So well had Sir Garnet Wolseley matured his plans before entering on the campaign, that he had predicted his arrival in Cairo on the 16th September. As a fact, he arrived a day earlier, that is to say, on the morning of the 15th, when the railway brought him and the Guards to Cairo at the same time.
Arabis" account of Tel-el-Kebir and the subsequent events is as follows:--
"Before our trenches, &c., were completed, the British forces attacked us suddenly at sunrise, the firing lasting for some time, when suddenly in our rear appeared a division of cavalry and artillery, which caused the flight of the Egyptian troops on Wednesday, the 13th September.
"After the flight of the troops I left for Belbeis, the English artillery following close behind me. When I arrived there I met Ali Pasha El Roby, with whom I went to Insbuz, and thence by train to Cairo.
"In Cairo we found a Council at the Ministry of War, all the Princes being present. After a long discussion, all being confident that England had no intention of annexing Egypt, it was decided to offer no more resistance, more especially as England was renowned for dealing always towards others with equity and humanity; and we were confident that if the necessary inquiries were inst.i.tuted, and the feeling of the people generally understood, England would do her utmost to put a stop to all injustice and give back freedom to them.
"For this purpose I sent a telegram on the 14th September to the Commander of the Abba.s.sieh troops, ordering him to hoist a flag of truce, and to proceed and meet the commander of the British troops, informing him at the same time that the war was altogether at an end, it being understood that the intention of the British Government was to preserve the country from ruin.[74]
"The English troops arrived in Cairo at sunset, and were met by Riza Pasha and Ibrahim Bey Fawzi, the Prefect of Police. At 1.30 a.m. Ibrahim Bey Fawzi came and informed me that General Lowe desired to have an interview with me at Abba.s.sieh. The same day the officer in charge at Kafr Dowar (Toulba Pasha) came up to Cairo and was summoned with myself to this interview. We thereupon went to General Lowe. When Toulba Pasha met General Lowe he asked us whether we were willing to give ourselves up as prisoners to the English Government. We thereupon took off our swords and delivered them to General Lowe, who was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, telling him at the same time that we only gave ourselves up to the English Government because we were confident England would deal with us justly, and for the safety and peace of our country we had abandoned all idea of resistance, and had surrendered ourselves, being confident that England had no wish to annex the country. The General agreed with this statement, and we remained with him three days, and then were sent to Abdin, and were treated kindly and well."
In the following telegram to Abdel-el-Al, in command at Damietta, the defeat at Tel-el-Kebir was thus described by Yacoub Pasha, the Under Secretary of State for War, who had been with Arabi in the insurgent camp:--
"At half-past ten (Turkish time) the enemy attacked the line of intrenchments, and firing commenced on both sides. We caused a large number of the enemy to perish beside the intrenchments. I found a train about to leave Tel-el-Kebir, and got in with a few wounded. I know nothing after that, except that on leaving Tel-el-Kebir I saw that a train had been smashed."
The manner in which the news of the fight reached the agricultural population may be gathered from the following extract from the work of one of the native historians of the British occupation of Egypt:--
"The peasants were relating to each other one morning the news of a great victory by which the land forces of the invading foreigner had received a blow, when suddenly a peasant rode into the village on a cavalry horse, without his coat, belt, or arms, and announced that the English were coming! He related how he had been in the camp of Tel-el-Kebir, how he and his comrades had been aroused before daybreak by a dreadful fire of musketry and artillery, and how, before they had time to prepare themselves for defence, the nimble foreigners came scampering over the intrenchments and right into the very heart of the camp. Satan must have aided them, for there was no possibility of resistance, and even Arabi fled! By this time, he thought, the English must be in Cairo, for they were nimble, cunning dogs and sons of dogs, and n.o.body could resist them."
The submission of the Egyptian army in Cairo was speedily followed by surrenders in other places--Kafr Dowar, Aboukir, and Rosetta yielded without a struggle. Fort Ghemil, near Port Sad, was occupied on the 21st September by the British.
Damietta was the last to hold out. A British force, consisting of the Berkshire, Shropshire, South Staffordshire, and Suss.e.x Regiments, under Sir Evelyn Wood, was despatched against it on the 22nd September, after negotiations with the Commandant Abdel-el-Al had failed. A portion of the fleet under Admiral Dowell was ordered to co-operate. However, on the 23rd, Abdel-el-Al, hearing of these preparations, capitulated with all his forces.
The surrender of the Egyptian army at Kafr Dowar was an event of importance. But to render what follows intelligible, as well as for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to preface the history of that event with an account of occurrences at Alexandria subsequent to the departure of Sir Garnet Wolseley for the Ca.n.a.l.
On the 21st August, the Khedive relieved Ragheb Pasha and his colleagues of their duties, and named Cherif Pasha President of the Council of Ministers. With him was a.s.sociated Riaz Pasha, who had in the meantime returned from Europe.
After the departure of Wolseley for Port Sad and Ismailia, General Hamley took the local command, and the fresh transports constantly arriving at Alexandria were very welcome to reinforce the garrison, which had been considerably weakened by the departure of the main body of the army. Only two ships of war were left in harbour, the _Invincible_ and _Inconstant_, which latter vessel had lately arrived from England.
The military operations dwindled into insignificance. Both sides confined themselves to strengthening their positions and to making small reconnaissances. Round Mex the Bedouins kept the troops well on the alert, and several minor skirmishes took place. About August 20th, the defences of Ramleh were strengthened by the mounting of three additional guns. Two were taken from the Hospital battery at Ras-el-Tin, and the third was found unmounted near Mex Fort.
On the 31st of August a party of bluejackets from the _Minotaur_ landed at night and demolished, by gun-cotton, a house near the British advanced posts on the Mahmoudieh Ca.n.a.l, which afforded cover to the enemy. Some native houses opposite the Villa Antoniades, which had been used by the Bedouins as a place whence to take shots at our posts there, had for the same reason to be destroyed.
On the 1st September, Generals Hamley and Alison and the Highland Brigade sailed for Port Sad and Ismailia, General Sir Evelyn Wood being left in command.
Anxious to make the rebel leader believe that the chief attack would be on Kafr Dowar, and to prevent him from sending away his troops to strengthen other positions, the British troops contrived daily to hara.s.s the Egyptian lines. Generally the reconnaissances took place at dusk, as the Egyptians seemed to prefer withdrawing their troops under the cover of the darkness. Grown wary by experience, they refused to be drawn out in force, but limited themselves to a brisk artillery fire.
It was at this time that an attempt was made to cut the d.y.k.e at Mex, in order to flood Lake Mareotis, the level of which at this season was some feet lower than that of the sea. Although it was reckoned that it would take some weeks in this way to raise the water of the lake to its proper level, the stratagem was not devoid of merit. One of its objects was to enable steam launches with guns to hara.s.s the flank of the enemy"s position at Kafr Dowar.
Early in September, Mahmoud Fehmi, already referred to as having been made prisoner by Sir Garnet Wolseley"s force, was brought to Alexandria, and, in return for a promise to spare his life, furnished full details of Arabi"s plans and position.
On the 13th September, Alexandria received the news of the victory of Tel-el-Kebir with the wildest delight. Early in the morning it was known that the fight had begun, and great excitement was manifested by all cla.s.ses. About eleven in the forenoon, when the facts were published, this feeling increased perceptibly. All business was suspended.
Processions of Europeans were formed, and, preceded by bands of music, paraded amid the ruins of the town. Hats and helmets were thrown into the air, and cheers and cries of "Viva Inghilterra!" resounded on all sides. The bands played "G.o.d Save the Queen" and the Khedivial Hymn by turns. Crowds rushed for the English soldiers on guard at the Tribunals, and embraced them frantically. Sir Edward Malet, the English Consul-General, called to congratulate the Khedive, who also received a congratulatory message from the Queen. Never before had the English been so popular in Alexandria. It took some days before the excitement cooled down and things resumed their ordinary course.
Kafr Dowar was given up to Sir Evelyn Wood on the 16th September. Yacoub Sami, Arabi"s sub-Minister of War, represented him on this occasion.
Some 6,000 men in all laid down their arms. There were 700 captured horses, 50 field-guns with their equipments, and 15,000 Remington rifles. The captured men were allowed to disband, and the officers were lodged as prisoners in the Palace at Ramleh.
General Wood and his staff went out by rail, preceded, as a measure of precaution, by the armour-clad train. The 49th Regiment had been previously sent forward as an escort. Arrived at the bridge crossing the Mahmoudieh Ca.n.a.l, the party proceeded on horseback to Fort Aslam, as the most advanced of the earthworks of Kafr Dowar was called. This formed a part of three long lines of redoubts, flanked on both sides by swampy and impa.s.sable ground, and running at right angles across the railway and Ca.n.a.l. These defences were supplemented by shelter-trenches and rifle-pits. The position was one of great strength, and if held by good soldiers could only have been taken, if at all, at a great sacrifice of life. Each line of redoubts had a ditch of 15 feet in width in front of it. The distance between the first and second lines was 4,000 metres, and between the second and third 5,000 metres. Fort Aslam was the strongest of the redoubts, and was pierced with embrasures for guns. The pa.s.sage for the railway trains was blocked by a large ma.s.s of masonry, which Sir Evelyn Wood at once caused to be blown up with dynamite. Fort Aslam was capable of being easily defended by 250 good soldiers. The garrison, however, had disappeared, leaving only a dozen or so of officers, including Yacoub Sami, who came forward to meet the English Commander. In the fort, which appeared to have suffered but slightly, were found 150 horses, besides quant.i.ties of arms and ammunition abandoned by the soldiers. Amongst the cannon were some mounted Krupp guns. Between the first and second lines the remains of one camp for about 2,500 men were found, and between the second and third lines, of another camp for the rest of the army. On all sides were found horses and mules, mixed pell-mell with carriages, still loaded with silks, clothes, calico, &c., from the shops and houses pillaged in Alexandria.
The third line of defence, that situated at Kinje Osman, the nearest point to Kafr Dowar, was inferior to other parts of the defence, being provided only with two insignificant bastions, armed with old cannons and a long line of rifle-pits extending across the railway. Behind it, in the camp of Kafr Dowar, stood 6,000 soldiers, armed with Remington rifles, waiting to surrender to the British army. There were also several batteries of artillery and two squadrons of cavalry. The men were anything but warlike in appearance. Many of them had already thrown away their uniforms, and the greater part wore only the dress of the ordinary fellah.
The natives met with along the line showed not the slightest sign of hostility. On the contrary, they tried to conceal their evident uneasiness at the sight of the British force by a.s.suming a pleased air, and waving white rags as a subst.i.tute for flags of truce. At Kafr Dowar itself, crowds of Arabs, mostly refugees from Alexandria, were congregated. Many of these were pillagers and incendiaries of the worst cla.s.s, and strict orders had to be given to prevent their returning to the scene of their former exploits.
Yacoub Sami, on giving up his sword to General Wood, a.s.sured him that no one had been throughout more loyal to the Khedive than he, Yacoub Sami, had been; and as for Arabi, he was simply a scoundrel and a monster who had refused to listen to Yacoub"s loyal counsels.
One of the first questions put by General Wood was as to what had become of a Lieutenant named Paolucci, who had deserted some weeks before from the Italian ironclad _Castelfidardo_ to join Arabi. This officer, in his endeavour to reach the rebels" lines, had the misfortune to fall into the hands of Bedouins, who used him in the most brutal manner.
Eventually, after five days" wandering, he succeeded in finding his way to the camp at Kafr Dowar, but in a pitiable condition. He was dest.i.tute of every rag of clothing, and so exhausted as to be barely able to stand on his legs. Arabi, on hearing him say that his wish was to serve the cause of liberty, allowed him to be removed to the camp ambulance, where he remained till the surrender. In reply to General Wood, M. Paolucci himself was produced. He was now dressed in an Egyptian officer"s uniform much too large for him, and was still suffering acutely. The General, without making any observation, handed M. Paolucci over to two marines, with instructions to conduct him to the Italian Consul at Alexandria.[75] M. Ninet, who had been in the enemy"s lines ever since the bombardment and subsequent destruction of Alexandria, had, it was ascertained, left for Cairo on receipt of the news of the taking of Tel-el-Kebir.
General Wood at once gave orders for clearing the railway. Civilians were requisitioned for the work, and so well was this carried out that the following day, which was fixed for the surrender of the arms, the trains were running freely between Kafr Dowar and Alexandria.
Two British battalions were despatched on the 17th, to encamp at Kafr Dowar, and to take delivery of the Egyptian arms. The army which was to surrender had then practically disappeared. The rifles were piled, the officers were in charge, but their men, they said, "had gone off to the fields."[76]
General Wood received the same day the submission of about 1,000 men from Aboukir and 4,000 from Mex. On the 17th, the Khedive signed a Decree disbanding the Egyptian army.
One of the most remarkable features of the campaign was the rapidity with which it was conducted. From the firing of the first gun at the bombardment on the 11th July until the occupation of Cairo, but sixty-six days elapsed, the campaign proper occupying only twenty-five in all. It served also to ill.u.s.trate the power of moving large bodies of troops by sea with a rapidity and certainty of concentration impossible on land.
The difference between the power of steam and sails in connection with military operations may be seen from the following examples:--
On the 19th May, 1798, Napoleon sailed for Egypt from Toulon with favouring winds; nevertheless, it was not until the 10th June (according to some reports the 15th) that he reached even his first port of call, Malta, thus occupying no less than twenty-three days on this short voyage, and it was not till the 1st July that he arrived off Alexandria.
In 1800, when Indian troops were despatched to a.s.sist in expelling the French from Egypt, the first detachment sailed from Bombay on the 28th December, but did not get to Suez till the end of April, 1801, and the remainder, following some days later, only arrived at Kosseir, on the Red Sea, _en route_ to Keneh, on the Nile, on the 8th June, nearly six months later. As a contrast to the above, the head of the column of British transports left England on the 30th July, 1882, and arrived at Alexandria on the 10th August, thus completing the voyage in only eleven days.
Much has been made of the rapidity of the French invasion of Egypt, but, after all, Napoleon only entered Cairo on the 23rd July, that is, sixty-five days after leaving France, whereas Wolseley left England on the 2nd August, made the long sea-voyage by way of Gibraltar, and arrived in Cairo forty-five days after, viz., on the 15th September.
With regard to Tel-el-Kebir, the shortness of the time occupied in storming the intrenchments has been made use of, more especially by foreign critics, to lessen the credit of the victory. Without pretending that the battle was more than, comparatively speaking, a small affair, exceedingly well-managed, the number of casualties relatively to the number of the attacking force shows that there was a real resistance, and that the fighting on both sides was more serious than is generally supposed.
The news of the victory of Tel-el-Kebir, the capture of Cairo, and the close of the war, produced a profound sensation in Europe. In England the greatest enthusiasm was manifested, and to the events of the campaign was given an importance perhaps in excess of their actual merits.[77]
On the Continent, however, the opposite was the case. The very journals which only a week before had declared that, in undertaking to subdue Arabi, England had a.s.sumed a task the difficulties of which she had scarcely calculated, now went to the other extreme, and described Tel-el-Kebir as a mere military promenade. In the "Debats," M. Gabriel Channes wrote that the fears that an Egyptian campaign would prove hazardous were groundless. The only difficulties which the English army had to encounter were due to the vast amount of baggage it had to transport, owing to the men carrying nothing but their arms. According to the same article an army less burdened would have beaten Arabi and reached Cairo in a few days; and if the campaign had lasted some weeks, this was only due to the slowness of the attack. The "Avenir Militaire"
maintained that Sir Garnet Wolseley did not shorten the campaign by transferring his base to Ismailia, and that the qualities of the English troops were not exposed to a very severe ordeal. "The attack on Tel-el-Kebir," it added, "against troops ill on the watch, succeeded with a prompt.i.tude which rendered a portion of those qualities useless."
Many of the Continental journals went further, and unable in any other way to explain the dashing fight which in twenty minutes placed all Egypt at England"s feet, boldly a.s.serted that the victory was bought and paid for by English gold. They even named the exact sum, viz., E32,000. It was, perhaps, unfortunate that the late Professor Palmer"s ill-fated expedition into the Sinaitic Desert to secure the neutrality of the Bedouins, at a price of 5,000, should have given an apparent colour to these reports.[78]
One author,[79] whose writings, however, are not always to be accepted as accurate, states that Sultan Pasha (already referred to as the President of the Chamber of Notables) was attached to Wolseley"s force with the object of securing by large bribes the fidelity of the Bedouins in the district between Ismailia and Zag-a-zig. According to the same authority, the Bedouins received from 3 to 2 a head, and much of the money found its way into the pockets of officers of the Egyptian army from the rank of Lieutenant to that of Colonel.
The events of Tel-el-Kebir are thus referred to by the same writer:--
"On the 12th September, Arabi learned towards twelve o"clock, from a Bedouin Sheikh, that the English would attack _en ma.s.se_ the lines of Tel-el-Kebir towards two o"clock in the morning on the 13th, throwing themselves on Belbeis to open the road to Cairo. It was then necessary to guard this point, formerly fortified by the French. Arabi consequently telegraphed to Toulba Pasha at Kafr Dowar to send at once one of his best battalions, the last, or nearly the last, which remained to him, with orders to be in line of battle at Tel-el-Kebir at daybreak on the 13th. At one a.m. the train brought this detachment, which only arrived at Zag-a-zig long after everything was finished. The battalion then returned on its steps in company with the fugitives from the battlefield.
"At Tel-el-Kebir, during the night, between two and three a.m., at the first rifle shots, the Bedouins, _en ma.s.se_, threw themselves on the Egyptian lines, shouting like demons, and causing the wildest confusion. The native troops knew not who was with them or against them. Whole regiments ran like hares without striking a blow (_sic_), and the English, astonished to encounter so little resistance, ma.s.sacred the fugitives as if at a shooting-party; 3,000 trained men belonging to the infantry, all that the army of the East possessed, faced the enemy, and with the last vestiges of the artillery, fired valiantly as long as they were able. More than half of them perished.
"It is confidently a.s.serted that several of the Egyptian officers, hindered in their flight by the gold which they had in their pockets, seeking to lighten themselves, were arrested and pillaged by the soldiers of one of the black regiments. As to the Bedouins, their treason was so well arranged by agreement with Sultan Pasha, that they, with the speed of the wind, quitted their cantonments without molestation."
In considering M. Ninet"s narrative, it must be remembered that he was, from first to last, an avowed ally of the Arabist party, and also that his sentiments towards England had always been of the most unfriendly character. That, under these circ.u.mstances, he should seek to explain Sir Garnet Wolseley"s success by suggesting treachery and corruption is not altogether unnatural.
It is quite possible that, as regards the corruption of the Bedouins, Sultan Pasha, as an Egyptian official, may have acted in the manner described. But that, as suggested by the Continental Press, English gold was employed by Sir Garnet Wolseley to secure his victory is too ridiculous for serious consideration. Had it been the desire of the British Government to purchase Tel-el-Kebir in the manner stated, it is incredible that by the expenditure of a little additional capital an entirely bloodless victory should not have been obtained.
Further than this, Arabi himself, in all the explanations which he gave of the war, never once hinted at the means alleged by his apologists as having brought about his defeat. The story of the Egyptian officers being so heavily weighted with gold as to be unable to make good their retreat reads more like an Oriental fable than anything else.