(34) "He who kens can."
Yes; these, and these alone (he said).
Soc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in the matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circ.u.mstances we are discussing?
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some egregious blunder?
Euth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.
Soc. It would seem, then, that those who know (35) how to cope with terrors and dangers well and n.o.bly are courageous, and those who fail utterly of this are cowards?
(35) "Who have the {episteme}."
So I judge them to be (he answered). (36)
(36) N.B.--For this definition of courage see Plat. "Laches," 195 A and pa.s.sim; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.
A kingdom and a tyranny (37) were, he opined, both of them forms of government, but forms which differed from one another, in his belief; a kingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law, whereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not according to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.
(37) Or, "despotism."
There were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the case where the magistrates were appointed from those who discharged the obligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy (or rule of the best); (38) where the t.i.tle to office depended on rateable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly, where all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office, that was a democracy (or rule of the people).
(38) Or, "in which the due discharge of lawful (law-appointed) obligations gave the t.i.tle to magisterial office and government, this form of polity he held to be an aristocracy (or rule of the best)." See Newman, op. cit. i. 212, 235.
Let me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear statement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend that such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a statesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person.
(39) Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the underlying proposition, (40) as thus:
(39) Or, "if any one encountered him in argument about any topic or person without any clear statement, but a mere ipse dixit, devoid of demonstration, that so and so," etc.
(40) Or, "question at bottom." Cf. Plat. "Laws," 949 B.
Soc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that this other whom I admire?
The Disputant. Yes; I repeat the a.s.sertion.
Soc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work or function of a good citizen?
The Disputant. Let us do so.
Soc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority will be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the expenditure of the state? (41)
(41) Or, "In the management of moneys, then, his strength will consist in his rendering the state better provided with ways and means?"
Certainly (the disputant would answer).
Soc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her antagonists?
The Disputant. Clearly.
Soc. Or on an emba.s.sy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends in place of enemies?
That I should imagine (replies the disputant).
Soc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party strife and fostering civic concord?
The Disputant. That is my opinion.
By this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting-point, even the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become manifest to his mind.
His own--that is, the Socratic--method of conducting a rational discussion (42) was to proceed step by step from one point of general agreement to another: "Herein lay the real security of reasoning," (43) he would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the common a.s.sent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying that Homer had conferred on Odyesseus the t.i.tle of a safe, unerring orator, (44) because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one commonly accepted opinion to another.
(42) Of, "of threading the mazes of an argument."
(43) Reading {tauton asphaleian}; aliter. {tauten ten asphaleian} = "that this security was part and parcel of reasoning."
(44) "Od." viii. 171, {o d" asphaleos agoreuei}, "and his speech runs surely on its way" (Butcher and Lang), where Odysseus is describing himself. Cf. Dion. Hal. "de Arte Rhet." xi. 8.
VII
The frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavoured to declare his own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him, (1) is, I think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time, as I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of independence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all transactions suited to their powers.
(1) Or, "who frequented his society, is, I hope, clear from what has been said."
Of all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in what any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of his own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything which it befits the true gentleman (2) to know; or where he was deficient in knowledge himself, (3) he would introduce his friends to those who knew. (4) He did not fail to teach them also up to what point it was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any particular matter. (5)
(2) Lit. "a beautiful and good man."
(3) Or, "where he lacked acquaintance with the matter himself." See, for an instance, "Econ." iii. 14.
(4) "To those who had the special knowledge"; "a connoisseur in the matter."
(5) Or, "of any particular branch of learning"; "in each department of things."
To take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be taught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to take over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or a.s.sign a portion of it for cultivation, (6) and in every case by geometric rule.
(7) That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn, that it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of mensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the piece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement, depart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry up to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams.
(8) What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and yet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself. (9) These things, he would say, were enough to wear out a man"s life, and to hinder him from many other more useful studies. (10)
(6) {e ergon apodeixasthai}, or "and to explain the process." Cf.
Plat. "Rep." vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for other interpretations of the phrase. Cf. Max. Tyr. x.x.xvii. 7.
(7) Or, "by correct measurement"; lit. "by measurement of the earth."
(8) Cf. Aristot. "Pol." v. (viii.) 2; Cic. "Acad. Post." I. iv. 15.
For the att.i.tude compare the att.i.tude of a philosopher in other respects most unlike Socrates--August Comte, e.g. as to the futility of sidereal astronomy, "Pos. Pol." i. 412 (Bridges).