Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?
Without a doubt, (he answered).
Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant?
What the laws ordain (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought? (16)
(16) "What they should and must."
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
(17)
(17) This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)--
A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are righteous and just.
B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound, cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as "Those who know what the law demands (aliter things right and just) concerning men."
I should say so myself (he answered).
Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what the laws ordain?
I should not (he answered).
Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to do supposes that he ought not to do them? (18)
(18) Or, "and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines that he must and should not do it?"
No, I suppose not (he answered).
Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to do? (19)
(19) Or, "and n.o.body that you know of does the contrary of what he thinks he should do?"
No, I do not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful (20) as concerning men does the things that are just and right?
(20) Or, "of lawful obligation."
Without a doubt (he answered).
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?
(21)
(21) N.B.--In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel, op. cit. p. 323 foll., "Das ist eine Karrikatur des Sokratischen Dialogs."
Who else, if not? (he replied).
Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as concerning men?
That is my opinion (he answered).
Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise in what they know, (22) or are there any who are wise in what they know not?
(22) Or, "in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme})."
Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; (23) for how could a man have wisdom in that which he does not know?
(23) Or, "their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the {episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge of?"
Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?
Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?
Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think you?
Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.
Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?
Euth. So it appears to me.
Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the things that are?
Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.
Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?
Quite impossible (he answered).
Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each is wise only in what he knows?
Euth. That is my opinion. (24)
(24) Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 145 D. N.B.--For this definition of wisdom see K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.