Major-General Commanding. Col. E. D. Townsend, a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D.C.
Headquarters Western Department, Sept 23, 1861. Nothing since my dispatch of this morning. Our loss 39 killed, 120 wounded. Loss of enemy, 1,400 killed and wounded. Our non- commissioned officers and privates sworn and released.
Commissioned officers held as prisoners. Our troops are gathering around the enemy. I will send you from the field more details in a few days.
JOHN C. FREMONT, Major-General Commanding. Hon. S.
Cameron, Secretary of War.
The patient and much enduring President answered as follows: Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Sept. 23, 1861. John C. Fremont, Major-General Commanding, St Louis, Mo.: Your dispatch of this day is received. The President is glad that you are hastening to the scene of action. His words are "He expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss of time." WINFIELD SCOTT.
Fremont began to topple to his fall.
{217}
CHAPTER XIII. FREMONT"S MARVELOUS INEFFECTIVENESS.
Gen. Sterling Price had scored a victory which gave him an enduring hold upon the confidence and esteem of the Missourians. With the least means he had achieved the most success of any Confederate General so far. His conduct at the battle of Wilson"s Creek had endeared him to the men he commanded. He exposed himself with utmost indifference to the fiercest firing, showed good judgment as to movements, was not discouraged after repeated repulses, and was everywhere animating and encouraging the men and bringing them forward into line of battle.
He sympathized with those who were wounded, and had them cared for, and immediately returned to the fighting with fresh troops.
It is true, however, that he had shown no generalship, but merely demonstrated himself a good Colonel, in leading up one regiment after another and putting them into the fight.
Lexington brought an immensity of prestige to Price and encouragement to the Secessionists and did a corresponding injury to the Union cause. It added immeasurably to the burdens which President Lincoln had to bear. He could make Brigadier-and Major-Generals, but he could not endow them with generalship.
The Senate could confirm them, but they were still more confirmed in the dull, unenterprising routine of camp and administrative regulations.
{218} The modest bars of a Captain on their shoulder straps had been, as it were, changed in the twinkling of an eye into the refulgent stars of a General, but they seemed to take this as a deserved tribute to their personal worth, rather than as an incentive and opportunity for the greater things which had made their predecessors ill.u.s.trious.
Fremont, in the palatial Brandt Mansion, for which the Government was paying the very unusual rent of $6,000 per year, was maintaining a vice regal court as difficultly accessible as that of any crowned head of Europe. His uncounted and glittering staff, which seemed to have received the Pentecostal gift of tongues-in which English was not included-was headed by a mysterious "Adlatus,"-a t.i.tle before unknown in America or to the dictionaries, and since retired to oblivion. Naturally, the Adlatus"s command of English was limited. His knowledge of Missouri was even more so. Though commanding Missouri and dealing intensely with Missouri affairs, the men surrounding Fremont were everything but Missourians or those acquainted with Missouri affairs. It would have been surprising to find one of them who could bound the State and name its princ.i.p.al rivers.
This, too, in the midst of a mult.i.tude of able, educated, influential Missourians who were ardent Unionists and were burning with zeal to serve the cause. Not one of them appears in the Fremont entourage.
{219} Gens. Pope, Sturgis, Jeff C. Davis, Hunter,-all Regulars and trained to war; Sigel, with his profound theoretical knowledge and his large experience; Curtis, lately returned to the Army with his military training supplemented by wide experience in civil life; Hurlbut, the brilliant orator and politician, were all busily engaged in something or other that kept them from interfering with Price while he lingered on the Missouri River gathering up recruits and stripping the Union farmers of that rich agricultural region of cattle and grain sufficient to feed his army during the coming Winter, and of horses and wagons to haul off his spoils and thoroly equip his army with transportation.
The only really soldierly thing done at this time was by the "political General,"-the erratic, demagogic, trumpet-sounding "Jim" Lane. He was commanding men who had come out from home to do something toward fighting the war and not to stay in camp and be drilled into automatons. He could only maintain his hold on them and his ascendency in Kansas politics by action.
Learning that Price had left a large stock of ammunition at the important little town of Osceola, the head of navigation on the Osage River, under strong guard, Lane led his brigade a swift march from Kansas upon the town, and succeeded in surprising the garrison, which, after a brief resistance, retreated and left it to Lane"s mercy, whereupon he proceeded to not only destroy the very considerable quant.i.ty of stores which Price had acc.u.mulated there, but to burn down the town. This was an exceedingly ill-advised ending to a piece of brilliant soldiership, because not only was it injustice to an enemy, but it was a severe blow upon Union men who owned full one-third of the property destroyed.
{220} A large number of these were engaged in the trade of the Southwest, for which Osceola was a distributing center. Goods were brought up the river during the high water and then shipped through the country by wagons. The town was also the County seat of St. Clair County, and contained the public records, etc.
Still more unfortunate was it that Lane"s act was taken as an excuse for the Missouri guerrillas to retaliate upon Kansas towns and the property of the Union people in their own State. Lane says in his report: "The enemy ambushed the approaches to the town, and after being driven from them by the advance under Cols. Montgomery and Weer, they took refuge in the buildings of the town to annoy us. We were compelled to sh.e.l.l them out, and in doing so the place was burned to ashes, with an immense amount of stores of all descriptions. There were 15 or 20 of them killed and wounded; we lost none. Full particulars will be furnished you hereafter."
This shows that even he felt the necessity of apologizing for the act, but the apology is too transparent. The fact was that the Kansas men saw an opportunity to pay back some of their old scores against the Missourians and did not fail to improve it.
In spite of Gen. Fremont"s promise to the President to "take the field himself and attempt to destroy the enemy," he moved with exceeding deliberation. It is true that he left St. Louis for Jefferson City, Sept. 27, a week after Mulligan"s surrender, but that week had been well employed by Price in gathering up all that he could carry away and making ready to avoid the blow which he knew must fall.
{221} After arriving at Jefferson City, Fremont, instead of taking the troops which were near at hand and making a swift rush upon his enemy, the only way in which he could hope to hurt him, began the organization of a "grande armee" upon the European model, and that which McClellan was deliberately organizing in front of Washington.
The impatient people, who were paying the $3,000,000 a day which the war was now beginning to cost, and who had begun to murmur for results, were amused by stories of plans of sweeping down the Mississippi clear to New Orleans, taking Memphis, Vicksburg and other strongholds on the way, severing the Southern Confederacy in twain, so that it would fall into hopeless ruin.
This was entirely possible at that time with the army that had been given Fremont, had it been handled with the ability and boldness of Sherman"s March to the Sea.
Two weeks after Mulligan"s surrender Fremont announced the formation of this grand "Army of the West," containing approximately 50,000 men. This was grouped as follows: The First Division, to which Gen. David Hunter was a.s.signed, consisted of 9,750 men, and was ordered to take position at Versailles, about 40 miles southwest of Jefferson City, and became the Left Wing of the Army.
Gen. John Pope was given command of the Second Division of 9,220 men and ordered to take station at Boonville, 50 miles northwest of Jefferson City. His position was to be the Right Wing of the army.
The Third Division, 7,980 strong, was put under command of Gen. Franz Sigel, and made the advance of the army, with its station at Sedalia and Georgetown, 64 miles west of Jefferson City.
{222} The Fifth Division, commanded by Gen. Asboth, had 6,461 men, and const.i.tuted the reserve at Tipton, on the railroad, 38 miles west of Jefferson City.
The Fifth Division, 5,388 men, under Gen. Justus McKinstry, formed the center and was posted at Syracuse, five miles west of Tipton.
Beside these, Gen. Sturgis held Kansas City with 3,000 men and Gen. Jas. H. Lane, with 2,500 men, was to move in Kansas down the State line, between Fort Scott and Kansas City, to protect Kansas from an incursion in that direction, and as opportunity offered attack Price"s flank.
Thus, there were 38,789 effectives in the five divisions, which with Sturgis"s and Lane"s forces made a total force of 44,289, not including garrisons which swell the total of the army to over 90,000.
Among these Division Commanders were two whom Fremont had discovered and created Brigadier-Generals out of his own volition, without consultation at Washington.
These were Gens. Asboth and McKinstry. Gen. Alexander (Sandor) Asboth, born in 1811, was a Hungarian and an educated engineer, with considerable experience in and against the Austrian army. He had entered ardently into the Revolution of 1848, and built a bridge in a single night by which the Revolutionary army crossed and won the brilliant victory of Nagy Salo. He became Adjutant-General of the Hungarian army, and when the Revolution was crushed by Russian troops, escaped with Kossuth into Turkey, came to this country, and became a naturalized citizen. He was by turns farmer, teacher, engineer, and manufacturer of galvanized articles. He sided with the Union Germans, went on Fremont"s staff, and was appointed a Brigadier-General. The Senate refused to recognize the appointment, but in consideration of his good service he was reappointed, served creditably through the war, was brevetted a Major-General, and after the war sent as Minister to the Argentine Confederation, where he died in 1868.
{223} The other, Justus McKinstry, was born in New York and appointed to the Military Academy from Michigan, where he graduated 40th in the cla.s.s of 1838, of which Beauregard, Barry, Irvin McDowell, W. J. Hardee, R. S. Granger, Henry H. Sibley, Edward Johnson and A. J. Smith were members. He had served creditably in the Mexican War, receiving a brevet for gallantry at Contreras and Churubusco, and at the outbreak of the war was a Major and Quartermaster at St. Louis, where he did very much to frustrate Lyon"s plans and was regarded by him as a Secessionist at heart. He continued to hold his position, however, as Chief Quartermaster of the Department of the West until Fremont appointed him Brigadier-General.
Shortly after Fremont"s removal he was placed under arrest at St. Louis and ordered before a court-martial, which did not convene, and he was at last summarily dismissed for "neglect and violation of duty, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline." He became a stock broker in New York City, and afterwards a land agent at Rolla, Mo.
It will be seen by the map that the disposition of the troops was good, and that Fremont had the advantage of short lines from Sedalia and Rolla to cut Price"s line of retreat, recapture the spoils he was hastening to a place of safely, and destroy, or at least disperse, his army.
{224} Fremont, however, made no use of this advantage, and Price seems to have had no apprehension that he would. Price remained in Lexington until Oct 1, serenely contemplating the gigantic preparations made for his destruction, and then having gathered up all that he could readily get, and reading Fremont"s order for a forward movement of the Army of the West, thought, like the prudent meadow lark, that probably something would be now done, and the time had come for moving. He began a deliberate retreat, crossing the Osage River at Osceola, and reaching Greenfield, 150 miles away, at the very comfortable pace of 15 miles a day.
Gen. Fremont ordered the Army of the West forward, but the so-called pursuit was very much like hunting a fox on a dray. He was enc.u.mbered with immense trains, for which bridges had to be built over numerous streams and roads made thru the rough country. The trains seemed to contain a world of unnecessary things and an astonishing lack of those necessary. Apparently almost anybody who had anything to sell could find purchasers among the numerous men about Fremont"s headquarters who had authority to buy, or a.s.sumed it.
One astonishing item in the purchases was a great number of half barrels for holding water, rather an extraordinary provision in a country like Missouri, where in the month of October water is disposed to be in excessive quant.i.ties.
Notwithstanding the astonishing purchase of mules by everybody and anybody, none of the Division Commanders seem to have had mules enough to pull their wagons.
{225} The division started out like the horses of a balky team. Gen. Pope, of the Right Wing, left Jefferson City Oct. 11, Sigel got away from Sedalia with the Third Division Oct. 13, the same day Hunter left Tipton with the Left Wing, and Asboth followed on Oct 14. Even when they started their progress was very slow, for the columns were halted at streams to build bridges and in the rough countries to wait for the sappers and miners to make pa.s.sable roads.
When one column was halted, all the rest had to do likewise, for though Price kept the safe distance of 100 miles away, Fremont was in constant apprehension of battle, and held his columns in close supporting distance. He did not get across the Osage River until Oct. 25, or nine days after Price"s leisurely crossing that important stream, on the banks of which it was confidently expected that he would give battle.
Price, with his diminishing forces, had no such intention, but fell back toward Neosho, to cover as long as possible the Granby Mines, seven miles from that place, which were the most important source of lead for the Southern Confederacy, to which they supplied 200,000 pounds per month.
Gov. Jackson took advantage of this breathing spell to call the Legislature together at Neosho, where it held a two weeks" "rump" session of the small minority of that body which favored Secession. They pa.s.sed an ordinance of Secession and elected Senators and Representatives to the Confederate Congress, adjourning when they heard that Fremont had at last pa.s.sed the Osage.
{226} Then Price took up his line of retreat toward the southern boundary of the State to get near Gen. Ben McCulloch, who had posted his forces at Cross Hollow, in Benton County, northwest Arkansas. Gen. Price took up his position at Pineville, in the extreme southwestern corner of Missouri, where the rough, hilly country offered great chances to the defense, and again began communication with Gen. McCulloch to induce him to unite his force with his own and attack the Union army.
He had correctly estimated Fremont"s generalship, and thought there was a possibility of ma.s.sing his and McCulloch"s forces, to attack a portion of Fremont"s army, drive it back and defeat him in detail. McCulloch, in spite of his ranger reputation, entirely lacked Price"s aggressive spirit, and thought that it would be much better to fall back to the Boston Mountain, about 50 miles farther south, and make a stand there. He so informed Gen. Price.
While McCulloch had no disposition to enter Missouri and defend it against the Union troops, he had no hesitation about treating it as part of Confederate territory. Desiring to embarra.s.s and delay Fremont"s advance as much as possible, he sent forward his Texas cavalry to burn the mills, forage and grain as far in the direction of Springfield as they could safely go, and urged Price to do the same. McCulloch"s Texans soon lighted up the southwest country with burning mills, barns and stacks.
To this Gen. Price was bitterly opposed. The mills and grain were in many instances the property of the Secessionists, and to destroy them would be to inflict worse punishment on his own people than the Union commanders had ever done, and would embitter them against his cause.
{227} Price repeatedly represented to McCulloch that altogether they would have 25,000 men, and if McCulloch did not desire to go forward they could make a good defensive battle inside the State on the hills around Pineville. To leave it would cause the loss of very many Missourians who had enlisted in the State Guard to defend Missouri, and who would feel that they had no cause to fight outside of the State.
After crossing the Osage Fremont halted near Connersville, about 25 miles south of Warsaw, where he crossed the river, and then advanced with Sigel to Bolivar, on the Springfield road, and sent forward Maj. Charles Zagonyi with 150 of his famous Body Guard and Maj. F. J. White with 180 men of the 1st Mo. Cav., to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Springfield.
Fremont"s Body Guard had played a large part in the pomp and circ.u.mstance of his administration. Maj. Chas. Zagonyi was a picturesque and effervescent Hungarian, who recounted fascinating stories of his experience as a subordinate to Gen. Bern during the Hungarian Revolution. Fremont had authorized him to raise a body guard, in imitation of the famous troops of Europe, and the novelty of the organization attracted to it a great number of quite fine young men, most of whom were from the country around Cincinnati-one company being from Kentucky. They were formed into three companies, mounted on fine blooded bay horses, showily uniformed and each armed with two navy revolvers, a five-barreled rifle and a saber.
All the officers were Americans except three-one Hollander and two Hungarians. The members of the Guard, in addition to their expensive and showy outfit, did not conceal from the other soldiers that they were picked men and considered themselves superior to the ordinary run, which did not enhance their popularity with their comrades.
{228} Majs. Zagonyi and White marched all that night, and the next day, about noon, when about eight miles north of Springfield, learned that there was a force of at least 1,500 Confederates in the town.
One of the rebel pickets who had not been captured hastened back to Springfield and gave the alarm, so that the Confederates were in readiness for them. Feeling that this would be so, Majs. Zagonyi and White determined to move around the town and approach it from the west on the Mt. Vernon road. In this movement White became separated from Zagonyi, who, about 4 o"clock in the afternoon, came most unexpectedly upon the Secessionists drawn up in line at the end of a long lane.
A heavy rail fence intervened between Zagonyi and the head of the lane, and an opening had to be made through this under a heavy fire from the enemy. The moment a gap was made, Zagonyi shouted to his men to follow him, and do as he did, raising the battle cry, "Fremont and the Union." He dashed gallantly forward, straight for the center of the rebel line, followed at a gallop by his command. The Confederate fire did fearful execution upon the Guard as it was crowded in the lane, but in a few seconds the lane was pa.s.sed and the cavalry saber began doing its wild work.
{229} The center of the enemy"s lines was at once broken by the terrible impact of galloping horses and the Confederates began a panicky retreat, followed by the vengeful hors.e.m.e.n shooting and sabering them as they ran. The infantry ran through the town to the shelter of the woods, and the Confederate cavalry fell back down the road, pursued by the Guard until it was getting nightfall, when Zagonyi recalled them and returned to the Court House, raised the Union flag from it, released the Union prisoners confined in the jail, gathered up his dead and wounded, and after dark decided to fall back until he met the advance of the army.
He had lost 15 men killed and 26 wounded, and reported that he had found 23 Confederates dead after the charge was over. This brilliant action, which was then compared with the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, redeemed the soldiers of the Guards in the eyes of their comrades, and it became an honor to belong to that organization.
The next morning Maj. White reached Springfield with a few Home Guards, where he found the Confederates still dazed by the occurrences of the day before, and he was careful not to undeceive them as to his strength. He solemnly received the flag of truce, said that he would have to refer the matter to Gen. Sigel, threw out his men as pickets, permitted the people to bury their dead, and then prudently fell back to meet the advance of the army.
Fremont took up his quarters in Springfield, and began ostentatious preparations for an immediate decisive battle, though Price was then more than 50 miles away from him. This Fremont should have known, for in some mysterious manner he was within ready communication with him, so much so as to be able to conclude the following remarkable convention which was duly published in a joint proclamation: {230} To All Peaceably-Disposed Citizens of the State of Missouri, Greeting:
Whereas a solemn agreement has been entered into by and between Maj.-Gens. Fremont and Price, respectively, commanding; antagonistic forces in the State of Missouri, to the effect that in the future arrests or forcible interference by armed or unarmed parties of citizens within the limits of said State for the mere entertainment or expression of political opinions shall hereafter cease; that families now broken up for such causes may be reunited, and that the war now progressing shall be exclusively confined to armies in the field:
Therefore, be it known to all whom it may concern:
1. No arrests whatever on account of political opinions, or for the merely private expression of the same, shall hereafter be made within the limits of the State of Missouri, and all persons who may have been arrested and are now held to answer upon such charges only shall be forthwith released; but it is expressly declared that nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to bar or interfere with any of the usual and regular proceedings of the established courts under statutes and orders made and provided for such offenses.
2. All peaceably disposed citizens who may have been driven from their homes because of their political opinions, or who may have left them from fear of force and violence, are hereby advised and permitted to return, upon the faith of our positive a.s.surances that while so returning they shall receive protection from both the armies in the field wherever it can be given.
3. All bodies of armed men acting without the authority or recognition of the Major-Generals before named, and not legitimately connected with the armies in the field, are hereby ordered at once to disband.
4. Any violation of either of the foregoing articles shall subject the offender to the penalty of military law, according to the nature of the offense.
In testimony whereof the aforesaid Maj.-Gen. John Charles Fremont, at Springfield, Mo., on this 1st day of November, A. D. 1861, and Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, at Ca.s.sville, Mo., on this 6th day of November, A. D. 1861, have hereunto set their hands, and hereby mutually pledge their earnest efforts to the enforcement of the above articles of agreement according to their full tenor and effect, to the best of their ability.
J. C FREMONT, Major-General Commanding.
STERLING PRICE, Major-General Commanding.
The practical effect of this was that Price was allowed to send such of his men as he wished home for the Winter, with a safeguard against their being molested by the Union troops, but it had no effect in protecting Union men from being hara.s.sed by guerrilla tormentors, who cared as little for conventions and proclamations as for the Sermon on the Mount.
{231} In the meanwhile Fremont"s astonishing ill success in purely military matters, the freely expressed opinion of all who came in contact with him as to his glaring incompetence, added to the fearful stories of the corruption of the men immediately surrounding him, were making his position very insecure. President Lincoln sent his intimate and life-long friend, David Davis, whom he was about to elevate to the Supreme Bench, to St. Louis with a commission to investigate the rank-smelling contracts and disburs.e.m.e.nts. No report was ever made public, but it was generally known that they found even worse than they feared.
The Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, undertook a tour of investigation on his own account, accompanied by Adj"t-Gen. Lorenzo Thomas. Some of the things which they found are set forth in the following extracts from the memorandum from Gen. Thomas to his superior officer: Gen. Curtis said of Gen. Fremont that he found no difficulty in having: access to him, and when he presented business connected with his command, it was attended to. Gen. Fremont never consulted him on military matters, nor informed him of his plans. Gen. Curtis remarked that while he would go with freedom to Gen. Scott and express his opinions, he would not dare to do so to Gen. Fremont. He deemed Gen. Fremont unequal to the command of an army, and said that he was no more bound by law than by the winds.
Col. Andrews, Chief Paymaster, called and presented irregularities in the Pay Department, and desired instruction from the Secretary for his government, stating: that he was required to make payments and transfers of money contrary to law and regulations. Once, upon objecting to what he conceived an improper payment, he was threatened with confinement by a file of soldiers. He exhibited an order for the transfer of $100,000 to the Quartermaster"s Department, which was irregular. Exhibited abstract of payment by one Paymaster (Maj. Febiger) to 42 persons, appointed by Gen. Fremont, viz: one Colonel, three Majors, eight Captains, 15 First lieutenants, 11 Second Lieutenants, one Surgeon, three a.s.sistant Surgeons; total 42. Nineteen of these have appointments as engineers, and are ent.i.tled to cavalry pay.
{232} Maj. Allen, Princ.i.p.al Quartermaster, had recently taken charge at St Louis, but reported great irregularities in his Department, and requested special Instructions. These he deemed important, as orders were communicated by a variety of persons, in a very irregular manner, requiring disburs.e.m.e.nts of money. These orders were often verbally given. He was sending, under Gen. Fremont"s orders, large amounts of forage from St. Louis to.... where corn was abundant and very cheap. The distance was 160 miles. He gave the indebtedness of the Quartermaster"s Department in St. Louis to be $4,606,809.73.
By direction of Gen. Meigs, advertis.e.m.e.nts were made to furnish grain and hay, and contracts made for specific sums-28 cents per bushel for corn, 30 cents for oats, and $17.95 per ton for hay. In face of this another party at St. Louis-Balrd, or Baird A Palmer (Palmer being of the old firm in California of Palmer, Cook & Co.)-were directed to send to Jefferson City (where hay and corn abound) as fast as possible 100,000 bushels of oats, with a corresponding amount of hay, at 33 cents per bushel for grain and $19 per ton for hay.
Capt Edward M. Davis, a member of his staff, received a contract by the direct order of Gen. Fremont for blankets. They were examined by a board of army officers consisting of Capt Hendershott, 4th U. S. Art, Capt Haines, Commissary of Subsistence, and Capt Turnley, a.s.sistant Quartermaster. The blankets were found to be made of cotton and were rotten and worthless. Notwithstanding this decision they were purchased, and given to the sick and wounded soldiers in hospitals.
One week after the receipt of the President"s order modifying Gen. Fremont"s proclamation relative to emanc.i.p.ation of slaves, Gen. Fremont by note to Capt McKeever, required him to have 200 copies of the original proclamation and address to the army, of same date, printed and sent immediately to Ironton, for the use of Maj. Gavitt, Indiana Cavalry, for distribution through the country. Capt McKeever had the copies printed and delivered. The order is as follows: "Adjutant-General will have 200 copies of proclamation of Commanding General, dated Aug. 30, together with the address to the army of same date, sent immediately to Iron-ton, for the use of Maj. Gavitt Indiana Cavalry. Maj. Gavitt will distribute it through the country.
"J. C. Ft.
"Commanding General.
"Sept. 23, 1861."