A council of general officers was held at Chancellorsville on Friday evening, in which many were still strongly in favor of making the advance again. Warren says: "I was in favor of advancing, and urged it with more zeal than convincing argument." But Hooker held to his own opinion. He could not appreciate the weakness of a.s.suming the defensive in the midst of the elan of a successful advance.
It is not difficult to state what Hooker should have done. He had a definite plan, which was to uncover and use Banks"s Ford. He should have gone on in the execution of this plan until arrested by superior force, or until something occurred to show that his plan was inexpedient. To retire from an enemy whom you have gone out to attack, and whom you have already placed at a disadvantage, before striking a blow, is weak generalship indeed.
Hooker had arrived at Chancellorsville at noon Thursday. Lee was still in Fredericksburg. The troops were able to march many miles farther without undue taxing. They should have been pushed out that afternoon to the open ground and to Banks"s Ford. To fail in this, was the first great error of the campaign. There had not been a moment"s delay allowed from the time the troops reached the river until they were ma.s.sed at Chancellorsville, and the proposed movement nearly completed. One continued pressure, never let up, had constantly been exerted by the headquarters of the army. The troops had been kept in constant movement towards Banks"s Ford. Hooker had all but reached his goal. Suddenly occurred a useless, unexplained pause of twenty-four hours. And it was during this unlucky gap of time that Lee occupied the ground which Hooker"s cavalry could have seized, and which should have been held at all hazards.
Nor is this error excusable from ignorance of the terrain. For Hooker had shown his knowledge of the importance of celerity; and his own declared plan made Banks"s Ford, still a half-dozen miles distant, his one objective. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he thus refers to his plan: "As soon as Couch"s divisions and Sykes"s corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose, in the first instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks"s Ford, which was six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer communication with the left wing of the army." And if the troops had needed repose, a few hours would have sufficed; and, the succeeding night being clear moonlight, a forward movement was then entirely feasible.
Dating from this delay of Thursday, every thing seemed to go wrong.
More curious still is Hooker"s conduct on Friday, when his three columns came into presence of the enemy. What every one would have expected of Fighting Joe was, that at this supreme moment his energy would have risen to its highest pitch. It was a slight task to hold the enemy for a few hours. Before ordering the columns back, Hooker should have gone in person to Sykes"s front. Here he would have shortly ascertained that Jackson was moving around his right. What easier than to leave a strong enough force at the edge of the Wilderness, and to move by his left towards Banks"s Ford, where he already had Meade"s heavy column? This would have kept his line of communication with United-States Ford open, and, while uncovering Banks"s Ford, would at the same time turn Jackson"s right. It is not as if such a movement carried him away from his base, or uncovered his communications. It was the direct way to preserve both.
But at this point Hooker faltered. Fighting Joe had reached the culminating desire of his life. He had come face to face with his foe, and had a hundred and twenty thousand eager and well-disciplined men at his back. He had come to fight, and he-retreated without crossing swords.
XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
The position at Chancellorsville was good for neither attack nor defence. The ground was not open enough for artillery, except down the few roads, and across an occasional clearing. Cavalry was useless. Infantry could not advance steadily in line. The ground was such in Hooker"s front, that Lee could manoeuvre or ma.s.s his troops unseen by him. Our own troops were so located, that to re-enforce any portion of the line, which might be attacked, with sufficient speed, was impossible.
Anderson (as has been stated) had been ordered by Lee to hold Chancellorsville; but after examination of the ground, and consultation with Mahone and Posey, he concluded to transcend his instructions, and retired to the junction of Mine Road and the turnpike. He a.s.sumed that the superiority of this latter ground would excuse his failure to hold his position in the Wilderness.
Gen. Hanc.o.c.k says: "I consider that the position at Chancellorsville was not a good one. It was a flat country, and had no local military advantages."
And the testimony of all our general officers is strongly to the same effect.
The position to which Hooker retired was the same which the troops, wearied with their march of Thursday, had taken up without any expectation of fighting a battle there. Hooker had desired to contract his lines somewhat after Friday"s check; but the feeling that farther retreat would still more dishearten the men, already wondering at this unexplained withdrawal, and the a.s.surance of the generals on the right that they could hold it against any force the enemy could bring against their front, decided him in favor of leaving the line as it was, and of strengthening it by breastworks and abattis.
Having established his troops in position, Hooker further strengthened his right wing at Chancellorsville to the detriment of his left below Fredericksburg; and at 1.55 A.M., Sat.u.r.day, ordered all the bridges at Franklin"s Crossing, and below, to be taken up, and Reynolds"s corps to march at once, with pack-train, to report at headquarters.
This corps reached him Sat.u.r.day night, and was deployed upon the extreme right of the new position then being taken up by the army.
The line as now established lay as follows:-
Meade held the left, extending from a small bluff near Scott"s Dam on the Rappahannock, and covering the roads on the river, along a crest between Mine and Mineral Spring Runs towards and within a short mile of Chancellorsville.
This crest was, however, commanded from several points on the east, and, according to the Confederate authorities, appeared to have been carelessly chosen. Meade"s front, except at the extreme river-flank, was covered by impenetrable woods. The Mine road intersected his left flank, and the River road was parallel to and a mile in his front.
Couch joined Meade"s right, and extended southerly to Chancellorsville, with Hanc.o.c.k thrown out on his front, and facing east, astride the River road, and up to and across the old turnpike; his line being formed south of this road and of the Chancellor clearing. The division of French, of Couch"s corps, was held in reserve along the United-States Ford road.
From here to Dowdall"s Tavern the line made a southerly sweep outwards, like a bent bow, of which the plank road was the string.
As far as Hazel Grove, at the centre of the bow, Sloc.u.m"s Twelfth Corps held the line, Geary"s division joining on to Couch, and Williams on the right. From Sloc.u.m"s right to the extreme right of the army, the Eleventh Corps had at first been posted; but Hooker determined on Sat.u.r.day morning that the line was too thin here, and thrust Birney"s division of the Third Corps in between Sloc.u.m and Howard. The rest of the Third Corps was in reserve, ma.s.sed in columns of battalions, in Bullock"s clearing, north of the Chancellor house, with its batteries at the fork of the roads leading to the United-States and Ely"s Fords.
Towards sunset of Friday, Birney had advanced a strong line of skirmishers, and seized a commanding position in his front. Birney"s line then lay along the crest facing Scott"s Run from Dowdall"s to Sloc.u.m"s right.
Pleasonton"s cavalry brigade was ma.s.sed at headquarters, ready for duty at any point.
Howard held the line, from Dowdall"s Tavern (Melzi Chancellor"s) to beyond Talley"s farm on the old pike, with his right flank substantially in the air, and with two roads, the main thoroughfares from east to west, striking in on his right, parallel to his position.
As will be noticed from the map, the right, being along the pike, was slightly refused from the rest of the line, considering the latter as properly lying along the road to headquarters. From Dowdall"s west, the rise along the pike was considerable, and at Talley"s the crest was high. The whole corps lay on the watershed of the small tributaries of the Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers.
As a position to resist a southerly attack, it was as good as the Wilderness afforded; although the extreme right rested on no obstacle which superiority in numbers could not overcome. And a heavy force, ma.s.sed in the clearing at Dowdall"s as a point d"appui, was indispensable to safety, inasmuch as the conformation of the ground afforded nothing for this flank to lean upon.
Having forfeited the moral superiority gained by his advance, having withdrawn to his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, and decided, after surprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, early on Sat.u.r.day morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in the forces under his command.
The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of great natural strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangled under-growth, behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis, and approached by few roads, all easily swept by artillery. And, while it is true that the position was difficult to carry by direct a.s.sault, full compensation existed in other tactical advantages to the army taking the offensive. It is not probable that Lee, in Hooker"s place, would have selected such ground. "Once in the wood, it was difficult to tell any thing at one hundred yards. Troops could not march without inextricable confusion." Despite which fact, however, the density of these very woods was the main cause of Lee"s success.
In this position, Hooker awaited the a.s.sault of his vigorous opponent. As in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, and peculiarly so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, or been forced to choose by Friday"s easily accepted check. There were no debouches for throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to a.s.sume the offensive. There was no ground for manoeuvring. The woods were like a heavy curtain in his front. His left wing was placed so as to be of absolutely no value. His right flank was in the air. One of the roads on which he must depend for retreat was readily a.s.sailable by the enemy. And he had in his rear a treacherous river, which after a few hours" rain might become impa.s.sable, with but a single road and ford secured to him with reasonable certainty.
And, p.r.o.ne as we had always been to act upon unwarrantable over-estimates of the strength of our adversaries, Hooker had not this reason to allege for having retired to await Lee"s attack. For he had just received excellent information from Richmond, to the effect that Lee"s rations amounted to fifty-nine thousand daily; and we have seen that he told Sloc.u.m, on Thursday, that his column of nearly forty thousand men was much stronger than any force Lee could detach against him. Hooker acknowledges as much in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, when, in answer to the question, "What portion of the enemy lay between you and Gen. Sedgwick?" he replied:-
"Lee"s army at Fredericksburg numbered sixty thousand, not including the artillery, cavalry, and the forces stationed up the river, occupying the posts at Culpeper and Gordonsville. I think my information on this point was reliable, as I had made use of unusual means to ascertain. The enemy left eight thousand men to occupy the lines about Fredericksburg; Jackson marched off to my right with twenty-five thousand; and Lee had the balance between me and Sedgwick."
It will be well to remember this acknowledgment, when we come to deal with Hooker"s theories of the force in his own front on Sunday and Monday.
XII. JACKSON"S MARCH, AND SICKLES"S ADVANCE.
Lee and Jackson spent Friday night under some pine-trees, on the plank road, at the point where the Confederate line crosses it. Lee saw that it was impossible for him to expect to carry the Federal lines by direct a.s.sault, and his report states that he ordered a cavalry reconnoissance towards our right flank to ascertain its position. There is, however, no mention of such a body having felt our lines on the right, in any of the Federal reports.
It is not improbable that Lee received information, crude but useful, about this portion of our army, from some women belonging to Dowdall"s Tavern. When the Eleventh Corps occupied the place on Thursday, a watch was kept upon the family living there. But in the interval between the corps breaking camp to move out to Sloc.u.m"s support on Friday morning, and its return to the old position, some of the women had disappeared. This fact was specially noted by Gen. Howard.
However the information was procured, the Federal right was doubtless ascertained to rest on high ground, where it was capable of making a stubborn resistance towards the south. But Lee well knew that its position was approached from the west by two broad roads, and reasoned justly that Hooker, in canva.s.sing the events of Friday, would most probably look for an attack on his left or front.
Seated on a couple of cracker-boxes, the relics of an issue of Federal rations the day before, the two Confederate chieftains discussed the situation. Jackson, with characteristic restless energy, suggested a movement with his entire corps around Hooker"s right flank, to seize United-States Ford, or fall unawares upon the Army of the Potomac. This hazardous suggestion, which Lee in his report does not mention as Jackson"s, but which is universally ascribed to him by Confederate authorities, was one as much fraught with danger as it was spiced with dash, and decidedly bears the Jacksonian flavor. It gave "the great flanker" twenty-two thousand men (according to Col. A. S. Pendleton, his a.s.sistant adjutant-general, but twenty-six thousand by morning report) with which to make a march which must at best take all day, constantly exposing his own flank to the Federal a.s.sault. It separated for a still longer time the two wings of the Confederate army; leaving Lee with only Anderson"s and McLaws"s divisions,-some seventeen thousand men,-with which to resist the attack of thrice that number, which Hooker, should he divine this division of forces, could throw against him, the while he kept Jackson busy with the troops on his own right flank.
On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting a defensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Army of the Potomac had done. And he knew Jackson too. Should Hooker remain quiet during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee"s engrossing his attention by constant activity in his front, the stratagem might succeed. And in case of failure, each wing had open ground and good roads for retreat, to form a junction towards Gordonsville.
Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in the presence of a more active foe, Lee would never have hazarded so much, the very aggressiveness of the manoeuvre, and the success of Jackson"s former flank attacks, commended it to Lee, and he gave his lieutenant orders to proceed to its immediate execution.
For this division of his forces in the presence of an enemy of twice his strength, Lee is not ent.i.tled to commendation. It is justifiable only-if at all-by the danger of the situation, which required a desperate remedy, and peculiarly by the success which attended it. Had it resulted disastrously, as it ought to have done, it would have been a serious blow to Lee"s military prestige. The "nothing venture, nothing have" principle applies to it better than any maxim of tactics.
Before daybreak Jackson sends two of his aides, in company with some local guides, to find a practicable road, by which he may, with the greatest speed and all possible secrecy, gain the position he aims at on Hooker"s right and rear, and immediately sets his corps in motion, with Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill"s division, in the advance, and A. P. Hill bringing up the rear.
Jackson"s route lay through the woods, along the road on which rested Lee"s line. His corps, since Friday"s manoeuvres, was on the left; and, as he withdrew his troops at dawn, Lee deployed to the left to fill the gap, first placing Wright where Jackson had been on the west of the plank road, and later, when Wright was ordered to oppose Sickles at the Furnace, Mahone"s brigade.
This wood-road led to Welford"s or Catherine"s Furnace, from which place a better one, called the Furnace road, zigzagged over to join the Brock (or Brook) road, the latter running northerly into Y-shaped branches, each of which intersected the pike a couple of miles apart.
Jackson was obliged to make some repairs to the road as he advanced, for the pa.s.sage of his artillery and trains. In many places the bottom, none too reliable at any time, was so soft with the recent rains, that it had to be corduroyed to pull the guns through. But these men were used to marches of unequalled severity, and their love for their leader made no work too hard when "Old Jack" shared it with them. And although they had already been marching and fighting continuously for thirty hours, this circuit of well-nigh fifteen miles was cheerfully done, with an alacrity nothing but willing and courageous hearts, and a blind belief that they were outwitting their enemy, could impart.
His progress was masked by Stuart, who interposed his cavalry between Jackson and the Union lines, and constantly felt of our skirmishers and pickets as he slowly kept abreast with the marching column.
At the Furnace comes in another road, which, a short distance above, forks so as to lead to Dowdall"s Tavern on the left, and to touch the Union lines by several other branches on the right. It was this road down which Wright and Stuart had advanced the evening before in their attack on our lines.