Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to search for the good in this way?
What way? (he asked).
Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to all?
No, I should say not (he answered).
Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes hurtful to another?
Decidedly (he replied).
Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial, should you say? (25)
(25) Or reading (1) {allo d" an ti phaies e agathon einai to ophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d" an ti phaies agathon einai to ophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1) "and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?"
lit. "could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good (or a good)?" or else (2) "and what is beneficial is good (or a good)? or is it anything else?"
Nothing else (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to him to whom it is beneficial?
That is how it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body, vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?
(26)
(26) i.e. "beautiful in all relations into which it enters." Reading {to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalon e soma e skeuos e all" otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; Ma Di", ouk egog", ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and the many interpretations which have been given to the pa.s.sage, see R.
Kuhner ad loc.
Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself. (27)
(27) Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an} above, translate "I certainly cannot, I confess."
Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it beautifully?
Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance. (28)
(28) Or, "I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this, that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particular thing is useful?"--"That n.o.body can deny (he answered)." It is impossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi- argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tini khresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.
Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else except that to which it may be beautifully applied?
Euth. No single thing else.
Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for which it is of use?
So it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And what of courage, (29) Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage among things beautiful? It is a n.o.ble quality? (30)
(29) Or, perhaps better, "fort.i.tude." See H. Sidgwick, "Hist. of Ethics," p. 43.
(30) It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in reference to the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425 foll.
Nay, one of the most n.o.ble (he answered).
Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?
Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, G.o.d knows.
Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an advantage to be ignorant of them?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?
Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of madmen and cowards would be courageous.
Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not dreadful, are they--
Euth. Courageous, Socrates?--still less so than the former, goodness knows.
Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face of the same to be cowards?
Certainly I should (he answered).
Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to n.o.ble account? (31)
(31) {kalos khresthai}, lit. "make a beautiful use of them."
No; these and these alone (he answered).
Soc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same occurrences, it would seem, are bad?
Who else, if not they? (he asked).
Soc. May it be that both one and the other cla.s.s do use these circ.u.mstances as they think they must and should? (32)
(32) Or, "feel bound and constrained to do."
Why, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).
Soc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or to turn them to n.o.ble account know how they must and should deal with them? (33)
(33) Or, "Can it be said that those who are unable to cope n.o.bly with their perilous surroundings know how they ought to deal with them?"
I presume not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to behave are also those who have the power? (34)