The steamer was beached on the sandspit of a small island, and everything landed. The island of Mernat, about forty yards distant, was occupied by a picket of the Royal Suss.e.x and the crew and soldiers of the _Tala Hawiyeh_, and at nightfall the picket of the Suss.e.x was withdrawn to the smaller island.
Stuart-Wortley was directed to proceed as soon as it was dark to Gubat, with information of the position of the expedition, and a request for a.s.sistance.
Wilson at first intended to cross to the right bank of the Nile and march as soon as the moon rose, but finding it impossible to move the Soudanese troops, he bivouacked with Khasm-el-Mus on Mernat, whilst Captains Trafford and Gascoigne remained on the smaller island to guard the stores.
On the 1st February a zeriba was made on Mernat Island; the four guns from the steamers were mounted, and all the ammunition and stores which had been saved were collected. Some Shukriyehs from the mainland visited the party, and said that since the fall of Khartoum they had determined to throw in their lot with the Mahdi; they advised Khasm-el-Mus to do the same, but he replied he would never surrender without a letter from the Mahdi promising safety.
When the zeriba was finished, Wilson called the men to arms and, during the inspection which followed, was able to a.s.sure himself that a large proportion of the soldiers would remain loyal and fight to the last. One soldier deserted during the day. Two messengers were sent to Halfiyeh to obtain news from Khartoum.
On the 2nd Fiki-Mustapha, from Wad-Habeshi, crossed to the island and tried to persuade Khasm-el-Mus to submit, but he returned the same answer as before. A friendly Shukriyeh brought news that a steamer had left Gubat for the relief of the force at noon the previous day. A sister of Khasm-el-Mus, who had followed the steamers down the river, also arrived, with news that the families of all the officers on board the steamers had been killed at Khartoum, and that Gordon was killed whilst coming out of his room in Government House. Khasm-el-Mus" sister was sent back to Khartoum to obtain further information, and to purchase back any of the family sold into slavery. During the afternoon Abdul Hamid Bey (who had brought a strong letter of recommendation from Gordon to Lord Wolseley) deserted, as well as some of the "Reises" (pilots) and four soldiers. As soon as Wilson was aware of this, he placed the remaining Reises, who were all Dongolawis, and friendly to the Mahdi, under a guard of the Suss.e.x, with orders that they were to be shot if they attempted to escape.
On the 3rd, Wilson ordered all the troops to be confined to the zeriba, and, in the event of the non-arrival of the steamer, made arrangements to seize Fiki-Mustapha, who was again to visit the island, and keep him as hostage.
To return to Stuart-Wortley: he left the island at 6.45 p.m. in a small rowing-boat with four English soldiers and eight natives, and floated past the enemy"s works, who did not see him until opposite their last bonfire, when they fired several shots without effect. He then ordered the men to row hard, and reached the camp at Gubat at 3 a.m. on the 1st February without any further opposition.
The news he brought placed the force at Gubat in a state of consternation. The first necessity was, of course, to get Wilson"s party off the island. It was decided that Lord Charles Beresford should start early in the afternoon in one of the remaining steamers. It was also resolved to send off a convoy across the desert to bring up reinforcements in view of a probable advance of the Mahdi with the force which the capture of Khartoum had set free.[115]
Stuart-Wortley left Gubat at 2 p.m. on board the _Safiyeh_, with Lord Charles Beresford in command; a portion of the Naval Brigade, under Lieutenant Van Koughnet; twenty non-commissioned officers and privates of the Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Bower, King"s Royal Rifles; two Gardner guns; and two 4-pounder bra.s.s mountain-guns.
On the 2nd a few shots were fired from the west bank. The vessel stopped for the night just past Gebel-Fangur. On the 3rd she started at 6.30 a.m. At 8 a.m. she came in sight of the enemy"s works at Wad-Habeshi, where the Arabs could be seen running into the rifle-trench; fire was opened with the bow gun at about 1,000 yards range. On nearing the position, the enemy opened a heavy rifle-fire, and a gun, in an embrasure facing down the river, also opened fire. The steamer replied with the Gardners and rifles, and also with a 4-pounder. When opposite the central embrasure, the enemy moved their gun and fired, their shot pa.s.sing over the steamer. The latter"s fire was so rapid and well-directed that the enemy were shy of putting their heads over the parapet to take aim. Having pa.s.sed the embrasure facing up the river, where the enemy had their second gun, a round shot pa.s.sed through the vessel"s boiler and caused the steam to escape in a huge volume. She proceeded about 300 yards further, while the steam lasted, and then dropped anchor at 500 yards from the enemy"s position. Van Koughnet was shot through the thigh when serving the Gardner, one bluejacket was mortally wounded, and two more were severely scalded. The Gardners had to be moved abaft the battery, and a hole made in it to allow the gun and the Gardners to play upon the enemy"s works. The boiler was found to be repairable. Firing continued very brisk until 10.30 a.m., when the enemy"s fire was silenced.
Wilson"s party heard the _Safiyeh_ coming into action with the enemy"s battery at Wad-Habeshi; but shortly afterwards Trafford, who was on the "look-out" at the end of the island, reported that he had seen the steamer enveloped in smoke, and feared she had met with a serious accident. As the steamer continued to fire on the battery, and could be seen swinging at anchor, it was determined to break up the zeriba at once and march down to her.
As soon as the order was given a scene of wild confusion arose, as it was impossible to keep the Soudanese soldiers under control, and the enemy opened a heavy rifle-fire when they noticed the movement.
Eventually the guns, ammunition, stores, wounded, and women, were placed in a nugger, and the troops a.s.sembled on the island. Gascoigne, with a small guard of the Suss.e.x, was put in charge of the nugger with instructions to stop at the nearest point he could reach on the right bank.
Wilson then marched the rest of the British and Soudanese troops to the end of the island, whence they crossed to the right bank in a small boat. The crossing was covered by the detachment of the Suss.e.x.
On reaching the nugger Gascoigne proceeded down the river until he reached the right bank opposite the _Safiyeh_, whilst Wilson marched to the same place. Finding it difficult to communicate with Beresford by signal, he sent Gascoigne, who volunteered for the service, in a small boat to the _Safiyeh_ with the two naval artificers, and a native crew; the boat was received with a sharp rifle-fire from the enemy going and returning, but fortunately no one was. .h.i.t. In the meantime, Wilson had got one of the guns out of the nugger and brought it into action against the centre embrasure of the battery; whilst three marksmen of the Suss.e.x made good practice at 1,100 yards range, and the remainder of the Suss.e.x and the Soudanese were drawn up behind a sakhea channel.
Lord Charles Beresford having sent a message to say that his boiler, which had been pierced by a shot, would be ready by the evening, and that he would pick the party up at a more convenient place about three miles lower down next morning, Wilson directed Trafford to proceed down the river with the Suss.e.x and a portion of the Soudanese under Khasm-el-Mus to form a zeriba at the selected point.
Wilson remained behind to cover the pa.s.sage of the nugger with the gun and a detachment of Soudanese, but she unfortunately ran on a sandbank, and did not get off before sunset. In dragging the gun down through the tangled vegetation after dark, the men, who had had no food, became exhausted, and it was found necessary to abandon the gun, which was spiked and thrown into the river. After sunset Gascoigne endeavoured to run past the battery in the nugger, but she again grounded on two rocks opposite to and about 200 yards from the centre embrasure. Here she remained all night and until about 8 a.m. next morning, under fire from the battery and rifle-pits, but by most extraordinary good fortune no one was wounded.
On the 4th Beresford, having got up steam, ran past the battery, which now reopened on him, and brought to a short distance below; he then sent a party of bluejackets under Lieutenant Keppel, in a boat, to Gascoigne"s a.s.sistance. For more than an hour the work of lightening the nugger had to be carried on under fire, and nothing could exceed the coolness and gallantry shown by Gascoigne and by Keppel, who was struck by a spent ball during this trying time. When the nugger was clear of the rocks Beresford proceeded down stream, and embarked the soldiers and crews of the steamers by 11 a.m. The camp at Gubat was reached at 5.30 p.m.
Though the members of Wilson"s expedition were repeatedly under fire, their losses were only two Soudanese killed and twenty-five wounded.
This was due to the excellent manner in which the steamers were protected, as well as to the enemy"s bad shooting. The casualties on board Beresford"s steamer have been already mentioned, and they also were comparatively small for the same reason.
It only remains to add that there are probably few more gallant achievements recorded than the successful rescue effected by Lord Charles Beresford in the face of difficulties.[116]
CHAPTER XLIV.
THE FALL OF KHARTOUM.
Gordon"s Diaries bring the history of the siege of Khartoum down to the 14th December, 1884. The relative positions of the besiegers and besieged at that date may be seen from the accompanying plan.
It will be observed that Khartoum was protected on the north and west sides by the Blue and White Niles respectively, and on the south and east by a line of intrenched fortifications, with intervening redoubts, running from Fort Buri, on the Blue Nile, almost to the White Nile.
Unfortunately, at this time, the late high Nile had washed away portions of the parapet for a considerable distance from the western end, and, now that the river had fallen, there was a serious gap in this part of the defences. To remedy this, Gordon had for some time employed working parties to repair the demolished parapets, but as the work had to be conducted under fire from the enemy"s troops at Omdurman, on the opposite bank, but little progress had been made. The ditch at this point was also more or less damaged by the action of the river, and was never completely restored. To guard this, the weak part of the position, Gordon stationed armed barges and native boats on the river close by. He also placed mines there, but these were destroyed by the Nile. In the rear of the line of ramparts, and between them and the town, extended an open plain, a little more than a mile in breadth, on which stood barracks and slaughter-houses, and here and there an Arab cemetery. On the south and east sides, fronting the fortifications, were the camps of the besieging armies of Wad en Nejumi and Abu Girgeh.[117]
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The army under the immediate command of the Mahdi was encamped on the west of Omdurman, where Mohamed Faragallah Bey, with some Egyptian soldiers, was still holding out, in a work called Fort Omdurman. A large force of Dervishes,[118] under Sheikh-el-Obeid, occupied a position at Khojali, on the north side of the Blue Nile, where Gordon also had a fort called "the North Fort," at a point named "Ras-el-Rasek," as well as a battery on Tuti Island, nearly opposite.
On the 14th December Gordon wrote, "In ten days the town may fall."
There were then in store 83,525 okes (or 227,000 lbs.) of biscuit, and 546 ardebs (or 2,700 bushels) of dhoora (Indian corn), representing approximately eighteen days" rations for the troops alone. But Gordon had already, on the 22nd November, found it necessary to issue 9,600 lbs. of biscuit to the poor in the town, so great was the dest.i.tution which prevailed. As the siege progressed this state of things became more and more aggravated, and the Government supplies had to be further drawn on for the benefit of the civil population.
Ever since the 3rd of November the Fort of Omdurman had been cut off from communication with Khartoum. It was then provisioned only for a month and a half, and at the end of the year the garrison was in great straits from want of food. Gordon made one or two efforts to relieve the garrison, but, having no longer his steamers, four of which had gone to meet the British expedition, and the fifth having been lost with Colonel Stewart, he was unable to open communication.
On the 5th January, 1885, Faragallah signalled that his provisions and ammunition were alike exhausted, and Gordon was compelled to reply that there was nothing for it but to surrender. Faragallah and the whole of the force at Fort Omdurman then capitulated, and were transferred to the Mahdi"s camp, where they were well treated, as an encouragement to others to join the Dervish ranks.
On the 6th January, seeing that the garrison of Khartoum was becoming daily more and more reduced by want of food, and that existence for many of the inhabitants was almost impossible, Gordon issued a Proclamation authorizing as many of the civil population as liked to leave the town and go over to the Mahdi. Some thousands of natives took advantage of the offer, and Gordon sent with them a letter to the Mahdi, asking him "to feed and protect these poor Moslem people as he (Gordon) had done for the last nine months." After the fugitives had left, it was estimated that only about 14,000 remained in the town, out of a population shown by the census taken in the September previous as 34,000.
The fall of Omdurman was a great blow to the garrison of Khartoum, who thus lost the only position they had on the west bank of the White Nile.
The Dervishes were thenceforth able to close the river to Gordon"s two remaining steamers, and to establish ferries south of Khartoum, giving easy communication between the camps at Omdurman and those of Wad en Nejumi and Abu Girgeh. Khartoum was practically hemmed in on three sides.
The food difficulty became daily more serious. To make matters worse, those in charge of the biscuit and dhoora stole quant.i.ties of both, as occasion offered. The officer in charge of the stores was arrested and brought before a court of inquiry, but Gordon, realizing the emergency of the situation, had to point out to those conducting the investigation the necessity of not inquiring too critically into the matter.
The Island of Tuti was still held by Gordon"s forces, and the crops there were reaped under the fire of the forts, and stored in the Commissariat. This produced about 1,600 bushels of corn altogether, which, with the remaining biscuits, were served out to the soldiers.
When this was finished, Gordon ordered a search to be made in the town, with the result that further quant.i.ties (32 bushels only) were discovered in some of the houses, and also buried in the ground. These also were taken to the Government store, the owners being given, in every case, receipts for the quant.i.ties carried off. The search was conducted daily until there was nothing left in possession of the inhabitants.
Soon all that had been collected in the Commissariat was finished, and then the soldiers and inhabitants were reduced to eating dogs, donkeys, skins of animals, gum, and palm-fibre. Then an actual famine prevailed.
The gum produced diarrhoea, and the soldiers became so weak that they could scarcely man the fortifications.[119] The situation of the civil inhabitants was even worse. Many died of actual starvation, and corpses lay about the streets, no one having sufficient strength or energy to bury them.
All this time the enemy kept up a fusillade on the garrison, occasionally killing a few of their number. The soldiers were also hara.s.sed by repeated night attacks.[120]
Although it must have been evident to Gordon that the end could not be far off, he continued to encourage the people by Proclamations announcing the near approach of the British Relief Expedition, and even went so far as to hire some of the princ.i.p.al houses on the river for the reception of the men belonging to it. Day by day he watched from the roof of his Palace, in the hope of seeing them arrive. After awhile many of the inhabitants began to lose faith in him, and commenced opening communications with the Mahdi.
On the 20th January, the news of the battle of Abu Klea reached the Mahdi"s camp, where it caused the greatest consternation. A Council of Emirs was thereupon held, at which there were great divergencies of opinion. The Mahdi himself was strongly in favour of raising the siege.
He told the Emirs that he had been warned in a vision that he was to make a "Hegira," or flight, to Obeid, whither he proposed to withdraw with his forces. He said, "If one Englishman had been able to keep us at bay for a year, what chance shall we have against thousands of Englishmen who have defeated our best men at Abu Klea?" All agreed except one Emir, named Mohammed Abd el Kerim, who said that an attempt should be made to take Khartoum by a.s.sault, adding, rightly enough, that if it succeeded the English would not dare to come on, and that, if it failed, there would always be time to retreat. Abd el Kerim"s views, for the time being, prevailed, and there was no longer any talk of raising the siege.
Before the meeting terminated it was decided to announce a great victory. Accordingly a salute of 101 guns was fired, the war drums were beaten, and every demonstration was made, as if in celebration of some great triumph. The stratagem failed to impose on Gordon, who had seen, through his gla.s.s, thousands of women in the camp, weeping and indulging in signs of despair. The actual news of the battle was conveyed to him shortly after by a female spy from Omdurman.
A Council, composed of Farag Pasha, the Military Commandant, the chief Government officials, the Greek Consul, and other leading members of the Greek colony, was hurriedly summoned to the Palace. The meeting was then informed of the victory at Abu Klea, and that the English were approaching, and would arrive in two or three days. This intelligence inspired everybody with fresh hope, only, however, to give place to deeper despair when the next few days pa.s.sed away without any signs of the relieving force. Gordon still struggled to keep up the spirits of his men, constantly saying, "They must come to-morrow," though few believed in him, and people began to say that, after all, the great battle which had taken place must have been a Dervish victory.
It is said that Gordon at this time took no sleep, but spent his days in watching the river from the roof of the Palace, and his nights in visiting the various posts.
On the 23rd, he had a stormy interview with Farag Pasha, whom he reproached with having left one of the forts insufficiently guarded. It seems that Farag, on this occasion, proposed to surrender Khartoum to the Mahdi, and stated the terms which the latter was willing to accept.
Gordon indignantly refused to listen to the proposition, and is even said to have struck Farag.
There is no doubt that, at this period, not only Farag, but many of the other officers and Government officials, as well as some of the leading merchants, were in correspondence with the Mahdi, who was also kept posted up in the condition of the garrison by the deserters who, from time to time, left Khartoum. On one night alone, Omar Agha Ibrahim, a lieutenant of infantry, after taking the precaution of drawing half a month"s pay for himself and his men, went over to the enemy with thirty of his comrades.
By the way of final preparations, Gordon had all the ammunition and powder not required for daily use removed from the a.r.s.enal and placed in the Catholic Church, a strong stone building near the Palace, and commenced to lay a slow match train between the two buildings, so as to enable him to explode the whole supply, in the event of the Mahdists entering the town.[121]
To provide for the safety of the Europeans, he stationed the small steamer _Ismailia_ just beyond the Palace walls, with orders to the engineer to get up steam on a signal being made. The arrangement was kept secret, being communicated only to the princ.i.p.al Greek residents, who, it was proposed, should go on board with their families at the last moment and save themselves by the river.[122]