""(4) In either of these events he will do his best to effect a thorough settlement. "He will go forward or fall."
""(5) I gather that he will not, as he ought, challenge Parnell to say publicly exactly what he wants, but that he will propose his own scheme, which is an Irish legislature with a veto reserved to the Crown--to be exercised on most questions on the advice of the Irish Ministry, but on questions of religion, commerce, and taxation, on the advice of the Imperial Ministry.
""(6) The Irish are suspicious, and have not made up their minds.
Parnell says nothing, but the rank and file are inclined to give Mr.
Gladstone his chance and turn him out again if they are not satisfied with his proposals.
""The Tories hope to get out Mr. Gladstone"s intentions in debate on Address, and threaten another immediate dissolution if they are placed in a minority; I think, however, their true policy is and will be to let Mr. Gladstone come in and make his proposals. This will divide the Liberal party, and in all probability alarm and disgust the country.
""Was there ever such a situation? Test Mr. Gladstone"s scheme in practice. The Irish Ministry insist on necessity of restoring Irish manufactures by protection. The Imperial Parliament veto their proposals. Thereupon the Irish representatives join the Tories and turn out the Government on a foreign and colonial debate, the same Government being in a great majority on all English and Scotch questions. How long can such a state of things last? Mr. Gladstone will have the support of a portion of the Liberal party--Morley, for instance, Storey, the Crofters" representatives, and probably some of the Labour representatives. How many more will he get? Will he have the majority of the Radicals? Will he have the majority of the Liberals, following the party leader like sheep? It is curious to see the _Scotsman_ and the _Leeds Mercury_ leading in this direction. What are we to do? Certainly I will not join a Government pledged to such a mad and dangerous proposal. But this may mean isolation for a long time.
""The prospect is not an inviting one.
""I have told Harcourt the facts as in the numbered paragraphs. Do not say a word to anyone else. Harcourt is perplexed and hesitating.
I think he is impressed with the danger of Fenian outrages, dynamite, and a.s.sa.s.sination.
""For myself, I would sooner the Tories were in for the next ten years than agree to what I think the ruin of the country."
"On New Year"s Eve, the 31st, we went to Rugby, where I had to make the speech alluded to in Chamberlain"s letter. I had received an invitation, dated December 29th, to a meeting at Devonshire House.
Hartington wrote:
""My Dear Dilke,
""You know, no doubt, that Harcourt has had a good deal of communication with Chamberlain lately. I hear that Chamberlain will be in town on Friday (New Year"s Day), and it is proposed that he, Harcourt, you, and I, should meet here on Friday at four to talk over matters, especially Irish. I have asked Granville to come up if he likes. I do not think there would be any advantage in having any others, unless Rosebery?
""Yours sincerely,
""Hartington."
"I sent this letter to Chamberlain with an inquiry as to what he knew about the meeting, and he replied on New Year"s Eve:
""The meeting to-morrow was arranged by telegraph.... I suspect Mr.
Gladstone is inclined to hedge. He refuses to satisfy the Irish by any definite statements. I hope they may continue suspicious and keep the Tories in for some time.""
"Yet it was Chamberlain who was to turn out the Tories. On New Year"s Eve, at Rugby, referring to the Irish Question, I praised the speech made by Trevelyan on the previous night as being "a declaration in favour of that scheme of National Councils which he supports for Ireland at least, and which was recommended in an able article in the _Fortnightly Review_ for Scotland, Ireland, and Wales." I said: "I am one of those who have never limited my views upon the subject to Ireland. Mr. Trevelyan last night spoke as though it were only in Ireland that it was necessary to inst.i.tute some local body to deal with purely local questions--with those questions which now come before nominated boards or branches of the Executive Government." I went on to speak in the sense of Mr.
Gladstone"s letter, in favour of the Conservatives being encouraged to propose such Irish remedial legislation.
"On New Year"s Day, 1886, an important meeting took place at Devonshire House between Hartington, Harcourt, Chamberlain, and myself. I did not see my way clearly, and did not say much; the other three arguing strongly against Mr. Gladstone"s conduct in having sent Herbert Gladstone to a news agency to let out his views for the benefit of the provincial Press, in such a way as to put pressure on his colleagues. It seemed to me that the pressure, though no doubt unfair and indefensible, had nevertheless been pretty successful, as neither Harcourt nor Chamberlain saw their way to opposing Mr. Gladstone, although both of them disliked his scheme. Hartington only said that he "thought he could not join a Government to promote any such scheme." But, then, he would not, I pointed out, be asked to do so. He would be asked to join a Government to consider something. The practical conclusion come to was to write to Mr. Gladstone to urge him to come to London to consult his colleagues. On January 4th I heard from Hartington that Mr. Gladstone informed him that he had nothing to add to his previous letter dated December 17th. Hartington wrote:
""I have heard from Mr. Gladstone. He declines to hasten his arrival in London, but will be available on the 11th after 4 p.m. for any who may wish to see him. He will be at my sister-in-law"s (Lady F.
Cavendish), 21, Carlton House Terrace.... He has done nothing and will do nothing to convert his opinions into intentions, for he has not the material before him. There is besides the question of Parliamentary procedure (this refers to action on the Address). For considering this, he thinks the time available in London will be ample."
"In forwarding the correspondence to Chamberlain with a copy of the letter of December 17th, 1885, as I was requested by Hartington to do, I added that Mr. Gladstone could hardly be said not to have done anything which had enabled the Nationalists to establish rival biddings between the two sides (to use his phrase), because we knew that he had asked Arthur Balfour to go to Lord Salisbury with a message from him promising his support if the Government would bring in a Home Rule scheme. This he had let out to the Irish.
"After this we were in consultation as to whether we ought to see Mr. Gladstone separately; and Hartington wrote to me on January 10th, 1886, from Hardwick, that he did not see how we could decline to see Mr. Gladstone separately, but that we might be as reticent as we pleased, and could all combine in urging further collective consultations; and it was arranged that Hartington himself should see Mr. Gladstone on January 12th--the day of the election of the Speaker. Mr. Gladstone then informed us all that he would see such of us as chose on the afternoon of January 11th, and Chamberlain then wrote:
""As far as I know, only Harcourt is going on Monday, and I on Tuesday morning. If for _any_ reason you think it well to go, there is really not the least objection."
"I went on the 11th, but nothing of the least importance pa.s.sed, and the same was the case with Chamberlain"s interview on the 12th.
Harcourt was present on the 11th, and evidently in full support of Gladstone.
"On the 15th Labouchere gave a dinner to Chamberlain and Randolph Churchill, but I do not think that anything very serious was discussed. There was a sharp breach at this moment between Chamberlain and Morley, Chamberlain telling Morley that his speeches were "foolish and mischievous," and that he was talking "literary nonsense--the worst of all."
"On January 21st we had a meeting of all the ex-Cabinet at Lord Granville"s. Chamberlain breakfasted with me before the meeting, and he drew and I corrected the amendment which was afterwards accepted at the meeting as that which should be supported by the party on the Queen"s Speech, and which was that moved by Jesse Collings by which the Government were turned out on the 26th. The adoption of our amendment was very sudden. The leaders had met apparently without any policy, and the moment Chamberlain read our "three acres and a cow" amendment, they at once adopted it without discussion as a way out of all their difficulties and differences. [Footnote: This amendment was carried by seventy-nine votes, and the Government thus overthrown.] The Government resigned on the 28th, and on the 29th I had an interview with Chamberlain as to what he should do about taking office.
"On January 30th Mr. Gladstone offered Chamberlain the Admiralty, after Hartington had refused to join the Government. Chamberlain came and saw me, and was to go back to Mr. Gladstone at six. He thought he had no alternative but to accept a place in the Government, although he did not like the Admiralty. Mr. Gladstone showed him a form of words as to Irish Home Rule. It was equivalent to a pa.s.sage in s.e.xton"s [Footnote: Home Rule M.P. for S. Sligo, 1885-1886; Belfast W., 1886-1892.] speech on the 22nd, at which Mr.
Gladstone had been seen to nod in a manner which implied that he had suggested the words. The proposal was, as we knew it would be, for inquiry. Chamberlain did not object to the inquiry, but objected to the Home Rule. Chamberlain, before returning to Mr. Gladstone, wrote him a very stiff letter against Home Rule, which somewhat angered him. On Sunday, January 31st, Chamberlain wrote that for personal reasons he had sooner not accept the Admiralty. Mr. Gladstone saw Chamberlain again later in the day, on the Sunday, and asked what it was then that he wanted; to which Chamberlain replied, "The Colonies," and Mr. Gladstone answered, "Oh! A Secretary of State."
Chamberlain was naturally angry at this slight, and being offered by Mr. Gladstone the Board of Trade, then refused to return to it.
After leaving Mr. Gladstone he went to Harcourt, and told Harcourt that he would take the Local Government Board, "but not very willingly." On Monday, February 1st, I asked Chamberlain to reconsider his decision about the Admiralty, and found that he would have been willing to have done so, but that it was now too late. On the 2nd Mr. Gladstone wrote me a very nice letter quoted above, [Footnote: Chapter XLII., p.172.] about the circ.u.mstances relating to the trial then coming on which made it impossible for him to include me in the Ministry. Morley wrote: "Half my satisfaction and confidence are extinguished by your absence. It may and will make all the difference.""
Mr. Morley"s apprehension was justified by events.
In 1880 the position of the Radical leaders, while only private members, had been of such strength that Sir Charles had been able to secure, from a reluctant Prime Minister, the terms agreed on between Mr. Chamberlain and himself. He had obtained for both positions in the Government, and procured Cabinet rank for Chamberlain. Now that the power of one of the allies was demolished, and Mr. Chamberlain stood alone, Mr. Gladstone"s view of the changed situation was apparent. The "slight" to Chamberlain was followed by that course of action which resulted in his breach with the Liberal party. Together the two men could, from a far stronger point of vantage than in 1880, have made their terms; with Mr. Chamberlain isolated Mr. Gladstone could impose his own. The alteration in the course of English political history which the next few months were to effect was made finally certain by Sir Charles Dilke"s fall.
Lord Rosebery wrote on February 3rd to say that he had been appointed Foreign Secretary, an office which in happier circ.u.mstances would, he said to Sir Charles, "have been yours by universal consent." The letter went on to state in very sympathetic words how "constantly present to his mind" was his own inferiority in knowledge and ability to the man who had been set aside.
"I had written to Rosebery at the same moment, and our letters had crossed. I replied to his:
""My Dear Rosebery,
""Our letters crossed, but mine was a wretched scrawl by the side of yours. I do not know how, with those terrible telegrams beginning to fly round you, you find time to write such letters. I could never have taken the Foreign Office without the heaviest misgiving, and I hope that whenever the Liberals are in, up to the close of my life, you may hold it. My "knowledge" of foreign affairs _is_, I admit to you, great, and I can answer questions in the Commons, and I can negotiate with foreigners. But these are _not_ the most important points. As to the excess of "ability" with which you kindly and modestly credit me, I do not admit it for a moment. I should say that you are far more competent to advise and carry through a policy--far more competent to send the right replies to those telegrams which are the Foreign Office curse. As to questions, these are a mere second curse, but form a serious reason why the Secretary of State should be in the Lords.
""I have always said that, if kept for no other reason, the Lords should remain as a place for the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, and _I_ think also for the Prime Minister. Between ourselves, you will not have quite a fair chance in being Secretary of State for the Foreign Department under Mr. Gladstone, because Mr.
Gladstone _will_ trust to his skill in the House of Commons, and _will_ speak and reply when the prudent Under-Secretary would ask for long notice or be silent. Lord Granville was always complaining, and Mr. Gladstone always promising never to do it again, and always doing it every day. [Footnote: See supra, p. 51 and note.] I am going to put down a notice to-day to strengthen your hands against France in _re_ Diego Suarez."
"From Bryce I heard that he had been appointed Under-Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, and asking me whom he should take as his private secretary; and I told him Austin Lee, and he took him at once."
"To the Prince of Wales I wrote to say that I should not attend the Levee, and had from him a reply marked by that great personal courtesy which he always shows."
Thus came into being Mr. Gladstone"s third Administration. In 1885 the continuance of Mr. Gladstone"s leadership had seemed necessary in order to bridge the gap between Lord Hartington and the Radicals. Now in 1886 Lord Hartington was out, to mark his opposition, not to Chamberlain, but to Gladstone; and Chamberlain was in, though heavily handicapped. Yet none of these contradictions which had defied antic.i.p.ation was so unforeseen as the exclusion of Sir Charles Dilke.
APPENDIX
See p. 196. Letter of Mr. Gladstone to Lord Hartington, December 17th, 1885:
"The whole stream of public excitement is now turned upon me, and I am pestered with incessant telegrams which I have no defence against but either suicide or Parnell"s method of self-concealment. The truth is I have more or less of opinions and ideas, but no intentions or negotiations. In these ideas and opinions there is, I think, little that I have not more or less conveyed in public declarations: in principle, nothing. I will try to lay them before you. I consider that Ireland has now spoken, and that an effort ought to be made by the _Government_ without delay to meet her demand for the management, by an Irish legislative body, of Irish as distinct from Imperial affairs. Only a Government can do it, and a Tory Government can do it more easily and safely than any other.
"There is first a postulate--that the state of Ireland shall be such as to warrant it.
"The conditions of an admissible plan, I think, are--
"(1) Union of the Empire and due supremacy of Parliament.
"(2) Protection for the minority. A difficult matter on which I have talked much with Spencer, certain points, however, remaining to be considered.
"(3) Fair allocation of Imperial charges.