"_20th Dec._--The day being fine, we determined to have a look at the steamers _Feillong_ and _Sycee_. A smart walk to the Padi-cho gate brought us to the "fifty-two arched bridge," where we saw the heavy artillery just outside.
"We looked with regret upon those splendid "peace-makers," that _they_ should have been _loaned_ to the butcher of Soo-chow--that _they_ should be the property of the British Government--were thoughts upon which we need make no comment.
"Captain Baily in charge, and very creditably too! His hospitality is the last pleasant impression we had of Soo-chow, if we omit the feeling of relief we experienced when once outside of its walls on our way to Shanghae.
"_21st Dec._--On learning (to our surprise) that the _locale_ of the "execution ground" was neither more nor less than the court-yard of the "_Shing-s-tah_," "twin paG.o.das," where the unhappy rebels had paid with the forfeit of their lives for trusting in the word of honour of their unprincipled a.s.sailants, we determined on a trip thither. On our arrival, we examined several most ancient tablets of stone, whence we gathered that these paG.o.das were erected long anterior to the Ming dynasty (_i.e._ reign of Tai Ching, dynasty of Sung); but we will not detain our readers with antiquarian trifles. On entering the court-yard (about half an acre) we found the ground _soaked_ with HUMAN BLOOD! the creek forming its drain was still (after twenty days of slaughter) reddish with blood, as the officers of Dr. Macartney"s force can testify. The ground for three feet deep stunk with blood (and the best blood of China); though the weather, except at noonday, did not favour the corruption of animal particles, Soo-chow being situated in lat. 31 23" 25"
N., and long. 120 25" E.; consequently of rather a warm climate even in winter.
"Our Chinese informants told us that 30,000 rebels had been led to these shambles, and executed. We had proofs enough to know that the number was enormous; we have it on authority of an European _eye-witness_ that this creek was so full of decapitated rebels that the Mandarins employed boatmen to clean it, by pushing the bodies with boat-hooks outside of the city into the princ.i.p.al stream.
"We quitted the "execution ground" (travellers will know it by the "twin towers"), faint at these horrible proofs of _human_ butchery which had met our view, and overcome with emotion. Was it for _this_ that Englishmen fought? Was it for this that English guns had been loaned by the representatives of the British people? Was it for _this_ that the "first nation of the world" and the two _Scotchmen_, Gordon and Dr. Macartney, had fought?
"Let the spirit of Robert Bruce forbid it! Let the n.o.ble sons of Scotia contemn it; and all Christendom, in the name of ...
liberty, protest against the unspeakable perfidy, the horrible treachery, and brutal butchery of Soo-chow!
"_22nd Dec._--Though the experiences of yesterday made us long to leave Soo-chow, we determined to visit the ruins of Mo-w.a.n.g"s palace; though completely burned, it had evidently covered an immense area of several acres; huge bronzes half melted obstructed the pa.s.sage, and only a solitary drum stood sentinel at the entrance.
"It was with a melancholy satisfaction that we gazed at the wreck of his palace.
"Among so many traitors (his brother w.a.n.gs) he had been _true_ to his flag. He knew what Manchoo honour meant, and his death by the hands of Taeping traitors is his eulogium. If his spirit _can_ visit this world of ours, we must rejoice that the Manchoos have not profited (even in money) by his destruction.
"If the infamous barbarity of the Futai _can_ be excused; if his atrocious violation of justice and right can be pardoned; if there is any possible Jesuitical ground of justification for his immeasurable atrocities, it is this--he betrayed the betrayers of their own cause: he was a traitor to traitors, and has broken faith with the recreant w.a.n.gs.
"Depressed in spirit, we hurried from the ruins of Mo-w.a.n.g"s palace to our boat, and instantly gave orders to our crew to get under weigh for Shanghae.
"Hardly had we quitted the gate, when a letter was placed in our hands by a trusty agent from Chung-w.a.n.g, dated Kia-ching-foo; what were our feelings in perusing it and finding these words:--"You foreigners are like the Manchoos; you have no honour! you have deceived us!" We, as a foreigner, felt all the bitterness herein contained. We, a personal friend of his, blushed for our nationality in being compared to perfidious Manchoos!
"We candidly avow it, if we thought that the sword was really stronger than the pen, we would have girded it on, and be one more "witness" to the glorious cause of liberty! We should like to prove to the Taepings that European nations are not _all_ unprincipled liars, devoid of every virtue recognised by men, and that sacred volume which teaches a morality of which one would think they were ignorant. So much for our trip to Soo-choo and back.
"S. E. F. O. C."
The dreadful Soo-chow tragedy may be considered the terminating point of that unrighteous period of British policy commencing with the organization of the Anglo-Manchoo flotilla; the hiring out of Major Gordon and other officers; and the making of those infamous Orders in Council authorizing military and naval support of the Manchoo, while it has since been declared that an ordinance of neutrality was in force all the time! That the terrible result of their policy would have so far influenced the supposed Christian and civilized principles of those members of Lord Palmerston"s Government who originated it, as to make them admit their mistake with worthy humility, and seek to rectify the wrong already done by an essay towards the much easier path of right, is very doubtful. However, the spirit of Englishmen could no longer be restrained, and the Government were driven to rescind their former Orders in Council (placing the forces of England at the evil disposal of the Manchoo) by the unanimous voice of the Parliamentary representatives of the people.
Englishmen may thus flatter themselves that they have repudiated the atrocities which they had occasioned; but the very fact that their mistaken policy entirely caused such deplorable results, makes them morally responsible for the same. Still the national complicity _may_ be glossed over. The partic.i.p.ation of the agents on the spot, and especially the princ.i.p.al, Gordon, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be excused.
If Major Gordon had resigned his employment in the service of the local servant of the Manchoo Government, he might, by thus immediately forsaking his brother generals when he became involved in their deeds of blood and treachery, have saved his honour from suspicion and his name from everlasting infamy. If he had possessed the least particle of self-respect, humanity, or Christian feeling, he could not possibly have followed any other course. Incredible as the fact must ever seem to right-minded Englishmen, Major Gordon, after craftily pa.s.sing two months at Quin-san, still in command of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, and still receiving his pay from his employer, resumed active service with those sanguinary monsters and consummate betrayers, General Ching and the Futai Le.
Men judge by actions, but despise words. Gordon has _said_ that his disgust was something stupendous at the revolting barbarities perpetrated by his friends; yet the sentiment did not make him refuse their pay, neither did it prevent his return to partic.i.p.ate in fresh atrocities within two months, nor shock him sufficiently to stay his early reconciliation with the blood-stained wretches who had smeared him with the same unfading and polluting mark. Of course, before returning to active service, the British officer induced his Manchoo master to indite a cunningly worded Chinese despatch, setting forth that he was not actually concerned in the ma.s.sacre of the confiding Soo-chow victims. Naturally enough, to retain the services of Major Gordon (and the consequent a.s.sistance of the British Government), without which they would still have been powerless before the Ti-pings, the Manchoos, through Futai Le, verbosely declared all that was required. Shortly afterwards, besides resuming his employment, the major responded by writing an official letter, in which he forgot his former disgust, and had the singular audacity not only to exonerate the Futai from blame for his unparalleled atrocities, but to request Sir F. Bruce not to make any further complaint about the same[71]--events that had seriously stained the honour of Great Britain, and which only the most prompt and unqualified repudiation, together with entire cessation of further countenance and help to the Manchoo, could either erase from her scutcheon, or clear her policy from the imputation of complicity.
Unfortunately for the reputation of Major Gordon, since his elevation to the position of General of Futai Le"s Anglo mercenaries, he had been too much accustomed to intrigue and encouragement of treachery to have felt a proper indignation at the Soo-chow affair; and it is possible he might have had some knowledge of the planned perfidy before it was put into execution, and so was not sufficiently horrified to throw up his 1,200 taels (400) per month. Gordon"s behaviour in the treachery of the Burgevine-Ti-ping legion is one specimen, and a very strong one too, of the conduct referred to. He induced the Europeans who went over to him to desert the Ti-ping cause by his promises of office, bribes, and safe conduct to Shanghae for such as were tired of fighting. Some mistaken individuals have ascribed this proceeding to the humane disposition of the man who condoned the ruthless ma.s.sacre of his paroled prisoners, who a.s.sisted as a princ.i.p.al agent in the vast destruction of life and desolation of country during the unjustifiable British hostilities against the Ti-pings, and who never put himself to the trouble of saving the lives of those he a.s.sisted to vanquish. It must be a rather lax code of military honour which could reflect any _credit_ on Gordon for rewarding many of the traitors (mostly low American rowdies), by bestowing upon them various commands in his own force; and he--supposed to be an English officer and gentleman--with open arms receiving them as his messmates and brother officers: even less creditable is the fact that he obtained pecuniary reward for those whom he did not make his _friends_.
The letter written to Sir F. Bruce by Gordon as a justification for his fresh alliance with the Futai Le, appears in the Parliamentary Papers, as noticed by the foot-note on the preceding page. This doc.u.ment is so important, as showing the character of Gordon"s connection with the Imperialists, that I quote it in full, and then subject it to a close a.n.a.lysis.
"INCLOSURE 1 in No. 9.
"_Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce._ "Soo-chow, February 6, 1864.
"My dear Sir Frederick Bruce,--
Par. 1.--"_In consequence of the danger which will arise by my delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footae_ to issue a proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any partic.i.p.ation in the late execution of the w.a.n.gs, and have determined to act immediately."
Par. 2.--"The reasons which actuate me are as follows:--_I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character; and that the Footae will not accept another British officer if I leave the service_, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put under men of Ward"s and Burgevine"s stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain."
Par. 3.--"_I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for the course I am about to pursue_; but in the absence of advice, _and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk_. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful. _But the rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body_, and it will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government."
Par. 4.--"_I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave, and the Government does not support the Imperialists._ I propose to cut through the heart of the rebellion, and to divide it into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang."
Par. 5.--"If the course I am about to pursue meets your approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect to be well rebuked. However, _I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most conducive to the interests of our Government_.
"The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself."
Par. 6.--"_The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some extenuating circ.u.mstances in his favour, for his action_; and although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an European governor.
"This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I will answer shortly, I am, &c.,
(Signed) "C. G. GORDON."
Par. 7.--"P.S. _If you would let the matter drop_, and make me responsible for my action in the matter, _I think it would be more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae_.
"C. G. G."
NOTE.--The parts of the letter in italics are those subjected to review.
_a.n.a.lysis of Major Gordon"s Letter._
Par. 1. Now, with regard to this first premise, what right had Major Gordon to make a prospect of danger to the Imperialists a pretext to resume _friendship_ and _alliance_ with the faithless and barbarous wretches who had already implicated him in their revolting atrocities?
Major Gordon"s duty as a British officer, specially executing the policy of his Government, and leaving it responsible for his conduct, was simple and palpable. To avoid the deathless guilt of partic.i.p.ation in the Soo-chow treachery and ma.s.sacre, he should have repudiated both.
What course did he pursue? He wrote and talked a great deal about disgust, indignation, horror, &c., but never took any _action_ to fulfil his otherwise worthless protestations. By the only part we find he really performed and did not merely talk, it appears that he actually had the unparalleled audacity, folly, or knavishness, to _arrange_ terms with the Futai, although any intercourse, arrangement, or communication whatever, upon a friendly basis const.i.tuted a direct condonation and approval of the atrocities which would have made an unqualified separation from _all_ interests and future connection imperative to any man of honour, humanity, or Christian principle.
Par. 2. The a.s.sertion that Gordon _knew for a certainty_ that Burgevine intended to rejoin the Ti-pings, is best controverted by the following extract from the _Friend of China_, Shanghae newspaper (issue of September 29, 1864), which, being one of the princ.i.p.al organs among a population of Europeans and Americans, scarcely numbering 2,000 souls, may be credited for being well informed upon affairs in their midst; moreover, the editor was personally acquainted with Burgevine, and was aware, equally with myself, that he entertained no enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause.
The article referred to states:--
"As for Gordon"s a.s.sertion to Sir F. Bruce that he knew for a certainty Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels, and that upwards of 300 Europeans--[This estimate is supremely absurd.
During the whole time Burgevine was with the Ti-pings, and when everything seemed to favour his enterprise, he could never obtain more than one-third of 300 Europeans]--of no character, intended to join him. This being written in February last, we know for a greater certainty that, at that time, neither did Burgevine meditate anything of the kind, nor were there thirty--the tenth of 300--Europeans in this quarter available for any such game. And though Gordon may have been under an impression that he was writing truth when he made this a.s.sertion, his common sense might have told him the thing was as improbable as it has eventually proved incorrect. We say he _may_ have been under an impression that he was writing truth.
We may not refrain, however, from saying we doubt it. Why, Gordon knew as well as we did that the rebels never sought the a.s.sistance of foreigners, did not care to see them in their ranks, and were always jealous of them. Gordon knew right well, moreover, that when Burgevine left Soo-chow he left the rebel service for ever; that he was sick and disgusted with it; and if ever he meditated anything afterwards, it was operation rather as an independent buccaneer than as a Ti-ping general. The a.s.sertion--yarn, wilful lie, or whatever it shall be called--did very well, however, in the place it was intended for, viz.
Pekin, a place so far away from the scene of action, that there was no possibility of contravening it at the time."
Besides the facts--incontrovertible to those acquainted with the case--in the above refutation of Gordon"s "reasons" for his fresh blood-alliance with that cold-blooded murderer, the Futai, another strong argument may be proved against his veracity:--
1. We may be quite sure that the Ti-pings would never have accepted a second time the services of the man who had once betrayed them. From my own knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Chung-w.a.n.g, I am quite a.s.sured on this point. 2. Then with respect to the probable action of Burgevine himself. Having deserted the Ti-ping cause before Soo-chow had fallen, and while its prospects were in vastly more favourable condition than at the period of Gordon"s statement, he would, consequently, never be disposed to join when its circ.u.mstances had become desperate. 3. As for the "300 of no character," mercenaries would certainly not espouse a failing movement, which, in fact, had become still more "unprofitable"
than when the Burgevine-Ti-ping legionaries ran away because, even at that time, they found no sufficient inducement to remain. These propositions cannot fail to damage the "reasons" given by Gordon, because they show that all common sense and reason points to an exactly opposite conclusion. Thus we find that logic reverses Gordon"s "reasons," while facts entirely prove the falseness of his statements.
The princ.i.p.al argument is the fact that Burgevine _did not_ join the Ti-ping, and the mythical "300" were never more heard about.
Par. 3. This paragraph of Gordon"s letter seems to contain about the most severe condemnation of his "reasons" that it would be possible to imagine. He states that "he is open to very grave censure for the course he was about to pursue," and that, "knowing the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done," he had made up his mind to "run the risk;" that is to say, he knew that the Manchoo Government would approve the treachery and ma.s.sacre in which the Futai had involved him; yet such was his obliquity of principle that he actually used as a reason to resume the sanguinary alliance the very fact which should have made his separation from the Manchoo still more imperative.
With regard to the ungenerous, if not treacherous, manner in which Gordon, behind their backs, termed his comrades "the rabble," it is well noticed in the quotation from the _Hong-Kong Daily Press_, at the end of this a.n.a.lysis.
Par. 4. This section of the letter exhibits a very pretty ebullition of overweening self-conceit. If the writer takes the field again, the rebellion cannot last "six months;" without that mighty warrior"s hostility, it would last "six years." Well, Bombastes did take the field, but the "rebellion" still flourishes. It will be seen that the blower of his own trumpet modestly puffs his value at only twelve times that of any other officer who might conduct the operations against the Ti-ping.