Amongst the troops ordered to take part in it were the 1st Battalion of the Coldstream Guards; the 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards; the 3rd Battalion of the Grenadier Guards; the 1st Battalion of the Shropshire Regiment; the 2nd Battalion of the East Surrey; the 1st Battalion of the Berkshire Regiment; one Battalion of Royal Marines; one regiment of Australian Infantry; some batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, of Royal Artillery, and Australian Artillery; some companies of Royal Marine Artillery, and Royal Engineers, as well as squadrons of the 5th Lancers, and the 20th Hussars, and detachments of the Ordnance, Commissariat, and Medical Staff Corps. In addition to these, an Indian Contingent of over 2,000 men was provided. It comprised the 9th Bengal Cavalry, the 15th (Loodianah) Sikhs, the 17th Bengal Native Infantry, the 28th Bombay Native Infantry, and some companies of Madras Sappers. Besides the above, several hundred labourers were ordered from England, and one thousand coolies from India to construct the railway to Berber.
The operation of crushing Osman Digna having to be performed, General Graham was selected as the "crusher."
This was a surprise to most people, and probably equally so to Graham himself. Military critics had not forgotten how, by his order to charge, given at an unfortunate moment, the General very nearly caused the wreck of the 2nd Brigade at Tamaai; nor the ill-feeling, bordering almost upon insubordination, which his treatment of the Black Watch had brought about in the Soudan army of 1884; and the appointment was freely criticized. The General, however, was a nominee of Lord Wolseley, and this, although it did not silence criticism, served in a great measure to satisfy public opinion.
Brevet-Major-General A. J. L. Fremantle was appointed to command the Brigade of Guards, and Major-General Greaves was named Chief of the Staff. The Infantry Brigade was placed under Major-General Sir J. C.
McNeill, V.C.
General Graham"s instructions, dated 20th February, were on arrival at Souakim to take command of the forces which were to be a.s.sembled there, to make the best arrangements which the shortness of the time at his disposal, before the hot weather commenced, would admit of to organize a field force, and to make such transport arrangements as were possible to enable it to secure the first and most pressing object of the campaign, viz., the destruction of the power of Osman Digna.
The General was told that an agreement had been made with Messrs. Lucas and Aird to construct a railway from Souakim to Berber, and that on this he must greatly rely for his means of transporting supplies. It would therefore be of the first importance that every possible facility should be given to Messrs. Lucas and Aird in the conduct of their operations.
The pushing on of the railway from Souakim towards Berber was the next point to which he was to direct the greatest attention. By the agreement with Messrs. Lucas and Aird, the contractors were to construct for the War Department for the purposes of the expeditionary force, a 4 ft.
8-1/2-inch gauge single line of railway from Souakim, and thence in sections so far towards Berber as might from time to time be ordered in writing by the Secretary of State, and also an 18-inch gauge single line of railway in or about Souakim. The War Department engaged to keep the way clear and the working staff protected. The contractors were to supply plant and working staff, and, with regard to the latter, were to be at liberty, with the consent of the Secretary at War, to employ natives as labourers. The staff to be paid by the Government, and rationed and clothed by the War Department. The contractors were to receive a commission of 2 per cent. upon all expenditure, from the War Department, such commission, however, not to exceed in the whole 20,000, and they were to be ent.i.tled to a further sum not exceeding 20,000 if the railway should be satisfactorily completed in the judgment of the Secretary of State.
On the 27th February, Lord Hartington again called Graham"s attention to the necessity for rapidly constructing the railway from Souakim to Berber, and to the extreme importance of the services it would be required to perform, not only in connection with the advance of Graham"s force, but also in connection with the troops under Wolseley"s command when concentrated at Berber. His Lordship pointed out that by this route alone, when the railway should have been completed, could that force be supplied, re-equipped, and reinforced with that precision and certainty so essential to the future operations on the Nile. He continued:--
"When the first and essential operation of crushing Osman Digna and clearing the country sufficiently to make it safe for the constructors of the railway is accomplished, the next most important duty will be the pushing on of the railway, and I request that you will facilitate and aid this object by every means in your power. You will, of course, decide what military posts you will occupy."
Towards the end of February Graham"s force began to a.s.semble at Souakim, and from that date troop-ships and store-ships began to come in almost daily.
Early in March Graham reached Souakim, and a.s.sumed command of the force a.s.sembled there.
Considering the camp to be too extended, rendering night attacks too easy, he at once took steps to reduce the front occupied. The enemy had in fact for some time been in the habit of attacking in small bodies every night, and succeeded in killing or wounding many of the sentries.
The camps were surrounded by zeribas and entanglements which were never attacked, the plan adopted being to creep in at unguarded points, and stab or spear the men as they slept. A large number of so-called friendly natives were employed about the camps in the daytime, and so acquired a knowledge of the localities. Returning at night, it was thus easy for them to choose positions which were unguarded, and so to murder the sleeping soldiers. That this was so, was shown by more than one native who had been shot down being found to be wearing the red badge given to the "friendlies."
On the 17th Graham"s force amounted to 491 officers, 10,222 non-commissioned officers and privates, 1,616 horses, 2,759 camels, 791 mules, and 2,629 followers. At this date troop and store-ships were still arriving.
On the 19th Graham made a reconnaissance to Hasheen, about seven and a half miles from Souakim, with the Cavalry Brigade and Mounted Infantry, the Infantry of the Indian Contingent moving out about four miles in support. The enemy retired in front of the British force, evacuating the village of Hasheen, and making for the mountains, but not without first offering some resistance, by which one private was killed, and one officer and a sergeant were wounded. After this the whole force marched back to the camp.
On the 20th Graham determined on a general advance to Hasheen, and at 6.15 a.m., leaving only the Shropshire Regiment and details as guards, the whole force, numbering about 10,000 men, marched out from the camp.
Making for the hills in front of Hasheen, the Cavalry moved off at about 6.10 a.m., the Infantry following at 6.25 in the following order:--The Guards in columns of companies, on the right; the 2nd Brigade (East Surrey Regiment and Marines), in line of company columns of fours; the Indian Brigade in column of companies on the left; the Horse Artillery Battery on the right of the line. The water camels and transport animals followed in rear of the 2nd Brigade.
The action is described in the General"s despatch as follows:--
"The advance was made in a direction nearly due west. The Infantry reached the foot of the hills at about 8.25 a.m. The 17th and 24th Companies Royal Engineers, the Madras Sappers, and the 70th East Surrey Regiment, were ordered to commence work at once. The enemy had fallen back on Dihilibat and the Beehive Hill, exchanging shots with my advance guard at about eight a.m.
I now determined to clear these hills, and gave orders to the Infantry to advance in the following order:--2nd Brigade in first line, Indian Contingent in support, Guards in reserve; the Horse Artillery to take up a position on Beehive Hill.
"At about nine a.m. the force had reached the foot of Dihilibat Hill. The Berkshire Regiment advanced up the steep slopes of the hill in attack formation, with one half battalion Royal Marine Light Infantry on the right rear, and the other half battalion in rear of the centre of the Berkshire Regiment as supports. The ascent was very steep and difficult, but the first spur was occupied without opposition. This spur is separated from the main edge by a deep ravine. The enemy now, however, opened a heavy fire from the summit, and from a position further to the right. The Berkshire Regiment replied by volleys, and the half battalion of Marines on the right was advanced to flank the enemy"s position. The enemy then abandoned their position, and the Berkshire Regiment advanced to the summit, and detached one company to a spur on the left, from which an effective fire was opened upon the retiring enemy. Meanwhile the Indian Brigade had taken up a position between the foot of Dihilibat and the Beehive Hill; the Guards also were formed up near the foot of the north-east spur of Dihilibat Hill.
"The Horse Artillery, which moved out with the Guards" Brigade as far as the first hills, received orders to follow the Indian Brigade in its further advance, and to take up a position on Beehive Hill. While pa.s.sing under the Hill Dihilibat they were heavily fired upon, losing two horses. The slopes of Beehive Hill proving impracticable for the guns, the battery, after firing a few rounds of shrapnel into the bush, detached three guns to a position on a low spur to the west of Beehive Hill, where they remained in action for some time sh.e.l.ling parties of the enemy who were visible across the valley on the spurs of the Wharatab Range. The battery subsequently retired with the Guards" square, and took up a position on one of the hills reached at 8.25. Here several rounds were fired, subsequently to the retirement of the Infantry, at parties of the enemy which appeared on the low spur.
"At about 9.40 a.m. two squadrons of the 9th Bengal Cavalry were detached by Colonel Ewart, commanding Cavalry Brigade, to pursue the enemy, who, driven from the Hill Dihilibat by the Berkshire Regiment, were retiring south in the direction of Tamaai. Colonel Ewart ordered two squadrons to dismount and fire volleys. These squadrons were charged by the enemy in considerable strength, and retired with loss on the square formed by the Guards at the foot of the Dihilibat Hill.
"During the morning the 5th Lancers were employed in securing the right front. At about 10.45 a considerable force of the enemy endeavoured to advance down the Hasheen Valley from the north-west, apparently attempting to turn my right flank. Both the 5th Lancers and a portion of the 9th Bengal Cavalry were engaged with the small advanced parties of this force, and succeeded in checking the movement. During this time work was carried on by the Royal Engineers and Madras Sappers, a.s.sisted by parties of the East Surrey Regiment, and by about 2.30 p.m.
four strong posts had been formed, and a zeriba commenced.
"At 12.25 I recalled the Indian Brigade, the Berkshire Regiment, and the Marines covering the movement. The latter then joined the Indian Brigade, and, forming a single square, retired to the more open ground south. The Guards" square and the Artillery remained at the foot of the Dihilibat Hill till one p.m., and then retired, taking a direction somewhat to the south of that followed by the 2nd and Indian Brigades.
"During the retirement of the Guards the right face of the square received a hot fire from parties of the enemy concealed among the bushes, and suffered some loss. By firing steady volleys into the bush the enemy"s fire was effectually silenced, and the Brigade halted close to the south foot of the hills first mentioned. The general retirement of the whole force began about 4.30 p.m., and the camp was reached at 6.15.
"The Dihilibat Hill was carried by the Berkshire Regiment with the greatest spirit, and the behaviour of the Guards" square under a heavy fire from an unseen enemy was marked by extreme steadiness. During the formation of the fortified posts, the presence of the enemy in rear rendered it necessary several times to order the East Surrey Regiment to stand to their arms.
This was done without any confusion, and the Royal Engineers and Madras Sappers quietly continued their work on the defences.
"It is impossible in such a country to estimate the numbers of an enemy who is able to remain completely concealed until he chooses to attack; but it is probable that on this occasion the number of Arabs present was about 3,000, of whom at least 250 were killed, much of this loss being caused by the fire of the Berkshire Regiment from the commanding position they had taken up on Dihilibat Hill. The scouting was very efficiently performed by the Cavalry, considering the great difficulties of the country with which they had to contend."
The enemy, according to other accounts, seemed to have lost none of the daring with which they had met Graham"s force a twelvemonth before.
Instead of fleeing before the charge of the Bengal Lancers, the Soudanese actually charged the Cavalry. The same tactics were practised as at El-Teb, the Soudanese throwing themselves on the ground at the critical moment of the charge, and slashing with their swords at the horses" legs. So badly were the Lancers used that they had to fall back as stated in the despatch, losing one non-commissioned officer and four men, whose horses had been hamstrung in the encounter.
In the course of the fight, some 150 of the enemy sprang up from behind a hill 300 yards off, and had the audacity to charge the whole of the Guards" Brigade. The a.s.sailants were received by such a deadly fire from the face of the square that they never succeeded in getting nearer than fifteen or twenty yards of the line of bayonets. Those who survived at once turned and fled, leaving behind their wounded chief on a camel, within thirty yards of the square, where he was made prisoner.
The object of the recall of the Indian Brigade at 12.25 p.m., and the subsequent retirement towards the hill (then being fortified by the 70th Regiment) of that force, the Berkshire Regiment, and Marines, followed at one p.m. by the Guards and Artillery, practically the whole army, is not stated in the General"s despatch. But from other reports it seems that the troops had got into a position where the thickness of the bush gave the enemy the advantage of pouring a heavy fire into General Graham"s force, whilst the latter could only deliver an ineffective fire in return.[133] At the position to which the troops fell back, the ground was more open, and Graham"s men could make better practice with their Martinis.
The apparent intention of the enemy to turn the right of the British line, also probably influenced the General in retiring.
After some hours" marching and fighting under a blazing sun the force set out on the return to Souakim, leaving a detachment to guard the fortified posts made by the Engineers and Madras Sappers.
The following are the casualties as reported by telegram from Graham:--Officers killed, Lieutenant M. D. D. Dalison, Scots Guards; 1 native officer, Indian Contingent; 4 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 12 sowars of the Indian Contingent. Wounded, 6 officers, 26 non-commissioned officers and privates, 13 sowars, and 3 privates of the Indian Contingent.
The enemy"s strength was, as usual, liberally estimated in the various newspaper reports of the action, some putting the number as high as 14,000 men. General Graham"s original estimate was 4,000, but this he subsequently reduced to 3,000, a number probably much nearer the mark.
Graham"s object in occupying a position at Hasheen was declared by him to be to protect his right flank in the impending advance on Tamaai, to obtain a post of observation near to the mountains, and to a.s.sist in overawing the tribes. How far this was effected may be judged from the fact that only five days later the works were dismantled and the place was abandoned.
CHAPTER XLIX.
THE ATTACK ON McNEILL"S ZERIBA.
After the operations on the 19th and 20th March, 1885, preparations were made for the advance on Tamaai, Osman Digna"s reputed head-quarters and stronghold. Situated, as it was, some fourteen miles to the south-west of Souakim, the distance was deemed too great to be traversed in a single day"s march. It became necessary then, as on previous occasions, to establish an intermediate position in which, as an advanced camp, the usual stores of water, provisions, and ammunition might be acc.u.mulated.[134]
About an hour after daylight on the 22nd March the force detached for this purpose started from Souakim. Ahead and on the flanks was one squadron of the 5th Lancers scouting; next marched the British regiments, the 49th Berkshire, and the Royal Marine Light Infantry, formed up in square under the command of Major-General Sir John C.
McNeill. The Berkshire Regiment led the way, and the Marines brought up the rear, a detachment of the Royal Engineers occupying places in the flanks. The only representatives of the artillery arm were four Gardner guns with detachments of sailors and Royal Marine Artillery.
Outside the British square, but close to its left flank, moved the Field Telegraph waggon and party, which kept unrolling the telegraph wire and covering it with loose soil as it went on, so maintaining the communication with Souakim throughout the advance.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
Formed up in a still larger square a short distance in rear of the right flank, the Indian Contingent marched in echelon under command of Brigadier-General Hudson. The 15th Sikhs formed the front face and a portion of the flanks. The remainder of the right flank and one half of the rear face were formed by the 28th Bombay Native Infantry. The 17th Bengal Native Infantry occupied a similar position on the left flank and rear face. In reserve, immediately within the rear face, marched a company of Madras Sappers. Within this square was inclosed a vast and miscellaneous array of laden camels, mules, carts, and conveyances of all kinds, forming the transport train. The camels alone numbered from 1,000 to 1,200, and there were in all some 1,500 animals. The combined British and Indian forces amounted to 3,300 men.
The orders were for the whole force to proceed to a point eight miles distant in the direction of Tamaai, there to form a zeriba (No. 2), in which the stores, &c., were to be deposited. When this was accomplished the Lancers, Indian Infantry, and empty transport train were to return, stop at a point five miles from Souakim, construct another zeriba (No.
1), and leaving it to be garrisoned by the 15th Sikhs, go back to Souakim.
General Graham accompanied the troops for about two and a half miles and then returned to camp, the chief of his staff warning McNeill to "look out for an attack," but, beyond this casual reference to the possibility of an attack, nothing more was said on the subject, although at head-quarters information had several days previously been received that the force would be a.s.sailed by at least 5,000 of the enemy before there should be time to form the zeriba. The importance of this circ.u.mstance will be apparent later on in connection with the events which followed.
The route which the force was instructed to take was to the westward of the comparatively well-known road followed by Baker Pasha, and also by the British troops, in 1884, and though free from difficulty at first, later on led through thick bush of ever-increasing height and density.
The rate of progress was necessarily slow, and frequent halts became imperative.