HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 2, 1863, 9.30 A.M.
MAJOR-GEN. SLOc.u.m AND MAJOR-GEN. HOWARD.
I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground, and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up; and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the general"s opinion, as favorably posted as might be.
We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.
JAMES H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.
Although addressed to Sloc.u.m as well as Howard, this order scarcely applied with much force to the former, who occupied the right centre of the army, with Birney lying between him and the Eleventh Corps. Howard carried out his part of these instructions as well as circ.u.mstances allowed. He posted Barlow"s brigade, his largest and best, on the Buschbeck line, in position for a general reserve for the corps, and took advantage of the ground in a manner calculated to strengthen his flank, and to enable it to cover a change of front if necessary; he placed his reserve artillery on the right of the rifle-pits running across the road at Dowdall"s; he located several regiments on Dowdall"s clearing so as to wheel to the west or south as might be required; Major Hoffman was set to work, and spent the entire day locating and supervising the construction of field-works; and generally, Howard disposed the forces under his command after a fashion calculated to oppose a stubborn resistance to attacks down the pike, should they be made.
Later on in the day, we have seen how Hooker"s aide, Capt. Moore, ordered this brigade of Barlow"s away from its all-important position. We have seen Hooker"s dispositions of the Third and Twelfth Corps. We have seen Hooker"s 4.10 P.M. order to Sedgwick. No room is left to doubt that Hooker"s opinion, if he had any, underwent a change after issuing these instructions, and that he gave up the idea of an attack upon the right. His dispositions certainly resulted in convincing Howard that he had done so.
But suppose Hooker still remained of the same opinion during the afternoon, was the issue of this circular in the morning enough? If he supposed it probable that the enemy would strike our right, was it not the duty of the commanding general, at least to see that the threatened flank was properly protected,-that the above order was carried out as he intended it should be? No attack sufficient to engross his attention had been made, or was particularly threatened elsewhere; and a ten-minutes" gallop would bring him from headquarters to the questionable position. He had some excellent staff-officers-Gen. Warren among others-who could have done this duty; but there is no evidence of any one having been sent. Gen. Howard, in fact, states that no inspection by, or by the order of, Gen. Hooker was made during the day, after the one in the early morning.
It may be alleged that Hooker had desired to draw in the extended right the evening before, and had yielded only to the claim that that position could be held against any attack coming from the front. This is true. But when half his enemy"s forces, after this disposition was made, are moved to and ma.s.sed on his right, and have actually placed themselves where they can take his line in reverse, is it still fair to urge this plea? Hooker claims that his "instructions were utterly and criminally disregarded." But inasmuch as common-sense, not to quote military routine, must hold him accountable for the removal of Barlow (for how can a general shelter himself from the consequences of the acts of his subordinates, when these acts are in pursuance of orders received from his own aide-de-camp?), and himself acknowledges the disposition made of Sickles and Sloc.u.m, can the facts be fairly said to sustain the charge? There was, moreover, so much bitterness exhibited after this campaign, that, had the facts in the slenderest degree warranted such action, formal charges would a.s.suredly have been brought against Howard and his division commanders, on the demand alike of the commander-in-chief and a disappointed public.
XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
Gen. Howard states that he located his command, both with reference to an attack from the south, and from the west along the old turnpike and the plank road. The whole corps lies on a ridge along which runs the turnpike, and which is the watershed of the small tributaries of the Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. This ridge is terminated on the right by some high and easily-defended ground near Talley"s.
Gen. Devens, with the first division, holds the extreme right. He has less than four thousand men under his command. Von Gilsa"s brigade has, until this morning, been half a mile farther out the pike, and across the road; but on receipt of Hooker"s 9.30 order has been withdrawn, and now lies with two regiments astride and north of the pike, some distance beyond Talley"s, the rest skirting the south of it. His right regiment leans upon that portion of the Brock road which is the prolongation of the eastern branch, and which, after crossing the plank road and pike, bears north-westerly, and loses itself in the woods where formerly was an old mill. McLean"s brigade prolongs von Gilsa"s line towards Schurz. Dieckman"s battery has two pieces trained westerly down the pike, and four on Devens"s left, covering, near Talley"s Hill, the approaches from the plank road. Devens has the Twenty-fifth and Seventy-fifth Ohio Volunteers as a reserve, near the pike.
Schurz"s (third) division continues this line on the edge of the woods to Dowdall"s. His front hugs the eastern side of the clearing between the pike and the plank road, thence along the latter to the fork. Schimmelpfennig"s brigade is on the right, adjoining Devens; Krzyzanowski"s on the left. Three regiments of the former are on the line, and two in reserve: the latter has two regiments on the line, and two in reserve. On Schurz"s right wing, the troops are shut in between thick woods and their rifle-pits, with no room whatever to manoeuvre or deploy. This condition likewise applies to many of the regiments in Devens"s line. The pike is the means of inter-communication, running back of the woods in their rear. Dilger"s battery is placed near Dowdall"s, at the intersection of the roads.
Steinwehr considers himself the reserve division. He is more or less ma.s.sed near Dowdall"s. Buschbeck"s brigade is in the clearing south of the road, but has made a line of rifle-pits across the road, facing west, at the edge of the open ground. Two regiments are deployed, and two are in reserve. His other brigade, Barlow"s, has been sent out nearly two miles, to protect Birney"s right, leaving no general reserve whatever for the corps. Wiederich"s battery is on Steinwehr"s right and left, trained south.
Three batteries are in reserve on the line of Buschbeck"s rifle-pits running north and south. Barlow had been, as above stated, ma.s.sed as a general reserve of the corps on Buschbeck"s right,-the only reserve the corps could boast, and a most necessary one.
Two companies, and some cavalry and artillery, have been sent to the point where the Ely"s Ford road crosses Hunting Creek.
Devens states that his pickets were kept out a proper distance, and that he had constant scouting-parties moving beyond them. In his report he recapitulates the various attacks made during the day. Shortly after noon, cavalry attacked his skirmishers, but drew off. This was Stuart protecting Jackson"s flank, and feeling for our lines. Then two men, sent out from Schimmelpfennig"s front, came in through his, and were despatched to Hooker with their report that the enemy was in great force on our flank. Later, Lieut. Davis, of Devens"s staff, with a cavalry scout, was fired upon by Confederate horse. Then von Gilsa"s skirmishers were attacked by infantry,-again Stuart seeking to ascertain our position: after which the pickets were pushed farther out. Cavalry was afterwards sent out, and returned with information that some Confederate troopers, and part of a battery, were in the woods on our right.
But all this seems to have been explained as a retreat. "The unvarying report was, that the enemy is crossing the plank road, and moving towards Culpeper."
The ground about Dowdall"s is a clearing of undulating fields, closed on three sides, and open to the west. As you stand east of the fork of the roads, you can see a considerable distance down the plank road, leading to Orange Court House. The pike bears off to the right, and runs up hill for half a mile, to the eminence at Talley"s.
The dispositions recited were substantially the same as those made when the corps arrived here on Thursday. They were, early Sat.u.r.day morning, inspected by Hooker in person, and p.r.o.nounced satisfactory. As he rode along the line with Howard, and with each division commander in succession, he was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. His exclamation to Howard, several times repeated, as he examined the position,-his mind full of the idea of a front attack, but failing to seize the danger of the two roads from the west,-was: "How strong! How strong!"
An hour or two later, having ascertained the Confederate movement across our front, he had sent his circular to Howard and Sloc.u.m. Later still, as if certain that the enemy was on the retreat, he depleted Howard"s line by the withdrawal of Barlow, and made dispositions which created the gap of nigh two miles on Howard"s left.
Howard, during the day, frequently inspected the line, and all dispositions were approved by him.
And, when Barlow was ordered out to the front, both Howard and Steinwehr accompanied him. They returned to Dowdall"s Tavern just as Jackson launched his columns upon the Eleventh Corps.
XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O"CLOCK.
It is now six o"clock of Sat.u.r.day, May 2, 1863, a lovely spring evening. The Eleventh Corps lies quietly in position. Supper-time is at hand. Arms are stacked on the line; and the men, some with accoutrements hung upon the stacks, some wearing their cartridge-boxes, are mostly at the fires cooking their rations, careless of the future, in the highest spirits and most vigorous condition. Despite the general talk during the entire afternoon, among officers and rank and file alike, of a possible attack down the pike, all but a few are happily unsuspicious of the thunder-cloud gathering on their flank. There is a general feeling that it is too late to get up much of a fight to-day.
The breastworks are not very substantial. They are hastily run up out of rails from the fences, logs from barns in the vicinity, and newly felled trees. The ditch skirting the road has been deepened for this temporary purpose. Abattis, to a fair extent, has been laid in front. But the whole position faces to the south, and is good for naught else.
Nor were our men in those days as clever with the spade as we afterwards became. This is clearly shown in the defences.
There is some carelessness apparent. Ambulances are close by the line. Ammunition-wagons and the train of pack-mules are mixed up with the regiments. Even a drove of beeves is herded in the open close by. All these properly belong well to the rear. Officers" servants and camp-gear are spread abroad in the vicinity of each command, rather more comfortably ensconced than the immediate presence of the enemy may warrant.
The ground in the vicinity is largely clearing. But dense woods cover the approaches, except in some few directions southerly. Down the roads no great distance can be seen; perhaps a short mile on the plank road, not many hundred yards on the turnpike.
Little Wilderness Church, in the rear of the position, looks deserted and out of place. Little did its worshippers on last sabbath day imagine what a conflict would rage about its walls before they again could meet within its peaceful precincts.
There may be some absence of vigilance on the part of the pickets and scouts; though it is not traceable in the reports, nor do any of the officers concerned remember such. But the advanced line is not intrenched as Miles"s line in front of Hanc.o.c.k has been. Less care, rather than more carelessness, is all that can be observed on this score.
Meanwhile Jackson has ranged his corps, with the utmost precaution and secrecy, in three lines, at right angles to the pike, and extending about a mile on either side. All orders are given in a low tone. Cheering as "Old Jack" pa.s.ses along is expressly prohibited.
Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill"s division, leads, with Iverson"s and Rodes"s brigades to the left of the road, and Doles"s and Colquitt"s to the right. Rodes"s orders to his brigades are to push on steadily, to let nothing delay or r.e.t.a.r.d them. Should the resistance at Talley"s Hill, which Rodes expects, render necessary the use of artillery, the line is to check its advance until this eminence is carried. But to press on, and let no obstacle stand in the way, is the watchword.
Two hundred yards in rear of the first line, Colston, commanding Trimble"s division, ranges his brigades, Nichols and Jones on the left, and Colston on the right of the road; Ramseur in support.
A. P. Hill"s division is not yet all up; but, as part reaches the line, it is formed in support of Colston, the balance following in column on the pike.
The second and third lines are ordered to re-enforce the first as occasion requires.
Two pieces of Stuart"s horse-artillery accompany the first line on the pike.
The regiments in the centre of the line appear to have been formed in columns with intervals, each brigade advancing in line of columns by regiment. The troops are not preceded by any skirmishers. The line on the wings is probably not so much ma.s.sed. It is subsequently testified by many in the Eleventh Corps, that the centre of the line appears to advance en echiquier, the front companies of each line of columns firing while the rear columns are advancing through the intervals.
The march through the woods up to Dowdall"s clearing has not disturbed the lines so materially as to prevent the general execution of such a manoeuvre.
But the Confederate reports show that the regiments were all in line and not in column. The appearance of columns was due to the fact that the second and third lines, under Colston and A. P. Hill, were already pressing up close in the rear of the first under Rodes, thus making a ma.s.s nine deep. The intervals between regiments were accidental, occasioned by the swaying of the line to and fro as it forced its way through the underbrush.
It is perhaps no more than fair to say that whatever laxity was apparent at this hour in the Eleventh Corps was by no means incompatible with a readiness to give a good account of itself if an attack should be made upon its front.
XVI. JACKSON"S ATTACK.
Such is the situation at six P.M. Now Jackson gives the order to advance; and a heavy column of twenty-two thousand men, the best infantry in existence, as tough, hardy, and full of elan, as they are ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-looking, descends upon the Eleventh Corps, whose only ready force is four regiments, the section of a battery, and a weak line of pickets.
The game, in which these woods still abound, startled at the unusual visitors, fly in the advance of Jackson"s line towards and across the Dowdall clearing, and many a mouth waters, as fur and feather in tempting variety rush past; while several head of deer speedily clear the dangerous ground, before the bead of willing rifles can be drawn upon them.
This sudden appearance of game causes as much jollity as wonder. All are far from imagining its cause.