The result of the taking of Khartoum was naturally to increase the renown of the Mahdi to a greater extent than ever in the Moslem world.
His fame as a conqueror spread not only throughout the Soudan, but also in the towns and villages of Upper and Lower Egypt. Many of those who before had disbelieved in him, now became fully a.s.sured of his holy mission. Had he at once followed up his success by an advance down the Nile, the consequences to the British forces at Gubat and elsewhere might have been disastrous. As it was, he contented himself with staying with his followers in the neighbourhood of Khartoum, the pillaging of which no doubt afforded an agreeable relaxation after a long and arduous siege.
With Khartoum in the Mahdi"s power, the whole situation was changed. His army instead of being concentrated before Khartoum, was set free to strike a blow at any point which he might think opportune for attack.
Not merely was the small force at Gubat in danger, but Wolseley"s entire army was at this period divided and split up in fragments. One of these was at Gubat, in immediate proximity to the fortified town of Metammeh held by a superior force. Another was isolated near Kirbekan, where the enemy were reported to be in considerable strength; whilst a third remained with Wolseley at the head-quarters at Korti. In addition detachments were scattered across the Bayuda desert at the different points of communication.
Though at first the capture of Metammeh and operations against Berber were contemplated, the question of the relief of Khartoum gradually resolved itself into the problem of extricating "The Relief Expedition"
itself. Opinions differed greatly how this was to be effected. Some were in favour of the immediate retreat of the desert column to Korti. Others considered a march across the desert of so small a force, with the prospect of encountering hordes of Mahdists from Khartoum, anything but a safe operation. Other advisers were in favour of concentrating the whole of the expeditionary force on the capture of Berber and holding that place until the arrival of reinforcements from India or from home landed at Souakim, should either insure the safe retreat of the force, or allow of the recapture of Khartoum. That which was done will appear later.
During the absence of Sir Charles Wilson, the British force in the neighbourhood of Gubat, under Colonel Boscawen, was employed in improving and strengthening the works there. A triangular fort was erected, and earthworks with flanking trenches and parapets were thrown up both on the land side and towards Metammeh. Brushwood and wire entanglements were placed outside to impede the enemy in the event of their attempting to storm the position, and, in fact, every preparation was made to stand a siege.
Although an attack was constantly expected, the enemy, beyond beating tom-toms all night and making a parade every day, did nothing.
The force from time to time sent convoys of sick and wounded back across the desert to Abu Klea and Korti. To facilitate and guard the line of communications, the garrisons at the Wells were strengthened from time to time by detachments from Korti.
The whole country round Metammeh, except the village itself, where 2,000 to 3,000 of the enemy were quartered, remained quiet. At Metammeh, on the 28th January, there was a great firing of guns, with other signs of rejoicing over the news from Khartoum.
On intelligence of General Stewart"s condition reaching head-quarters, Sir Redvers Buller was appointed to succeed to the command of the Desert column, Sir Evelyn Wood becoming Lord Wolseley"s Chief of the Staff, and Brigadier-General Grenfell succeeding Sir Evelyn Wood as "Sirdar"
(Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian army.
Buller left Korti on the 29th January for Gakdul by the Desert route.
The Royal Irish and West Kent Regiments left at the same time to strengthen the garrisons at the Wells and reinforce Gubat.
On the 11th February, Buller, with six companies of the Royal Irish Regiment, which had marched on foot the whole way from Korti, reached Gubat. His instructions were to seize Metammeh and march on Berber, but on no account to let himself be hemmed in at Metammeh.
The programme was suddenly altered, and in lieu thereof a retreat was decided on. One reason for this change was the loss likely to be incurred in the taking of Metammeh, another consideration was the insufficiency of Buller"s column to operate against Berber in the face of the large force, which, set free by the fall of Khartoum, the Mahdi would now have at his disposal.
Buller deemed it unwise even to attempt to hold the position at Gubat against the Mahdi"s army reinforced by Gordon"s captured soldiers, and supplied with the arms and ammunition taken at Khartoum. Reports of the Mahdi having commenced an advance with 50,000 men were received, and it was judged best to retire, and so avoid the risk of having the retreat cut off.
Under these circ.u.mstances preparations were made for the march back across the Bayuda desert.[126]
Before leaving, Gordon"s two remaining steamers were rendered useless by removal of parts of the machinery.
On the 13th Buller evacuated Gubat. His force numbered nearly 1,600 rank and file, and consisted of the following corps:--Squadron of 19th Hussars, Naval Brigade with two Gardner guns, detachment of Royal Artillery with two guns, a portion of the Mounted Infantry, a portion of the Guards Camel Corps, a wing of the Heavy Cavalry Camel Corps, portions of the Suss.e.x and Royal Irish Regiments, details from departmental corps, and 300 Soudanese.
The wounded were the first sent off, the escort of 300 men being placed under the command of Colonel Talbot. The bad cases were carried in litters by the Egyptians. Sir Herbert Stewart, by this time much changed for the worse, was among the sick.
On the march to Abu Klea, Buller met with no opposition beyond a skirmish which the advance guard had on the day of starting.
On the 16th the column arrived at Abu Klea, and at once set to work to strengthen the position against attack.
About thirty of the enemy"s cavalry were seen scouting round the place all day. About an hour before sunset these were reinforced by some 400 infantry armed with rifles. They crossed the hills to the north-east and eastward, and having made a cover by throwing up a series of low stone walls, opened a well-directed fire at long range on the camp. The bullets fell all round and over the position. No lights or fires were allowed after dark, as the enemy kept up a dropping fire throughout the night. The British force made no reply. Up to the morning of the 17th, two men had been killed, and four officers and ten men wounded. On the 17th the guns of the Royal Artillery opened fire on the enemy"s position with shrapnel. The Gardners were also turned on, but as the supply of ammunition was limited the fire had to be restricted. Still, slow as was the fire, it sufficed to check that of the enemy until eight a.m., when the cover they had been throwing up being completed, their fire became as heavy as before. Fortunately, the aim was somewhat interfered with by the high wind blowing, and by clouds of sand. Still, as Buller in his despatch to Lord Wolseley observed, to remain stationary subject to this unceasing pelting by bullets "was annoying."
The fire of the enemy did not interfere with the work of strengthening the camp. Three new forts mutually supporting one another were constructed. Buller placed the command of the princ.i.p.al and largest of them in the hands of Lord Charles Beresford, with his naval men and guns. The Royal Irish were ordered to hold the fort on the west of the camp, while the Suss.e.x men garrisoned the fort on the east. The Engineers guarded the zeriba itself, in which the hospital was erected.
About noon a steady sh.e.l.ling of the enemy"s position was commenced. The Gardner guns were at the same time again brought into use, and the Mounted Infantry also opened fire with their Martinis. After about two hours of this long range fighting, the enemy"s fire showed signs of slackening. Major Wardrop was then sent out to reconnoitre, and endeavoured to ascertain the actual strength and position of the enemy, up to this time unknown.
With one officer and three troopers the Major crept round the enemy"s right, under cover of some rising ground. Ascending a slight rise, he looked cautiously over, and observed that the enemy"s riflemen on the hill were not numerous, and had no supports. He dismounted his men, and made them, without showing more than their heads, fire a volley. He then remounted and galloped off and repeated his tactics two or three times in different places, leaving one man in each place to fire as rapidly as possible, but without exposing himself to view. The Arabs were completely deceived by this manoeuvre, and imagining that large reinforcements of British troops had come up, became demoralized, broke off the fight, and retreated towards Metammeh, carrying with them their killed and wounded, and leaving only a few mounted scouts to watch the camp.
Buller"s loss in this skirmish amounted to three men killed, and four officers and twenty-three men wounded. The enemy"s losses were more severe. They were seen to carry off several bodies, and they left six on the field of battle. Owing to the nature of the ground it was impossible to form an estimate as to the strength of the enemy. Equally difficult was it to understand what their object was, but the better opinion seems to be that it was intended to try and engage Buller until the Mahdi should come up with his whole army.
Buller then sent off a detachment of the Light Camel Corps, with despatches for Gakdul, requesting that more transport camels with ammunition might be sent to him. His reasons for thus weakening his forces were twofold. In the first place, the water supply at Abu Klea was not sufficient for the whole force for many days. In the second, his means of transport were insufficient for the requirements of the marching column, in addition to those of the garrison at the Wells.
The night of the 17th was pa.s.sed quietly at the camp. On the morning of the 18th Buller detached a party of infantry which moved southwards towards the hills which had been occupied by the enemy. Their position was found to be completely abandoned, and was taken possession of by the British force. A strong post was established on the princ.i.p.al hill, and scouting-parties were sent out, but nothing more could be seen of the enemy.
Sir Evelyn Wood, with three companies of the West Kent Regiment, was despatched from Korti to strengthen the force at Gakdul Wells, which they reached on the 17th, and from Gakdul a supply of transport camels with stores was sent on to Buller at Abu Klea.
During the march of the convoy from Gakdul nothing had been seen of the enemy until the neighbourhood of Abu Klea was reached, when suddenly a small body of armed men was observed watching the movements of the party. Some of the Camel Corps forthwith went in chase, and captured a half-dozen. These made no attempt to resist capture, but threw down their Remingtons, and begged for mercy. When interrogated the prisoners declared that there was no strong force of rebels anywhere near. There was, they said, a rebel camp on rising ground some two miles distant, but there were only 600 fighting men there, all of whom had recently come from Metammeh. The prisoners agreed in stating that none of the Mahdi"s forces from Khartoum had yet reached Metammeh.
On the arrival of the camels and stores, Buller made his preparations for evacuating Abu Klea. His original intentions were merely to destroy the forts, and leave the wells untouched. But on the forenoon of the 23rd, he got information to the effect that the enemy had received a strong reinforcement, estimated at not less than 8,000 men. This compelled him to modify his plans, and he resolved to leave the forts standing, but to fill up all the larger wells.
The latter step was afterwards much criticized, and can only be justified by the extreme peril in which Buller"s force might otherwise have been placed. To stop up a desert well is to the Oriental mind about the blackest crime that could be committed; and is a measure which is never adopted even in savage warfare. Buller, however, had no alternative. The absence of water in his rear was the sole thing that could check pursuit by the supposed force in his rear. It was, in short, the only method of covering his retreat. Accordingly, regardless of Eastern traditions, heaps of stones and rubbish were piled into all the princ.i.p.al wells before leaving. It was foreseen that before the enemy could advance he must lose several hours, and perhaps days, in restoring the wells to their former state. This time Buller calculated on employing in getting a start over his pursuers.
At two p.m. all the baggage was sent on under convoy to camp on the Omit Handel plain out of gunshot range of the Abu Klea hills. At six the outposts were withdrawn, and an hour later the whole force, including thirty-two sick and wounded, was in retreat towards Gakdul. As they marched out, the troops were not interfered with by the enemy. The enemy"s scouts appeared about midday on the 24th, and fired a few shots.
After this they retired, and the column was no more molested, reaching Gakdul on the 26th.
There being barely sufficient camels for the supplies, all the men and officers had to march on foot. This, as Buller observed in his despatch, in the weather which prevailed, with an allowance of only three quarts of water per man a-day, was most exhausting. He adds, "Nothing could have been better than the spirit shown by all ranks."
At Gakdul Buller"s force learned the news of the death on the 16th of their former leader, General Stewart, who, with the other wounded, had been sent on in advance. The latest accounts of his condition had been such as to lead to hope of his recovery. It subsequently transpired that the nature of the wound he had received rendered this impossible, and after supporting the hardships of the desert march he finally succ.u.mbed the day before the convoy reached the wells of Gakdul, where a small force was left to bring on the stores.[127]
The column remained but a brief period at Gakdul, and on the 27th set out for Korti, which was reached on the 1st March, the last of the troops arriving on the 15th.
Of the march of Stewart"s column across the Bayuda desert to Metammeh and back, it is unnecessary to say anything more. The highest military authority in Europe, Count Von Moltke, said of the men who took part in it, "They were not soldiers but heroes."
CHAPTER XLVI.
THE NILE COLUMN.
The advance guard of the Nile column, consisting of 545 of the 38th South Staffordshire Regiment, left Korti for Abu Hamid in the whalers on the 28th December, 1884. Brigadier-General Brackenbury, second in command, with a troop of the 19th Hussars, followed the next day.
On the 3rd January, 1885, the force encamped at Hamdab, where General Earle and his staff arrived on the 4th. The remainder of the column was sent forward from time to time, as the regiments reached Korti.
On the 24th the force at Hamdab, having been in the meantime joined by the Royal Highlanders (Black Watch), a portion of the Gordon Highlanders, the Duke of Cornwall"s Regiment, the Transport Camels and the Camel Battery, left camp and continued the journey up stream, the mounted troops proceeding along the banks, and the remainder going in the whalers as before. The enemy being reported to be in force at Berti, every precaution was taken to avoid a surprise, zeribas being formed each night, and a system of moonlight signalling was adopted.
Pa.s.sing the Fourth Cataract and other formidable rapids, Berti was reached by the advance guard on the 1st February and found deserted. The enemy, according to the report of a deserter, had abandoned the place on the previous day, and retired up the river to Salamat. Suleiman Wad Gamr, the murderer of Colonel Stewart"s party, it was reported, had fled beyond recall. The boat belonging to Stewart"s steamer _Abbas_ was discovered on the sh.o.r.e. Hussein Ismael, the stoker, whose account of the murder has been already given, presented himself and confirmed his previous story. The houses in Berti being searched, traces of Stewart"s party were found in the shape of a number of papers, fragments of books, and a portion of a barometer.
On the 3rd the head-quarters moved to Berti, where the rest of the troops encamped as they came up. On the 4th news was received of the fall of Khartoum by a telegram from Sir Evelyn Wood. The discouraging information was carefully kept from the knowledge of the men. The same message instructed General Earle to halt where he was until further orders. On the 8th the General was informed by telegraph that Lord Wolseley was communicating with the Government as to future operations, but that the column was to push on to Abu Hamid. Orders for the troops to move up were thereupon issued.
On the night of the 8th General Earle received a report from Colonel Butler, who was in command of the advanced camp, that, in reconnoitring that day, he had found the enemy in a strong position, occupying some rocky knolls, and holding a high razor-backed ridge of hills behind.
Earle then ordered the advance of the 1st Battalion South Staffordshire and 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, in boats, to an open camping-ground which Colonel Butler had selected, about a mile short of the enemy"s position, and ordered the squadron 19th Hussars, half of the Egyptian Camel Corps, and two guns of the Egyptian artillery, to advance to the same place.
On the 9th General Earle himself arrived on the scene, and having personally reconnoitred the enemy"s position, and sent Colonel Butler with the cavalry to make a wide reconnaissance towards the enemy"s rear, he decided to attack the position the next morning.
A company of the Royal Highlanders was left in a zeriba to guard the boats, baggage, and baggage animals, and at 7 a.m. on the 10th the advance commenced.