Here, in pa.s.sing Lewis"s Creek (Scott"s Run) and some elevated ground near by, the column of Jackson had to file in full view of the Union troops, barely a mile and a half away. The movement was thus fully observed by us, hundreds of field-gla.s.ses pointing steadily at his columns.
It seems somewhat strange that Jackson should have made this march, intended to be quite disguised, across the Furnace-clearing. For there was another equally short route, making a bend southward through the woods, and, though possibly not so good as the one pursued, subsequently found available for the pa.s.sage of Jackson"s trains, when driven from the Furnace by Sickles. It is probably explained, however, by the fact that this route, selected during the night, was unfamiliar to Jackson, and that his aides and guides had not thought of the point where the troops were thus put en evidence. And Jackson may not have been with the head of the column.
So early as eight o"clock Birney of the Third Corps, whose division had been thrust in between Howard and Sloc.u.m, reported to Sickles that a movement in considerable force was being made in our front. Sickles conveyed the information to Hooker, who instructed him to investigate the matter in person. Sickles pushed out Clark"s rifled battery, with a sufficient support, to sh.e.l.l the pa.s.sing column. This, says Sickles, obliged it to abandon the road. It was observed that the column was a large one, and had a heavy train. Sickles considered it either a movement for attack on our right, or else one in retreat. If the former, he surmised at the time that he had arrested it; if the latter, that the column had taken a more available route.
It was while Rodes was filing past the Furnace that the first attack by Clark"s battery was made; and Col. Best, with the Twenty-third Georgia Regiment, was sent out beyond the Furnace to hold the road. Best subsequently took position in and about the Furnace buildings, and placed some troops in the railroad cutting south.
Sickles, meanwhile, had again reported to Hooker, and been instructed to strengthen his reconnoissance. But it was noon before this order was given, and he was then advised to push out with great caution. He asked for the whole of Birney"s division, and another one in support. With these he thought to get possession of the road on which the enemy was moving, and, if it was a retreat, cut him off; if a flank movement, thrust himself in between the two bodies of the enemy. Hooker accorded this request; and Birney was advanced a mile and a half through the woods, bridging two or three arms of Scott"s Run, and some marshy ground, and making his way with great difficulty. Two regiments of Berdan"s sharpshooters were thrown out in front, and the Twentieth Indiana Infantry led Birney"s division. Considerable opposition was encountered, say the reports of these regiments; but after some skirmishing, Berdan managed to surround Best"s command, and captured nearly the entire force.
Why Birney advanced through the woods is not readily understood; for there was a good road close by his position, leading to the Furnace, by using which many hours could have been saved.
From the prisoners of the Twenty-third Georgia, and some others intercepted, it was clearly ascertained, by two P.M., that Jackson was moving towards our right flank, with, as the prisoners stated, some forty thousand men.
These facts Sickles also reported to Hooker, requesting Pleasonton"s cavalry, and his own third division, to cooperate in a flank attack, which he seems to have a.s.sumed he could make on Jackson. Hooker ordered Whipple up into supporting distance to Birney, with instructions to connect the latter with Sloc.u.m; and directed Williams (Sloc.u.m"s right division) to cover the left of the advancing column, and if necessary attack the enemy there. Howard received instructions from Capt. Moore, who had been announced in general orders as on Hooker"s staff, to cover Birney"s right; and he detached his reserve brigade, the best and largest in the Eleventh Corps, commanded by Barlow, and led it out in person to its position.
Hooker subsequently denied having sent Capt. Moore to Howard, alleging the order to have emanated from Sickles; but, as Capt. Moore was on Hooker"s staff, Howard certainly could do no less than he did, supposing the order to be by authority from headquarters.
Sickles now imagined that every thing promised the most brilliant success. He was preparing to make his attack, as he supposed,-to judge, at least, from what he says,-on Jackson"s flank. "McLaws"s opposition had all but ceased," says he; "and it was evident that in a few moments five or six regiments would be cut off, and fall into our hands."
But Sickles had been deceived by a simple rear-guard of the enemy; while Jackson, by a long circuit, was not only far beyond his reach, but in position to crush Howard, and cut off Sickles from communication with the rest of the army.
Pleasonton, whom Hooker had sent out to Sickles"s aid, held his three regiments and Martin"s horse-battery, in the clearing at Scott"s Run, being unable to operate to any advantage on the ground occupied by Birney. Three or four other Third-Corps batteries were also here for a similar reason.
When Sickles"s attack, leading to the capture of the Twenty-third Georgia, was made, Col. Brown"s battalion of Confederate artillery happened to be within reach, and was speedily ordered up by Jackson, and placed on a cleared eminence south of the railroad cutting. Here, gathering a few detached companies in support, he opened smartly upon Sickles. The latter, bearing in mind his orders impressing caution in his advance, was for the moment checked, long enough, at all events, to enable Jackson"s trains to get out of reach by the lower road.
Birney had barely reached the Furnace when Brown"s fire became quite annoying. He accordingly placed Livingstone"s, and afterwards Randolph"s, batteries in position, and spent some time in silencing the Confederate guns; after accomplishing which, he threw forward his skirmishers, and occupied Welford"s house, while Graham, with four regiments, got possession of the railroad cutting.
By this time Jackson"s troops had pa.s.sed a couple of miles beyond the Furnace; but on hearing of Sickles"s attack, and the capture of an entire regiment, Archer, who commanded the rear brigade, promptly retraced his steps with his own and Thomas"s brigades, and supported Brown"s excellent work. So soon as the trains had got well along, these two brigades rejoined their command; and their work as rear-guard was undertaken by Posey, and subsequently by Wright, whom Anderson ordered out, and threw across his own left flank to engage the attention of Sickles"s column.
Jackson"s divisions were well out of reach, a half-dozen miles from Sickles, before this officer was ready for an advance in force. Jackson had marched on, or parallel to, the Brock road. When he reached the Orange plank road, he was shown an eminence from which he could observe the position of the Union lines. Riding up alone, so as not to attract attention, after-as Cooke affirms-driving the Federal cavalry from the spot, he examined our position carefully; and, seeing that he was not yet abreast of our flank on this road, he ordered his troops farther along the Brock road to the old turnpike.
But he sent Fitz Hugh Lee"s cavalry, supported by Paxton, along the plank road, to hold it in case his designs were prematurely discovered and met.
By four P.M. he had reached the right and rear of the Union line; while Hooker complacently viewed the situation from his comfortable headquarters at the Chancellor house, apparently in a semi-torpid state, retaining just enough activity to initiate manoeuvres, which, under the circ.u.mstances, were the most unfortunate possible.
For not only had he robbed his right corps of Barlow"s brigade, the only general reserve of the "key of his position," as himself has called it, and despatched Birney two miles into the woods, supported by Whipple, and protected on the left by Williams; but about five P.M. he ordered Geary from his position on Sloc.u.m"s left, to move forward, and make an attack down the plank road. This order Geary carried out in person with several regiments. He had a smart skirmish with the enemy, and was considerably advanced, when, about sundown, he was suddenly ordered to return to his position.
Hooker"s right flank, of less than ten thousand men, was thus isolated from the rest of the army, with no supports within two miles.
And yet the full evidence of Jackson"s whereabouts was before him. There had been a constant feeling of the Union lines (by Stuart"s cavalry and some infantry skirmishers) all day, gradually working from east to west. This fact was noticed by many officers, and is particularly referred to by Pleasonton, Warren, and Howard. Jackson"s columns and trains had been strongly reconnoitred, their force estimated, and their direction noted. The question as to what might be the objective of such a movement, had been the main topic of discussion during the day throughout the right of the army.
At noon a cavalry picket on the plank road was driven in, and gave notice of the pa.s.sing of a heavy column a mile beyond our lines. About 3.30 P.M. the leading divisions of Jackson"s corps, arriving on the old turnpike, sent a party forward to feel our lines, and a ten-minutes" skirmish resulted, when the Confederate party withdrew. There had been a number of minor attacks on our outlying pickets, some of them occurring when Gen. Howard was present. All these facts were successively reported to headquarters.
About the same time two men, sent out as spies, came in, and reported the enemy crossing the plank road on our right, in heavy columns. These men were despatched by Howard to Hooker, with instructions to the officer accompanying them to see that Hooker promptly received their information. On the other hand, a half-hour before Jackson"s attack came, Howard sent a couple of companies of cavalry out the plank road to reconnoitre. These men, from negligence or cowardice, failed to go far enough to ascertain the presence of Jackson, and returned and reported all quiet. This report was, however, not forwarded to Hooker.
There was not an officer or man in the Eleventh Corps that afternoon who did not discuss the possibility of an attack in force on our right, and wonder how the small body thrown across the road on the extreme flank could meet it. And yet familiar with all the facts related, for that they were reported to him there is too much c.u.mulative evidence to doubt, and having inspected the line so that he was conversant with its situation, Hooker allowed the key of his position to depend upon a half-brigade and two guns, facing the enemy, while the balance of the wing, absolutely in the air, turned its back upon the general whose attack was never equalled for its terrible momentum during our war, or excelled in any, and whose crushing blows had caused the brave old Army of the Potomac more than once to stagger.
Moreover, the "key of the position" was confided to a corps which was not properly part of the Army of the Potomac, and untried as yet. For not only had the Eleventh Corps, as a corps, seen no active service, but the most of its regiments were made up of raw troops, and the elements of which the corps was composed were to a degree incongruous. Of itself this fact should have caused Hooker to devote serious attention to his right flank.
XIII. HOOKER"S THEORIES AND CHANCES.
Hooker and Sickles have both stated that the plan of the former was to allow this movement of Jackson"s to develop itself: if it was a retreat, to attack the column at the proper time; if a tactical flank movement, to allow it to be completed, and then thrust himself between the two wings of Lee"s army, and beat them in detail. This admirable generalization lacked the necessary concomitant of intelligent and speedy execution.
Now, Hooker had his choice between two theories of this movement of Jackson. It was a retreat from his front, either because Lee deemed himself compromised, or for the purpose of making new strategic combinations; or it was the ma.s.sing of troops for a flank attack. It could mean nothing else. Let us, then, do Hooker all the justice the situation will allow.
All that had occurred during the day was fairly explainable on the former hypothesis. If Jackson was pa.s.sing towards Culpeper, he would naturally send flanking parties out every road leading from the one his own columns were pursuing, towards our lines, for strictly defensive purposes. The several attacks of the day might have thus occurred. This a.s.sumption was quite justifiable.
And this was the theory of Howard. He knew that Hooker had all the information obtained along the entire line, from prisoners and scouts. He naturally concluded, that if there was any reasonable supposition that an attack from the west was intended, Hooker would in some way have notified him. But, far from doing this, Hooker had inspected and approved his position, and had ordered Howard"s reserve away. To be sure, early in the morning, Hooker had told him to guard against an attack on the right: but since then circ.u.mstances had absolutely changed; Barlow had been taken from him, and he conjectured that the danger of attack had pa.s.sed. How could he a.s.sume otherwise?
Had he suspected an attack down the pike, had he received half an hour"s warning, he could, and naturally would, a.s.suming the responsibility of a corps commander, have changed front to rear so as to occupy with his corps the line along the east side of the Dowdall"s clearing, which he had already intrenched, and where he had his reserve artillery. He did not do so; and it is more easy to say that he was to blame, than to show good cause for the stigma cast upon him for the result of this day.
However much Hooker"s after-wit may have prompted him to deny it, his despatch of 4.10 P.M., to Sedgwick, shows conclusively that he himself had adopted this theory of a retreat. "We know that the enemy is flying," says he, "trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles"s divisions are among them."
And it is kinder to Hooker"s memory to a.s.sume that he did not apprehend a flank attack on this evening. If he did, his neglect of his position was criminal. Let us glance at the map.
We know how the Eleventh Corps lay, its reserve removed, with which it might have protected a change of front, should this become necessary, and itself facing southerly. What was on its left, to move up to its support in case of an attack down the pike? Absolutely not a regiment between Dowdall"s and Chancellorsville, and near the latter place only one division available. This was Berry"s, still luckily ma.s.sed in the open north of headquarters. And to Sickles"s very deliberate movement alone is due the fact that Berry was still there when the attack on Howard burst; for Sickles had bespoken Berry"s division in support of his own advance just at this juncture.
Birney, who was the prop of Howard"s immediate left, had been advanced nearly two miles through the thickets to the south to attack an imaginary enemy. Whipple had followed him. Of Sloc.u.m"s corps, Williams had been sent out "two or three miles," to sweep the ground in his front, and Geary despatched down the plank road "for the purpose of cutting off the train of the enemy, who was supposed to be in retreat towards Gordonsville." To oppose the attack of a column of not far from twenty-five thousand men, there was thus left a brigade front of four small regiments, and the flank of a corps of eight thousand men more, without reserves, and with no available force whatever for its support, should it be overwhelmed.
Is any criticism needed upon this situation? And who should be responsible for it?
In a defensive battle it is all-important that the general in command should hold his troops well in hand, especially when the movements of the enemy can be concealed by the terrain. The enemy is allowed his choice of ma.s.sing for an attack on any given point: so that the ability to concentrate reserve troops on any threatened point is an indispensable element of safety. It may be a.s.sumed that Hooker was, at the moment of Jackson"s attack, actually taking the offensive. But on this hypothesis, the feebleness of his advance is still more worthy of criticism. For Jackson was first attacked by Sickles as early as nine A.M.; and it was six P.M. before the latter was ready to move upon the enemy in force. Such tardiness as this could never win a battle.
While all this had been transpiring on the right, Lee, to keep his opponent busy, and prevent his sending re-enforcements to the flank Jackson was thus threatening, had been continually tapping at the lines in his front. But, owing to the small force left with him, he confined this work to Hooker"s centre, where he rightly divined his headquarters to be. About seven A.M. the clearing at Chancellorsville was sh.e.l.led by some of Anderson"s batteries, obliging the trains there parked to go to the rear into the woods.
Hanc.o.c.k states that the enemy frequently opened with artillery, and made infantry a.s.saults on his advanced line of rifle-pits, but was always handsomely repulsed. "During the sharp contests of that day, the enemy was never able to reach my princ.i.p.al line of battle, so stoutly and successfully did Col. Miles (who commanded the advanced line) contest the ground."
Col. Miles says his line was constantly engaged skirmishing with the enemy during the day. At about three P.M. the Confederates ma.s.sed troops in two columns, one on each side the road, flanked by a line some eight hundred yards long, in the woods. An impetuous charge was made to within twenty yards of the abattis, but it was baffled by our st.u.r.dy front.
Sickles, then still in reserve, had made a reconnoissance early on Sat.u.r.day, in Hanc.o.c.k"s front, with the Eleventh Ma.s.sachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, covered by some sharpshooters; had driven in the enemy"s pickets, and found him, to all appearances, in force. This was Anderson"s line.
The Twelfth Corps had also made a reconnoissance down the plank road later in the day, but with no immediate results.
All that was accomplished was a mere feeling of the other"s lines by either force. Hooker vainly endeavored to ascertain Lee"s strength at various places in his front. Lee, to good purpose, strove to amuse Hooker by his bustle and stir, to deceive him as to the weakness of his force, and to gain time.
During the afternoon of Sat.u.r.day, Hooker had a rare chance of redeeming his error made, the day before, in withdrawing from the open country to the Wilderness, and of dealing a fatal blow to his antagonist. He knew that Jackson, with twenty-five thousand men, was struggling through difficult roads towards his right. Whatever his object, the division of Lee"s forces was a fact. He knew that there could be left in his front not more than an equal number. It was actually less than eighteen thousand men; but Hooker, with his knowledge of Lee"s strength, could not estimate it at more than twenty-five thousand by any calculation he could make. Himself had over seventy thousand men in line, and ready to ma.s.s on any given point. He ought to have known that Lee was too astute a tactician seriously to attack him in front, while Jackson was manoeuvring to gain his right. And all Lee"s conduct during the day was palpable evidence that he was seeking to gain time.
However much Hooker may have believed that Jackson was retreating, he was bound to guard against the possibility of an attack, knowing as he did Jackson"s whereabouts and habit of rapid mystery. Had he thrown the entire Eleventh Corps en potence to his main line, as above indicated, to arrest or r.e.t.a.r.d an attack if made; had he drawn troops from Meade on the extreme left, where half an hour"s reconnoitring would have shown that nothing was in his front, and from Couch"s reserves in the centre; had he thrown heavy columns out where Birney was, to prevent the re-union of Jackson and Lee, and to make a determined attack upon the latter"s left while Hanc.o.c.k pressed him in front,-half the vigor displayed in the early days of this movement would have crushed the Army of Northern Virginia beyond recovery for this campaign. Lee"s only salvation would have lain in instant withdrawal from our front, and a retreat towards Gordonsville to re-unite with his lieutenant.
However he might have disposed his forces for an attack on Sat.u.r.day afternoon, he could have committed no mistake as great as the half-way measures which have been narrated. And if the heavy fighting of Sunday had been done the day before with any thing like the dispositions suggested, it could have scarcely failed of brilliant success for the Army of the Potomac.
But six o"clock came: Hooker still lay listlessly awaiting an attack, with his forces disjointedly lodged, and with no common purpose of action; and Jackson had gathered for his mighty blow.
It is but fair to give weight to every circ.u.mstance which shall moderate the censure attributable to Hooker for his defeat in this campaign. Early in the morning, after his inspection of the lines on the right, which was made with thoroughness, and after receipt of the first news of the movement of troops across our front, Hooker issued the following circular:-