Undisturbed thereafter, Taylor continued his march, removed all the stores from the fortification at Berwick"s, and on the 21st of July moved up the Teche. The pickets left at Berwick"s reported that the enemy"s scouts only reached the bay twenty-four hours after Taylor"s troops had withdrawn.
In the recital of those events connected with the sieges of Port Hudson and Vicksburg, enough has been given to show the great anxiety of the Administration to retain those two positions as necessary to continued communication between the Confederate States on the east and west sides of the Mississippi River. The reader will not have failed to observe that General Johnston, commanding the department, and General Pemberton, the district commander, entertained quite different views. The former considered the safety of the garrisons of such paramount importance, that the position should be evacuated rather than the loss of the troops hazarded; the latter regarded the holding of Vicksburg as of such vital consequence that an army should be hazarded to maintain its possession. When General Pemberton and his forces were besieged in Vicksburg, every effort was made to supply General Johnston with an army which might raise the siege.
While General Johnston was at Jackson, preparing to advance against the army investing Vicksburg, the knowledge that the enemy was receiving large reenforcements made it evident that the most prompt action was necessary for success; of this General Johnston manifested a dear perception, for on the 25th of May he sent Pemberton the following message:
"Bragg is sending a division; when it comes, I will move to you."
After all the troops which could be drawn from other points had been sent to him, it was suggested that he might defeat the force investing Port Hudson, and unite the garrison with his troops at Jackson, but he replied:
"We can not relieve Port Hudson without giving up Jackson, by which we should lose Mississippi."
On June 29th General Johnston reports that--
"Field transportation and other supplies having been obtained, the army marched toward the Big Black, and on the evening of July 1st encamped between Brownsville and the river."
The 2d and 3d of July were spent in reconnaissance, from which the conclusion was reached that an attack on the north side of the railroad was impracticable, and examinations were commenced on the south side of the railroad. On the 3d a messenger was sent to General Pemberton that an attempt would be made about the 7th, by an attack on the enemy, to create a diversion which might enable Pemberton to cut his way out. The message was not received, and Pemberton, despairing of aid from the exterior, capitulated on the 4th.
General Grant, in expectation that an attack in his rear would be made by General J. E. Johnston, formed a provisional corps by taking brigades from several corps, and a.s.signed General Sherman to command it. He was sent in the direction of Big Black. Colonel Wilson, then commanding the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, was sent to the Big Black River to watch for the expected advance of Johnston, when Sherman was to be notified, so that he might meet and hold Johnston in check until additional reenforcements should arrive. Wilson never sent the notice. An officer of Grant"s army, whose rank and position gave opportunity for accurate information, writes:
"It was always a matter of surprise to Grant and his commanders that Johnston failed to make the attempt to break up the siege of Vicksburg, of which from the long line and consequent weakness of the army of the North there seemed a fair chance of accomplishment."
General Johnston, being informed on the 5th of the surrender of Vicksburg, fell back to Jackson, where his army arrived on the 7th.
"On the morning of the 9th the enemy appeared in heavy force in front of the works thrown up for the defense of the place; these, consisting of a line of rifle-pits prepared at intervals for artillery, ... were badly located and constructed, presenting but a slight obstacle to a vigorous a.s.sault." [77]
The weather was hot, deep dust covered the country roads, and for about ten miles there was no water to supply the troops who were advancing in heavy order of battle from Clinton; and the circ.u.mstances above mentioned caused General Johnston, as he states, to expect that the enemy "would be compelled to make an immediate a.s.sault." Sherman, in command of the attacking column, did not, however, elect to a.s.sault the intrenchments, but moved the left of his line around so as to rest upon Pearl River above, and then, extending his right so as to reach the river below, commenced intrenching a line of investment. As early as May 27th Brigadier-General J. G. Rains had been directed to report to General Johnston in connection with torpedoes and sub-terra sh.e.l.ls, and a request had been made for "all reasonable facilities and aid in the supply of men or material for the fair trial of his torpedoes and sh.e.l.ls." There could scarcely have been presented a better opportunity for their use than that offered by the heavy column marching against Jackson, and the enemy would have been taken at great disadvantage if our troops had met them midway between Jackson and Clinton. As the defenses of Jackson had not been so corrected in location and increased in strength as to avail against anything other than a mere a.s.sault, it is greatly to be regretted that the railroad-bridge across Pearl River was not so repaired that the large equipments of the Central road might have been removed for use elsewhere and at other times. One of the serious embarra.s.sments suffered in the last two years of the war was from the want of rolling-stock, with which to operate our railroads, as required for the transportation of troops and supplies. On the 12th of July a heavy cannonade was opened, and the missiles reached all parts of the town. An a.s.sault was also made on Major-General Breckinridge"s position on our extreme left. His division, with the aid of Cobb"s and Sloc.u.m"s batteries, repulsed it, inflicting severe loss, and capturing two hundred prisoners, besides the wounded, and taking three regimental colors. On the 15th General Johnston was a.s.sured that the remainder of Grant"s army was moving from Vicksburg to Jackson, and on the night of the 16th he, having previously sent forward his sick and wounded, successfully withdrew his army across the Pearl River, and moved toward Brandon, and continued the march as far as Morton, about thirty-five miles from Jackson. The enemy followed no farther than Brandon, which was reached on the 19th, and manifested no higher purpose than that of arson, which was exhibited on a still larger scale at Jackson.
Thus, within the first half of July, our disasters had followed close upon the heels of one another. Though not defeated at Gettysburg, we had suffered a check, and an army, to which nothing was considered impossible, had been compelled to retire, leaving its opponent in possession of the field of battle. The loss of Vicksburg and Port Hudson was the surrender of the Mississippi to the enemy. It was true that gunboats had run by our batteries, but not with impunity, and some of them had been sunk in the attempt. Transports for troops, supplies, and merchandise could not, except at great risk, use the river while our batteries at those two points remained effective, and gunboats cruising between them would have but a barren field.
Moreover, they needed to be very numerous to prevent intercourse between the two sides of the river, which, thus far, they had never been able to effect.
[Footnote 75: General D. H. Maury.]
[Footnote 76: "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol i, pp. 310, 311.]
[Footnote 77: General Johnston"s "Report of Operations in Mississippi and East Louisiana," pp. 12, 13.]
CHAPTER XL.
Inactivity in Tennessee.--Capture of Colburn"s Expedition.--Capture of Streight"s Expedition.--Advance of Rosecrans to Bridgeport.-- Burnside in East Tennessee.--Our Force at Chattanooga.--Movement against Burnside.--The Enemy moves on our Rear near Ringgold.-- Battle at Chickamauga.--Strength and Distribution of our Forces.-- The enemy withdraws.--Captures.--Losses.--The Enemy evacuates Pa.s.ses of Lookout Mountain.--His Trains captured.--Failure of General Bragg to pursue.--Reenforcements to the Enemy, and Grant to command.--His Description of the Situation.--Movements of the Enemy.--Conflict at Chattanooga.
After the battle at Murfreesboro, in Tennessee, a period of inactivity ensued between the large armed forces, which was disturbed only by occasional expeditions by small bodies on each side. On March 5, 1863, an expedition of the enemy, under Colonel Colburn, was captured at Spring Hill, ten miles south of Franklin, by Generals Van Dorn and Forrest. Thirteen hundred prisoners were taken. In April another expedition, under Colonel Streight, into northern Georgia, was captured near Rome by our vigilant, daring cavalry leader, Forrest. This was one of the most remarkable, and, to the enemy, disastrous raids of the war. Seventeen hundred prisoners were taken.
In June some movements were made by General Rosecrans, which were followed by the withdrawal of our forces from Middle Tennessee, and a return to the occupation of Chattanooga. At this time General Buckner held Knoxville and commanded the district of East Tennessee; General Samuel Jones commanded the district of southwest Virginia, his headquarters at Arlington, Virginia. Between the two was c.u.mberland Gap, the well-known pa.s.s by which the first pioneer, Daniel Boone, went into Kentucky, and the only one in that region through which it was supposed an army, with the usual artillery and wagon-train, could march from the north into East Tennessee or southwest Virginia. It was, therefore, occupied and partially fortified, which, with the precipitous heights flanking it on the right and left, would, it was hoped, suffice against an attack in front, and prove an adequate barrier to an advance on our important line of communication in its rear, which Buckner and Jones were relied on to defend.
On the 20th of August Brigadier-General I. W. Frazier, an educated soldier in whom I had much confidence, a.s.sumed, by a.s.signment, the command of this position, and energetically commenced to perfect the defenses, and ingeniously though unsuccessfully endeavored to bring a supply of water into the fortifications. He reported his force to amount to seventeen hundred effective infantry and artillery, and about six hundred cavalry; the supply of ammunition was deficient, and some of it damaged by a badly constructed magazine.
About August 20th it was ascertained that the army under General Rosecrans had crossed the mountains to Stevenson and Bridgeport. His force of infantry and artillery amounted to seventy thousand men, divided into four corps. About the same time General Burnside advanced from Kentucky, crossed, by using pack-mules, the rugged mountains west of c.u.mberland Gap, and, about the 1st of September, approached Knoxville, East Tennessee, with a force estimated at over twenty-five thousand men. General Buckner, therefore, evacuated Knoxville, and took position at Loudon, with a force of about five thousand infantry, artillery, and cavalry; this rendered the occupation of c.u.mberland Gap hazardous to the garrison, and comparatively of little value to us, but, when its surrender was demanded by a force which might be resisted, General Frazier promptly refused to comply with the demand. Subsequently, General Burnside advanced with a large body of troops, and, approaching from the south, renewed the demand, when General Frazier, recognizing the inutility as well as futility of resistance, surrendered on the 9th of September, 1863.[78] The main body of our army was encamped near Chattanooga, while the cavalry force was recruiting from fatigue and exhaustion near Rome, Georgia. The enemy first attempted to strike Buckner in the rear, but failing, commenced a movement against our left and rear. On the last of August he had crossed his main force over the Tennessee River at Carpenter"s Ferry, near Stevenson. Our effective force of infantry and artillery was about thirty-five thousand. By active reconnaissance of our cavalry, which had been brought forward, it was ascertained that Rosecrans"s general movement was toward our left and rear, in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between us. The want of supplies in the country and the force under Burnside on our right rendered hazardous a movement on the rear of the former with our force. General Lee, with commendable zeal for the public welfare and characteristic self-denial, had consented to remain for a time on the defensive for the purpose of reenforcing Bragg"s army, and General Longstreet had been detached with his corps for that purpose. These troops were to come by rail from Atlanta, and might soon be expected to arrive. It was, therefore, determined to retire toward our expected reenforcements, as well as to meet the foe in front when he should emerge from the mountain-gorges.
As we could not thus hold Chattanooga, our army, on September 7th and 8th, took position from Lee and Gordon"s Mill to Lafayette, on the road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain. The forces on the Hiawa.s.see and at Chickamauga Station took the route by Ringgold. A small cavalry force was left in observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry at Ringgold to cover the railroad.
The enemy immediately moved the corps that threatened Buckner into Chattanooga, and, shortly after, it commenced to move on our rear by the roads to Lafayette and Ringgold. Another corps was nearly opposite the head of McLemore Cove, in Will"s Valley, and one at Colonel Winston"s opposite Alpine. During the 9th it was ascertained that a column, between four and five thousand, had crossed Lookout Mountain by Stevens"s and Cooper"s Gaps into McLemore"s Cove. An effort was made by General Bragg to capture this column, with intent then to turn upon the others, and beat each in succession. But, some delay having occurred in the advance of our forces through the gap, the enemy took advantage of it and retreated to the mountain-pa.s.ses.
He then withdrew his corps from the route toward Alpine to unite with the one near McLemore"s Cove, which was gradually extended toward Lee and Gordon"s Mills. It was now determined to turn upon the Third Corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of Chattanooga.
The forces sent toward the Cove were accordingly withdrawn to Lafayette, and Polk"s and Walker"s corps were moved immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon"s Mills, Lieutenant-General Polk commanding. He was ordered to attack early the next morning, as the enemy"s corps was known to be divided, and it was hoped by successive attacks to crush his army in detail; but the expectation was not realized, as his forces withdrew and formed a junction. Our trains and supplies were then put in a safe position, and all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the opposing force in front. Major-General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry, occupied the extreme left, vacated by Hill"s corps, and was directed to press the enemy in McLemore"s Cove; to divert his attention from the real movement, General Forrest covered the movement on our front and right; General B. R. Johnson was moved from Ringgold to the extreme right of the line; Walker"s corps formed on his left opposite Alexander"s Bridge, Buckner"s next, near Tedford Ford, Polk opposite Lee and Gordon"s Mills, and Hill on the extreme left. Orders were issued to cross the Chickamauga at 6 A.M., commencing by the extreme right.
The movements were unexpectedly delayed by the difficulty of the roads and the resistance of the enemy"s cavalry. The right column did not effect its crossing until late in the afternoon of the 18th; at this time, Major-General Hood, from the Army of Northern Virginia, arrived and a.s.sumed command of the column. General W. H. T, Walker had a severe skirmish at Alexander"s Bridge, from which he finally drove the enemy, but not before he had destroyed it; General Walker, however, found a ford, crossed, and Hood united with him after night.
The advance was resumed at daylight on the 19th, when Buckner"s corps with Cheatham"s division of Polk"s corps crossed the Chickamauga, and our line of battle was thus formed: Buckner"s left rested on the bank of the stream about one mile below Lee and Gordon"s Mills; on his right came Hood with his own and Johnson"s divisions, and Walker"s formed the extreme right; Forrest with his cavalry was in advance to the right. He soon became engaged with such a large force that two brigades were sent from Walker"s division to his support. Forrest, here fighting with his usual tenacity, desperately held in check the comparatively immense force which he was resisting. General Walker, being ordered to commence the attack on the right, boldly advanced, and soon developed opposing forces greatly superior to his own; he, however, drove them handsomely, capturing several batteries of artillery, by dashing charges. As he pressed back the force in his front, it rested upon such heavy ma.s.ses in the rear, that he was in turn repulsed. Cheatham"s division was ordered to his support; it came too late. Before it could reach him, a.s.sailed on both flanks, he had been forced back to his first position, but the two commands united, though yet greatly outnumbered, and, by a spirited attack, recovered our advantage. These movements on our right were in such direction as to create an opening between the left of Cheatham"s division and the right of Hood"s. To fill this, Stewart"s division, the reserve of Buckner"s corps, was ordered up, and soon became engaged, as now did Hood"s whole front. The enemy had transferred forces from his extreme right so as to concentrate his main body on his left, acutely perceiving the probability of an effort on our part to gain his rear, and cut off his communication with his base at Chattanooga. The main part of the battle, therefore, was fought on the opposite flank from that where both armies had probably expected it. Lieutenant-General Polk was now directed to move the remainder of his corps across the stream, and to a.s.sume command in person; Hill"s corps was also directed to move to our right. Stewart, by a gallant a.s.sault, broke the enemy"s center, and pushed forward until he became exposed to an enfilading fire. Hood steadily advanced, driving the force in his front until night. Cleburne, of Hill"s corps, immediately on reaching the right, closed so impetuously with the enemy as to create surprise, and drove him in great disorder. From prisoners and otherwise, the commanding General became satisfied that his antagonist had by marching night and day succeeded in concentrating his whole force, and that it had that day been fought on the field of Chickamauga. A part of the forces on our extreme left had not reached the field of actual conflict in time to partic.i.p.ate in the engagement of that day; they, together with the remainder of Longstreet"s corps, were brought up and put in position to renew the battle in the morning. Our troops slept upon the field they had so bravely contested. The Confederate troops engaged on the right were as follows:
General W. H. T. Walker"s division ... . . 5,500 Cheatham"s division ... ... ... ... . 7,000 A. P. Stewart"s division ... ... ... . 4,040 Cleburne"s division ... ... ... ... . 5,115 Hood"s, B. R. Johnson"s, and Trigg"s troops 8,428 Forrest"s and Pegram"s cavalry ... ... . 3,500 ------ Total ... ... ... ... ... ... . 33,583
General Wheeler with his cavalry had been in observation on the left, and for a fortnight, daily skirmishing with the enemy. On the 17th he was ordered to move into McLemore"s Cove to make a demonstration in that direction, where, after a severe engagement, he developed a force too large to be dislodged. On the 18th he was directed to hold the gap in Pigeon Mountain, so as to prevent the enemy from moving on our left. As appeared subsequently, General Rosecrans, by forced marches, had made a _detour_, and formed a junction of his forces in front of ours, so that it was no longer needful to hold the pa.s.ses of the Pigeon Mountain, and Wheeler with his cavalry was called to take position on the left of our line.
On the night of the 19th, the whole force having been a.s.sembled, including the five thousand effective infantry sent for temporary service from Virginia, the command was organized as two corps, the one on the right to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk; the other, on the left, to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
These corps consisted respectively as follows: Polk"s right wing, of Breckenridge"s, Cleburne"s, Cheatham"s, and Walker"s divisions, and Forrest"s cavalry--aggregate, 22,471; Longstreet"s left wing, of Preston"s, Hindman"s, Johnson"s (Hood"s), Law"s, Kershaw"s, Stewart"s divisions, and Wheeler"s cavalry--aggregate, 24,850: grand aggregate of both wings, 47,321, The forces under Rosecrans, as has been subsequently learned, consisted of McCook"s corps, 14,345; Thomas"s, 24,072; Crittenden"s, 13,975; Granger"s, about 5,000; cavalry, 7,000: whole number, 64,392. On the night of the 19th General Bragg gave his instructions orally, to the general officers whom he had summoned to his camp-fire, as to the position of the different commands; and the order of battle was that the attack should commence on the right at daybreak, and be taken up successively to the left. From a combination of mishaps, it resulted that the attack was not commenced until nine or ten o"clock in the day, and, what was much more important, the troops from right to left did not in rapid succession engage, so as to have that effectiveness which would have resulted from concert of action. Prodigies of valor were performed, many partial successes were gained in the beginning of the battle, but in the first operations the troops so frequently moved to the a.s.sault without the necessary cohesion in a charging line, that nearly all early a.s.saults by our right wing were successively repulsed with loss. Though at first invariably successful, our troops were subsequently compelled to retire before the heavy reenforcements constantly brought.
Wheeler with his cavalry struck boldly at the enemy"s extreme right and center, and with such effect that, in the Federal battle reports, it appears the attack was mistaken for a flank movement by General Longstreet.
Rosecrans having transferred his main strength to our right, the attack of the left met with less resistance, and was successfully and vigorously followed up. About 4 P.M. a general a.s.sault was made by the right, and the attack was pressed from right to left until the enemy gave way at different points, and, finally, about dark, yielded along the whole line. Our army bivouacked on the ground it had so gallantly won. The foe, though driven from his lines, continued to confront us when the action closed. But it was found the next morning that he had availed himself of the night to withdraw from our front, and that his main body was soon in position within his lines at Chattanooga. We captured over eight thousand prisoners, fifty-one pieces of artillery, fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and quant.i.ties of ammunition, with wagons, ambulances, teams, and medicines with hospital stores in large quant.i.ties. From the appearance of the field the enemy"s losses must have largely exceeded ours, and the victory was complete; but these results could not console us for the lives they cost. Pride in the gallantry of our heroes, rejoicing at the repulse of the invader, was subdued by the memory of our fallen brave.
After General Rosecrans"s retreat to Chattanooga, he withdrew his forces from the pa.s.ses of Lookout Mountain, which covered his line of supplies from Bridgeport. These commanding positions were immediately occupied by our troops, and a cavalry force was sent across the Tennessee, which destroyed a large wagon-train in the Sequatchie Valley, captured McMinnsville and other points on the railroad, and thus temporarily cut off the source of supplies for the army at Chattanooga.
The reasons why General Bragg did not promptly pursue are stated in his report thus:
"Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced, the railroad having been constantly occupied in transporting troops, prisoners, and our wounded, and the bridges having been destroyed to a point two miles south of Ringgold. These supplies were ordered to be replenished, and, as soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted, the army was moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear. His important road, and the shortcut by half to his depot at Bridgeport, lay along the south bank of the Tennessee. The holding of this all-important route was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet"s command, and its possession forced the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation. At the same time, our cavalry, in large force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and difficult route. These dispositions, faithfully sustained, insured the enemy"s speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage."
These reverses caused the enemy to send forward reenforcements from the army at Vicksburg, and also to a.s.sign General Grant to the command in Tennessee. As early as September 23d the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were detached, and sent under General Hooker to Tennessee, and a.s.signed to protect Rosecrans"s line of communication from Bridgeport to Nashville. It was on October 23d that General Grant arrived at Chattanooga, and only in time to save their army from starvation or evacuation. The investment by General Bragg had been so close and their communications had been so destroyed that Bragg was on the point of realizing the evacuation of Chattanooga, which he had antic.i.p.ated.
The report of Grant thus describes the situation on his arrival:
"Up to this period our forces in Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy"s lines extending from the Tennessee River, above Chattanooga, to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain, below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed nearly to Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable roads to army supplies.
"The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied upon for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of and overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued retreating forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga over Waldron"s Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week."
The first movement under Grant was, therefore, to establish a new and shorter line of supplies. For this purpose a night expedition was sent down the river from Chattanooga, which seized the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and covered the Brown"s Ferry road.
By 10 A.M. a bridge was laid across the river at the ferry, which secured the end of the road nearest to our forces and the shorter line over which the enemy could move troops. General Hooker also entered Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie, and took up positions for the defense of the road from Whiteside"s, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown"s Ferry to Kelly"s Ferry. General Palmer crossed from the north side of the river opposite Whiteside"s, and held the road pa.s.sed over by Hooker. An unsuccessful attack was made on a portion of Hooker"s troops the first night after he entered the valley. Subsequently, we lost the remaining heights held by us west of Lookout Creek.
Further operations of the enemy were delayed until the arrival of Sherman"s force from Memphis. After his arrival, on November 23d, an attempt was made to feel our lines. This was done with so much force as to obtain possession of Indian Hill and the low range of hills south of it. That night Sherman began to move to obtain a position just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and by daylight on the 24th he had eight thousand men on the south side of the Tennessee, and fortified in rifle-trenches. By noon pontoon-bridges were laid across the Tennessee and the Chickamauga, and the remainder of his forces crossed. During the afternoon he took possession of the whole northern extremity of Missionary Ridge nearly to the railroad-tunnel, and fortified the position equally with that held by us. A raid was also made on our line of communication, cutting the railroad at Cleveland. On the same day Hooker sealed the western slope of Lookout Mountain. On the 26th he took possession of the mountain-top with a part of his force, and with the remainder crossed Chattanooga Valley to Rossville. Our most northern point was a.s.sailed by Sherman, and the attack kept up all day. He was reenforced by a part of Howard"s corps. In the afternoon the whole force of the enemy"s center, consisting of four divisions, was moved to the attack. They got possession of the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left, and continued it until the summit was reached, notwithstanding the volleys of grape and canister discharged at them. Our forces retreated from the ridge as the mult.i.tudinous a.s.sailants neared the thin line on the crest, and during the night withdrew from the positions on the plain below. General Grant, after advancing a short distance from Chattanooga, dispatched a portion of his forces to the relief of Burnside in East Tennessee, where he was closely besieged by General Longstreet in Knoxville. Longstreet moved east into Virginia, and ultimately joined General Lee. He had left the army of General Lee, and moved to the West with his force, on the condition that he should return when summoned. This summons had been sent to him. The loss of the enemy in the conflicts at Chattanooga was 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 337 missing; total, 5,616. Our loss in killed and wounded was much less than theirs.
[Footnote 78: Some of the garrison of c.u.mberland Gap escaped, and stated to General Jones that the surrender had been made without resistance, on the demands of the smaller detachments which had preceded General Burnside, and I was not advised of the fact that Buckner had previously retreated toward Chattanooga, and that Burnside was in possession of Knoxville. In my message of December 12, 1863, I referred to the event, as reported to the War Department, as follows:
"The country was painfully surprised by the intelligence that the officer in command of c.u.mberland Gap had surrendered that important and easily defensible pa.s.s, without firing a shot, upon the summons of a force still believed to have been inadequate to its reduction, and when reenforcements were in supporting distance and had been ordered to his aid. The entire garrison, including its commander, being still held prisoners by the enemy, I am unable to suggest any explanation of this disaster which laid open Eastern Tennessee and Southwestern Virginia to hostile operations."
So far as censure of General Frazier was implied in these remarks, I am now fully satisfied it was unjust, and I can only regret that the authentic information recently furnished to me had not been received at an earlier date, so that I might have relieved General Frazier from the reflection while I held executive authority. It gives me pleasure now to say that full and exact information justifies the high estimate I placed upon him when he was a.s.signed to the separate command of that important post. Full justice can be done to General Frazier only when his report and those of his subordinate officers shall have been published.]