of the other, seeking to divine his purpose. Sedgwick and Reynolds were thus holding the bulk of Lee"s army at and near Fredericksburg. Hooker, with four corps, and Sickles close by, lay at Chancellorsville, with only Anderson"s small force in his front, and with his best chances hourly slipping away. For Lee, by this time aware of the real situation, hesitated not a moment in the measures to be taken to meet the attack of his powerful enemy.
IX. LEE"S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS.
Let us now turn to Lee, and see what he has been doing while Hooker thus discovered check.
Pollard says: "Lee calmly watched this" (Sedgwick"s) "movement, as well as the one higher up the river under Hooker, until he had penetrated the enemy"s design, and seen the necessity of making a rapid division of his own forces, to confront him on two different fields, and risking the result of fighting him in detail."
Lossing states Lee"s object as twofold: to retain Banks"s Ford, so as to divide Hooker"s army, and to keep his right wing in the Wilderness.
Let us listen to Lee himself. In his report he says he was convinced on Thursday, as Sedgwick continued inactive, that the main attack would be made on his flank and rear. "The strength of the force which had crossed, and its apparent indisposition to attack, indicated that the princ.i.p.al effort of the enemy would be made in some other quarter."
He states that on April 14 he was informed that Federal cavalry was concentrating on the upper Rappahannock. On the 21st, that small bodies of infantry had appeared at Kelley"s Ford. These movements, and the demonstrations at Port Royal, "were evidently intended to conceal the designs of the enemy," who was about to resume active operations.
The Federal pontoon bridges and troops below Fredericksburg "were effectually protected from our artillery by the depth of the river"s bed and the narrowness of the stream, while the batteries on the other side completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the river."
"As at the first battle of Fredericksburg, it was thought best to select positions with a view to resist the advance of the enemy, rather than incur the heavy loss that would attend any attempt to prevent his crossing."
At the time of Hooker"s flank movement, there were between the Rappahannock and Rapidan no troops excepting some twenty-seven hundred cavalry under Stuart, forming Lee"s extreme left. But Stuart made up for his small numbers by his promptness in conveying to his chief information of every movement and of the size of every column during Hooker"s pa.s.sage of the rivers. And the capture of a few prisoners from each of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps enabled him and his superior to gauge the dimensions of the approaching army with fair accuracy.