Admiral Hope, in his attack upon the Ti-pings, a.s.sociated himself with one Ward, an American filibuster, in the service of the Manchoos.
Previous to this, and to the Admiral"s unsuccessful attempt to juggle the Ti-ping authorities into another agreement not to approach Shanghae, the said Ward was persecuted and reviled very fiercely; but no sooner did the Admiral and his colleagues think it necessary to pull in the same boat, than the Yankee filibuster became their pattern and ally. The whilom _rowdie_ companion of _ci-devant_ General Walker, of Nicaraguan memory, mercenary leader of a band of Anglo-Saxon freebooters in Manchoo pay, and sometime fugitive from English marines sent to weed his ruffians of their countrymen, suddenly became the friend and ally of the British and French Admirals, Generals, and Consuls. The surprise of Ward can only have been equalled by his gratification upon finding his very questionable presence, and still more doubtful pursuits, patronized and imitated. No doubt, at first, he felt considerably elated and vastly astonished at the idea of filibusting having become an honourable and recognised profession; but soon, poor fellow! a black, or rather green, shadow came across his uncertain dream of happiness and respectability--he became jealous of his friend Admiral Hope, whose talent and zeal for making war without declaring it or being authorized so to do by any Government, he found surpa.s.sed even his own.
The village of Kao-kiau was garrisoned by a few hundred Ti-pings, and several thousand country people, who had just joined them, the whole mostly armed with bamboo spears. The force led against them by Admiral Hope comprised 350 British seamen with a six-pound rocket-tube, and about 600 disciplined Chinese, under Ward, besides which, the French Admiral, Protet, commanded 160 Frenchmen, with a couple of field-pieces.
Of course, the ill-armed Ti-pings were unable to resist the European artillery and arms of precision, and were consequently driven from the village, with a loss of more than 100 men killed. This gallant exploit was safely performed by the Anglo-Franco contingent, who, completely out of range of the few wretched matchlocks of the Ti-pings, shot them down at their ease with rifles and artillery, with a loss to themselves of _only one_ French sailor, killed by a stray shot.
This murderous and cowardly deed was quickly followed up by the gallant Admiral, who seemed unable to refrain from action, especially when it could be indulged with comparative safety.
We have already noticed that one excuse Admiral Hope made to justify his broken faith was the probability that the Ti-pings might injure the supply of provisions. Strange to say, the Admiral did the very things he pretended the rebels might have done. At the capture of Kao-kiau all hands dispersed to loot whatever the Ti-pings had left behind; and, quoting from the official report of the affair, "Large stores of grain were discovered about the place, _the greater part of which were burned_."
After the exploit of Kao-kiau, Admiral Hope, with a small party of seamen and Ward"s filibusters, went roving about the country for a week in search of some one to fight. His warlike spirit was gratified at a place named Hsiau-tang, in the vicinity of Ming-hong (nearly twenty miles away from Shanghae), a fortified village occupied by several thousand Ti-pings. Directly he found this place in the way, an order was sent to Shanghae for reinforcements to attack it with. These having arrived, upon the 1st of March, 1862, the whole force, consisting of 750 of Ward"s disciplined Chinese, 350 British sailors and marines, and 35 artillery-men, with four light howitzers, one field-piece, and some rocket-tubes, and 200 French, with two bra.s.s howitzers, moved forward to the attack. Again, as at Kao-kiau, the murderous work was executed, and the poorly-armed Ti-pings slaughtered with impunity. For more than an hour they bravely held their mud and brick entrenchments, but at last the crushing fire from the foreign artillery, and the sharp practice of the Enfield rifles, carried the day. After standing to their few gingalls to the last, amid a storm of shot and sh.e.l.l (all fresh from British a.r.s.enals and paid for by British tax-payers), they were driven from the lines of defence and through the village with immense slaughter. As they retreated from the rear, the sh.e.l.l from the irresistible foreign artillery "were thrown rapidly amongst them, committing fearful havoc. Numbers also fell under the fire from the rifles of the French and English sailors." In the centre of the village the rear guard made a gallant effort to repulse their pursuers, but they could not withstand the deadly volleys and bayonet charge of the marines; and although their bravest men fell in heaps, while many hand-to-hand conflicts took place, they were ultimately driven out with a loss of 1,000 killed and 300 taken prisoners, the English and French _not losing a single man_. A great ma.s.sacre of the unfortunate non-combatants was perpetrated by the Imperialist soldiery, who actually forced very many of the living wounded into the flames of the burning village. In one official report it is stated:--
"The streets and houses presented an awful spectacle, the bodies in some places lying in heaps; and the plain beyond the village was strewed with those shot down in the flight."
Another report states:--
"The rebels ran from the fortifications and came to a stand in the main street.... Upon this, the field-piece from the _Imperieuse_, in charge of Lieutenants Stuart and Richardson, swept them down with grape and canister shot; after this their retreat became a flight, when the party of marines and Chinese detached to cut them off did considerable execution, some 900 or 1,000 having been killed and wounded."
The same report concludes with this sentence:--
"After all was over, _the village was set on fire_,[1] and the foreign troops embarked for Shanghae."
What will those who falsely accuse the Ti-pings of devastating and destroying say to this? They have declared that the Christian patriots"
"success in any locality is attended with its total destruction," &c.; but it appears that these totally destroyed places were reserved for Admiral Hope to burn down.
As this history progresses we shall find that although the Admiral made the damaging effect which the presence of the Ti-pings _might_ have upon supplies one element of his _casus belli_, _he_ actually destroyed the very supply of grain which he dreaded might be affected by the rebels!
There is a more serious matter to be deplored with regard to the numerous raids commenced and followed up by Admiral Hope, namely, the cruel slaughter of so many hundreds of his fellow-men. We have reviewed the unmeaning pretences invented by the Admiral and his co-adjutors, but even should it be admitted they were valid, is it possible any Englishman can be found willing to justify the ma.s.sacre of thousands of human beings, because, although ever friendly to them, they affected the mercenary speculations of a few merchants? If, in order to maintain the immediate profit of their mercantile adventurers, any Englishman can attempt to justify or palliate these summary proceedings against the unfortunate Ti-pings, then I say, far better should that unholy traffic perish, cursed as it is by the slaughter of thousands of our fellow-creatures, whose blood has cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance upon their a.s.sailants.
Even the pretence that the revolutionists would have injured our "commercial interests" falls to the ground by the testimony of the very merchants themselves, for the leading mercantile house in China, Messrs.
Jardine, Matheson, & Co., in their business circular, dated "Kong-kong, 27th February, 1862," referring to Admiral Hope"s first ma.s.sacre of Ti-pings, state:--
"During the interval that has elapsed since the date of our last circular there is no particular change to notice in the state of matters about Shanghae; but the policy the Allied Commanders are adopting will, it is feared, lead to disastrous consequences....
_Our interests call for a strict neutrality_, but so far from this course being pursued, our last advices report a combined expedition of English and French marines and sailors in conjunction with a force of Imperialists, commanded in person by their respective Admirals, against a body of some 6,000 rebels, which of course they defeated with great slaughter.... The whole country being in the hands of the Taepings, should this _suicidal_ policy be persisted in, must in the end materially interfere with, if not ruin, all trade, as it cannot do otherwise than exasperate a foe by no means to be despised."
What stronger condemnation of the policy pursued against the Ti-pings can be made, coming, as it does, from the princ.i.p.al representative of the very cla.s.s whose interests it was pretended necessary to protect?
That this opinion of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. was correct has at the present time been pretty well ascertained, for it did "in the end materially interfere with" trade, as the fall off of silk _after_ the expulsion of the Ti-pings from the producing district proves. This, however, was not occasioned, as that firm expected, by the exasperation of "a foe by no means to be despised," for the Ti-pings (with a Christian humanity far excelling that possessed by their _civilized_ enemies) never retaliated either upon the trade (entirely in their power) or the lives of Europeans. The decrease of silk was caused entirely by the ruthless nature of the war carried by British officers and Imperialists into the once happy districts of Ti-ping-tien-kwo. The Ti-ping patriots were either fools or saints, for by their mad forbearance they suffered themselves to be driven from their former possessions with incalculable loss of life; whereas, a system of retaliation on their part would have endangered the entire trade of the district, and consequently have forced the enemy to relinquish hostilities which so conclusively endangered the prospect of our "commercial interests."
As the first mercantile house in China considered the policy of the British Government "suicidal," we may safely p.r.o.nounce the affected anxiety for commercial interests a shallow pretext. What then remains to const.i.tute the real _casus belli_, unless it be "the temporary interest arising out of the indemnities," and the great revenue arising out of the vile opium traffic, the loss of which would have caused a deficit of many millions in the British treasury?
The seeming inconsistency of allowing the Ti-pings to take Ningpo and yet defending Shanghae against them is easily explained. At the capture of the former city no British force was present, and although the seven days" grace so cunningly obtained from the Ti-ping leaders seems to have been employed in endeavouring to raise a sufficient force to oppose their entrance, this, in the shape of H.M.S. _Scout_ and several other vessels, arrived too late, having reached Ningpo some hours after its fall. Then, as Admiral Hope very wisely observed with regard to the policy of exasperating the Ti-pings, "We cannot afford to quarrel with them, as at any moment they _might_ stop the whole trade of Shanghae."
Their wonderful forbearance had not at that time become a.s.sured; directly it was, hostilities were commenced. Before taking up the sword for good, it became necessary to try the temper of the Ti-pings. This Admiral Hope effectually did by his arrogance at Nankin; his "every obstruction" plan at Ningpo; his raids around Shanghae; an example followed by the British and French authorities by their unwarrantable notifications and defence of Shanghae Chinese city.
There are, in fact, very many reasons by which the defence of Shanghae may be accounted for; but five of the most important will sufficiently ill.u.s.trate the principle of the whole.
Firstly. The British Government and its officials interfered in order to save the indemnity and opium trade, which the capture of Shanghae by the Ti-pings would have annihilated, and they were strongly supported by the opium merchants, who, by this vile traffic, made their largest profits.
Secondly. A large number of the Shanghae foreign landholders approved of the defence of the city, because it enabled them to obtain fresh lots at their own prices from the Chinese proprietors. From the "minutes of a meeting of land-renters, held at the British Consulate, Shanghae, January 12, 1862," it appears that during a council of war with the Manchoo authorities of the Chinese city (all in accordance with the pledges of "strict neutrality," of course?)--
"The Taoutae undertook to do this also" (open a road to facilitate military operations) "_by obliging the Chinese renters interested to part with their land to the foreign applicants whose names stood recorded first for purchase_."
Thirdly. A certain proportion of traders having taken advantage of the Ti-ping movement to circulate unfounded reports as to its brigandage, in order to monopolize the trade by frightening outsiders away, naturally sanctioned the defence of Shanghae, as the capture of the city would have exposed the trick by proving the Ti-pings were not brigands and robbers.
Fourthly. Many land and house speculators opposed the success of the insurgents for this reason. The foreign settlements in the vicinity of the Chinese city had become crowded with fugitives awaiting the firm establishment of Ti-ping jurisdiction in the interior; by numerous lawless Chinamen attracted by the shadow of foreign protection and the opportunity of establishing gambling h.e.l.ls and bagnios, _ad libitum_; and by the manifold parasites and hangers-on of the Imperial authority in its last stronghold. Therefore, while this state of affairs lasted, the land speculators made prodigious wealth by the letting of their property to the natives at almost fabulous rents, but the capture of the city by the Ti-pings would have altered all this. The vile manner in which many colossal fortunes have thus been obtained is lost sight of in England by the glitter of the ingots.
Fifthly. A large proportion of partners in mercantile houses _upon the spot_, expected to make their fortunes and retire to their home in three years; but the occupation of Shanghae by the Ti-pings, and the natural effect of the civil war, must have interfered with the import trade and injured their immediate profits.
Upon these grounds British faith was dishonoured and a murderous war waged against the unfortunate Ti-pings. Admiral Hope continued the work of destruction with his artillery and rifles from a safe distance, until his recall to England. Violation of good faith, misrepresentation, and partial aggression, became superseded by regular hostilities, carried on without any previous declaration of war, or even statement of grievance.
What would such manner of warfare be denominated in Europe?
Having reviewed the policy of the British Government, and the conduct of its officials in China, it may be well to notice a few reports upon the Ti-ping rebellion, well worthy of attention, even though ignored by the British Ministry. These testimonies prove that the Ti-pings have not been decimated because they were misunderstood by the British Government, but that the latter were as well acquainted with their Christianity, friendliness, political object, superiority to the Manchoos, and generally improved character, as the writer of this history, or the authors of the statements he quotes. Therefore, when the evil policy of those who authorized the unnecessary and unjustifiable hostilities upon the part of England shall become more generally admitted, they cannot palliate their wickedness by pleading ignorance of the true merits of the people. It is difficult to speak of this British interference in any but the most forcible and unmeasured terms of condemnation. Not a solitary excuse can be truly made for it; and when the selfishness of that policy is thoroughly appreciated (which is rapidly becoming the case), the atrocities committed by its sanction, and their consequences, will be looked back upon with grief and sadness by every loyal Englishman.
The first and most important of the above-mentioned reports was made by Mr. Consul Meadows to Lord Russell. Mr. Meadows was better acquainted with the Ti-pings than any other English official in existence. He was the most talented in China, the most honourable and disinterested; therefore, it may be that his statements were not regarded, and that his presence at Shanghae became an inconvenience. This difficulty was soon surmounted by the removal of Mr. Meadows from Shanghae to New-chw.a.n.g, very soon after his truthful and independent exposition of the Ti-ping rebellion, and by naming as his successor a Consul who was more pliable.
The following despatch of Mr. Meadows bears date "February 19, 1861,"
and is worthy of most attentive perusal:--
"CONSUL MEADOWS TO LORD J. RUSSELL.--(Received April 12.)
"Shanghae, February 19, 1861.
"British trade and British-India trade with this country, and the revenues derived from the one and the other, are among the most important of British interests abroad. A necessary condition to the flourishing of these is the existence of order--of security to life and property--in this country; and the existence of this order and security, again, requires the existence of a strong national government. These propositions are so well established that I merely state them.
"But the hitherto existing Imperial Government, that of the Manchoo or Ta-tsing dynasty, which was already becoming weak from internal causes, has received its death-blows from the external action, first of British arms alone, and now of British and French combined. No strong national government now exists anywhere; and in large, and to us very important, portions of the country, anarchy and insecurity prevail.
"It becomes, therefore, of the utmost importance to look around us for some other power in the nation to take its place. If we find any such other power, we must not only not attack it, but must earnestly desire its speedy growth. An adherence, not less wise than just, to the principle of non-intervention, together with the due observance of the treaties with the Ta-tsing Government, should prevent our taking direct positive steps to aid that growth; but a.s.suredly it would be a most suicidal course, as regards those large interests to which I have pointed, first to achieve the destruction of the government we find existing, and then to proceed to prevent any other from coming into existence.
"Now we have such another power in the Taepings, and such another government in the government which they have established at Nanking.
"It has been, and by many is still, denied that the Taepings have any regular government, or can be considered a political power.
"For one moment I will grant this, but only in order to point out that after maintaining themselves for eleven years in arms in China, and for eight in the centre of the empire, the Taepings are manifestly a power of some sort, and to ask--Are we, because this power does not come up to all that is expected of it, are we, therefore, gratuitously to attack it, and either greatly lessen or altogether destroy its chances of ever realizing those expectations? What else have we got to look to for the re-establishment of a government having power to preserve order?
"But I entirely deny that the Taepings have no regular government, and have no claim to be considered a political power.
"Ten years ago, almost immediately after they rose in arms, they threw off the characteristics of local insurgents, and proclaimed themselves the irreconcilable enemies of the Ta-tsing dynasty. From that time to this they have never left us in doubt of their object. It has always been the great one of making themselves the heads of the first state in Asia, and the governors of the largest people in the world. So much has been established, not only by their own published manifestoes, but by the official doc.u.ments of their enemies.
"As to their manner of pursuing that object, whether it is such as befits a power a.s.suming to be political, it would too much prolong even this letter to meet in detail all the objections of those foreigners who declaim against them.
"Speaking generally, these objections may be cla.s.sed under two heads. First, those which are based on the application to this region and its peoples, of arguments drawn from the state of society and modes of political action of Western Europe, in defiance of the fact that these arguments are wholly inapplicable to a state of civilization and a polity so different; and secondly, those which are applied in entire disregard of the parallel transactions in Western Europe itself, a disregard of obvious a.n.a.logies, which can only be the result of great ignorance or of wilful prejudice.
"Among the former, are nearly all the objections to their military discipline, tactics, and strategy, and to their administrative forms, whether of a civil or a military nature.
"Among the latter, are objections such as that they do not fix themselves in the places they take; that they take them and then leave them again, &c.
"The obvious rejoinder, drawn from the history of Western Europe is, how often, during the great rebellion in England, were important cities and strong places taken and evacuated or retaken? Did that prove that the English n.o.blemen and gentlemen who first headed that rebellion were unfit to establish a government? Did it prove that Cromwell was neither a general nor an administrator? And when, ten years ago, the Italians left Milan to be reoccupied by its former oppressors, after these had been once expelled, and also allowed the foreign dynasties to reinstate themselves in their princ.i.p.alities, did that prove that the Italian party which aimed at expelling all these foreigners was not a political power?
"A stock argument against the Taepings was drawn from their destruction of the suburbs of the cities they occupied. This, however, was finally silenced when, on the approach of the Taepings to Shanghae a few months ago, the British and French garrison in that city fired all its suburbs, not excepting the densely peopled and commercially important suburb between the city and the river.
"Then, again, ruthless and wanton slaughter, not only of the foreign Manchoos, but of their Chinese countrymen, has been urged against the Taepings as a proof that they were a mere gang of robbers and murderers. But was there during the revolutionary struggle in France no mutual killing of the opposing parties of Frenchmen? I mention only the Reign of Terror, and the "Noyades," and, leaving it to your Lordship"s memory to add further ill.u.s.trative transactions, I ask, do such well-established historical facts prove that the revolutionary party were merely a large gang of robbers and murderers, and not a political power?