The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to train the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the Interior, which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded a large team within Iraq for counterterrorism activities.
Building on this experience, the training programs should be expanded and should include the development of forensic investigation training and facilities that could apply scientific and technical investigative methods to counterterrorism as well as to ordinary criminal activity.
RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.
One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its lack of equipment, particularly in the area of communications and motor transport.
RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.
The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department of Defense to carry out the mission of reforming Iraq"s Ministry of the Interior and Iraq"s judicial system. Iraq needs more than training for cops on the beat: it needs courts, trained prosecutors and investigators, and the ability to protect Iraqi judicial officials.
RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in partnership.
RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and to create inst.i.tutions and practices to fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice.
5. The Oil Sector
Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help Iraq maximize its capability.
Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore oil production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a day over a three-to five-year period, depending on evolving conditions in key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production would decline unless current problems in the oil sector were addressed.
Short Term
RECOMMENDATION 62:
--As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical a.s.sistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract investment.
--The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States should no longer fund such infrastructure projects.
--The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors.
Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed amounts).
--Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector.
--In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S.
government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant a.s.sistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain.
Long Term
Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require creating corporate structures, establishing management systems, and installing competent managers to plan and oversee an ambitious list of major oil-field investment projects.
To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts forward the following recommendations.
RECOMMENDATION 63:
--The United States should encourage investment in Iraq"s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.
--The United States should a.s.sist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.
--To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export revenues.
--The United States should support the World Bank"s efforts to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits.
--The United States should provide technical a.s.sistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technical personnel.
6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction a.s.sistance
Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands additional U.S. resources.
Progress in providing essential government services is necessary to sustain any progress on the political or security front. The period of large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects is over, yet the Iraqi government is still in great need of technical a.s.sistance and advice to build the capacity of its inst.i.tutions. The Iraqi government needs help with all aspects of its operations, including improved procedures, greater delegation of authority, and better internal controls. The strong emphasis on building capable central ministries must be accompanied by efforts to develop functioning, effective provincial government inst.i.tutions with local citizen partic.i.p.ation.
Job creation is also essential. There is no subst.i.tute for private-sector job generation, but the Commander"s Emergency Response Program is a necessary transitional mechanism until security and the economic climate improve. It provides immediate economic a.s.sistance for trash pickup, water, sewers, and electricity in conjunction with clear, hold, and build operations, and it should be funded generously. A total of $753 million was appropriated for this program in FY 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic a.s.sistance should be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline.
The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance on the Commander"s Emergency Response Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic a.s.sistance should be provided on a nonsectarian basis.
The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international partners to a.s.sist with the reconstruction mission. The United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and some Arab League members need to become hands-on partic.i.p.ants in Iraq"s reconstruction.
RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively partic.i.p.ate in the design and construction of projects.
The number of refugees and internally displaced persons within Iraq is increasing dramatically. If this situation is not addressed, Iraq and the region could be further destabilized, and the humanitarian suffering could be severe. Funding for international relief efforts is insufficient, and should be increased.
RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in funding a.s.sistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies.
Coordination of Economic and Reconstruction a.s.sistance
A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington still hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq"s reconstruction.
Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in short supply. No single official is a.s.signed responsibility or held accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives of key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have also spoken to us directly and specifically about the need for a point of contact that can coordinate their efforts with the U.S. government.
A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies continuing to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer dollars on duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste will further undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq.
A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is required. He or she should report to the President, be given a staff and funding, and chair a National Security Council interagency group consisting of senior princ.i.p.als at the undersecretary level from all relevant U.S.
government departments and agencies. The Senior Advisor"s responsibility must be to bring unity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The Senior Advisor must act as the princ.i.p.al point of contact with U.S.
partners in the overall reconstruction effort.
He or she must have close and constant interaction with senior U.S.
officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, so that the realities on the ground are brought directly and fully into the policy-making process. In order to maximize the effectiveness of a.s.sistance, all involved must be on the same page at all times.