"While, however, considering it an established fact in the history of the Taepings that they, on taking Nanking, put the whole of the Manchoos to death, not sparing even the women and children; and while thinking it highly probable that they will treat in the same way any other of the military colonies of the Tartar conquerors of their country that may fall into their power, I have long ago arrived at the full conviction that the tales of the slaughter committed by them on their own countrymen are not only exaggerated, but very grossly exaggerated.
"My own experience has furnished me with an instructive example of gross exaggeration of the kind. In the beginning of September, 1853, when, not the Taepings, but the Triad Society rebels, suddenly rose and seized the city of Shanghae, I was travelling alone from Ningpo to Shanghae, _via_ Chapoo. It was on reaching this latter place, about sixty miles from Shanghae, that I first got the news from the crew of my own river-craft, which had come there to meet me. The insurrection having broken out just as they had left, they themselves could give no particulars about it. But from other vessels, and from the local merchants and officials, I learnt that there had been a fearful slaughter in the city of Shanghae; that the streets were covered with dead bodies and blood; that the foreigners and the rebels had been fighting; and that the whole of the foreign community had retired in the shipping outside of Woo-sung. So uniform and consistent were these reports, and so certain did it appear that I should be unable to pa.s.s Shanghae out to Woo-sung, that I set about studying the Chinese maps, with a view of finding a succession of river-pa.s.sages by which I might, keeping some twenty or thirty miles distant, make my way through the country inside of it, and so out into the Great River, and down that to the reported position of the foreign shipping. But before undertaking so serious a circuit I, of course, determined to approach nearer to Shanghae city. As I did so, I found the prevalent reports less and less alarming; and at length, when about twelve miles distant, ascertained the fact--one well known here at the time--that there had been no fighting whatever with the foreigners, and that, in the whole city the slaughter and bloodshed was limited to the killing of one man. Yet the current and fully-believed reports only sixty miles off were exactly like those we have so often heard of the slaughter committed by the Taepings. We know, from the experience of British troops during the last twenty years, that much loss of life usually ensues on the forcible occupation of Chinese cities from men destroying their families, and then themselves; from women, young and old, committing suicide; and from an unreasoning terror, that drives people into deep ca.n.a.ls or rivers, in vain attempts to cross them. In these very ways several lives were nearly lost, a few months back, in the Chinese portion of this settlement before an alarm subsided which was caused by a sudden outcry that the Taepings were entering it, none being at the time within twenty miles" distance.
"From these habits of the Chinese, we may infer that there has been, in the many populous cities occupied by the Taepings in this province, much loss of life among women and children, as well as grown men--non-combatants; and the inference is supported by the fact of foreigners who having visited such cities seeing in the ca.n.a.ls many unwounded bodies. But that the Taeping troops have directly put to death a greater proportion of their non-combatant countrymen, or have even refused quarter to the armed, to a greater extent than have done revolutionary parties in the civil wars of England and France, is, I am fully satisfied, a prejudiced repet.i.tion on the part of inimical foreigners of the interested calumnies of the Ta-tsing party.
"Some time back it had become a good conclusion that in the tracts of country occupied by the Taepings there must be greater security for life and property than in those occupied by the Ta-tsings. We knew that the Taepings had long given up that system of universal conscription on which they acted in 1853, and which then made their approach a source of peculiar terror.
We knew that they depended on voluntary enrolment for the support of their fighting force, and that they were earnestly endeavouring to get the inhabitants generally of hamlets and open towns to remain at their usual occupations. This being the case, it was plain that the Taepings could preserve the public peace better than the Ta-tsings. For the bulk of the leading officials among the former were themselves not only fighting men, but about the best fighting men that they had; men who owed their position to their military qualities. To them there could, among their own party, be no open defiance. There might be nothing of that military drill and tactics which characterize European armies, but that discipline, which consists in strict obedience to orders could not fail to be there. On the other hand, the bulk of the leading Ta-tsing officials, the mandarins, were about the most inactive and timid, the most unwarlike of their party, and were, we knew, compelled to employ, as their chief fighting men, the ex-pirates of the south-eastern coast-land, who, with their followers, would not content themselves with their official pay, but would also, in defiance of the wishes of their weak employers, exact money from, or plunder outright, the peaceable populations whom they were hired to protect.
"These inferences have been amply confirmed by recent unquestionable experiences. Mr. John, an English missionary of education and intelligence, went two or three months ago from Shanghae to Soo-chow, and thence to Nanking, where he stayed for seven days. Mr. John put the question to the Taeping officials why it was that the walled cities held by them were so entirely deserted by their former populations of tradesmen, artificers, &c. He received answers to the effect that those cities had been transformed into fortresses, necessary to be held for the reconquest of the country from the Manchoos; that having been once deserted, no population was readmitted, as, under the guise of tradesmen, &c., they might gradually be filled with hostile forces; but that, as soon as their own progress advanced their frontier to other points, they themselves would be anxious to see these places repeopled by a peaceful population. In the mean time they were doing their best to protect, in the hamlets, villages, and open towns, all who choose to remain in them, in quiet submission to the Taeping rule.
"Now these explanations and statements were fully supported by the nature of the circ.u.mstances and by what Mr. John saw himself. He was altogether about a month in the country held by the Taepings. He traversed a tract of that country of about 120 miles in extent (Tsing-poo to Nanking), and travelled by night as well as by day, quite unarmed, and never molested. He found the country people quietly pursuing their usual occupations; and--a proof of the understanding between them and their Taeping rulers--saw the soldiers of the latter moving from place to place in large bodies without inspiring terror, and in parties of three or two without being a.s.sailed. At Soo-chow, both Mr.
John and a well-educated and observant Chinese who accompanied him, and whom I questioned closely, saw the veritable landed gentry coming in parties to give in to the civil governor their adhesion to the Taeping dynasty.
"What, on the other hand, is the state of the country on this side of the Ta-tsing lines? Not only do the exactions of the mandarins for military objects equal any similar demands that can be made by the Taepings, but piracy and robbery are well known to be everywhere rife. During an excursion, in the end of October, of some ninety miles up the Yang-tze, I had myself full opportunity of observing the prevalence of piracy and the alarm of the country people; and reports came constantly in, on all sides, showing that the reign of lawless violence is rather increasing than diminishing.
"It is impossible to say how much of China proper the Taepings hold altogether, clear of Ta-tsing authorities or troops. But in proof of their right to be considered a political power, we have the fact that their armies are operating successfully up into Shang-tung in the North, down into Kw.a.n.g-tung and Kw.a.n.g-se in the South, and in Sze-chuen in the West, while nothing prevents their penetrating to the sea in the East but the presence of the foreign forces at Shanghae.
"On the religion of the Taepings little need here be said.
Viewed as a piece of contemporary history, the fact of the rise and progress, in this old seat of Confucianism and Buddhism, of the Bible-spreading Taeping Christianity--be its exact character what it may--is one of the most interesting spectacles that the annals of the human race present; and if the Taepings succeed in becoming the rulers of the Chinese people, it will prove one of the most momentous. A foreign official agent, whose nature or the limited extent of whose information permits of his viewing that spectacle with indifference, must surely be adjudged mentally unfitted for the career he has chosen. But except as a deeply interesting piece of contemporary history, we have nothing to do with it. If we aid the Taepings on account of their professed creed, we propagate religion by the sword; if we attack them on account of it, we engage in a religious persecution.
"One circ.u.mstance, which does not directly interest us, remains to be considered; the disposition of the Taepings towards us. On this point, the testimony is continuous, always consistent, and remarkably satisfactory. On three or four occasions, on which foreign war-vessels have, without any previous communication, steamed right up to the river batteries of the Taeping fortified places, they have exercised the right--a right inherent in every belligerent power--of endeavouring to keep off a suspicious and, for their means of defence, formidable force. But so soon as they have been told that it was not the hired foreign steamers of their Ta-tsing enemies, but the Government vessels of neutral foreigners that were before them, they have in every instance at once ceased firing. Their superior officers have fully explained that if foreign neutral vessels would send small unarmed boats in advance, they would not be fired at; and whenever this has been done, they have kept faith. As for the white flag of truce, it is simply absurd to suppose that that purely conventional signal of the Western world can be known to the commander of every Taeping battery. But the Taepings have a complete justification for disregarding it, even if they knew it; they are fighting with an enemy who would not hesitate an instant about sending in his own foreign steamers to open fire or effect a hostile landing, with a white flag or a British ensign flying at each mast-head. In no one of the numerous cases of one or more unarmed foreigners advancing to the Taeping outposts, since I first landed at Nanking in April, 1853, up till the most recent visits of Shanghae traders to Soo-chow, have they been received otherwise than peacefully; while in several cases those who have visited them as prejudiced unfriends have been converted into well-wishers by the friendliness of their reception.
"They appeared in force before Shanghae six months ago, but I have good reasons for feeling satisfied that they were deluded into so doing by certain foreigners who wished to bring on an irremediable hostility between them and us, and who had held out to them the hope that we should give up the place to them. They fired a few ineffectual shots at the Chinese troops who were mingled with the British on the walls, and who kept discharging their matchlocks. But they did not fire at all where there were only British in front of them, and not one of the foreign soldiers received a wound, though a number of the Taepings were killed by our fire. Lastly, during the half-year that has elapsed since they retired, foreigners have been received at their places, if not with the same hopeful cordiality, as peacefully and as civilly as before.
"We have a long succession of irrefragable proofs that the Taepings do earnestly desire friendly commercial relations with us. The fact is so well known that inimical foreigners have been constrained to endeavour, with a curiously blind ingenuity, to turn it against them. "All that is mere pretence," it has been argued; "if they felt sure they were strong enough to attack us with advantage, they would do it." In reply, I ask if it be so, in how far do the Taepings differ in that respect from the Russians, French, and Americans? Is the peaceful and civil reception the English get from these nations the result of pure friendliness or of policy? Would they attack us if they felt sure they could do so with advantage? What are our Channel fleets, our fortifications, and our 150,000 volunteers for?
"A few years back the aid of a small British army and naval squadron, operating along a portion of the Great River, could perhaps have enabled the Manchoos to suppress this particular Chinese rising against their rule; but now it would require a large fleet of steamers, operating throughout some 1,500 to 2,000 miles of the Great River and its larger branches, and some 20,000 troops, operating in three or four complete small armies in different parts of the tract of country mentioned above as being more or less in the occupation of Taeping forces, and which extends about 800 to 900 miles from north to south, and 1,000 to 1,100 from east to west. It would prove one of the most troublesome and costly wars that England ever engaged in; costly as regarded the direct outlay, and still more costly as regarded the consequences to our trade; for the region in question is that which, practically speaking, produces the whole of our tea and silk exports, and which consumes the larger portion of our manufactured imports; and the effect of our hostilities in it would be to overspread it with anarchy and desolation."
From this despatch it will be seen that every point upon which the British Government has based its hostilities against the Ti-pings is plainly disproved. The last paragraph may be regarded by some few bigoted pro-Imperialists as an exaggeration; but when they glance at the present state of China (1865), and see the Ti-pings still victoriously disputing the supremacy of the Manchoo, when they look upon the very diminished export of silk, and upon the rebellion rampant in every province of China, they can hardly dispute that a "large fleet of steamers" and 20,000 troops was correctly considered by Mr. Meadows necessary to suppress the revolution.
As for the justice of the British intervention, it is hardly necessary to speak any further. The belligerent character of the Ti-ping rebellion was recognised immediately after its origin, simply because the British remained neutral towards a Power carrying on war, and moreover, from the fact that English representatives sought out and made guarantees of neutrality with the Ti-ping authorities. But, while openly recognising the belligerent rights of the revolutionists, the British Government has invariably evaded a strict interpretation of its professions, and given a tacit support to the Manchoos, thereby making themselves a party to the war, and const.i.tuting themselves the allies of the latter Power.
The Ti-pings were fully ent.i.tled to equal rights with the Imperialists, whether upon the high seas, neutral waters, at the treaty ports, or elsewhere. They possessed a settled Government at Nankin, a vast territory, and _several_ ports; and such being the case, should, and had the British authorities acted honourably would, have enjoyed any and every privilege given or allowed to the other party in the civil war.
When the Spanish colonies cast off their allegiance to Spain, when Brazil revolted against Portugal, when Texas seceded from Mexico, when Greece rebelled against its Turkish rulers, when the Southern States of America seceded from the Union, when Santo Domingo rose against Spain, when the Neapolitans revolted against their Government, in every one of these, and countless other cases, each belligerent as a matter of right received equal privileges from neutral Powers.
Had England and other neutral Powers acted according to their own laws, they would have been bound to recognise the independence of the Ti-pings, for the utter inability of the ousted Manchoo Government to recover its authority within a reasonable time was apparent. More than this, it was universally admitted that the Tartars, if una.s.sisted by foreigners, would be overthrown, and when such contingency became certain, England was dragged in to a.s.sist them. The excuse about danger to British lives and property from the occupation of the treaty ports by the insurgents is proved false by the capture of Shanghae in 1853, and the capture of Ningpo in 1861. The only other excuse of any moment is the "_might_ injure trade" one; but is that to be considered a sufficient justification? In all the cases of rebellion just cited, England remained neutral; why then has she been made to a.s.sume to herself, in China _only_, the right to interfere in internecine strife?
Why not interfere in America for the sake of trade and to prevent so-called rebels from collecting duties? As principle has nothing to do with the policy pursued in China, why should it elsewhere? Or why may it not be boasted that England feared to interfere in America, and therefore refrained; but acted differently in China, having no fear.
The _Shanghae Times_, a paper giving its general support to the Government, in its issue of March 15, 1862, thus describes the initiation of hostilities against the Ti-pings:--
"We believe that Admiral Hope is the first English officer of the present century who has adopted the unsoldierly practice of making war without having declared war. Having recognised the Taepings as a Power, according to the usage of civilized nations, he ought to have given them the alternative of retreat, submission, or butchery, before commencing the latter. This he did not. But as the Imperialists served him at Taku, he served the Taepings at Ming-hong. Honourable men condemned the conduct of the Imperial general at the Taku, and if the code of honour has not changed since then, it has been _grossly_ violated in the two recent attacks on the Taepings."
We have in a former chapter noticed the false a.s.sertion of the British minister in China with regard to "all cla.s.ses of observers" condemning the religion of the revolutionists, and his equally unfounded statement that the Revds. J. Edkins and Griffith John met with an "ungracious reception." The following reports by the Rev. G. John (of the London Missionary Society) will not only expose the truthlessness of Mr. Bruce, but also multiply proofs as to the Christianity of the Ti-pings, the evil policy of the British Government, and the astounding apathy of the missionary body at large.
The Rev. Griffith John, in a report to the secretary of his society, dated "Shanghae, December 6, 1860," states:--
"They" (the Ti-pings) "have created a vacuum, not only in the temples, but also in the hearts of the people, which remains to be filled. This is the missionary"s work--_a work that might be done immediately, were it not for the unaccountable policy of the representatives of foreign Powers at this port_. My princ.i.p.al object in going has been fully realized.
"My object was to obtain from the chief an edict of religious toleration. This I have obtained. It gives full permission to missionaries of every persuasion to enter into and live in the insurgents" territory, for the purpose of carrying on missionary work. The phraseology, in some parts, is bombastic, and therefore objectionable; but the simple meaning is full toleration to all Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic. "I see that the missionaries are sincere and faithful men, and that they do not count suffering with Christ anything; and because of this I esteem them very highly." Such are the words of the edict. Then comes a command to the chief officers to issue orders to all the (insurgent) brethren to treat the missionaries well. I showed the edict at Su-cheu, and asked the chiefs if they would help me to get a house, a chapel, &c. "Yes," said they, "you come, and it will be all right." I send you the original of this edict, written by the young prince himself, and bearing the seal of his father, and I intend to furnish you with a translation by the first opportunity. _I firmly believe that G.o.d is uprooting idolatry in the land, through the insurgents, and that He will by means of them_, in connection with the foreign missionary, plant Christianity in its stead. Let the prayers of our brethren in England be more fervent than ever in behalf of China. If these men succeed, the days of idolatry are numbered in the land. I am fully convinced that, should they succeed to establish order within the boundary of the Keang-su province, it would be _nominally_ a Christian province before the expiration of twenty years. The same observation will hold good of all the other provinces."
This is the edict referred to by Mr. John:--
""EDICT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION," BY THE CHIEF OF THE CHINESE INSURGENTS.[2]
""Having received the decree of my Heavenly Father (G.o.d), of my Heavenly adopted Father (Christ), and of my Father (the Celestial King), I command all the King"s officers, both civil and military, and all the Brethren, to be acquainted with it.
The true doctrine of my Father (G.o.d), and of my adopted Father (Christ), is the religion of Heaven. The religion of Christ (Protestant religion), and the religion of the Lord of Heaven (Roman Catholic religion), are included in it. The whole world, together with my father and myself, are one family. Those who lovingly and harmoniously observe the regulations of the heavenly religion are permitted to come and visit (us). Now, from the _memorial_ presented to us by my uncles, Kan, Tsan, Chung, and others, I learn that the foreign teacher G. John and his friends, esteeming the Kingdom of Heaven, and reverencing and believing in my Father (G.o.d), and my adopted Father (Christ), to whom be thanks for the bestowment upon us of authority, power, and wonders, of which those who are far and near have reverentially heard--have come for the express purpose of seeing the light, of beholding G.o.d and Christ, and of requesting permission to spread abroad the true doctrine.
Seeing, however, that the present time is a time of war, and that the soldiers are scattered abroad in every direction, I am truly afraid that the missionaries might be injured by following the rabble soldiery, and that thus serious consequence might ensue. Still, I truly perceive that these (missionaries) are sincere and faithful men, and that they count it nothing to suffer with Christ; and because of this I esteem them very highly.
""Let the kings inform all the officers and others, that they must all act lovingly and harmoniously towards these men, and by no means engender contention and strife. Let all know, that the Father (G.o.d), my adopted Father (Christ), my father and myself, are one family; and let these men (missionaries) be treated exceedingly well.
""Respect this."
"NOTE.--The Kan-w.a.n.g told us that the chief is anxious that his son should feel an interest in the propagation of the Gospel, and therefore directed him to write it....
"The expressions "to the light," and "behold Christ and G.o.d,"
are explained in the fact that Nanking is the Jerusalem of the Celestial dynasty. I asked the Kan-w.a.n.g if the above edict opens up the whole of the insurgents" territory--Nanking not excepted--to missionary operations. He replied that it does....
"Thus, then, the above throws open the whole of the insurgents"
territory to missionary work, so far as the insurgents themselves are concerned. Here and there the phraseology is objectionable; still, this point is quite clear: they have done this not in ignorance, but with their eyes quite open to the difference which exists between them and ourselves."
In a letter, dated twelve days later than that already quoted from, Mr.
John gives this reason for not going to live among the Ti-pings:--
"When I returned from Nankin I fully intended to go to live in that city, if practicable; but after much thought, _and some consultation with those who are in authority_, I have come to the conclusion that it would be premature to do so just now....
The river, I am told on good authority, is to be opened at once, and the ports of Han-kow and Kin-kiang are to become consular ports. Another expedition is about to go up the river, and then it will be determined what is to be done with the insurgents.
They may be treated as friends, or, on the other hand, as foes.
If not as friends, I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WILL BE OUR FAULT, because they cherish the kindliest feeling towards us, in spite of our conduct towards them when they visited Shanghae."
We will conclude Mr. John"s reports with three short extracts; the first of which clearly shows what good might have been effected by the British missionaries had they performed their duty; the second goes far to establish the superiority of the Ti-pings over the Manchoos.
1. "The insurgents are making rapid strides, and are determined, as you will learn from my journal, to uproot idolatry in the land, _and to plant Christianity in its room_. The former they will do with a strong hand, and the latter will not be left undone, _if the Churches and missionaries are alive to their duty in reference to this great movement_."
2. "They have doubtless gross defects; but in every respect--religious, political, social, &c.--they are centuries ahead of the Imperialists, and I cannot but wish them G.o.d speed."
The third and last extract from Mr. John"s reports is taken from one dated "February 2, 1861," and fully shadows forth what England has _now_ been compelled to understand, and what every sensible person fully comprehended long since. Mr. John states:--
"It is fortunate for us that the Tartars have their hands full just now, _as the value of the recent treaty rests solely on the weakness of the existing dynasty_. The Tartars hate us with an insatiable hatred, and would, in spite of the treaty, recommence warlike operations to-morrow had they the power. To break faith with the _barbarian_ is not crime but virtue, according to their creed, if his humiliation and expulsion might thereby be effected. From the Manchoos we have nothing to hope, but everything to fear. They are sworn enemies to Christianity and civilization, and they have set their iron faces determinedly against both. They _can_ do but little at present. The wonderful progress of the insurrection in the South, during the last year, and the repeated defeats and the complete discomfiture of the Tartar hosts in the North, have thoroughly undermined the Manchoo power. It must fall. There is no power in China to uphold it. The Kw.a.n.g-si insurrection, on the other hand, must triumph, _if foreign Powers do not interfere_. The Manchoos might as well attempt to blow the sun out of the heavens as to quench this flame which their folly and tyranny have kindled....
"The insurgents themselves are still determinately opposed to idolatry in all its features. At their approach the idols vanish, and the priests of Buddh and Tau disappear. The downfall of idolatry in the land seems to be bound up with their success.
Never did China present such a spectacle to the Christian world.
Will the Church, _unfaithful to her Head and false to herself_, as the depository of the blessings of light and life for the world, look on with indifference? Shall the four hundred millions of China remain in their state of darkness and death, _because of the worldliness and deadness_ of the people of G.o.d?"
To these questions the British Government appears to have returned an affirmative answer.
A few extracts from a report of the Rev. W. Muirhead, in harmony with the testimonies of other missionaries, both as to the death-blow idolatry had received from the victorious arms of the Ti-pings, and the general knowledge of Christianity possessed by them, shall close our quoted evidence for the present. In the spring of 1861, Mr. Muirhead spent a month among the Ti-pings at Nankin, and while there was constantly engaged in preaching about the city, and thus describes his experience:--
"Going about sometimes for several hours a day, I have been abundantly encouraged by the number and attention of the audiences. It seems as if there were a foundation to go upon, from the amount of religious knowledge diffused among the people. There is a response, if not in their hearts, at least in their thoughts, to the tidings of mercy. They are made familiar at every step with the name and compa.s.sion of the Heavenly Father, _by the unprecedented practice of recording the fact over every door_. When, therefore, the same truths are announced in their hearing by a foreign missionary, _they give a ready a.s.sent, and express their cordial approval_. How different is all this from our experience in Shanghae and elsewhere! There we have a hard and strong ground to work upon; ignorance and _opposition_ prevail in abundant measure. Here, on the part both of the military and civilians, there _is_ knowledge, and there _is_ appreciation of the truth to a certain extent, which renders the spiritual enforcement of it a more easy and pleasant duty."