Upon this, I recounted the history of General Gage"s agreement with the inhabitants of Boston, that they should remove with their effects, upon condition, that they would surrender their arms; but as soon as the arms were secured, the goods were forbid to be carried out, and were finally carried off in large quant.i.ties to Halifax. Dr Franklin mentioned the case of Philadelphia, and the carrying off of effects there, even his own library. Mr Jay mentioned several other things, and Mr Laurens added the plunders in Carolina, of negroes, plate, &c.
After hearing all this, Mr Fitzherbert, Mr Oswald, and Mr Strachey retired for some time, and returning, Mr Fitzherbert said, that upon consulting together, and weighing everything as maturely as possible, Mr Strachey and himself had determined to advise Mr Oswald to strike with us, according to the terms we had proposed as our ultimatum, respecting the fishery and the loyalists. Accordingly, we all sat down, and read over the whole treaty, and corrected it, and agreed to meet tomorrow, at Mr Oswald"s house, to sign and seal the treaties, which the Secretaries were to copy fair in the mean time.
I forgot to mention, that when we were upon the fishery, and Mr Strachey and Mr Fitzherbert were urging us to leave out the word _right_, and subst.i.tute the word _liberty_, I told them at last, in answer to their proposal to agree upon all other articles, and leave that of the fishery to be adjusted at the Definitive Treaty, that I could never put my hand to any articles, without satisfaction about the fishery; that Congress had three or four years ago, when they did me the honor to give me a commission to make a Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain, given me a positive instruction not to make any such treaty, without an article in the Treaty of Peace, acknowledging our right to the fishery; that I was happy Mr Laurens was now present, who, I believed, was in Congress at the time, and must remember it. Mr Laurens, upon this, said with great firmness, that he was in the same case, and could never give his voice for any articles without this. Mr Jay spoke up, and said, it could not be a peace, it would only be an insidious truce without it.
_Sat.u.r.day, November 30th. St Andrews" Day._--We met first at Mr Jay"s, then at Mr Oswald"s, examined and compared the treaties. Mr Strachey had left out the limitation of time, the twelve months, that the refugees were allowed to reside in America, in order to recover their estates, if they could. Dr Franklin said this was a surprise upon us.
Mr Jay said so too. We never had consented to leave it out, and they insisted upon putting it in, which was done.
Mr Laurens said, there ought to be a stipulation, that the British troops should carry off no negroes, or other American property. We all agreed. Mr Oswald consented.
Then the treaties were signed, sealed, and delivered, and we all went out to Pa.s.sy to dine with Dr. Franklin. Thus far has proceeded this great affair. The unravelling of the plot has been to me the most affecting and astonishing part of the whole piece.
As soon as I arrived in Paris, I waited on Mr Jay, and learned from him the rise and progress of the negotiations. Nothing, that has happened since the beginning of the controversy in 1761, has ever struck me more forcibly, or affected me more intimately, than that entire coincidence of principles and opinions between him and me. In about three days I went out to Pa.s.sy, and spent the evening with Dr Franklin, and entered largely into conversation with him upon the course and present state of our foreign affairs. I told him, without reserve, my opinion of the policy of this Court, and of the principles, wisdom, and firmness, with which Mr Jay had conducted the negotiation in his sickness and my absence, and that I was determined to support Mr Jay to the utmost of my power in the pursuit of the same system. The Doctor heard me patiently, but said nothing.
The first conference we had afterwards with Mr Oswald, in considering one point and another, Dr Franklin turned to Mr Jay, and said, I am of your opinion, and will go on with these gentlemen in the business, without consulting this Court. He accordingly met with us in most of our conferences, and has gone with us, in entire harmony and unanimity throughout, and has been able and useful, both by his sagacity and his reputation in the whole negotiation.[15]
I was very happy, that Mr Laurens came in, although it was the last day of the conferences, and wish he could have been sooner. His apprehension, notwithstanding his deplorable affliction under the recent loss of so excellent a son, is as quick, his judgment as sound, and his heart as firm as ever. He had an opportunity of examining the whole, and judging and approving, and the article, which he caused to be inserted at the very last, that no property should be carried off, which would most probably in the multiplicity and hurry of affairs have escaped us, was worth a longer journey, if that had been all. But his name and weight is added, which is of much greater consequence.
These miserable minutes may help me to recollect, but I have not found time, amidst the hurry of business and crowd of visits, to make a detail.
I should have before noted, that at our first conference about the fishery, I related the facts, as well as I understood them; but knowing nothing myself, but as a hearsay witness, I found it had not the weight of occular testimony; to supply which defect, I asked Dr Franklin, if Mr Williams of Nantes could not give us light. He said Mr Williams was on the road to Paris, and as soon as he arrived he would ask him. In a few days, Mr Williams called on me, and said Dr Franklin had, as I desired him, inquired of him about the fishery, but he was not able to speak particularly upon that subject; but there was at Nantes a gentleman of Marblehead, Mr Samuel White, son-in-law to Mr Hooper, who was master of the subject, and to him he would write.
Mr Jeremiah Allen, a merchant of Boston, called on me about the same time. I inquired of him. He was able only to give such a hearsay account as I could give myself. But I desired him to write to Mr White, at Nantes, which he undertook to do, and did. Mr White answered Mr Allen"s letter by referring him to his answer to Mr Williams, which Mr Williams received and delivered to Dr Franklin, who communicated it to us, and it contained a good account.
I desired Mr Thaxter to write to Messrs Ingraham and Bromfield, and Mr Storer to write to Captain Coffin at Amsterdam. They delivered me the answers, both contained information, but Coffin"s was the most particular, and of the most importance, as he spoke as a witness. We made the best use of these letters with the English gentlemen, and they appeared to have a good deal of weight with them.
From first to last, I ever insisted upon it with the English gentlemen, that the fisheries and the Mississippi, if America was not satisfied in those points, would be the sure and certain sources of a future war, showed them the indispensable necessity of both to our affairs, and that no treaty we could make, which should be unsatisfactory to our people upon those points, could be observed; that the population near the Mississippi would be so rapid, and the necessities of the people for its navigation so pressing, that nothing could restrain them from going down, and if the force of arms should be necessary, it would not be wanting; that the fishery entered into our distilleries, our coasting trade, our trade with the Southern States, with the West India Islands, with the coast of Africa, and with every part of Europe in such a manner, and especially with England, that it could not be taken from us, or granted us stingily, without tearing and rending; that the other States had staples, we had none but fish, no other means of remittances to London, or paying those very debts they had insisted upon so seriously; that if we were forced off, at three leagues distance, we should smuggle eternally, that their men-of-war might have the glory of sinking, now and then, a fishing schooner, but this would not prevent a repet.i.tion of the crime, it would only inflame, and irritate, and enkindle a new war, that in seven years we should break through all restraints, and conquer from them the island of Newfoundland itself, and Nova Scotia too.
Mr Fitzherbert always smiled, and said it was very extraordinary that the British Ministry and we should see it in so different a light.
That they meant the restriction, in order to prevent disputes, and kill the seeds of war, and we should think it so certain a source of disputes, and so strong a seed of war; but that our reasons were such, that he thought the probability on our side.
I have not time to minute the conversation about the sea-cow fishery, the whale fishery, the Magdalen Islands, the Labrador coasts, and the coasts of Nova Scotia. It is sufficient to say, they were explained to the utmost of our knowledge, and finally conceded.
I should have noted before, the various deliberations between the English gentlemen and us, relative to the words, "indefinite and exclusive right," which the Count de Vergennes and M. Gerard had the precaution to insert in our treaty with France. I observed often to the English gentlemen, that, aiming at excluding us from fishing upon the north side of Newfoundland, it was natural for them to wish that the English would exclude us from the south side. This would be making both alike, and take away an odious distinction. French statesmen must see the tendency of our fishermen being treated kindly and hospitably, like friends, by the English on their side of the Island, and unkindly, inhospitably, and like enemies, on the French. I added, further, that it was my opinion, neither our treaty with the French, nor any treaty or clause to the same purpose, which the English could make, would be punctually observed. Fishermen, both from England and America, would smuggle, especially the Americans, in the early part of the spring, before the Europeans could arrive. This, therefore, must be connived at by the French, or odious measures must be recurred to by them or us to suppress it, and, in either case, it was easy to see what would be the effect upon the American mind. They, no doubt, therefore, wished the English to put themselves upon as odious a footing at least as they had done.
Dr Franklin said, that there was great weight in this observation, and the Englishmen showed plainly enough that they felt it.
I have not attempted, in these notes, to do justice to the arguments of my colleagues; all of whom were throughout the whole business, when they attended, very attentive and very able, especially Mr Jay, to whom the French, if they knew as much of his negotiations as they do of mine, would very justly give the t.i.tle, with which they have inconsiderately decorated me, that of "_Le Washington de la negotiation_," a very flattering compliment indeed, to which I have not a right; but sincerely think it belongs to Mr Jay.
_Tuesday, December 3d._--Visited M. Brantzen, _Hotel de la Chine_. M.
Brantzen asked me, how we went on? I told him we had come to a full stop, by signing and sealing the preliminaries the 30th of November. I told him, that we had been very industrious, having been at it forenoon, afternoon, and evening, ever since my arrival, either with one another, or with the English gentlemen. He asked if it was definitive and separate? I said by no means. They were only articles to be inserted in the definitive treaty. He asked, if there was to be any truce or armistice in the mean time? I said again, by no means.
He then said, that he believed France and England had agreed too; that the Count de Vergennes" son was gone to England with M. de Rayneval; but he believed the Spaniards had not yet agreed, and the Dutch were yet a great way off, and had agreed upon nothing. They had had several conferences. At the first, he had informed Mr Fitzherbert, that their High Mightinesses insisted upon the freedom of navigation as a preliminary and a _sine qua non_. Mr Fitzherbert had communicated this to his Court, but the answer received was, that his Court did not approve of conceding this as a _sine qua non_, but chose to have all the demands of their High Mightinesses stated together. M. Brantzen answered, that his instructions were, not to enter into any conferences upon other points, until this was agreed. That it was the intention of the British Court to agree to this. That he could not consider any changes in the Ministry as making any alteration. They were all Ministers of the same King, and servants of the same nation.
That Mr Fox, when he was Secretary of State, by his letter to the Russian Minister, had declared the intention of the King to consent to the freedom of navigation, &c.
M. Brantzen said, however, that he had in his private capacity and without compromising his ministerial character, entered into explanations with Mr Fitzherbert, and had told him that he should insist upon three points, the freedom of navigation, the rest.i.tution of territories in the East and West Indies, and compensation for damages. The two first points could not be disputed, and the third ought not be; for the war against them had been unjust, the pretences for it were groundless, their accession to the armed neutrality must now be admitted, even by Britain"s accession to it, to have been an illegitimate cause of war, and the object of a treaty with America could not be seriously pretended to be a just cause of war; and many members of Parliament had in the time of it declared the war unjust, and some of those members were now Ministers; even the prime Minister, my Lord Shelburne himself, had freely declared the war unjust in the House of Peers; and if the war was unjust, the damages and injustice ought to be repaired.
Mr Fitzherbert said, that there was no precedent of compensation for damages in a treaty of peace. M. Brantzen begged his pardon, and thought there had been instances. One example in particular, which the English themselves had set against the Dutch, which just then came into his head. Cromwell had demanded compensation of them, and they had agreed, as now appears by the treaty, to pay a hundred thousand pounds sterling as a compensation.
M. Brantzen was not furnished with a full account of all the losses of individuals, and therefore could not precisely say what the amount would be. That perhaps they might not insist upon prompt payment, nor upon a stated sum, but might leave both the sum and time of payment to be ascertained by commissioners at their leisure after the peace.
I observed to him, that we intended to write to Mr Dana, and send him a copy of our preliminaries, that he might commence his negotiations with the neutral powers, and if he succeeded we could then make common cause with Holland, and insist on an article to secure the freedom of navigation. This idea he received with great pleasure, and said he would write about it to the States. Upon this I asked him, with whom he and the other Dutch Ministers abroad, held their correspondence? He answered, that the Secretary f.a.gel was properly speaking the Minister of Foreign Affairs. That their princ.i.p.al correspondence was with him; but that they had a correspondence with the Grand Pensionary Bleiswick too. That the letters received by the Secretary were laid before the _Besogne Secrete_, or Committee of Secresy. This committee consisted of so many members, one at least for each Province, that it was very difficult to keep anything secret. Foreign Ministers were very inquisitive, and the Duc de la Vauguyon would be likely to get at it.
So that if they had any to write, which they wished secret, they wrote it to the Grand Pensionary, who is not obliged to lay before the States letters entire. He selects such parts as he judges proper, and prints them, to be taken _ad referendum_, and laid before the Regencies of the cities. That they had sometimes a little diffidence of this Court (_quelque mefiance_), for this Court was very fine (_diablement fine_), and when this happened, they wrote to the Grand Pensionary, that it might not be communicated to the French Minister, and consequently to his Court. "These people are vastly profound, They will not favor the Spaniards in obtaining the Floridas. They will play England against Spain, and Spain against England. England against you, and you against England, and all of you against us, and us against all of you, according to their own schemes and interests. They are closely b.u.t.toned up about Gibraltar, and as to Jamaica, they will not favor Spain in that view. I expect they will get their own affairs arranged, and then advise England to agree to the freedom of navigation and a rest.i.tution of territory, and then advise us to be very easy about compensation." Thus M. Brantzen.
I next visited Mr Jay, to talk about writing to Mr Dana, and communicating to the neutral powers the preliminary articles. Mr Jay says, that Mr Oswald is very anxious that his Court should do that, and he has been writing to the ministry to persuade them to it. Had a long conversation with Mr Jay about the manner of settling the western lands. This I cannot now detail.
Went next to Mr Laurens, upon the subject of writing to Mr Dana, and found him full in my sentiments, and at my return found answers from Dr Franklin and Mr Laurens to the letters I wrote them, both agreeing that this is the critical moment for Mr Dana to commence his negotiations. Doctor Franklin promises to have an authentic copy made to send to Mr Dana.
In the evening many gentlemen came in, among the rest Mr Bourse, the agent of the Dutch East India company, Who expressed a good deal of anxiety about their negotiations, and feared they should not have justice in the East Indies.
_Wednesday, December 4th._--It is proper that I should note here, that in the beginning of the year 1780, soon after my arrival at Paris, Mr Galloway"s pamphlets fell into my hands. I wrote a long series of letters to a friend, in answer to them. That friend sent them to England, but the printers dared not publish them. They remained there until last summer, when they were begun to be printed, and are continued to this day, (not being yet quite finished,) in Parker"s General Advertiser, but with false dates, being dated in the months of January and February last, under the t.i.tle of "Letters from a distinguished American." They appear to have been well received, and to have contributed somewhat to unite the nation in accelerating the acknowledgment of American independence, and to convince the nation of the necessity of respecting our alliances, and making peace.
I hope it will be permitted to me, or to some other who can do it better, some ten or fifteen years hence, to collect together in one view, my little negotiations in Europe. Fifty years hence it may be published, perhaps twenty. I will venture to say, however feebly I may have acted my part, or whatever mistakes I may have committed, yet the situations I have been in, between angry nations and more angry factions, have been some of the most singular and interesting, that ever happened to any man. The fury of enemies, as well as of elements, the subtlety and arrogance of allies, and, what has been worse than all, the jealousy, envy, and little pranks of friends and copatriots, would form one of the most instructive lessons in morals and politics, that ever was committed to paper.
_Monday, December 9th._--Visited Mr Jay. Mr Oswald came in. We slided from one thing to another, into a very lively conversation upon politics. He asked me what the conduct of his Court and nation ought to be in relation to America. I answered, the alpha and omega of British policy towards America was summed up in this one maxim, see that American independence is independent,--independent of all the world,--independent of yourselves, as well as of France,--and independent of both, as well as the rest of Europe. Depend upon it, you have no chance for salvation, but by setting up America very high; take care to remove from the American mind all cause of fear of you; no other motive but fear of you will ever produce in the Americans any unreasonable attachment to the House of Bourbon. "Is it possible,"
says he, "that the people of America should be afraid of us, or hate us?" "One would think, Mr Oswald," said I, "that you had been out of the world for these twenty years past; yes, there are three millions of people in America, who hate and dread you more than anything in the world." "What," said he, "now we have come to our senses?" "Your change of system is not yet known in America," said I. "Well," said he, "what shall we do to remove those fears and jealousies?" "In one word," said I, "favor and promote the interest, reputation, and dignity of the United States, in everything that is consistent with your own. If you pursue the plan of cramping, clipping, and weakening America, on the supposition, that she will be a rival to you, you will make her really so; you will make her the natural and perpetual ally of your natural and perpetual enemies." "But in what instance," said he, "have we discovered such a disposition?" "In the three leagues from your sh.o.r.es, and the fifteen leagues from Cape Breton," said I, "to which your Ministry insisted so earnestly to exclude our fishermen. Here was a point, that would have done us great harm, and you no good; on the contrary, harm; so that you would have hurt yourselves to hurt us; this disposition must be guarded against." "I am fully of your mind, about that," said he, "but what else can we do?" "Send a Minister to Congress," said I, "at the peace, a clever fellow, who understands himself, and will neither set us bad examples, nor intermeddle in our parties. This will show, that you are consistent with yourselves; that you are sincere in your acknowledgment of American independence; and that you do not entertain hopes and designs of overturning it. Such a Minister will dissipate many fears, and will be of more service to the least obnoxious refugees, than any other measure could be. Let the King send a Minister to Congress, and receive one from that body. This will be acting consistently, and with dignity, in the face of the universe."
"Well, what else shall we do?" said he. "I have more than once already," said I, "advised you to put your Ministers upon negotiating the acknowledgment of our independence by the neutral powers." "True,"
said he, "and I have written, about it, and in my answers," said he, laughing, "I am charged with speculation; but I do not care, I will write them my sentiments. I will not take any of their money. I have spent already twelve or thirteen hundred pounds, and all the reward I will have for it shall be the pleasure of writing as I think. My opinion is, that our Court should sign the armed neutrality, and announce to them what they have done with you, and negotiate to have you admitted to sign too. But I want to write more fully on the subject, I want you to give me your thoughts upon it, for I do not understand it so fully as I wish. What motives can be thrown out to the Empress of Russia? Or what motives can she be supposed to have to acknowledge your independence? And what motives can our Court have to interfere, or intercede with the neutral powers, to receive you into their confederation?"
"I will answer all these questions," said I, "to the best of my knowledge, and with the utmost candor. In the first place, there has been, with very little interruption, a jealousy between the Court of Petersburg and Versailles for many years. France is the old friend and ally of the Sublime Porte, the natural enemy of Russia. France, not long since, negotiated a peace between Russia and the Turks; but upon the Empress" late offers of mediation, and especially her endeavors to negotiate Holland out of the war, France appears to have been piqued, and, as the last revolution in the Crimea happened soon after, there is reason to suspect that French emissaries excited the revolt against the new independent government, which the Empress had taken so much pains to establish. Poland has been long a scene of compet.i.tion between Russian and French politics, both parties having spent great sums in pensions to partisans, until they have laid all virtue and public spirit prostrate in that country. Sweden is another region of rivalry between France and Russia, where both parties spent such sums in pensions, as to destroy the principles of liberty, and prepare the way for that revolution, which France favored from a principle of economy, rather than any other. These hints are sufficient to show the opposition of views and interests between France and Russia, and we see the consequence of it, that England has more influence at Petersburg than France. The Empress, therefore, would have two motives, one, to oblige England, if they should intercede for an acknowledgment of American independence, and another, to render America less dependent upon France. The Empress, moreover loves reputation, and it would be no small addition to her glory to undertake a negotiation with all the neutral Courts, to induce them to admit America into their confederacy. The Empress might be further tempted; she was bent upon extending her commerce, and the commerce of America, if it were only in duck and hemp, would be no small object to her. As to the motives of your Court, Princes often think themselves warranted, if not bound, to fight for their glory; surely they may lawfully negotiate for reputation. If the neutral powers should acknowledge our independence now, France will have the reputation, very unjustly, of having negotiated it; but if your Court now takes a decided part in favor of it, your Court will have the glory of it, in Europe and in America, and this will have a good effect upon American grat.i.tude." "But," said he, "this would be negotiating for the honor and interest of France, for no doubt France wishes all the world to acknowledge your independence." "Give me leave to tell you, Sir," said I, "you are mistaken. If I have not been mistaken in the policy of France, from my first observation of it to this hour, they have been as averse to other powers acknowledging our independence as you have been." Mr Jay joined me in the same declaration. "I understand it now," said he; "there is a gentleman going to London this day, I will go home and write upon the subject by him."
_Tuesday, December 10th._--Visited Mr Oswald, to inquire the news from England. He had the _Courier de l"Europe_, in which is Mr Secretary Townshend"s letter to the Lord Mayor of London, dated the 3d instant, in which he announces the signature of the preliminaries, on the 30th of November, between the Commissioners of his Majesty, and the Commissioners of the United States of America. He had also the King"s speech, announcing the same thing.
Mr Oswald said, that France would not separate her affairs from Spain; that he had hoped that America would have a.s.sisted them somewhat, in compromising affairs with France; and Dr Franklin, who was present, said he did not know anything of the other negotiations. He said that neither Mr Fitzherbert, nor the Count de Vergennes, nor the Count d"Aranda, communicated anything to him, that he understood the Dutch were farthest from an agreement. Upon this, I said, "Mr Oswald, Mr Fitzherbert cannot, I think, have any difficulty to agree with M.
Brantzen. There are three points, viz. the liberty of navigation; rest.i.tution of possessions; and compensation for damages. The liberty of navigation, I suppose, is the point that sticks. But why should it stick? When all nations are agreed in the principle, why should England stand out? England must agree to it, she has already in effect agreed to it; as it affects all nations but Holland and America, and, if she were disposed, she could not prevent them from having the benefit." Upon this, Dr Franklin said, "the Dutch would be able in any future war, to carry on their commerce, even of naval stores, in the bottoms of other neutral powers." "Yes," said Mr Oswald, "and I am of opinion, that England ought to subscribe the armed neutrality." "Very well," said I, "then let Mr Fitzherbert agree to this point with M.
Brantzen, and let Mr Harris, at Petersburg, take Mr Dana in his hand, and go to the Prince Potemkin, or the Count d"Ostermann, and say, the king, my master, has authorised me to subscribe the principles of the armed neutrality, and instructed me to introduce to you, Mr Dana, Minister from the United States of America, to do the same. Let him subscribe his name under mine."
At this, they all laughed very heartily. Mr Oswald, however, recollecting himself, and the conversation between him and me, yesterday, on the same subject, very gravely turned it off, by saying, "he did not see a necessity to be in a hurry about that, America was well enough." I said, "as to rest.i.tution of the Dutch territories, I suppose your Court will not make much difficulty about that, if this Court does not, as it is not probable they will, and as to compensation for damages, the Dutch will probably be as easy as they can about that."
Dr Franklin said, he was for beginning early to think about the articles of the definitive treaty. We had been so happy as to be the first in the preliminaries, and he wished to be so in the definitive articles. Thus we parted.
_Thursday, December 12th._--Met at Mr Laurens", and signed the letter I had drawn up to Mr Dana, which I sent off, enclosed with a copy of the preliminaries, and consulted about articles to be inserted in the definitive treaty. Agreed that Mr Jay and I should prepare a joint letter to Congress. At seven o"clock, I met Mr Jay at his house, and we drew up a letter.
_Friday, December 13th._--I went first to Mr Jay, and made some addition to the joint letter, which I carried first to Mr Laurens, who made some corrections and additions, and then to Pa.s.sy, to Dr Franklin, who proposed a few other corrections, and showed me an article he had drawn up for the definitive treaty, to exempt fishermen, husbandmen, and merchants, as much as possible, from the evils of future wars. This is a good lesson to mankind, at least. All agreed to meet at my house, at eleven o"clock tomorrow, to finish the joint letter.
FOOTNOTE:
[15] For some account of the part taken by Dr Franklin, in regard to the Treaty, before the arrival of Mr Jay and Mr Adams in Paris, see the North American Review, for January, 1830, No. 66, p. 15.
END OF THE SIXTH VOLUME.