In addition to all destroyers, adequate protection of the fleet would require all other available light craft in the service, or which could be commandeered and put into service--that is, submarines, armed tugs, trawlers, yachts, torpedo boats, revenue cutters, mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and in fact any type of small craft which could be used as protective or offensive screens.
9. In view of the shipping situation, as affected by the submarine campaign, it has been impossible to date to see in what way our battleships could be supplied in case they were sent into the war area.
This refers particularly to oil-burning vessels. It would therefore seem unwise to recommend such a movement until we could see clearly far enough ahead to ensure the safety of the lines of communication which such a force would require.
10. It is to be observed, however, that even in case the decision were made to move the battleships into the war area, it would unavoidably be greatly delayed both in getting together the necessary screening forces and also in getting such craft across the Atlantic.
In the meantime, and while awaiting a decision as to the movements of the battleship fleet, the submarine campaign has become so intensive, and the available anti-submarine craft have been so inadequate to meet it, that the necessity for increasing the anti-submarine forces in the war area to the maximum possible extent has become imperative.
11. As long, therefore, as the enemy fleet is contained by the stronger British fleet in a position of readiness, it would not seem a disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war area all the light craft of every description which would necessarily have to accompany the fleet in case it should be needed in this area.
Such movements of the light craft would not in any way separate them strategically from the battleships, as they would be operating between the enemy and our own main body and based in a position to fall back as the main body approached, or to meet it at an appointed place. This advance of light forces, strategically, would mean no delay whatever to our heavy forces, should the time come for their entry into the active war zone.
12. Another very important consideration is the fact that, pending the movement of the battleships themselves, all of the light forces would be gaining valuable war experience and would be the better prepared for operations of any nature in the future, either in connection with the fleet itself or independently.
It is also considered that it would not const.i.tute a disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation with the British Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our battleship fleet.
These would merely const.i.tute units advanced for purpose of enemy defeat, and which would always be in a position to fall back on the main part of our Fleet, or to join it as it approached the war zone.
It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917, that all coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for distant service in case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might be deemed advisable in connection with unexpected enemy developments.
It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire fleet providing adequate lines of communications could be established to ensure their efficient operation. At the present time there is a sufficient coal supply in England to supply our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil would be a very difficult problem as it must be brought in through the submarine zone.
When notified that the _Chester_, _Birmingham_, and _Salem_ were available for duty in the war area, I recommended, after consultation with the Admiralty, that they join the British Light Cruiser Squadrons in the North Sea, where there is always a constant demand for more ships, especially to oppose enemy raiding and other operations aimed at dispersing the Allied sea forces.
In view of the Department"s reference to the Gibraltar situation, and also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities of the seven gunboats of the _Sacramento_ cla.s.s, it was recommended that they be based on Gibraltar for duty in a.s.sisting to escort convoys clear of the Straits, and particularly as this would release some British destroyers which are urgently needed in critical areas to the northward.
13. The Department"s policy, as contained in its letter to the Secretary of State, refers in the first statement to an adequate defence of our own home waters. It would seem to be sound reasoning that the most effective defence which can be afforded to our home waters is an offensive campaign against the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in other words, that the place for protection of home waters is the place in which protection is necessary--that is, where the enemy is operating and must continue to operate in force.
As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered that home waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone--in fact are being attacked solely in that zone, and must continue to be attacked therein if the enemy is to succeed against us as well as against the European Entente.
The number of available enemy submarines is not unlimited, and the difficulties of obtaining and maintaining bases are fully as difficult for submarine as for surface craft.
The difficulties experienced by enemy submarines en route and in operating as far from their bases as they now do are prodigious.
Operations on our coast without a base are impracticable, except by very limited numbers for brief periods, purely as diversions.
In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent of our coastline, and the distances between our princ.i.p.al ports, it is a safe a.s.sumption that if we could induce the enemy to shift the submarine war area to our coasts his defeat would be a.s.sured, and his present success would be diminished more than in proportion to the number of submarines he diverted from the more accessible area where commerce necessarily focuses.
14. The Department"s policy refers to willingness to extend hearty co-operation to the Allies, and to discuss plans for joint operations, and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted by the joint Allied Admiralties.
15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this co-operation, to discuss plans with the various Admiralties, except in one way--and that is, to establish what might be termed an advance headquarters in the war zone composed of Department representatives upon whose recommendations the Department can depend.
I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the army--that is, the General Headquarters in the field being the advance headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters must of necessity be left a certain area of discretion and freedom of action as concerns the details of the measures necessitated by the military situations as they arise.
16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which enter into military warfare, and hence delays in communications by written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very difficult to discuss plans at long range. The enemy secret service has proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency.
Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The opportunities for misunderstandings are great. It is difficult to be sure that one has expressed clearly one"s meaning in writing, and hence phrases in a letter are very liable to misinterpretation. They cannot explain themselves.
17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of co-ordination and co-operation in military effort. I am aware of a great ma.s.s of information in this connection which it is practically impossible to impart except by personal discussion.
It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if _any one_ of the Allies--Italy, France, England, or the United States--were selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these resources.
18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary to decide as to the best location in which to establish such advanced headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at the front--that is, an advanced branch upon whose advice and decisions the War Council itself largely depends.
I fully realize the pressure and the influences which must have been brought to bear upon the Department from all of the Allies, and from various and perhaps conflicting sources.
I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of the war. It should be unnecessary to state that I have done everything within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint with the above stated mission constantly in mind.
19. From the _naval_ point of view it would seem evident that London is the best and most central location in the war area for what I have termed above the Advance Branch of our Naval War Council.
The British navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of the naval war, and hence all naval information concerning the war therefore reaches and centres in London.
It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters staff, or parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other Allied Admiralties at any time.
I wish to make it quite clear that up to date it has been wholly impossible for me, with one military Aide, to perform all of the functions of such an advanced branch of the Department.
As stated in my despatches, it has been evident for some time that I have been approaching a state in which it would be physically impossible to handle the work without an increase of staff.
The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within range of possibility for serious errors to occur which may involve disaster to our ships, due to the physical impossibility of handling the administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is essential to safety.
20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be required is approximately as follows. More officers could be well employed with resulting increase of efficiency:
(1) One Chief of Staff, who should be free to carry on a continuous estimate of the situation, based upon all necessary information. He would be given the freedom of the Operations Department of the British and French Admiralties.
(2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for duties in connection with shipping and convoy to handle all the numerous communications in relation to the movements of American shipping, particularly military shipping, and also other shipping carrying American troops.
(3) An officer, at least a lieutenant-commander, for duties in connection with Anti-Submarine Division operations in order to insure perfect co-operation in that field of work between our service and other Allied Services.
(4) An officer of all-round ability and discretion for duties in connection with general military intelligence. He should be in constant touch with the Secret Service Departments of the Admiralties to insure that all military intelligence, which in any way affects the Navy Department or our Forces, is properly and promptly acted upon.
(5) At least two lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders of the line in my own office in connection with general administrative questions in addition to the one now available. The necessity for these additional officers is imperative.
(6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes and communications both with the Department at home, the Allied Admiralties, and with the various bases of our Forces in the war area. (At present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London, and Paris.)
(7) A paymaster to have complete charge of all financial matters connected with our naval organization abroad. This officer should be in addition to Paymaster Tobey, who is performing necessary and invaluable service on my staff in connection with all logistic questions.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.