Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with My ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancellor that official notification has just reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at, and left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take measures for ensuring safety of My eastern frontiers where strong Russian troops are already posted.[66]
[Footnote 66: Second German _White Paper_.]
On its face this reply seems not unreasonable, but it must not be forgotten that Austria continued not only to bombard Belgrade but to mobilize its armies against Russia as well as Servia. Russia agreed to stop all military preparations, if Austria would consent to discuss the Servian question with a view to peace. Austria until the eleventh hour--when it was too late--refused even to discuss the Servian question and never offered either to demobilize or to cease its attack upon Servia. Germany upheld her in this unwarrantable course.
While in principle the Kaiser agreed with the King as to the method of adjustment, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Kaiser ever made any suggestion to his ally that it should stop its operations against Servia after capturing Belgrade, and await the adjustment of the questions through diplomatic channels.
Thereupon King George sent a brief telegram, stating that he had sent an urgent telegram to the Czar urging this course. Later on July 31st the Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Czar:
Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally, Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.
The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. _The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary._
In this fair-spoken message we unhappily find no suggestion that Austria would stop its mobilization, or its military operations against Servia. The untenable position of the Kaiser, to which he adhered with fatal consistency to the end, was that Austria should be given the full right to mobilize against Russia as well as Servia, and that his ally should even be permitted to press its aggressive operations against Servia by taking possession of its capital and holding it as a ransom. In the meantime Russia should not make any military preparations, either to move effectually against Austria in the event of the failure of negotiations, or even to defend itself.
The Kaiser"s suggestion did not even carry with it the implication that Germany would stop the military preparations that it was then carrying on in feverish haste, so that the contention of the Kaiser, however plausibly it was veiled in his telegram, was that _Germany and Austria_ _should have full freedom to prepare for war against Russia, while Russia was to tie its hands and await the outcome of further parleys, with Austrian cannon bombarding Belgrade_.
In this correspondence the Kaiser displayed his recognized ability as a writer and speaker, for in this rapid-fire exchange of telegrams the Kaiser was easily the better controversialist.
He a.s.sumed the role of a disinterested party, who, at the request of a litigant, agrees to become an impartial mediator. He was neither. The Czar had not asked him to be a mediator, although in the later telegrams the Russian monarch accepted that term. The Czar in his first telegram had asked the Kaiser as a party to the quarrel "to restrain your ally from going too far." The Kaiser, having adroitly accepted a very different role, promptly shifts the responsibility upon the Czar of embarra.s.sing the so-called "mediation." This enabled him to a.s.sume the att.i.tude of "injured innocence" and very skillfully he played that part.
This at least is clear that in this correspondence the Kaiser was either guilty of insincerity or he betrayed a fatal incapacity to grasp the essentials of the quarrel. I prefer the latter construction of his conduct. Against the bellicose efforts of his Foreign Office and his General Staff, I believe that for dynastic reasons he strove for a time to adjust the difficulty, but his egomania and his life-long habit of personal absolutism blinded him to the fact that he was taking an untenable, indeed an impossible, position, in contending that Russia should effectually tie its hands while Germany and Austria should be left free to prepare for eventualities. Had there been a breathing spell and the Kaiser had had more time for reflection, possibly the unreasonableness of his contention would have suggested itself, but he found on his sudden return from Norway that his country, through the fatuous folly of its military party, was almost irrevocably committed to war. Probably he did not dare to reverse openly and formally its policy. His popularity had already suffered in the Moroccan crisis. This consideration and the histrionic side to his complex personality betrayed him into his untenable and fatal position.
The Kaiser has. .h.i.therto been regarded as a man of exceptional ability.
Time and the issue of this war will tell. The verdict of history may be to the contrary. The world for a time may easily confuse restless energy and habitual meddling with real ability, but its final verdict will go far deeper. Since the Kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot, Germany"s real position in the world has steadily weakened. Then it was the first power in Europe with its rivals disunited. The Kaiser has united his enemies with "hoops of steel," driven Russia and England into a close alliance, forced Italy out of the Triple Alliance, and as the only compensation for these disastrous results, he has gained the doubtful cooperation of moribund Turkey, of which he is likely to say before many months are over: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"
In the meantime, Germany was not idle in its preparations for eventualities.
The Kaiser and his counsellors were already definitely planning for the war, and were taking steps to alienate England from her Allies and secure her neutrality. To insure this, the German Chancellor, having visited the Kaiser at Potsdam, sent for the British Amba.s.sador, and made the following significant offer:
[67]I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.
[Footnote 67: Sir E. Goschen.]
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany"s obligations as Austria"s ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. _That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed._ Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every a.s.surance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany"s adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty"s Government an a.s.surance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.
His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these a.s.surances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an a.s.surance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to a realization of his desire.
In reply to his Excellency"s inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.[68]
[Footnote 68: English _White Paper_, No. 85.]
While the German Foreign Office was thus endeavoring to keep England neutral, its army was on the move against France. This does not rest upon vague allegation, but upon the detailed specifications in a communication from the French Foreign Office, which the French Amba.s.sador in London submitted to Sir Edward Grey on July 31st. Its significance is apparent when it is remembered that simultaneously the Kaiser was invoking the Czar to demobilize his armies, and cease military preparations.
The German army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy"s army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th Corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th Army Corps from Stra.s.sburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single reservist.
As you see, Germany has done it. _I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Sat.u.r.day, the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in._[69]
[Footnote 69: English _White Paper_, No. 105 "Austrian" obviously means "Servian."]
In reply to the suggestion of the German Chancellor as to the neutrality of England, Sir Edward Grey advised the English Amba.s.sador on July 30th, as follows:
His Majesty"s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor"s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.
Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circ.u.mstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_ improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty"s Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.
_And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely pa.s.sed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be a.s.sured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately._
This letter will give Sir Edward Grey lasting glory in the history of civilization. Its chivalrous fairness to France needs no comment, but its most significant feature is the concluding portion, in which the English Foreign Minister suggested to Germany that if peace could be preserved, England stood ready to join with Germany in an alliance which would have insured all the great European nations against any aggressive war on the part of either of them.
It was, in fact, the "United States of Europe" in embryo. It was the one solution possible for these long-continued European wars--essentially civil wars--namely an alliance by the six great Powers,--a merger of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente,--whereby any aggressive act on the part of any one of them would be prevented by the others. What an infinite pity that the imprudent act of the Kaiser, and the mad folly of his advisers probably made a fair trial of this most hopeful plan for the unification of Europe an impossibility for another century!
In order that Germany should have no excuse whatever to declare war on account of Russia"s preparations, the Russian Foreign Minister saw the German Amba.s.sador in St. Petersburg on July 30th, _and then offered on behalf of Russia to stop all military preparations_, provided that Austria would simply recognize as an abstract principle that the Servian question had a.s.sumed the character of a question of European interest. As this proposal fully met the demands of the Kaiser with respect to the cessation by Russia of military preparations, the conversation as reported by the English Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey on July 30th deserves quotation _in extenso_:
French Amba.s.sador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Amba.s.sador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian va.s.sal, just as, in similar circ.u.mstances, Bokhara had become a Russian va.s.sal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.
M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government, that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia--more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.
German Amba.s.sador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Amba.s.sador a formula in French, of which the following is a translation:
"_If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has a.s.sumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations._"
Later in the day, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, the Russian Foreign Minister still further modified in the interests of peace the proposition upon which Russia was willing to cease all military preparations.
If Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has a.s.sumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the great Powers examine _the reparation which Servia could accord to the Government of Austria-Hungary without injury to her rights as a sovereign State_ and to her independence--Russia undertakes to maintain her expectant att.i.tude.
It will be noted that this formula implied that Servia owed some reparation to Austria, and it did not bind Austria to accept the judgment of the Powers as to the character of such reparation.
It simply conceded to the Powers the opportunity to "examine"--not the original controversy between Austria and Servia--but what reparation could be made without a compromise of sovereignty and independence. Austria did not bind itself to do anything except to stay the advance of her army into Servia, while Russia agreed to desist from further preparations or mobilization.
Could the offer have been more liberal? In face of this a.s.surance, how can the Kaiser or Germany reasonably contend that it was the mobilization of the Russian army which precipitated the war.
In the meantime Sir Edward Grey was working tirelessly to suggest some peace formula, upon which the Powers could agree. His suggestions for a conference of the four leading Powers of Europe, other than Russia and Austria, had been negatived by Germany on the frivolous pretext that such a conference was "too formal a method," quite ignoring the fact that its very formality would have necessarily given a "cooling time" to the would-be belligerents. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey urged that,
_the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia_. France agreed.
Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable_. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible _if only Germany would "press the b.u.t.ton" in the interests of peace_.[70]