The steamer and the nuggers having been captured, the flotilla went on its way about noon. The river here continued very wide, with much vegetation on its banks, where crocodiles and hippopotami were seen in numbers.
On the 18th a stop was made for the night ten miles below Fashoda, and a letter from the Sirdar informed the commandant of the post which was reported as being established there of the approach of the steamers.
Next morning, when the vessels were about five miles from Fashoda, a rowing boat flying a French flag was seen approaching. It contained one of the officers under the orders of Captain (afterwards Major) Marchand, the commander of a French exploring expedition, which it turned out had occupied Fashoda since the 10th July.
As Fashoda was neared the French flag was seen in the middle of the native village, and near the old Egyptian fort the Captain"s force, consisting of eight officers and 120 Senegalese armed with repeating rifles, and some Shilluks with native spears, was drawn up. On the steamers making fast, Marchand went on board the _Dal_ to visit the Sirdar, and remained in conference with him three quarters of an hour.
The Sirdar declared that the presence of a French force was an infringement of the rights of Egypt and of the British Government, and protested against the occupation of Fashoda and the hoisting of the French flag. Marchand stated, in reply, that he was acting under the orders of the French Government, and that without instructions it would be impossible for him to withdraw. He admitted that, in the face of a superior force, he was not prepared to resist the hoisting of the Egyptian flag.
When the conference was over the steamers proceeded some 300 yards up stream and landed the Sirdar"s troops. The Egyptian flag was then hoisted about 500 yards from the French flag, on a ruined bastion of the fortifications, and saluted with all ceremony by the gunboats.
Marchand"s force, which had been attacked by the Dervishes on the 25th August, was in great want of ammunition and supplies, and the Captain, in expectation of a further attack, had sent his steamer south to bring up reinforcements.
Leaving the 11th Soudanese with two guns and the steamer n.a.z.ir, the remainder of the force re-embarked and proceeded south to Sobat, where they arrived on the 22nd, hoisted the Egyptian flag, and established a second post. The _Abu Klea_ remained with part of the 13th Soudanese Battalion, and the other steamers then proceeded down the Nile to Omdurman without further adventure.
On the Sirdar"s arrival, he at once communicated to the Foreign Office the result of his mission.
Although want of s.p.a.ce renders it impossible to deal fully with the diplomatic incident to which the French occupation of Fashoda gave rise, a few particulars may, nevertheless, be given.
In the beginning of 1898, a Cairo telegram coming through Paris announced, somewhat prematurely, that a French expedition, under Captain Marchand, had arrived at Fashoda, and letters from his officers and men, written on their journey, expressed their anxiety to reach the Upper Nile before the British, and "to display the French flag between Khartoum and Gondokoro."
Although little notice was taken at the time of these announcements and aspirations, the knowledge of the Marchand expedition was undoubtedly one of the causes which determined the British Government to hasten the advance on Khartoum.
What subsequently occurred seems to have been in great measure foreseen by Lord Salisbury, who appears to have antic.i.p.ated that difficulties might arise, not only with regard to France, but with Abyssinia as well.
In a despatch dated the 2nd August, 1898, communicating to Lord Cromer the views of the British Government as to the line of action to be taken after the occupation of Khartoum, the British Premier stated that the Sirdar was authorized to send two flotillas, one up the White and the other up the Blue Nile. The flotilla up the White Nile was to be commanded by the Sirdar as far as Fashoda, and the officer in command of the Blue Nile flotilla was to go as far as the foot of the cataract commencing about Rosieres. Should he before reaching that encounter any Abyssinian outposts, he was to halt and await further instructions. The despatch added that, "in dealing with any French or Abyssinian authorities who might be encountered, nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply a recognition by the British Government of a t.i.tle to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile Valley."
It was scarcely to be expected that at the moment when the Anglo-Egyptian operations, undertaken mainly with the object of restoring her lost provinces to Egypt, had been crowned with success, England could acquiesce in the occupation of any portion of them by a foreign Power, and frequent exchanges of views took place between the British and French Governments.
The British Government asked for the withdrawal of Marchand, whom the French Minister had termed an "emissary of civilization." This demand the French Government was disinclined to agree to.
The French contention was that the country bordering the White Nile, though formerly belonging to Egypt, had by abandonment become _res nullius_, and that the French had as much right to a position on the Nile as the Germans or the Belgians.
The British case was that the valley of the Nile still belonged to Egypt, although her t.i.tle had been rendered dormant by the successes of the Mahdi; further, that whatever t.i.tle the latter might have acquired pa.s.sed on the 2nd September by right of conquest to the British and Egyptian Governments.
Lord Salisbury declared on the 9th September that Her Majesty"s Government did not consider that this right was open to argument.
Nevertheless, the discussions on the subject, to which the Foreign Office declined to give the name of "negotiations," continued for two whole months, and were marked throughout by great firmness on the part of the British Cabinet.
Lord Salisbury, besides being backed by the British nation generally, was supported by the leading men amongst the Opposition, including Lord Rosebery, who, in the middle of October, made a speech in which the following pa.s.sage occurred:--
"Great Britain has been conciliatory, and her conciliatory disposition has been widely misunderstood. If the nations of the world are under the impression that the ancient spirit of Great Britain is dead, or that her resources are weakened, or her population less determined than ever it was to maintain the rights and honour of its flag, they make a mistake which can only end in a disastrous conflagration."
Simultaneously quiet but effective steps were taken to put the defences of the United Kingdom in order, and to prepare the fleet for any emergency.
In the end the French Government, seeing that England was in earnest, made up its mind to retire from an untenable position. The good news was appropriately communicated to the nation by Lord Salisbury on November 4th at the Lord Mayor"s dinner to the Sirdar, and gave general satisfaction.
Shortly after, Marchand and his force returned to France, and an incident which had seriously threatened the good relations existing between England and France came to an end.
Whilst the Sirdar was making his excursion to Fashoda, General Hunter, accompanied by a small force, proceeded up the Blue Nile. Here he met no Abyssinian Marchand disguised as an "envoy of civilization," and returned without having encountered any serious opposition from the tribes along the river.
Notwithstanding the blow suffered by the Mahdist cause at Omdurman, there was still some fighting to be done in another quarter. This time the scene of operations was in the neighbourhood of Gedaref, about 130 miles south-west of Ka.s.sala and 180 from the Blue Nile. This place had, previously to the fall of Omdurman, been held by an emir called Ahmed Fedil with upwards of 5,000 men.
Ahmed, with the object of a.s.sisting the Khalifa, had withdrawn the greater part of his force from Gedaref, and on the 7th September, Colonel Parsons started from Ka.s.sala with 1,300 men composed of the 16th Egyptian Battalion and some irregulars to dislodge the garrison remaining at Gedaref.
On the 22nd Parsons arrived in front of the place, and, after defeating some 3,000 Dervishes, succeeded in occupying it. The fight was severe, the Egyptian losses being no less than thirty-seven killed and fifty-seven wounded. Meanwhile Ahmed Fedil, who had failed to reach Omdurman, was making his way back towards Gedaref, where, on the 28th, he turned up with 3,500 men. He made a determined a.s.sault on the town, but his Dervishes were defeated by Parsons with heavy loss. On the 1st October they withdrew to some distance, and the Egyptian force not being strong enough to pursue, occupied themselves in strengthening their defences.
General Rundle was then sent up the river to Parsons" a.s.sistance. Rundle reached Abu Harras, on the Blue Nile, whence Colonel Collinson, with the 12th Battalion, started across the desert and joined Parsons just in time to see Fedil"s forces in full retreat in the direction of the river. At Rosieres they found Colonel Lewis, who had been for several weeks on the look-out to intercept Fedil"s crossing. A severe fight ensued between the Dervishes and the 10th Battalion under Lewis, aided by some of the gunboats told off to patrol the river. Many of Fedil"s force were killed and many more surrendered. Out of Lewis"s 400 soldiers, no fewer than 159 were either killed or wounded. The enemy were utterly routed, but Fedil succeeded in crossing the river with a few of his followers. Several days later he pa.s.sed over the White Nile and joined the Khalifa in Kordofan.
The action at Rosieres was the last fight of the campaign of 1898 which the Sirdar had so successfully carried on against the Mahdists.
If there is one thing more remarkable than another in the campaign, it is the excellent administration by the Sirdar of the force under his command. The construction of the railway, the management of the commissariat, the slow, sure, and irresistible advance, and the avoidance of accidents or reverses--all these const.i.tuted a triumph of administration. The manner in which the transport of the largest force ever sent into the Soudan under civilized conditions was effected will bear comparison with any campaign in modern times.
Another important feature was the comparatively small cost. According to Lord Cromer"s report of the 26th February, 1899, the total expense from the spring of 1896, when the expedition to Dongola was decided upon, till the close of the operations in the Soudan, was only E2,354,354.
This included the construction of no less than 760 miles of railway at a cost of E1,181,372, of 2,000 miles of telegraphs at a cost of E21,825, and the building of six gunboats at an expense of E154,934, thus leaving the military expenditure only E996,223.
Whilst giving Lord Kitchener the fullest credit for the success achieved, it would be unjust not to refer to the powerful and steady support which in his task he received throughout from England"s representative in Egypt, Lord Cromer, who, happily combining in himself the qualities of a soldier and a diplomat, was in a position to give most valuable advice in either capacity.[178]
CHAPTER LXX.
DESTRUCTION OF THE KHALIFA.
With regard to the further movements of the Khalifa. As already stated, after leaving Omdurman Abdullah fled in the direction of Kordofan.
Following the course of the White Nile, he proceeded, with only a few followers, to Duem, whence, quitting the river, he struck off in a south-westerly direction to Lake Sherkeleh, about 120 miles further.
There he was joined by some of his shattered forces. Subsequently an Egyptian fort was established at Duem and occupied by the 2nd Egyptian Battalion.
Towards the end of 1898 it was reported that the Khalifa had with him only a few hundred followers, and against these, in January, 1899, Colonel Kitchener, a brother of the Sirdar, was despatched with 900 men belonging to the 2nd and 14th Battalions, and about fifty irregular Cavalry.
Starting from Duem in the following month, Colonel Kitchener"s troops arrived at the Khalifa"s supposed position only to discover that he had evacuated his camp, which bore traces of having been occupied by some thousands of men, instead of the few hundreds reported as composing the Dervish force.
A reconnaissance was then made to within three miles of Abdullah"s new position, and here Kitchener, having placed his men in a zeriba, sent out his scouts.
They reported that the Khalifa had with him a force of about 7,000 men, of which more than half were armed with rifles, and that they were drawn up in fighting order.
Kitchener, realizing the insufficient number of his troops for an attack, and running short of water, abandoned the zeriba and fell back upon the river.
The Khalifa followed him as far as the deserted zeriba, but, fortunately for the small Egyptian force, did not pursue further. The expedition was then abandoned, and Colonel Kitchener returned to Cairo.[179]
In the subsequent month of June the Khalifa was still in the neighbourhood of Lake Sherkeleh, and raiding the tribes in that vicinity. According to later reports he had been attacked by the Tagalla tribe and had sustained heavy losses, by which, and by other causes, his adherents were reduced to as few as 4,000 men.
On this intelligence reaching Cairo it was determined that another attempt should be made against him as soon as the rainy season, then impending, should be over.
In September, news arrived that the still uncaptured Abdullah, with an army increased to 10,000 men, had established himself near Jeb el Gheddeer, a mountainous spot 100 miles north-west of Fashoda. A powerful Emir named Arabi Dafalla, with a numerous following, was reported to be on his way to Darfur, with a view to joining hands with the Khalifa. The military authorities then decided that the moment had come for finally crushing the Khalifa.
On the 26th September, the Sirdar reached Cairo from Europe, and proceeded at once to Omdurman, where the arrangements for a further expedition were being rapidly pushed forward. The greatest care was taken to ensure secrecy, but it became known that the force, which was to be under the personal command of the Sirdar, would consist of about 6,000 men, including four battalions of Egyptian Infantry, with Cavalry, Camel Corps and Artillery, besides irregulars.
The troops were to concentrate at Kaka, on the White Nile, whence they were to march upon Jeb el Gheddeer, 90 miles distant from the river, at which place it was hoped the fight would come off. The expedition, which was to proceed partly by land and partly by river, was so far advanced that by the end of September the Cavalry, Camel Corps, and Artillery had already been sent off from Omdurman, and they were joined soon after by the Infantry, and on the 11th October the Sirdar and his staff followed in the steamer _Dal_.