As soon as I obtained a view of the several encampments at Tipton, I expressed the opinion that the forces there a.s.sembled could not be moved, as scarcely any means of transportation were visible. I saw Gen. Hunter, second in command, and conversed freely with him. He stated that there was great confusion, and that Fremont was utterly incompetent; that his own division was greatly scattered, and the force then present defective in many respects; that he required 100 wagons, yet he was ordered to march that day, and some of his troops were already drawn out on the road. His cavalry regiment (Ellis"s) had horses, arms (indifferent), but no equipments; had to carry their cartridges in their pockets; consequently, on their first day"s march from Jefferson City, in a heavy rain, the cartridges carried about their persons were destroyed. This march to Tipton (36 miles) was made on a miry, heavy earth road parallel to the railroad, and but a little distance from it. The troops were directed by Gen. Fremont to march without provisions or knapsacks, and without transportation. A violent rainstorm came up, and the troops were exposed to it all night, were without food for 24 hours, and when food was received the beef was found to be spoiled.
{233} Gen. Hunter stated that he had just received a written report from one of his Colonels, informing him that but 20 out of 100 of his guns would go off. These were the guns procured by Gen. Fremont in Europe. I may here state that Gen. Sherman, at Louisville, made a similar complaint of the great inferiority of these European arms. He had given the men orders to file down the nipples. In conversation with Col. Swords, a.s.sistant Quartersmaster-General; at Louisville, just from California, he stated that Mr. Selover, who was in Europe with Gen. Fremont, wrote to some friend In San Francisco that his share of the profit of the purchase of these arms was $30,000.
Gen. Hunter expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion that Gen. Fremont was incompetent and unfit for his extensive and important command. This opinion he gave reluctantly, owing to his position as second in command.
President Lincoln sent the following characteristic letter to Gen. S. R. Curtis, who, being in command at St. Louis, was directly accessible, and a man in whose discretion the President felt he might trust: Washington, Oct 24, 1861. Brig.-Gen. S. R. Curtis.
Dear Sir: On receipt of this with the accompanying incisures, you will take safe, certain and suitable measures to have the inclosure addressed to Maj.-Gen. Fremont delivered to him with all reasonable dispatch, subject to these conditions only, that if, when Gen. Fremont shall be reached by the messenger-yourself or anyone sent by you-he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle, it is not to be delivered, but held for further orders. After, and not until after, the delivery to Gen.
Fremont, let the inclosed addressed to Gen. Hunter be delivered to him.
Tour obedient servant, A. LINCOLN.
The following decisive order was one of the inclosures: Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Oct. 24, 1861.
General Orders No. 18.
Maj.-Gen. Fremont, of the U. S. Army, the present Commander of the Western Department of the same, will, on the receipt of this order, call Maj.-Gen. Hunter, of the U. S.
Volunteers, to relieve him temporarily in that command, when he (Maj.-Gen. Fremont) will report to General Headquarters, by letter, for further orders.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
{234} A special messenger arrived at Springfield, Nov. 2, with the order, which created consternation at Fremont"s headquarters. It is more than probable that Fremont felt his elevation to be such that he could try conclusions with the Administration, and refuse to obey the order.
There was considerable talk at that time about military headquarters as to a dictator, and this was so rife about McClellan"s that his journal constantly abounds in allusions which indicate that he was putting the crown away from him with increasing gentleness each time. There was much of the same atmosphere about the headquarters of the Army of the West, and it is claimed that Fremont at first decided not to obey the order, but on Sigel"s urgent representations finally concluded to do so, and issued the following farewell order to his troops: Headquarters Western Department,
Springfield, Mo., Nov. 2, 1861. Soldiers of the Mississippi Army:
Agreeably to orders this day received I take leave of you.
Altho our army has been of sudden growth, we have grown up together, and I have become familiar with the brave and generous spirit which you bring to the defense of your country, and which makes me antic.i.p.ate for you a brilliant career. Continue as you have begun, and give to my successor the same cordial and enthusiastic support with which you have encouraged me. Emulate the splendid example which you have already before you, and let me remain, as I am, proud of the n.o.ble army which I had thus far labored to bring together.
Soldiers, I regret to leave you. Most sincerely I thank you for the regard and confidence you have invariably shown me.
I deeply regret that I shall not have the honor to lead you to the victory which you are just about to win, but I shall claim to share with you in the joy of every triumph, and trust always to be fraternally remembered by my companions in arms.
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General, U. S. Army.
{235} He left at once for St Louis, with his Body Guard for an escort. Though these men had been enlisted for three years, they were ordered by Gen. McClellan to be mustered out, and Maj. Zagonyi was offered the Colonelcy of a new regiment.
The time and manner of the removal enabled Gen. Fremont"s ardent partisans to complain loudly that he was relieved on the eve of a battle in which he would have accomplished great things, and was thus denied an opportunity to achieve lasting fame and render essential service to the country. The evidence, however, is conclusive that at that time Price was at Pineville, fully 50 miles away, and in the midst of a very rough country, instead of being in Fremont"s immediate front, as Fremont certainly supposed.
Whether he would have accepted battle after Fremont had reached him at Pineville, is a matter of conjecture. The pressure in favor of Fremont continued strong enough, however, to bring about the offer of a new command to him the following year, but it was grotesquely shrunken from the proud proportions of that from which he had been relieved. It was styled the Mountain Department, and embraced a large portion of West Virginia. Even in this restricted area he again failed to give satisfaction.
June 8, 1862, he fought an indecisive battle against Stonewall Jackson at Cross Keys, took umbrage at being placed under the command of Gen. John Pope, whom he had once commanded, asked to be relieved from command, and joined the ranks of the bitter critics of President Lincoln"s Administration, though still retaining his commission and pay as a Major-General.
He still thought his was a name to conjure with, and May 31,1864, accepted the nomination for President from a convention of dissatisfied Republicans a.s.sembled at Cleveland, resigning his commission at last, June 4, 1864.
{236} The chill reception with which the country received his nomination at last disillusionized even him, and in September he withdrew from the field, to clear the way for Lincoln"s re-election. He then became connected with the promotion of a Pacific railway over the southern of the routes which he had surveyed, lost his money and property in the course of time, appealed to Congress for relief, and in 1890 was by special act put on the retired list of the Army with the rank of Major-General.
{237}
CHAPTER XIV. THE SAD RETREAT FROM SPRINGFIELD.
The partisans of Gen. Fremont bitterly blamed Gen. David Hunter for having intrigued to succeed Fremont, and they rejoiced that his tenure of that office proved to be so short-lived. This was both fallacious and unjust.
Gen. David Hunter, while not of the highest type of military ability, was yet far above mediocrity. He was one of the best examples of the Old Regular Army officer-thoroughly devoted to his profession, a master of all its details, incorruptible, inflexible, and intolerant to all whose character and conduct lowered the standard of what Hunter thought an American officer should be.
He was born in the District of Columbia, graduated from West Point in 1822, 25th in a cla.s.s of 40 members, and had an extensive experience in Indian fighting, commanding for several years a troop of dragoons. He resigned in 1836, but re-entered the Army in 1842 as a Paymaster and served as Chief Paymaster of Gen. Wool"s Division in the Mexican War.
At the outbreak of the war of the rebellion he had been made Colonel of the 6th U. S. Cav.-a new regiment-and commanded a division at Bull Run, where he showed great gallantry and was wounded. He had been sent out to Fremont as his second in command and adviser, in the hope that he would control in some measure the commander"s erratic course and be instrumental in promoting better methods in his administration.
{238} He was true to his duties in communicating to his superiors just what he found in the Department of the West and properly representing Fremont"s incompetence. It was not intended that he should have permanent command of the army, and probably no man was less desirous that he should be than he himself, for he had a modest opinion of his own abilities and never hesitated to subordinate himself when he thought another man would do better in the place.
The command was given him merely as a stop-gap until another commander could be determined upon.
In the same envelope which contained Lincoln"s letter to Gen. Curtis inclosing the order for the supersedure of Gen. Fremont, was another reading as follows: Washington, Oct. 24, 1861. To the Commander of the Department of the West
Sir: The command of the Department of the West having devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions.
Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much always depends on a knowledge of localities and pa.s.sing events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.
The main rebel army (Price"s) west of the Mississippi is believed to have pa.s.sed Dade County in full retreat upon northwestern Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from the enemy, excepting in the southeast of the State.
a.s.suming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from your own base of supplies and reinforcements, that you should give up the pursuit halt your main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one occupying Sedalla and the other Rolla, the present termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both corps by reestablishing and improving their discipline and instruction, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course, both railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously employing just so much force as is necessary for this. "From these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in judicious cooperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it would be so easy to concentrate and repel an army of the enemy returning on Missouri from the southwest that It is not probable any such attempt to return will be made before or during the approaching cold weather.
{239} Before Spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this. If you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I antic.i.p.ate, you will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points and direct to others, as may be needed, the railroads furnishing ready means of reinforcing their main points, if occasion requires. Doubtless local uprisings will for a time continue to occur, but these can be met by detachments and local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of themselves.
While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large discretion must be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of Price or an attempt by this long and circuitous route to reach Memphis will be exhaustive beyond endurance, and will end in the loss of the whole force engaged. Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
This letter, undoubtedly dictated by McClellan, who was then the dominant military influence at Washington, is yet strikingly characteristic of President Lincoln, and abounds in that profound common sense which made him easily the first General of the War.
The army was already 125 miles away from its base of suppliess on the railroad, with a terrible rough intervening country. Consequently, the problem of supplying it was of momentous seriousness and the expense appalling.
Though in the midst of a region of wonderful fertility, with its crops gathered in barns, no one seems to have though of utilizing these. They left them for Price to gather in, while they hauled their supplies from Rolla. Our officers as yet were only in the primer cla.s.s in war.
{240} The letter also shows the firm hold of the prevailing opinion that Secession was only a temporary madness, from which the people would recover when the Winter gave them time to reflect and reason. Probably this would have been the case had the Government put forth its power with crushing effectiveness. But the first year of the war was to end with the Secessionists successful almost everywhere, and big scores to their credit in Missouri. The fresh disaster at Ball"s Bluff on the Potomac unnerved many loyal people.
Possibly President Lincoln did not antic.i.p.ate that his suggestions would be carried out so literally. His best information was that Price"s army had virtually gone to pieces, and that by taking post at Sedalia and Rolla the central and southwestern parts of the State could be effectually controlled by parties sent out from there. He could not have conceived that Price had a strong, compact, aggressive army well in hand, and that the new commander of the Department of the West would march away from it without striking a blow or making a manuver to reduce its capacity for harmfulness.
Certainly some shreds of Lyon"s mantle must have fallen on that proud array of new-made Generals, and they would insist on striking a quick, sharp blow, as a return for Lexington, for the honor of the Union army, and to curb Price"s rising conviction that he was an irresistible conqueror.
But the next day after receiving his a.s.signment to command, Gen. Hunter made a reconnoissance in force to the battlefield of Wilson"s Greek, where Fremont had persisted in believing that Price was waiting to give him battle. He found no enemy on the scene of the terrible battle of two months before. Instead, all his information was to the effect that Price was among the rugged fastnesses about Pineville, 50 miles away, with McCulloch still farther off in the Boston Mountains.
{241} Hunter therefore ordered his columns to countermarch and proceeded to carry out the President"s instructions promptly and exactly.
This backward movement, without a blow at Price, abandoned the whole of the Union loving country of southwestern Missouri to the Secessionists, and was a measureless calamity.
The Union people, taking heart from the advance of Fremont with his great army, had returned to their homes and attempted to re-establish themselves upon their farms and in their business. All these hopes were suddenly dashed to the ground by the retirement of the army, and they had to flee again in haste before the immediate advance of Price to occupy the abandoned region.
It was not his army which was so terrible, but the horde of guerrilla bands, which rushed out like venomous serpents after a warm rain, intent upon rapine, outrage and murder. It was the "Poor White Trash" let loose under such leaders as Quantrill, the Young-ers, Jameses, Haywards, Freemans, and a thousand others of bandit infamy.
Aside from these calamities, the retreat, added to Price"s victory at Lexington, was a most stifling moral depression of the Union sentiment in Missouri.
While the condition of things in the greater central and southwestern parts of Missouri had been grievously unsatisfactory for many weeks, and seemed to be growing steadily more so, it was otherwise in the southeastern section.
{242} The so-called Ozark Mountains, which are really a series of rough, picturesque highlands, separating the watersheds of the Missouri and the Arkansas Rivers, begin on the Mississippi at the mouth of the Meramec River, 20 miles below St. Louis, and extend along the Mississippi, rising frequently into cliffs of limestone 350 feet high, to Gape Girardeau, 44 miles above Cairo, Ill.
This range, less than 100 miles wide, one of the richest in the world in minerals, sinks away on the north and west to the valleys of the Osage and the Missouri and the prairies which stretch across Kansas and the Indian Territory to the Rocky Mountains. To the southeast it falls into the lowlands and swamps along the Mississippi, making there a separate and distinct section-about the size of Connecticut-and of entirely different character from the rest of the State. Over 3,000 square miles of this-or nearly three times the size of Rhode Island-are swamps thickly wooded with towering cypresses, and covered with jungles impenetrable to man. The princ.i.p.al town In the region was New Madrid, a fever-smitten little village on the banks of the Mississippi, 44 miles below Cairo. It had once much promise, but the terrible earthquakes of 1811-12 had seamed the surrounding country with great crevices and gulches, adding hopelessly to its forbidding character, and giving a mortal blow to New Madrid"s expectations.
The region was drained-as far as it was drained-by the St. Francis River, a considerable stream, navigable nearly to the Missouri line, and emptying into the Mississippi nine miles above Helena, Ark.
Besides the Mississippi River there were then two routes of access from St. Louis to this region. One was by the Iron Mountain Railroad, which ran through the Ozarks to Pilot k.n.o.b, 84 miles from the city, and the other by common road through Fredericktown, 105 miles from St. Louis.
{243} Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston-regarded by Jefferson Davis as a great military genius, and appointed to command the entire Confederate army in the West-had some idea of moving an army up through the swamps to these roads, flanking the Union position at Cairo and taking St. Louis. The St. Francis River would aid in supplying the army. His immediate subordinate, Maj. Gen. Polk, was still more in favor of the plan, and it went in this proportion down through Gen. Gideon Pillow, with his "Army of Liberation," to the most enthusiastic advocate, of the scheme, our poetical acquaintance, Gen. M. Jeff Thompson, file "Swamp Fox of Missouri." The idea was to move in concert with Price coming up from the southeast.
Maj.-Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. A., who had been placed in command of the Mississippi River, and subsequently had the States of Arkansas and Missouri added to his Department, had gathered about him in the neighborhood of Memphis some 25,000 or 30,000 Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee and other troops, with which, scorning Kentucky"s claim of neutrality, he advanced to Columbus, Ky., the terminus of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, and 20 miles from Cairo, Ill. Upon the high bluff there he proceeded to construct one of those "Gibraltars" so numerous in the early history of the war.
With the force at his command and the opposition he was likely to meet from the Union commanders in southeast Missouri, a march on St. Louis by the roads indicated was a promising venture. Besides the forces immediately around him, he had control of McCulloch"s, Pearce"s and Hardee"s columns in Arkansas, and potential control of Price"s and Thompson"s Missouri forces, making altogether an aggregate approaching 70,000 men.
{244} But he hesitated, while Pillow fretted and fumed, and wrote that while he honored his superior officer as a prelate and admired him as a patriot, he had small opinion of his military judgment.
M. Jeff Thompson, who had no mean opinion of his own abilities, wrote to Jefferson Davis that what the Southern Confederacy needed in that quarter was "a first-cla.s.s leader," and he cast a unanimous vote for himself for that position.
In the meantime an event occurred as to the significance of which Polk, Pillow and Thompson were as unappreciative as the country at large.
In August, U. S. Grant, lately commissioned a Brigadier-General, was sent down to Cape Girardeau to look after matters in southeast Missouri, including Cairo, Ill., and he took with him his former regiment, the 21st Ill., to the command of which Col. John W. S. Alexander had succeeded. A peculiarity of Gen. Grant, which President Lincoln speedily noticed, was that wherever he was "things kept moving." There were no grand reviews, no sounding proclamations, no sensational announcements of plans, but somehow everybody about him was found to be speedily employed in an effective way against the enemy. But little clamor ever came from Grant for reinforcements or additional strength. If he was given a thousand men he at once set them to work doing all that 1,000 men were capable of. Given 2,000 men he would do twice as much, and so on. If supplies were not furnished him, he gathered them from the surrounding country, giving vouchers carefully based on the prevailing market rates. If no wagons or teams were at hand, he impressed them and gave vouchers.
{245} As una.s.sertive and modest as Grant seemed to be, he had a remarkable faculty for bringing in everybody near him and securing from them prompt and energetic obedience to his orders.
Among Gen. Grant"s subordinates was our old acquaintance, Capt. J. B. Plummer, who had done such good work at Wilson"s Creek and who was now in command of the 11th Mo. There was also Col. W. P. Carlin, a Captain in the Regular Army, whom the Governor of Illinois had wisely made Colonel of the 88th 111. Carlin, a graduate of West Point in the cla.s.s of 1850, was a somewhat austere, highstrung man, wrapped up in his profession, an excellent soldier, and feverishly anxious to do his duty and justify his promotion to the important position he held.
Like all Regulars he was jealously sensitive about his rank, and one of his first performances was insistence that he outranked Col. C. E. Hovey, of the 33d Ill., and should therefore have command of the post. Hovey, who had been Princ.i.p.al of the Normal Inst.i.tute before becoming a Colonel, felt that his position had been quite as high as that of a Captain in the Regular Army, and his men, who entered warmly into the dispute, could hardly understand how the Colonel of the 38th Ill. could outrank the Colonel of the 33d, and though they at last gave way, there was some bitterness of feeling.
{246} Though Gen. Grant had only about 14,000 men all told, he kept Johnston, Polk and Thompson, with their 30,000, so well employed guarding points that he threatened, or might take without threatening, that their superiority was neutralized and they were kept on the defensive.
Burning with desire to do something, M. Jeff Thompson, who, in spite of his gasconade, was really a brave, enterprising man, and a good deal of a soldier, started out from Columbus early in October with some 2,000 men, expecting to be joined by other forces on the way, capture Ironton and Frederick-town, open up the road for Pillow"s columns to St. Lous, and to co-operate with Gen. Price.
He went down the river in boats to New Madrid and there began a march across the country toward Bloomfield, which was to become the base of so many of his subsequent operations. Leaving his infantry under the command of Col. Aden Lowe, of the 3d Mo. State Guards, a prominent young attorney and politician, to follow more slowly, Thompson pushed on with 500 mounted men, whom he calls "dragoons," made a wide circuit, and struck the railroad north of Ironton at Big River Bridge, only about 40 miles from St Louis. He had made astonishing progress so far, and jubilantly reported to Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, who had come to Columbus to watch the movement, that his men were so anxious to fight that he reached his objective point two days ahead of the appointed time.
{247} At the Big River Bridge he struck a small company of a somewhat noted regiment, the 33d Ill. (the Normal Regiment), largely made up of students and teachers in the Normal Inst.i.tute of Illinois, who, despite the disparity in numbers, gave him a sharp little fight, in which he lost two killed and quite a number wounded. He reported having captured 45 prisoners, with a quant.i.ty of supplies, and succeeded in burning the bridge across the river. While engaged in distributing the supplies, another company of the 33d Ill., hearing the noise, came up to the a.s.sistance of their comrades, and Thompson had another fight on his hands, in which he admits he lost four men killed and quite a number wounded, but insists that he "killed another lot of the enemy and took 10 prisoners." He said he "had the enemy terribly frightened," and that if Albert Sidney Johnston had the rest of his men in striking distance that he could take Ironton, with its 12,000,000 rations stored for the Winter, in an hour.
Johnston transmitted Thompson"s report to Richmond with a complimentary indors.e.m.e.nt. Thompson also reported having received several hundred recruits and captured about 17,000 pounds of lead. These were destined to be the last of his rejoicings for some time.
Thompson sent word to all the commanders of Confederate forces in the neighborhood to join in his attack on Ironton, promising them victory and unlimited spoils.
Gen. Grant ordered Col. Carlin to move forward with his force from Pilot k.n.o.b and attack Thompson"s main body, which was then in the neighborhood of Fredericktown. He also ordered Col. J. B. Plum-mer to march from Cape Girardeau, strike at Thompson"s line of retreat, and endeavor to capture his whole force.
{248} Thompson had cunningly magnified the number of his troops, and Plummer and Carlin were both impressed with the idea that he had somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000 or 6,000 men and was likely to be joined by Gen. Hardee"s column from Pocahontas, Ark., with many more.
Grant, with that accurate knowledge of his enemy which was one of his conspicuous traits and never failed him at any time during the war, informed them that Thompson had only between 2,000 and 3,000 men. As usual in Grant"s operations, the columns moved on time and arrived when expected.
Col. Carlin moved Oct. 20 from Pilot k.n.o.b with about 3,000 men made up of the 21st Ill., Col. Alexander; 33d HI., Col. C. E. Hovey; 38th Ill., Maj. Gilman; 8th Wis., Col. Murphy; part of the 1st Ind. Cav., Col. Conrad Baker, and some of the guns of the 1st Mo. Art., under the charge of Maj. Schofield.
Col. Plummets column, about 1,500 strong, consisted of the 17th Ill., Col Ross; 20th Ill., Col. Marsh; 11th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Panabaker; Lieut. White"s section of Taylor"s Illinois Battery, and two companies of cavalry commanded by Capts. Stewart and Lan-gen.
Col. Plummer moved to Dallas, on Johnston"s line of retreat, and there sent through a messenger to Col. Carlin, stating where he was and what his intentions were, so that the two forces could cooperate. The messenger was captured by some of the Missourians, and therefore Thompson came into possession of the plans of his enemies. He moved back with his train until he saw it safely on its way to Greenville, and then returned with his command toward Fredericktown to accommodate his opponents with a fight if they desired it and to gain time for his train to get back to Bloomfield and New Madrid.
{249} Not finding Thompson at Dallas, Col. Plummer moved up to Fredericktown, arriving there at noon, Monday, Oct. 21, and found that Col. Carlin had arrived with his forces about 8 o"clock in the morning. There was immediately one of those squabbles over rank which were so frequent on both sides during the early part of the war and not absent from its history at any time.