But until Thursday night the plan of Hooker"s attack was not sufficiently developed to warrant decisive action on the part of Lee.
Of the bulk of the Confederate forces, Early"s division was ahead at Hamilton"s Crossing, intrenched in an almost impregnable position. On Wednesday, April 29, the rest of Jackson"s corps was moved up from below, where Doubleday"s and Morrow"s demonstrations had until now kept it.
A. P. Hill"s and Trimble"s divisions were in the second and third lines on this wing; while Anderson and McLaws, the only troops of Longstreet"s corps left with the Army of Northern Virginia, held the intrenchments along the river above Fredericksburg. Barksdale was in the town. Pendleton with the reserve artillery was at Ma.s.saponax.
When, from Sedgwick"s inactivity and the information received from Stuart, Lee, on Wednesday afternoon, had been led to suspect that the main attack might be from the columns crossing above, he had immediately ordered Anderson to occupy Chancellorsville with Wright"s brigade, and with Mahone and Posey from United-States Ford, so soon as that position was compromised, leaving a few companies there to dispute its possession as long as possible.
We have seen how Anderson engaged Meade near Chancellorsville as the latter advanced, and then retired to a position near Mine-Run road. Here was the crest of a hill running substantially north and south. Gen. Lee had already selected this line; and Col. Smith, his chief engineer, had drawn up a plan of intrenchments. Anderson detailed men, who, during the night, threw up some strong field-works.
Late Thursday night Lee appears first fully to have matured his plan for parrying Hooker"s thrust.
Barksdale"s brigade was left at Fredericksburg, where during the winter it had been doing picket-duty, to form the left of the line remaining to oppose Sedgwick. Part of Pendleton"s reserve artillery was near by; while Early, commanding this entire body, held Hamilton"s Crossing. He had a force of eighty-five hundred muskets, and thirty pieces of artillery.
The rest of his army Lee at once took well in hand, and moved out to meet the Army of the Potomac. McLaws was hurried forward to sustain the line taken up by Anderson. He arrived on the ground by daylight of Friday, and went into position in rifle-pits on the right about Smith"s Hill.
Jackson, equally alert, but having a longer distance to march from the extreme right along the military road, arrived about eight A.M., took command, and, as was his wont, ordered an immediate advance, throwing Owens"s regiment of cavalry forward to reconnoitre.
Posey and Wright followed Owens on the plank road, with Alexander"s battalion of artillery. Mahone, and Jordan"s battery detached from Alexander, marched abreast of his right, on the pike.
McLaws followed Mahone, and Wilc.o.x and Perry were called from Banks"s Ford to sustain this column, which McLaws directed; while Jackson, following on the plank road, watched the operations of the left.
X. HOOKER"S ADVANCE FRIDAY.
So far the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac had been at Falmouth, where still remained Gen. b.u.t.terfield, Hooker"s chief of staff. The last order from this point had been on Thursday to Gen. Sedgwick, who was therein notified that headquarters would be that night at Chancellorsville; that an advance would be made Friday morning along the plank road (meaning probably the pike) towards Fredericksburg, to uncover Banks"s Ford, thus making a shorter communication through b.u.t.terfield, who would still remain at Falmouth. This order substantially recapitulates former instructions, and is full of the flash and vim of an active mind, till then intent on its work and abreast of the situation. It urges on Sedgwick co-operation with the right wing, and the most vigorous pushing of the enemy. It impresses on him that both wings will be within easy communication, and ready to spring to one another"s a.s.sistance.
Slower than his adversary, and failing to follow up with vigor his advantage already gained, Hooker a.s.sumes command in person, and reconnoitres the ground between himself and Fredericksburg. He then orders Meade, with Griffin, followed by Humphreys, and with three batteries, to march along the river road to some commanding point between Mott and Colin Runs; his advance to be masked by throwing out small parties, and his command to be in position by two P.M., while Sykes"s division, supported by Hanc.o.c.k"s division of the Second Corps, march out the turnpike to a corresponding distance, each force then deploying towards the other, and engaging the enemy supposed to be in that vicinity.
A third column, consisting of the Twelfth Corps, he orders to march by the plank road, and to be ma.s.sed near Tabernacle Church, masked in like manner; to be in position by midday, so that the Eleventh Corps can move up to take position a mile in its rear as reserve, by two P.M.
French"s division of the Second Corps, and one battery, are ordered to Todd"s Tavern, from which detachments are to be thrown out on the various roads.
The unemployed troops are ma.s.sed at Chancellorsville, out of the roads. Pleasonton holds his cavalry brigade there in readiness to move. Hooker announces his headquarters at Tabernacle Church as soon as the movement opens.
Immediately after (11.30 A.M., Friday,) Sedgwick is directed to threaten an attack at one P.M., in the direction of Hamilton"s Crossing, to ascertain whether the enemy is hugging his defences in full force. A corps is to be used with proper supports, but nothing more than a demonstration to be made. If certain that the enemy is there in force, Sedgwick is to make no attack.
Sedgwick did not receive this order until about five P. M., but nevertheless made a display in force of Reynolds"s corps, with Newton and Brooks in support. But a countermand was soon received, and the troops withdrawn.
As Hooker supposed his enemy to be in line somewhere midway between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, the purpose of these orders to Sedgwick is not plain. Meade, Sykes, and Sloc.u.m were ordered to attack the enemy when met. Sedgwick could aid such an attack by pushing the force in his front at Hamilton"s. But a mere demonstration to find out whether the heights were strongly held could have no effect upon the real advance, nor procure Hooker any timely information.
The movement of the three columns out of the Wilderness begins at eleven A.M. It is in accordance with the declared plans of Hooker, and with sound policy. For Chancellorsville is of all places the worst in which to deliver or accept a general engagement, and every mile"s advance towards Fredericksburg brings the army into more open ground.
Meade, with Griffin and Humphreys, advances on the river road to within a short distance of Banks"s Ford, near Decker"s farm. He can easily seize the ford, the possession of which lessens the distance between the wings by six miles. It is the objective Hooker has had in view ever since the movement began. He is preparing to deploy towards Sykes.
Sykes,-to quote Warren,-"on gaining the ridge about a mile and a quarter from Chancellorsville, found the enemy advancing, and driving back our cavalry. This small force resisted handsomely, riding up and firing almost in the faces of the Eleventh Virginia Infantry, which formed the enemy"s advance. Gen. Sykes moved forward in double-quick time, attacked the enemy vigorously, and drove him back with loss, till he had gained the position a.s.signed him."
This is a crest in front of the heavy forest, and in range of Anderson"s rifle-pits. The Federal skirmishers are the Seventeenth United-States Infantry, supported by Burbank"s brigade.
McLaws is in his front, and deploys across the pike, Semmes on the left of the road, Mahone, Perry, and Wofford on the right. Jordan"s battery is posted on the Mine road.
Sykes brings up Weed"s battery, and opens on Semmes, and drives in his skirmishers, but can make no serious impression on his line. McLaws sends word to Jackson that Sykes is attacking in force, and that the country is favorable for a flank attack.
Jackson orders Kershaw through the woods to join Semmes"s left, and sends Wilc.o.x up the Mine road to extend the Confederate right, and head off a Federal advance from this direction.
Sykes thus finds himself overlapped on both flanks. He throws Ayres"s regular brigade out on his left, and the One Hundred and Forty-sixth New York on his right. His position is difficult, but he determines to hold it as long as possible.
It is noon. No sounds are heard from the parallel columns. Sykes has to make his line very thin, but holds his ground. If supported, he can maintain himself.
But at this juncture he receives orders to fall back on Chancellorsville, and slowly retires to McGee"s; later to his old position, Hanc.o.c.k taking his place in the front line; and he next morning at daylight is also withdrawn, and takes up the line he retains until Sunday morning.
Sloc.u.m, in like manner on the plank road, meets Posey and Wright, and a small affair occurs. But Wright is sent along the unfinished railroad, and outflanks him. He is also at this moment ordered to retire.
Meade has had similar orders, and has likewise withdrawn; and Wilc.o.x is sent to Banks"s Ford to hold it.
Wright continues his movement along the railroad, as far as Welford"s or Catherine"s Furnace, when, finding himself beyond communication with his superior, he, in connection with Stuart, who has been holding this point, determines to feel the Union line. Two regiments and a battery are thrown in along the road to Dowdall"s Tavern, preceded by skirmishers. Our pickets fall back, and through the dense wood the Confederates reach our line. But they are warmly received, and retire. This is six P.M. Wright now joins his division.
Lee has arrived, and a.s.sumes command.
Jackson"s divisions, thus following up our retiring columns, by nightfall occupy a line from Mine road to Welford"s Furnace. A regiment of cavalry is on the Mine road, and another on the river road as outposts. Stuart remains at the Furnace. McLaws occupies the crest east of Big-Meadow Swamp, and Anderson prolongs his lines westwardly.
Let us now examine into these operations of Friday.
This movement towards Fredericksburg was not a sudden idea of Hooker"s, but the result of a carefully studied plan. In his order of April 3, to Sedgwick, he says that he proposes to a.s.sume the initiative, advance along the plank road, and uncover Banks"s Ford, and at once throw bridges across. Gen. b.u.t.terfield, in a communication to Sedgwick of April 30, says, "He (Hooker) expected when he left here, if he met with no serious opposition, to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg to-morrow noon or shortly after, and, if opposed strongly, to-morrow night." In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker says, "The problem was, to throw a sufficient force of infantry across at Kelley"s Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away the enemy"s forces, holding the United-States and Banks"s Ford, by attacking them in the rear, and as soon as these fords were opened, to re-enforce the marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the flank of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if successful, his retreat intercepted. Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the left was to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his detaching an overwhelming force to his left."
Hooker, moreover, not only told Hunt that he expected to fight near Banks"s Ford, but instructed him to get all his artillery to that point from below, where it had been ma.s.sed to cover Sedgwick"s crossing.
There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness, in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville. This is, of all places in that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the general commanding expects to secure the best tactical results. But out towards Fredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings, woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms.
Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easier communication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy, and advanced against him, a retreat should have been made from imperative reasons alone.
Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, thus: "They"-the forces on the turnpike and plank road-"had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be advancing in line of battle. Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emerged from the forest at that moment" (this is a very imperfect statement of the facts); "but, as the pa.s.sage-way through the forest was narrow, I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist the advance of Gen. Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail." And in another place, "When I marched out on the morning of the 1st of May I could get but few troops into position: the column had to march through narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast enough to prevent their being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance. On a.s.suming my position, Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon repulsed, the column thrown back in confusion into the open ground. It could not live there. The roads through the forest were not unlike bridges to pa.s.s. A mile or more in advance of the position I had would have placed me beyond the forest, where, with my superior forces, the enemy would in all probability have been beaten."
This was not a valid conclusion from the actual facts. Listen to his subordinates" statements.
Gen. Humphreys testifies before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with reference to this falling-back: "It was totally unexpected to me: I thought it was part of the plan to attack him as quickly as possible. We had surprised them, and were strong enough to attack them." "After Friday I was apprehensive we should not have the success we had expected." "I think it was a mistake to fight a defensive battle after surprising the enemy." "I think we should have attacked the enemy immediately." "I must give my opinion, since you ask me; for I have an opinion, as a military man, from the general facts I know, and that I suppose I am obliged to express. My opinion is that we should not have been withdrawn, called back, on Friday afternoon. We had advanced along the road to Fredericksburg to attack the enemy: the troops were in fine spirits, and we wanted to fight a battle. I think we ought to have fought the enemy there. They came out, and attacked one division of the corps I belonged to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville. What caused Gen. Hooker to return after advancing some miles on this general position, which was about perpendicular to the plank road leading to Fredericksburg, I am not able to say, because, being only a division commander, the facts were not stated to me. But I have heard it said that he received some erroneous information about the enemy"s advancing on his flank from the direction of Orange Court House. It was my opinion, we should have attacked the enemy, instead of withdrawing, and awaiting an attack from the enemy."
He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back to Chancellorsville, they were for many hours ma.s.sed there in considerable confusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got into place.
Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground "produced among the soldiers a feeling of uncertainty."
Hanc.o.c.k testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "I consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping at Chancellorsville.... I believe, if all... had pushed right down to Banks"s Ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success. But I have no doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions, and still kept pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with Gen. Sedgwick."
Gen. Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and most useful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on this campaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, when the latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker"s orders to retire, while he (Warren) galloped back to headquarters to explain the importance of holding the position, which was formidable and had great tactical advantages. Hooker yielded; but, before Warren could get back to the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, and the position lost. He says: "I never should have stopped at Chancellorsville. I should have advanced and fought the enemy, instead of waiting for him to attack me. The character of the country was the great reason for advancing."
And it is thought that every one engaged in this campaign with the Army of the Potomac will remember the feeling of confusion and uncertainty engendered by the withdrawal from Jackson"s front on this unlucky day.