The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.[23]
[Footnote 23: English _White Paper_, No. 21.]
These pacific suggestions to Servia met with complete success, and as a result that country on July 25th, and before the expiration of the ultimatum, made a reply to Austria which astonished the world with its spirit of conciliation and for a short time gave rise to optimistic hopes of peace.
At some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it accepted substantially the demands of Austria, with a few minor reservations, which it expressed its willingness to refer either to arbitration at The Hague Tribunal or to a conference of the Powers.[24]
[Footnote 24: English _White Paper_, No. 39.]
Neither Germany nor Austria seriously contended that the reply was not on its face a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the a.s.surances, calling the concessions "shams." Unless Austria, in asking a.s.surances from Servia, were content to accept them as made in good faith and allow their sincerity to be determined by future deeds, why should the ultimatum, calling for such a.s.surances, have been made?
If Germany and Austria had accepted Servia"s reply as sufficient, and Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises in the utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and no general war. Russia and England pledged their influence to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria.
The princ.i.p.al outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or leave to the Powers, was the partic.i.p.ation of Austrian officials in the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem.
Austria"s professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily attained by having the Powers appoint a commission of neutral jurists to make such investigation.
In any event, Austria could have accepted the very substantial concessions of Servia and without prejudice to its rights proceeded to The Hague Tribunal or to a concert of the Powers as to the few and comparatively simple open points. When one recalls the infinite treasure of property and life, which would thus have been saved the world, had Germany and Austria accepted this reasonable and pacific course, one can only exclaim, "_But oh, the pity of it!_"
It is significant that while the entire official German press gave ample s.p.a.ce to the Austrian ultimatum and rejoiced in Austria"s energetic att.i.tude, it withheld from the German people any adequate information as to the conciliatory nature of the Servian reply, for the Russian Charge at Berlin telegraphed to Sazonof:
The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment this note has not appeared _in extenso_ in any of local journals, which according to all the evidence do not wish to give it a place in their columns, understanding the calming effect which this publication would produce upon the German readers.[25]
[Footnote 25: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 46.]
Instead of getting the truth, the Berlin populace proceeded to make riotous demonstrations against the Russian and Servian Emba.s.sies.
The time limit on the ultimatum expired on July the 25th at six o"clock in the evening.
There is no more significant and at the same time discreditable feature of an infinitely discreditable chapter in history than that the Austrian Government, _without giving the Servian answer the consideration even of a single hour_, immediately severed all diplomatic intercourse with Belgrade and at 6.30 P.M. the Minister of Austria
informed the Servian Government by note that, not having received within the delay fixed a satisfactory response, he is leaving Belgrade with the whole personnel of the legation.
On the same night Austria ordered the mobilization of a considerable part of its army.
Notwithstanding these rebuffs, England, France, and Russia continued to labor for peace, and made further pacific suggestions, all of which fell upon deaf ears.
On July 25th, Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four Powers (England, France, Italy, and Germany) should unite
in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four Powers, acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly cooperate.[26]
[Footnote 26: English _White Paper_, Nos. 24 and 25.]
To this reasonable request the German Chancellor replied:
The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct.
We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our known duties as Allies, to cooperate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.[27]
[Footnote 27: German _White Paper_, Exhibit 13.]
This distinction is hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia"s current difference with Austria concerned the attempt of the latter to crush Servia without interference. Russia claimed such right of intervention. Germany would not interfere in the former matter, but would abstractly but not concretely mediate between Russia and Austria in the latter. Mediate about what? To refuse to mediate over the Servian question was to refuse to mediate at all. For all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable.
All that Germany did on July 25th, so far as the record discloses, was to "pa.s.s on" England"s and Russia"s requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate that it was "pa.s.sed on" without any endors.e.m.e.nt, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally"s request for more time if it had ever been made? Here again we note with disappointment the absence from the record of Germany"s message to Austria, "pa.s.sing on" the reasonable request for an extension of time. The result indicates that the request received, if any endors.e.m.e.nt, the "faint praise" which is said to "d.a.m.n."
Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.
_A snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats._ The peace of the world was to be torpedoed by submarine diplomacy. The Austrian Government could wait nearly three months to try the a.s.sa.s.sin, who admittedly slew the Austrian Archduke, but could not wait even a few hours before condemning Servia to political death. It could not grant Russia any time to consider a matter gravely affecting its interests, even if the peace of Europe and the happiness of the world depended on it. It would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly Power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.
Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France, and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military proceedings until further efforts toward conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between them," but the German Amba.s.sador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign Office saying
that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion.
It will be noted that Germany thus gave to England, as it had already given to Russia and France in the most unequivocal terms, a disclaimer of any responsibility for the Austrian ultimatum, but we have already seen that when the German Foreign Office prepared its statement for the German nation, which was circulated in the Reichstag on August 4th, Germany confessed the insincerity of these a.s.surances by admitting that before the ultimatum was issued the Austrian Government had advised the German Foreign Office of its intentions and asked its opinion and that
we were able to a.s.sure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to a.s.sure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take ... would receive our approval.
Here again it is to be noted that the telegram, which the German Foreign Office sent to Prince Lichnowsky, and which that diplomat simply read to Sir Edward Grey, is not set forth in the exhibits to the German _White Paper_.
As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession until after the Kaiser"s return from Norway and then only if we accept the a.s.surances of its Foreign Office which are not supported by official doc.u.ments. Its att.i.tude was shown by the declaration of its Amba.s.sador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while again disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany "approved" its point of view,
and that certainly, the arrow once sent, Germany could not allow herself to be guided except by her duty as ally.[28]
[Footnote 28: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 19.]
This seemed to be the fatal error of Germany, that its duties to civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria, whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war without respect to the justice of the quarrel may be defensible, but to support it in a time of peace in an iniquitous demand and a policy of gross discourtesy to friendly States offends every sense of international morality.
On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in common of some clauses of the Austrian ultimatum. _To this Austria never even replied._
The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Amba.s.sador in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and submitted the following formal declaration:
"Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek territorial acquisitions, and that she does not threaten the integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own tranquillity. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France will use her influence at St. Petersburg in the direction of moderation." _The [French] Minister observed that Germany could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown.
The Amba.s.sador answered that that was not possible, in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict._ Thereupon the Minister asked if the four Powers--England, Germany, Italy, and France--were not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict between Russia and Austria. The Amba.s.sador pleaded the absence of instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to adhere to the German proposal.[29]
[Footnote 29: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 28.]
This significant interview states the consistent att.i.tude of Germany.
The burden is put upon France to induce its ally to desist from any intervention and thus give Austria a free hand, while Germany emphatically declines to promote the same pacific object by suggesting to Austria a more conciliatory course.
On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved that peace, the German Secretary of State, after conferring with the British Amba.s.sador at Berlin, replied that the conference
would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your [Sir Edward Grey"s] suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I [Sir E.
Goschen] said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He [von Jagow]
maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable.[30]
[Footnote 30: English _White Paper_, No. 43.]
Germany"s refusal to have Servia"s case submitted to the Powers even for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that on the same day the German Amba.s.sador at London quoted the German Secretary of State as saying
that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept,
thus recognizing that Austria"s ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the German Amba.s.sador"s attention to the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and marched into that country