M60 I.
87 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 13, 119-122, which deny the possibility of an idea or mental picture corresponding to abstract number.
M61 M. P.
88 "Praecedaneous," i.e. precedent.
M62 S.
89 Who refunds human as well as natural causation into Divine agency.
M63 Mo.
90 In which Locke treats "Of the Reality of Knowledge," including questions apt to lead Berkeley to inquire, Whether we could in reason suppose reality in the absence of all realising mind.
M64 M.
M65 M.
M66 E.
M67 M.
M68 Mo.
M69 I.
M70 I.
M71 I.
91 Locke"s "abstract idea" is misconceived and caricatured by Berkeley in his impetuosity.
M72 M.
92 This and other pa.s.sages refer to the scepticism, that is founded on the impossibility of our comparing our ideas of things with unperceived real things; so that we can never escape from the circle of subjectivity. Berkeley intended to refute this scepticism.
M73 I.
M74 I.
M75 I.
M76 Mo.
93 Probably Samuel Madden, who afterwards edited the _Querist_.
M77 M.
94 This "First Book" seems to be "Part I" of the projected _Principles_-the only Part ever published. Here he inclines to "perception or thought in general," in the language of Descartes; but in the end he approximates to Locke"s "sensation and reflection." See _Principles_, sect. 1, and notes.
M78 I.
M79 E.
M80 S.
M81 S.
95 Does he mean, like Hume afterwards, that ideas or phenomena const.i.tute the ego, so that I am only the transitory conscious state of each moment?
M82 S.
96 "Consciousness"-a term rarely used by Berkeley or his contemporaries.
97 This too, if strictly interpreted, looks like an antic.i.p.ation of Hume"s reduction of the ego into successive "impressions"-"nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one another with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." See Hume"s _Treatise_, Part IV. sect. 6.
M83 S.
M84 M.
98 What "Third Book" is here projected? Was a "Third Part" of the _Principles_ then in embryo?
M85 S.
99 This is scarcely done in the "Introduction" to the _Principles_.
M86 S.
M87 E.
100 Berkeley, as we find in the _Commonplace Book_, is fond of conjecturing how a man all alone in the world, freed from the abstractions of language, would apprehend the realities of existence, which he must then face directly, without the use or abuse of verbal symbols.
M88 E.
M89 T.
M90 I.
M91 I.
M92 E.
M93 I.
M94 I.
101 This "N. B." is expanded in the Introduction to the _Principles_.
M95 M.
M96 S.
M97 I.
M98 M.
M99 I.
M100 M.
102 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 4.
M101 E.
M102 M.
103 What is immediately realised in our percipient experience must be presumed or trusted in as real, if we have any hold of reality, or the moral right to postulate that our universe is fundamentally trustworthy.
M103 I.
M104 S.
104 But he distinguishes, in the _Principles_ and elsewhere, between an idea of sense and a percipient ego.
M105 S.
M106 S.