It may here be remarked that while Mr. Douglas held that "So far as the doctrine of Popular Sovereignty and Nonintervention is concerned, the Colorado Bill, the Nevada Bill, and the Dakota Bill, are identically the same with the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and in its precise language"-these former Bills having been pa.s.sed at the last Session of the 36th Congress-the Republicans, on the contrary, held that neither in these nor other measures had they abandoned any distinctive Republican principle; while Breckinridge declared that they had pa.s.sed those Territorial Bills, without the Wilmot proviso, because they felt perfectly secure in those Territories, with all the Federal patronage in Republican hands.
However that may be, we have here, brought out in strong contrast, the conciliatory feeling which inspired such Union men as Douglas, and the strong and persistent efforts they made in behalf of Concession and Peace up to a period only a few weeks before the bombardment of Sumter; and the almost total revulsion in their sentiments after that event, as to the only proper means to preserve the Union. For it was only then that the truth, as it fell from Douglas"s lips at Springfield, was fully recognized, to wit: that there was no half-way ground betwixt Patriotism and Treason; that War was an existing fact; and that Patriots must arm to defend and preserve the Union against the armed Traitors a.s.sailing it.
At last, July 4, 1861, the Congress met, and proceeded at once with commendable alacrity and patriotism, to the consideration and enactment of measures sufficient to meet the extraordinary exigency, whether as regards the raising and equipment of the vast bodies of Union volunteers needed to put down Rebellion, or in the raising of those enormous amounts of money which the Government was now, or might thereafter be, called upon to spend like water in preserving the Union.
It was at this memorable Session, of little over one month, that the chief of the great "War Measures" as they were termed, were enacted.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE STORM OF BATTLE.
We have seen how Fort Sumter fell; how the patriotic North responded to President Lincoln"s Call, for 75,000 three-months volunteers, with such enthusiasm that, had there been a sufficiency of arms and accoutrements, he might have had, within three months of that Call, an Army of 500,000 men in the field; how he had called for 42,000 three-years volunteers early in May, besides swelling what little there was of a regular Army by ten full regiments; and how a strict blockade of the entire Southern Coast-line had not only been declared, but was now enforced and respected.
General Butler, promoted Major-General for his Military successes at Annapolis and Baltimore, was now in command of Fortress Monroe and vicinity, with some 12,000 volunteers under him, confronted, on the Peninsula, by a nearly equal number of Rebel troops, under Generals Huger and Magruder-General Banks, with less than 10,000 Union troops, occupying Baltimore, and its vicinage.
General Patterson, with some 20,000 Union troops-mostly Pennsylvania militia-was at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, with about an equal number of the Enemy, under General Joseph E. Johnston, at Harper"s Ferry, on the Potomac, watching him.
Some 50,000 Union troops were in camp, in and about Washington, on the Virginia side, under the immediate command of Generals McDowell and Mansfield-Lieutenant General Scott, at Washington, being in Chief-command of the Union Armies-and, confronting these Union forces, in Virginia, near the National Capital, were some 30,000 Rebel troops under the command of General Beauregard, whose success in securing the evacuation of Fort Sumter by its little garrison of half-starved Union soldiers, had magnified him, in the eyes of the rebellious South, into the proportions of a Military genius of the first order.
There had been no fighting, nor movements, worthy of special note, until June 7th, when General Patterson advanced from Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to Hagerstown, Maryland. General Johnston at once evacuated Harper"s Ferry, and retreated upon Winchester, Virginia.
General McClellan, in command of the Department of the Ohio, had, however, crossed the Ohio river, and by the 4th of July, being at Grafton, West Virginia, with his small Army of Union troops, to which a greatly inferior Rebel force was opposed, commenced that successful advance against it, which led, after Bull Run, to his being placed at the head of all the Armies of the United States.
Subsequently Patterson crossed the Potomac, and after trifling away over one month"s time, at last, on the 15th of July, got within nine miles of Winchester and Johnston"s Army. Barring a spiritless reconnaissance, Patterson-who was a fervent Breckinridge-Democrat in politics, and whose Military judgment, as we shall see, was greatly influenced, if not entirely controlled, by his Chief of staff, Fitz John Porter-never got any nearer to the Enemy!
Instead of attacking the Rebel force, under Johnston, or at least keeping it "employed," as he was ordered to do by General Scott; instead of getting nearer, and attempting to get between Winchester and the Shenandoah River, as was suggested to him by his second in command, General Sanford; and instead of permitting Sanford to go ahead, as that General desired to, with his own 8,000 men, and do it himself; General Patterson ordered him off to Charlestown-twelve miles to the Union left and rear,-and then took the balance of his Army, with himself, to the same place!
In other words, while he had the most positive and definite orders, from General Scott, if not to attack and whip Johnston, to at least keep him busy and prevent that Rebel General from forming a junction, via the Mana.s.sas Gap railroad or otherwise, with Beauregard, Patterson deliberately moved his Army further away from Winchester and gave to the Enemy the very chance of escaping and forming that junction which was essential to Rebel success in the vicinity of Mana.s.sas.
But for this disobedience of orders, Bull Run would doubtless have been a great victory to the Union Arms, instead of a reverse, and the War, which afterward lasted four years, might have been over in as many months.
It is foreign to the design of this work, to present in it detailed descriptions of the battles waged during the great War of the Rebellion -it being the present intention of the writer, at some later day, to prepare and publish another work devoted to such stirring Military scenes. Yet, as it might seem strange and unaccountable for him to pa.s.s by, at this time, without any description or comment, the first pitched battle of the Rebellion, he is constrained to pause and view that memorable contest. And first, it may be well to say a word of the general topography of the country about the battle-field.
The Alleghany Mountains, or that part of them with which we have now to do, stretch in three almost equidistant parallel ridges, from North-East to South-West, through the heart of Old Virginia. An occasional pa.s.s, or "Gap," through these ridges, affords communication, by good roads, between the enclosed parallel valleys and the Eastern part of that State.
The Western of these Alleghany ridges bears the name of "Alleghany Mountains" proper; the Eastern is called the "Blue Ridge;" while the Middle Ridge, at its Northern end-which rests upon the Potomac, where that river sweeps through three parallel ridges almost at right angles to their own line of direction-is called the "Great North Mountain."
The valley, between the Middle Ridge and the Blue Ridge, is known as the Shenandoah Valley, taking its name from the Shenandoah River, which, for more than one hundred miles, flows along the Western foot of the Blue Ridge, toward the North-East, until it empties into the Potomac, at Harper"s Ferry.
The Orange and Alexandria railroad runs from Alexandria,-on the opposite bank of the Potomac from Washington, and a few miles below the Capital,-in a general Southeasterly direction, to Culpepper Court-House; thence Southerly to Gordonsville, where it joins the Virginia Central-the Western branch of which runs thence through Charlotteville, Staunton, and Covington, across the ridges and valleys of the Alleghanies, while its Eastern branch, taking a general South-easterly direction, crosses the Richmond and Fredricksburg railroad at Hanover Junction, some twenty miles North of Richmond, and thence sweeps Southerly to the Rebel capital.
It is along this Easterly branch of the Virginia Central that Rebel re-enforcements will be hurried to Beauregard, from Richmond to Gordonsville, and thence, by the Orange and Alexandria railroad, to Mana.s.sas Junction.
Some twenty-five miles from Alexandria, a short railroad-feeder-which runs from Strasburg, in the Shenandoah Valley, through the Blue Ridge, at Mana.s.sas Gap, in an East-South-easterly direction-strikes the Alexandria and Orange railroad. The point of contact is Mana.s.sas Junction; and it is along this Mana.s.sas-Gap feeder that Johnston, with his Army at Winchester-some twenty miles North-North-East of Strasburg-expects, in case of attack by Patterson, to be re-enforced by Beauregard; or, in case the latter is a.s.sailed, to go to his a.s.sistance, after shaking off Patterson.
This little link of railroad, known as the Mana.s.sas Gap railroad, is therefore an important factor in the game of War, now commencing in earnest; and it had, as we shall see, very much to do, not only with the advance of McDowell"s Union Army upon Bull Run, but also with the result of the first pitched battle thereabout fought.
From Alexandria, some twelve miles to the Westward, runs a fine turnpike road to Fairfax Court-House; thence, continuing Westward, but gradually and slightly dipping award the South, it pa.s.ses through Germantown, Centreville, and Groveton, to Warrenton.
This "Warrenton Pike"-as it is termed-also plays a somewhat conspicuous part, before, during, and after the Battle of Bull Run. For most of its length, from Fairfax Court-House to Warrenton, the Warrenton Pike pursues a course almost parallel with the Orange and Alexandria railroad aforesaid, while the stream of Bull Run, pursuing a South-easterly course, has a general direction almost parallel with that of the Mana.s.sas Gap railroad.
We shall find that it is the diamond-shaped parallelogram, formed by the obtuse angle junction of the two railroads on the South, and the similarly obtuse-angled crossing of the stream of Bull Run by the Warrenton Pike on the North, that is destined to become the historic battle-field of the first "Bull Run," or "Mana.s.sas;" and it is in the Northern obtuse-angle of this parallelogram that the main fighting is done, upon a spot not much more than one mile square, three sides of the same being bounded respectively by the Bull Run stream, the Warrenton Pike, which crosses it on a stone bridge, and the Sudley Springs road, which crosses the Pike, at right-angles to it, near a stone house.
On the 3rd of June, 1861, General McDowell, in command of the Department of North-Eastern Virginia, with head-quarters at Arlington, near Washington, receives from Colonel Townsend, a.s.sistant Adjutant-General with Lieutenant-General Scott-who is in Chief command of all the Union Forces, with Headquarters at Washington-a brief but pregnant communication, the body of which runs thus: "General Scott desires you to submit an estimate of the number and composition of a column to be pushed toward Mana.s.sas Junction, and perhaps the Gap, say in four or five days, to favor Patterson"s attack on Harper"s Ferry. The rumor is that Arlington Heights will be attacked to-night."
In response to this request, General McDowell submits, on the day following, an estimate that "the actual entire force at the head of the column should, for the purpose of carrying the position at Mana.s.sas and of occupying both the road to Culpepper, and the one to the Gap, be as much as 12,000 Infantry, two batteries of regular Artillery, and from six to eight companies of Cavalry, with an available reserve, ready to move forward from Alexandria by rail, of 5,000 Infantry and one heavy field battery, rifled if possible; these numbers to be increased or diminished as events may indicate." This force of raw troops he proposes to organize into field brigades under the command of "active and experienced colonels" of the regular Army. And while giving this estimate as to the number of troops necessary, he suggestively adds that "in proportion to the numbers used will be the lives saved; and as we have such numbers pressing to be allowed to serve, might it not be well to overwhelm and conquer as much by the show of force as by the use of it?"
Subsequently McDowell presents to General Scott, and Mr. Lincoln"s Cabinet, a project of advance and attack, which is duly approved and ordered to be put in execution. In that project or plan of operations, submitted by verbal request of General Scott, near the end of June,-the success of which is made contingent upon Patterson"s holding Johnston engaged at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley, and also upon Butler"s holding the Rebel force near Fortress Monroe from coming to Beauregard"s aid at Mana.s.sas Junction,-McDowell estimates Beauregard"s strength at 25,000, with a possible increase, bringing it up to 35,000 men. The objective point in McDowell"s plan, is Mana.s.sas Junction, and he proposes "to move against Mana.s.sas with a force of 30,000 of all arms, organized into three columns, with a reserve of 10,000."
McDowell is fully aware that the Enemy has "batteries in position at several places in his front, and defensive works on Bull Run, and Mana.s.sas Junction." These batteries he proposes to turn. He believes Bull Run to be "fordable at almost anyplace,"-an error which ultimately renders his plan abortive,-and his proposition is, after uniting his columns on the Eastern side of Bull Run, "to attack the main position by turning it, if possible, so as to cut off communications by rail with the South, or threaten to do so sufficiently to force the Enemy to leave his intrenchments to guard them."
In other words, a.s.suming the Enemy driven back, by minor flanking movements, or otherwise, upon his intrenched position at Bull Run, or Mana.s.sas, the plan is to turn his right, destroy the Orange and Alexandria railroad leading South, and the bridge at Bristol, so as to cut off his supplies. This done, the Enemy-if nothing worse ensues for him-will be in a "bad box."
McDowell, however, has no idea that the Enemy will stand still to let this thing be done. On the contrary, he is well satisfied that Beauregard will accept battle on some chosen ground between Mana.s.sas Junction and Washington.
On the afternoon of Tuesday, the 16th of July, the advance of McDowell"s Army commences. That Army is organized into five divisions-four of which accompany McDowell, while a fifth is left to protect the defensive works of Washington, on the South bank of the Potomac. This latter, the Fourth Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon, comprises eight unbrigaded New Jersey regiments of (three months, and three years) volunteers-none of which take part in the ensuing conflicts-at-arms.
The moving column consists of the First Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, comprising four brigades, respectively under Brigadier-General R. C. Schenck, and Colonels E. D. Keyes, W. T. Sherman, and I. B. Richardson; the Second Division, commanded by Colonel David Hunter, comprising two brigades, under Colonels Andrew Porter and A. E. Burnside respectively; the Third Division, commanded by Colonel S. P. Heintzelman, comprising three brigades, under Colonels W. B. Franklin, O. B. Wilc.o.x, and O. O. Howard, respectively; and the Fifth Division, commanded by Colonel Dixon S. Miles, comprising two brigades, under Colonels Lewis Blenker, and Thomas A. Davies, respectively.
Tyler"s Division leads the advance, moving along the Leesburg road to Vienna, on our right, with orders to cross sharply to its left, upon Fairfax Court House, the following (Wednesday) morning. Miles"s Division follows the turnpike road to Annandale, and then moves, by the Braddock road,-along which Braddock, a century before, had marched his doomed army to disaster,-upon Fairfax Court House, then known to be held by Bonham"s Rebel Brigade of South Carolinians. Hunter follows Miles, to Annandale, and thence advances direct upon Fairfax, by the turnpike road-McDowell"s idea being to bag Bonham"s Brigade, if possible, by a simultaneous attack on the front and both flanks. But the advance is too slow, and the Enemy"s outposts, both there and elsewhere, have ample opportunity of falling safely back upon their main position, behind the stream of Bull Run.
[McDowell in his testimony before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," said: "At Fairfax Court House was the South Carolina Brigade. And I do not suppose anything would have had a greater cheering effect upon the troops, and perhaps upon the Country, than the capture of that brigade. And if General Tyler could have got down there any time in the forenoon instead of in the afternoon, the capture of that brigade was beyond question. It was about 5,000 or 6,000 men, and Tyler had 12,000, at the same time that we were pressing on in front. He did not get down there until in the afternoon; none of us got forward in time."]
This slowness is due to various causes. There is a pretty general dread, for example, among our troops, of threatened ambuscades, and hence the advance is more cautious than it otherwise would be. It is thought the part of wisdom, as it were, to "feel the way." The marching, moreover, is new to our troops. General Scott had checked McDowell when the latter undertook to handle eight regiments together, near Washington, by intimating that he was "trying to make a show." Thus the very essential knowledge of how to manoeuvre troops in large bodies, has been withheld from our Union generals, while the volunteer regiments have either rusted in camp from inaction, or have been denied the opportunity of acquiring that endurance and hardiness and discipline which frequent movement of troops confers. Hence, all unused to the discipline of the march, every moment some one falls out of line to "pick blackberries, or to get water." Says McDowell, in afterward reporting this march: "They would not keep in the ranks, order as much as you pleased. When they came where water was fresh, they would pour the old water out of their canteens and fill them with fresh water; they were not used to denying themselves much."
Meantime, Heintzelman"s Division is also advancing, by cross-roads, more to the left and South of the railroad line,-in accordance with McDowell"s plan, which comprehends not only the bagging of Bonham, but an immediate subsequent demonstration, by Tyler, upon Centreville and beyond, while Heintzelman, supported by Hunter and Miles, shall swoop across Bull Run, at Wolf Run Shoals, some distance below Union Mills, turn the Enemy"s right, and cut off his Southern line of railroad communications. Thus, by the evening of Wednesday, the 17th, Heintzelman is at Sangster"s Station, while Tyler, Miles, and Hunter, are at Fairfax.
It is a rather rough experience that now befalls the Grand Army of the Union. All unused, as we have seen, to the fatigues and other hardships of the march, the raw levies, of which it almost wholly consists, which started bright and fresh, strong and hopeful, full of the buoyant ardor of enthusiastic patriotism, on that hot July afternoon, only some thirty hours back, are now dust-begrimed, footsore, broken down, exhausted by the scorching sun, hungry, and without food,-for they have wasted the rations with which they started, and the supply-trains have not yet arrived. Thus, hungry and physically prostrated, "utterly played out," as many of them confess, and demoralized also by straggling and loss of organization, they bivouac that night in the woods, and dream uneasy dreams beneath the comfortless stars.
A mile beyond Fairfax Court House, on the Warrenton Turnpike, is Germantown. It is here that Tyler"s Division has rested, on the night of the 17th. At 7 o"clock on the morning of Thursday, the 18th, in obedience to written orders from McDowell, it presses forward, on that "Pike," to Centreville, five miles nearer to the Enemy"s position behind Bull Run-Richardson"s Brigade in advance-and, at 9 o"clock, occupies it. Here McDowell has intended Tyler to remain, in accordance with the plan, which he has imparted to him in conversation, and in obedience to the written instructions to: "Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to Warrenton. Do not bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving on Mana.s.sas,"-this advance, by way of Centreville, being intended solely as a "demonstration" to mask the real movement, which, as we have seen, is to be made by the other divisions across Wolf Run Shoals, a point on Bull Run, some five or six miles below Union Mills, and some seven miles below Blackburn"s Ford.
Upon the arrival of Richardson"s Brigade, Thursday morning, at Centreville, it is found that, under cover of the darkness of the previous night, the Enemy has retreated, in two bodies, upon Bull Run, the one along the Warrenton Pike, the other (the largest) down the ridge-road from Centreville to Blackburn"s Ford. Richardson"s Brigade at once turns down the latter road and halts about a mile beyond Centreville, at a point convenient to some springs of water. Tyler soon afterward rides up, and, taking from that brigade two companies of light Infantry and a squadron of Cavalry, proceeds, with Colonel Richardson, to reconnoitre the Enemy, finding him in a strong position on the opposite bank of Bull Run, at Blackburn"s Ford.
While this is going on, McDowell has ridden in a Southerly direction down to Heintzelman"s Division, at Sangster"s Station, "to make arrangements to turn the Enemy"s right, and intercept his communications with the South," but has found, owing to the narrowness and crookedness of the roads, and the great distance that must be traversed in making the necessary detour, that his contemplated movement is too risky to be ventured. Hence he at once abandons his original plan of turning the Enemy"s right, and determines on "going around his left, where the country is more open, and the roads broad and good."
McDowell now orders a concentration, for that night, of the four divisions, with two days cooked rations in their haversacks, upon and about Centreville,-the movement to commence as soon as they shall receive expected commissariat supplies. But, later on the 18th,-learning that his advance, under Tyler, has, against orders, become engaged with the Enemy-he directs the concentration to be made at once.
Let us examine, for a moment, how this premature engagement comes about. We left Tyler, accompanied by Richardson, with a squadron of Cavalry and a battalion of light Infantry making a reconnaissance, on Thursday morning the 18th, toward Blackburn"s Ford. They approach within a mile of the ford, when they discover a Rebel battery on the farther bank of Bull Run-so placed as to enfilade the road descending from their own position of observation down to the ford,-strong Rebel infantry pickets and skirmishing parties being in front.
Tyler at once orders up his two rifled guns, Ayres" Battery, and Richardson"s entire Brigade-and later, Sherman"s Brigade as a reserve. As soon as they come up,-about noon-he orders the rifled guns into battery on the crest of the hill, about one mile from, and looking down upon, the Rebel battery aforesaid, and opens upon the Enemy; giving him a dozen sh.e.l.ls,-one of them making it lively for a body of Rebel Cavalry which appears between the ford and Mana.s.sas.
The Rebel battery responds with half a dozen shots, and then ceases. Tyler now orders Richardson to advance his brigade and throw out skirmishers to scour the thick woods which cover the Bull Run bottom-land. Richardson at once rapidly deploys the battalion of light Infantry as skirmishers in advance of his brigade, pushes them forward to the edge of the woods, drives in the skirmishers of the Enemy in fine style, and supports their further advance into the woods, with the 1st Ma.s.sachusetts Regiment.
Meanwhile Tyler, discovering a favorable opening in the woods, "low down on the bottom of the stream," for a couple of howitzers in battery, sends Captain Ayres of the 5th U. S. Artillery, and a detached section (two 12-pound howitzers) of his battery, with orders to post it himself on that spot, and sends Brackett"s squadron of the 2d Cavalry to his support.
No sooner does Ayres open fire on the Enemy, than he awakens a Rebel hornet"s-nest. Volley after volley of musketry shows that the Bull Run bottom fairly swarms with Rebel troops, while another Rebel battery, more to the Rebel right, opens, with that already mentioned, a concentrated cross-fire upon him.
And now Richardson orders up the 12th New York, Colonel Walrath, to the left of our battery. Forming it into line-of-battle, Richardson orders it to charge through the woods upon the Enemy. Gallantly the regiment moves forward, after the skirmishers, into the woods, but, being met by a very heavy fire of musketry and artillery along the whole line of the Enemy"s position, is, for the most part, thrown back in confusion-a mere fragment* remaining in line, and retreating,-while the howitzers, and Cavalry also, are withdrawn.
Meantime, however, Richardson has ordered up, and placed in line-of-battle, on the right of our battery, the 1st Ma.s.sachusetts, the 2d Michigan (his own), and the 3d Michigan. The skirmishers in the woods still bravely hold their ground, undercover, and these three regiments are plucky, and anxious to a.s.sault the Enemy. Richardson proposes to lead them in a charge upon the Enemy"s position, and drive him out of it; but Tyler declines to give permission, on the ground that this being "merely a reconnaissance," the object of which-ascertaining the strength and position of the Enemy-having been attained, a further attack is unnecessary. He therefore orders Richardson to "fall back in good order to our batteries on the hill,"-which he does.
Upon reaching these batteries, Richardson forms his 2d Michigan, in "close column by division," on their right, and the 1st Ma.s.sachusetts and 3d Michigan, in "line of battle," on their left-the 12th New York re-forming, under cover of the woods at the rear, later on. Then, with our skirmishers thrown into the woods in front, their scattering fire, and the musketry responses of the Rebels, are drowned in the volume of sound produced by the deafening contest which ensues between our Artillery, and that of the Enemy from his batteries behind Bull Run.
This artillery-duel continues about one hour; and then seems to cease by mutual consent, about dusk-after 415 shots have been fired on the Union side, and have been responded to by an equal number from the Rebel batteries, "gun for gun"-the total loss in the engagement, on the Union side, being 83, to a total loss among the Enemy, of Thursday night, Richardson retires his brigade upon Centreville, in order to secure rations and water for his hungry and thirsty troops,-as no water has yet been found in the vicinity of the Union batteries aforesaid. On the morrow, however, when his brigade re-occupies that position, water is found in abundance, by digging for it.
This premature attack, at Blackburn"s Ford, by Tyler, against orders, having failed, throws a wet blanket upon the martial spirit of McDowell"s Army. In like degree is the morale of the Rebel Army increased.
It is true that Longstreet, in command of the Rebel troops at Blackburn"s Ford, has not had things all his own way; that some of his artillery had to be "withdrawn;" that, as he acknowledges in his report, his brigade of three Virginia regiments (the 1st, 11th, and 17th) had "with some difficulty repelled" the Union a.s.sault upon his position; that he had to call upon General Early for re-enforcements; that Early re-enforced him with two Infantry regiments (the 7th Louisiana and 7th Virginia) at first; that one of these (the 7th Virginia) was "thrown into confusion;" that Early then brought up his own regiment (the 24th Virginia) under Lieutenant Colonel Hairston, and the entire seven guns of the "Washington Artillery;" and that but for the active "personal exertions" of Longstreet, in "encouraging the men under his command," and the great numerical superiority of the Rebels, there might have been no Union "repulse" at all. Yet still the attack has failed, and that failure, while it dispirits the Patriot Army, inspires the Rebel Army with renewed courage.
Under these circ.u.mstances, Friday, the 19th of July, is devoted to reconnaissances by the Engineer officers of the Union Army; to the cooking of the supplies, which have at last arrived; and to resting the weary and road-worn soldiers of the Union.
Let us take advantage of this halt in the advance of McDowell"s "Grand Army of the United States"-as it was termed-to view the Rebel position at, and about Mana.s.sas, and to note certain other matters having an important and even determining bearing upon the issue of the impending shock-at-arms.
Beauregard has received early information of McDowell"s advance from Arlington, and of his plans.
[This he admits, in his report, when he says; "Opportunely informed of the determination of the Enemy to advance on Mana.s.sas, my advanced brigades, on the night of the 16th of July, were made aware, from these headquarters, of the impending movement,"]
On Tuesday the 16th, he notifies his advanced brigades. On Wednesday, he sends a dispatch from Mana.s.sas, to Jefferson Davis, at Richmond, announcing that the Union troops have a.s.sailed his outposts in heavy force; that he has fallen back before them, on the line of Bull Run; and that he intends to make a stand at Mitch.e.l.l"s Ford (close to Blackburn"s Ford) on that stream,-adding: if his (McDowell"s) force is overwhelming, "I shall retire to the Rappahannock railroad bridge, saving my command for defense there, and future operations. Please inform Johnston of this, via Staunton, and also Holmes. Send forward any re-enforcements at the earliest possible instant, and by every possible means."
In the meantime, however, Beauregard loses no time in advantageously posting his troops. On the morning of the 18th of July, when the Union advance enters Centreville, he has withdrawn all his advanced brigades within the Rebel lines of Bull Run, resting them on the South side of that stream, from Union Mills Ford, near the Orange and Alexandria railroad bridge, up to the stone bridge over which the Warrenton Pike crosses the Run,-a distance of some six to eight miles.
Between the Rebel left, at Stone Bridge, and the Rebel right, at Union Mills Ford, are several fords across Bull Run-the general course of the stream being from the North-West to South-East, to its confluence with the Occoquan River, some twelve miles from the Potomac River.
Mitch.e.l.l"s Ford, the Rebel center, is about three miles to the South-West of, and about the same distance North-East from, Mana.s.sas Junction. But it may be well, right here, to locate all these fordable crossings of the rocky, precipitous, and well-wooded Bull Run stream, between the Stone Bridge and Union Mills Ford. Thus, half a mile below the Stone Bridge is Lewis"s Ford; half a mile below that, Ball"s Ford; half a mile below that, Island Ford; one and one-half miles below that, Mitch.e.l.l"s Ford-one mile below that.
Blackburn"s Ford; three-quarters of a mile farther down, McLean"s Ford; and nearly two miles lower down the stream, Union Mills Ford.
By Thursday morning, the 18th of July, Beauregard has advantageously posted the seven brigades into which he has organized his forces, at these various positions along his extended front, as follows: At the Stone Bridge, Brigadier-General N. G. Evans"s Seventh Brigade, of one regiment and one battalion of Infantry, two companies of Cavalry, and a battery of four six-pounders.
At Lewis"s, b.a.l.l.s, and Island Fords-Colonel P. St. George c.o.c.ke"s Fifth Brigade, of three regiments of Infantry, one battery of Artillery, and one company of Cavalry.
At Mitch.e.l.l"s Ford, Brigadier-General M. L. Bonham"s First Brigade, of four Infantry regiments, two batteries, and six companies of Cavalry.
At Blackburn"s Ford, Brigadier-General J. Longstreet"s Fourth Brigade, of four Infantry regiments, with two 6-pounders.
At McLean"s Ford, Brigadier-General D. R. Jones"s Third Brigade of three Infantry regiments, one Cavalry company, and two 6-pounders.
At Union Mills Ford, Brigadier-General R. S. Ewell"s Second Brigade, of three Infantry regiments, three Cavalry companies, and four 12-powder howitzers-Colonel Jubal A. Early"s Sixth Brigade, of three Infantry regiments and three rifled pieces of Walton"s Battery, being posted in the rear of, and as a support to, Ewell"s Brigade.
[Johnston also found, on the 20th, the Reserve Brigade of Brig. Gen. T. H. Holmes-comprising two regiments of Infantry, Walker"s Battery of Artillery, and Scott"s Cavalry-with Early"s Brigade, "in reserve, in rear of the right."]
The disposition and strength of Beauregard"s forces at these various points along his line of defense on Bull Run stream, plainly shows his expectation of an attack on his right; but he is evidently suspicious that it may come upon his centre; for, as far back as July 8th, he had issued special orders to the effect that: "Should the Enemy march to the attack of Mitch.e.l.l"s Ford, via Centreville, the following movements will be made with celerity: "I. The Fourth Brigade will march from Blackburn"s Ford to attack him on the flank and centre.
"II. The Third Brigade will be thrown to the attack of his centre and rear toward Centreville.
"III. The Second and Sixth Brigades united will also push forward and attack him in the rear by way of Centreville, protecting their own right flanks and rear from the direction of Fairfax Station and Court House.
"IV. In the event of the defeat of the Enemy, the troops at Mitch.e.l.l"s Ford and Stone Bridge, especially the Cavalry and Artillery, will join in the pursuit, which will be conducted with vigor but unceasing prudence, and continued until he shall have been driven beyond the Potomac."
And it is not without interest to note Beauregard"s subsequent indors.e.m.e.nt on the back of these Special Orders, that: "The plan of attack prescribed within would have been executed, with modifications affecting First and Fifth Brigades, to meet the attack upon Blackburn"s Ford, but for the expected coming of General Johnston"s command, which was known to be en route to join me on [Thursday] the 18th of July."
The knowledge thus possessed on Thursday, the 18th, by Beauregard, that Johnston"s Army is on its way to join him, is of infinite advantage to the former. On the other hand, the complete ignorance, at this time, of McDowell on this point,-and the further fact that he has been lulled into a feeling of security on the subject, by General Scott"s emphatic a.s.surance to him that "if Johnston joins Beauregard, he shall have Patterson on his heels"-is a great disadvantage to the Union general.
Were McDowell now aware of the real Military situation, he would unquestionably make an immediate attack, with the object of crushing Beauregard before Johnston can effect a junction with him. It would then be a mere matter of detail for the armies of McDowell, McClellan, and Patterson, to bag Johnston, and bring the armed Rebellion to an inglorious and speedy end. But Providence-through the plottings of individuals within our own lines-wills it otherwise.
Long before this, Patterson has been informed by General Winfield Scott of the proposed movement by McDowell upon Mana.s.sas,-and of its date.
On Sat.u.r.day, July 13th, General Scott telegraphed to Patterson: "I telegraphed to you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the Enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the Valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in force toward Mana.s.sas, and it be too hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Keys Ferry, Leesburg, etc."
On Wednesday, the 17th, Scott telegraphs to Patterson: "I have nothing official from you since Sunday (14th), but am glad to learn, through Philadelphia papers, that you have advanced. Do not let the Enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front whilst he re-enforces the Junction with his main body. McDowell"s first day"s work has driven the Enemy beyond Fairfax Court House. The Junction will probably be carried by to-morrow."
On Thursday, the 18th, Patterson replies that to attack "the greatly superior force at Winchester when the three months volunteers" time was about up, and they were threatening to leave him-would be most hazardous" and then he asks: "Shall I attack?"
Scott answers the same day: "I have certainly been expecting you to beat the Enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent re-enforcements toward Mana.s.sas Junction? A week is enough to win victories," etc.
Patterson retorts, on the same day: "The Enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by threats, and reconnaissances in force, caused him to be re-enforced. I have accomplished in this respect more than the General-in-Chief asked, or could well be expected, in face of an Enemy far superior in numbers, with no line of communication to protect."
In another dispatch, to a.s.sistant Adjutant-General Townsend (with General Scott), he says, that same afternoon of Thursday, the 18th: "I have succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the General-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston"s Force at Winchester. A reconnaissance in force, on Tuesday, caused him to be largely re-enforced from Strasburg."
Again, on Friday, the 19th, he informs Colonel Townsend that: "The Enemy, from last information, are still at Winchester, and being re-enforced every night."
It is not until Sat.u.r.day, the 20th of July, that he telegraphs to Townsend: "With a portion of his force, Johnston left Winchester, by the road to Millwood, on the afternoon of the 18th." And he adds the ridiculous statement: "His whole force was about 35,200."
Thus, despite all the anxious care of General Scott, to have Johnston"s Army detained in the Shenandoah Valley, it has escaped Patterson so successfully, and entirely, that the latter does not even suspect its disappearance until the day before the pitched Battle of Bull Run is fought! Its main body has actually reached Mana.s.sas twenty-four hours before Patterson is aware that it has left Winchester!