Par. 5. Concerning this protestation of disinterested motives--"I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations"--I beg to refer my readers to the concluding paragraph of the a.n.a.lysis, when they will find that this statement is no less questionable than others by the same author. With regard to Gordon"s excessive care of the "interests of our Government," and his declaration (in paragraph 2 of the letter), "that the Futai will not accept another British officer if I leave the service," the article in the _Friend of China_, already quoted, continues from where we left off:--"And just as likely to be true was the statement that the Futai would not accept another _British_ officer if he, Gordon, left the Chinese service. How did Gordon learn that fact, or that story? What can there be in _British_ officers that they should be so repugnant to the Deputy Viceroy? What Gordon really meant was:--If I leave, "the Government" will not find such a faithful tool in any one else as they have found in me."
Par. 6. In this part of the precious letter it is shamelessly declared that "the Futai has extenuating circ.u.mstances in his favour" for breaking faith and cruelly butchering the defenceless prisoners at Soo-chow, who solely surrendered upon the terms guaranteed by Gordon himself.
Par. 7. This postscript makes a fitting conclusion to the bad principle and illogical reasoning of the letter we have reviewed. Gordon has the audacity to request that the "matter"--affecting not only his own character, for that is immaterial, but the honour of the British army and the fair fame of England herself--may be "let drop," and to opine that "good relations" should be maintained with the Pekin Government, by no longer expressing any indignation at the immeasurable disgrace reflected upon England by the revolting barbarities perpetrated by her very good Manchoo allies, through the aid, and in the actual presence, of British officers.
Before concluding the a.n.a.lysis of Gordon"s apology for resuming active operations with the Futai, it is necessary to make a few further observations. In the first place, it is quite impossible to deduce a sufficient cause from the three "reasons" by which he declares himself to have been actuated (paragraph No. 2). Even suppose we admit the allegations that Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels; that 300 Europeans were ready to join him; and that the Futai would not have accepted another _British_ officer, to what conclusion do they lead us?
Simply, that _if_ these suppositions became realized, the event might prove disastrous to the Manchoo. Now, as Gordon chose to make this his excuse for comfortably pa.s.sing over the Soo-chow affair, and resuming active service, it is perfectly clear that (whether he intends to convey this meaning or not) he pursued such conduct in the interest of his Imperialist friends; and this reduces the three "reasons" into a plea of duty to the Manchoo. Moreover, from the independent action claimed throughout the letter, the writer does not attempt to justify himself by any pretence of duty to his own Government. British officers, and, indeed, all their countrymen, may well feel astonished and disgusted at the extraordinary reasoning of Gordon, who, though merely the hired mercenary of a _local_ Mandarin (Le Futai), and being totally without _status_ in the Imperialist service,[72] made his duty to the Manchoo, forsooth, a reason for condoning the atrocities in which they had already involved him, and justifying his future partic.i.p.ation in deeds equally abhorrent to every civilized and Christian sentiment.
We now come to the question as to the worth of this plea of duty. Either Gordon was the servant of the Manchoo Government or the British Government. When the English Commons compelled ministers to revoke the Order in Council authorizing the employment of British officers by the Manchoo, and to recall all so employed, _in consequence of the Soo-chow ma.s.sacre_, Gordon, eventually, was withdrawn from service with the Futai. Now this proves that he was _bona fide_ the servant of the British Government, and not only destroys his implied plea of duty to the Government of China, but virtually disclaims any countenance or indors.e.m.e.nt of his act in joining the Futai and resuming active operations subsequent to the Soo-chow tragedy. Thus it is palpable beyond any manner of doubt that the course Gordon pursued was _entirely_ according to "personal considerations;" was at his own responsibility; and was neither in consonance with duty to his own Government nor that of the Manchoo.
There are but three other motives which might be held to account for Gordon"s conduct. The first would be, duty to his G.o.d--but this never has been attributed to him, and it would be gross blasphemy to do so; the second, philanthropy, has been professed both by himself and friends; the third, which is pecuniary, has been more frequently ascribed to him. The philanthropical motive will be controverted shortly when we come to a case in which it is attributed to him. With one exception (the _China Mail_), the whole European press of China lamented Gordon"s connection with the Futai at Soo-chow; still more indignant were the channels of public opinion when they found that he quietly ignored the treacherous ma.s.sacre by remaining at his post; and then rumours were not wanting with regard to the mercenary motives believed by many people to be the real cause of his return to active service.
Major Gordon has not only brought himself into evil repute, but also the service of which he is so questionable a specimen. Take, for instance, the following extract from the _Friend of China_ (issue February 20, 1864):--"If it be true that Major Gordon has again coalesced with Le Futai, he must not blame us if we judge of his motives according to the old maxim, "actions speak louder than words." It would seem that his late rejection of rewards from the hand of Kung was simply because of its having been too little for his acceptance, not too vile. His retirement to Quin-san was a safe dodge to quiet public opinion in regard to the Soo-chow ma.s.sacre.... We hope that he has stipulated for tens of lacs of rupees. Why should a soldier of fortune not make a fortune? When the major returns to Scotland, will any of his "canny"
countrymen ask impertinent questions as to the source of the "siller"?
To be sure, military men who wear Queen Victoria"s uniform may hem and haw, cough and look doubtful; but we a.s.sure the major that if one British officer can sell his sword, the others have no right to complain about the price.... Dollars cover every defect, and a wealthy soldier can afford to buy the respect which he cannot exact. Let the trade of murder flourish, as it always has done, and may Major Gordon fully enjoy all the wealth that the Manchoos can give, and that mental satisfaction which faithful servitude never fails to bring to those of integrity! Is not faithfulness bought and sold in "Vanity Fair," and should that not be looked for in the conduct of a--British soldier?"
If this article were to be literally intended, it would probably indicate the principles of Gordon. It appears very unfair to judge him by the code of honour, civilized morality, and Christian doctrine, when he does not seem either to appreciate such restraints or conform to them; therefore it is possible that the press has been too severe when condemning acts that, in this case, may, perhaps, be rather virtuous than otherwise.
We now bring the a.n.a.lysis of Gordon"s "reasons" to a close by the following extract from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_ (October, 1864), which refers to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the letter, and finishes by making a direct accusation of mercenary motives for his coalescence with the Futai:--
"We believe it is well known that had Gordon left, Macartney would have succeeded. Certain it is that Macartney was an applicant for the post when Gordon was nominated, and as he had subsequently completely won the Futai"s confidence, there can be little doubt about the matter.
"It will be seen, therefore, that Gordon"s pretexts are shallow subterfuges, which will not stand the test of truth for one moment. He admits he is open to grave censure, but he says, "knowing as I do that the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk." That is a nice process of reasoning, certainly!
"He then turns round on his comrades--calls them a dangerous rabble, "which he will make it his duty to see dissolved as quietly as possible, and that while in course of dissolution it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government."
"Apart from Gordon"s unprincipled conduct with respect to the perfidy of the Futai, and to the murder of the w.a.n.gs--conduct which must heap disgrace on his name, and for ever prevent him from looking an honest man in the face again--we doubt whether, in the whole page of history, a parallel is to be found of a victorious fortunate commander turning on his comrades in the disgraceful, and we will add treacherous, manner in which Gordon turns on the Quin-san force in the letter before us. Let the reader remember the number of times Gordon had led the Quin-san force to victory--how splendidly they behaved in the campaign which Gordon was about to lead them through when he thus treacherously denounced them! Whatever they were, they had made him what he was; and bad as they might have been, we doubt whether any one of them ever departed more directly from the code of honour laid down by himself than Gordon did in rejoining the Futai, or even whether any one of them so far betrayed his comrades as Gordon does in the letter before us.
"A letter from Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell, dated Pekin, 21st March, encloses a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector of Customs, to Sir Frederic, communicating the important fact that, at the interview which Colonel Gordon had had with the Futai at Soo-chow, about the beginning of February, he, Mr. Hart, acted as interpreter between the two. The ostensible reason for Mr.
Hart thus acting was to enable the Futai to exculpate himself, which, according to Mr. Hart, he most completely did. Why did not Gordon mention this important circ.u.mstance in his letter to Sir Frederic advising His Excellency that he had again taken the field?[73] How came it that Mr. Acting-Consul Markham in his letter to Sir Frederic announcing the reconciliation, was silent on the point? How came it that General Brown was either ignorant of, or suppressed the fact? How did the fact come to be kept so secret from the public? Not a whisper nor a hint of Mr. Hart"s presence is to be detected in the despatches of these officers, let alone the complete vindication of the Futai which that gentleman avers was effected at the interview?
"The answer is plain. Mr. Hart is a man of good repute, of high standing, and is a true and faithful servant. The Mandarins have great faith in him, and his word goes a long way. If they sent him to Gordon with an offer of 50,000 _taels_, the colonel might be a.s.sured not only that the money would be placed to his credit in any bank in London he might name, but that the transaction would be kept an inviolable secret.
"There, reader, you have the clue to Gordon"s sacrifice of principle, and Mr. Hart"s visit to Soo-chow."
Before narrating the events subsequent to Gordon"s return to active operations, and bringing the history of the Ti-ping revolution down to a close, it is necessary to review a despatch written by Sir F. Bruce, the British Minister in China. The doc.u.ment const.i.tutes the only authority, or rather the only official approval, Gordon ever received for rejoining the Futai. It is necessary to notice the same, because, as it was an entirely conditional approval, and the conditions were _never_ observed, it naturally became null and void. It is, therefore, our duty to prove these facts, and thereby elucidate what might otherwise be held to remove the responsibility from Gordon, and, in fact, justify his conduct. The following despatch is the one in question, and it will be seen that it is the reply to Gordon"s letter:--
"Pekin, March 12, 1864.
"Sir,--I have received your letter of the 6th of February, stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations in concert with the Governor of Kiang-soo. I informed the Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere with the course you have taken, _but that my acquiescence was founded on the pa.s.sage in their despatch to me, which states_, that in any future operations in which a foreign officer is concerned the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations are to be observed, and that I should enclose you the extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing the arrangements agreed upon for the future. [1.]
"I have received the strongest a.s.surance that it will be strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Le is to be instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how essential it is that there should be no repet.i.tion of the occurrence at Soo-chow.
"I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at once, and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the onus of decision before committing yourself to any action.
"But you appear to have felt, as commander of a Chinese force, and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its composition and with the dangers to which this force, if indiscreetly handled, might give rise that the decision must be based on your representations, and you therefore a.s.sumed its responsibility.
"This honourable and manly conduct on your part ent.i.tles you to a frank expression of my opinion on the subject.
"I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of the high motives that have guided you while in command of the Chinese force, _of the disinterested conduct you have observed in pecuniary questions_, and of _the influence in favour of humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided a.s.sociates from Soo-chow_. [2.]
"I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily pursued the _pacification of the province of Kiang-soo_. _In relieving it_ from being the battle-field of the insurrection, and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry, you may console yourself with the a.s.surance that you are rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great material interest. [3.]
"It would be a serious calamity and addition to our embarra.s.sments in China were you compelled to leave your work incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution or dispersion of the Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger and anxiety from which, during the last two years, Shanghae has suffered.
"Her Majesty"s Government cannot be expected to garrison Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on until a civil administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits is firmly established in the province, and until the disorderly and brigand elements which form the force of the Taeping insurrection are either put down or so thoroughly repelled from its frontiers as to leave that unfortunate province in peace.
"To the force under your command we must look for that result, and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inactivity is full of danger, and I approve your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai"s proceedings at Soo-chow, _provided you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities_.[74] [4.]
"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant, "FREDERIC W. A. BRUCE.
"Major Gordon, R.E., &c."
[1.] Now, here we have the _condition_ upon which Sir F. Bruce agreed to Gordon"s action. Let us see how the condition has been observed. If my readers will take the trouble to turn back to the preceding chapter, they will find that the capture of Hwa-soo and Wu-see (as corroborated by the letter dated "April 28, 1864," from one of Gordon"s own officers) was followed with a complete violation of Sir F. Bruce"s conditional "acquiescence" by the wholesale ma.s.sacre of the unfortunate Ti-pings.
Furthermore, the following chapter will prove that at every city captured by Gordon and the Imperialists "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations" were _not_ observed, nor even pretended to be fulfilled according to the terms of the condition upon which Gordon"s action was approved: the princ.i.p.al cases referred to will be found to be the capture of Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, Chang-chow-foo, and Nankin.
[2.] The preceding quotation from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_, and the description of Burgevine"s hegira in Chapter XXII., sadly differ from Sir F. Bruce"s "pecuniary" and "influence in favour of humanity"
theories formed at Pekin upon evidence supplied by Gordon himself.
Burgevine had actually _left_ Soo-chow before Gordon interfered.
[3.] Readers of this history will at once perceive the falseness of these statements, Major Gordon having, in fact, not only _prevented_ the "pacification of the province of Kiang-soo" by the Ti-pings, but _made_ it "the battle-field of insurrection" by his "steadily pursued"
_invasions_ of the otherwise peaceful and settled Ti-ping territories.
As for the hypocritical cant about "a service to true humanity," &c., I need only refer to the narrative of the journey to Soo-chow by the sub-editor of the _Friend of China_; the travels of the silk-merchant through the _pacified_ country; the letters from two of Gordon"s own officers, &c.
[4 and 1.] Combining the first and last paragraphs selected from the precious letter for review, we will briefly notice the facts proving in what manner Gordon fulfilled the proviso of Sir F. Bruce--"I approve your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai"s proceedings at Soo-chow, PROVIDED you take care that _your efforts in favour of humanity_ are not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities." In Chapter XXIII., the letter from one of Gordon"s officers contains the following statement relative to the capture of the village of Hwa-soo, subsequent to the reconciliation between the official Manchoo murderer and the British bravo, and also subsequent to the establishment of the conditions by Sir F. Bruce"s despatch:--"The slaughter among the rebels _after_ the capture of Hwa-soo was terrible.
Upwards of 9,000 were _taken prisoners_, and of _these_ it was estimated 6,000 were killed or drowned, princ.i.p.ally by the Imperialists." Now, Gordon himself commanded on this occasion, but he did not "take care"
that "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations should be observed." This distinct violation of the British Minister"s conditional sanction is alone sufficient to ill.u.s.trate the fact that his _protege"s_ conduct was contrary to his wish or intention, and, also, to withdraw his stipulated justification. Moreover, we shall find that, at every succeeding capture of a Ti-ping city the same barbarities were perpetrated, and the same indifference to his superior"s instructions exhibited by Gordon, who stuck to his dear Imperialist friends with extraordinary devotion and tenacity, considering their sanguinary deeds and treacherous nature.
The _Shanghae Recorder_ (a paper supporting the policy of the British Government in China, and their very good Manchoo allies), in its issue of March 31, 1864, thus narrates the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the Imperialist General Ching and Major Baily, one of Gordon"s subordinates:--"As we expected, the usual horrible and revolting cruelty was exercised, after the _surrender_ of Kar-sing-foo, by Ching"s troops.
On entering the city they encountered no resistance, when the unfortunates (_all non-combatants_) found remaining were laden with loot, obliged to carry it out to the Imperial lines, and forthwith beheaded, as payment in full! Truly it is the cold-blooded butcheries which disgrace the Imperialist cause, and deaden every feeling except unmitigated disgust at their mode of warfare." The city had been evacuated by the troops.
The _China Mail_ (describing the capture of the city of Chang-chow-foo) by Gordon"s Anglo-Manchoo force and an army of his Imperial friends, in its issue of May 30, 1864, states:--"The two breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was given _to only a few hundred men_ who had offered to surrender some weeks before." The families of the garrison and the other inhabitants of this large city numbered many thousand; but all, excepting the "few hundred men," were cruelly butchered in cold blood during several days.
The _Times_, in its issue of September 28, 1864, in a leading article upon the fall of Nankin, states:--"What the cost of human life has been on this occasion we cannot yet calculate. It is plain that no mercy was extended, and although the treacherous deeds at Soo-chow must have acted as a warning to the European officers, the account of the European eye-witnesses makes it evident that the carnage was very great."
According to my own private advices, the _Friend of China_ and other journals, the Ti-ping capital was evacuated; therefore, the unfortunates butchered by the Imperialists were, probably, the sick, wounded, and poor inhabitants who were unable to fly, or had not sufficient inducement to do so.
With regard to Gordon"s "influence in favour of humanity," can any man of ordinary mind understand these results as philanthropical: viz., the slaughter of thousands in the field; the cold-blooded ma.s.sacre of thousands of helpless prisoners; and the death of even hundreds of thousands by starvation; the destruction of Christianity and free circulation of the Bible, as practised among the Ti-pings; and the re-establishment of Buddhism? Those who ascribe philanthropical motives to Gordon must entertain curious ideas as to the love of mankind, when they ill.u.s.trate it by ravaging Ti-pingdom with fire and sword!
Having now terminated the narrative of Gordon"s reconciliation with the Futai, the next chapter will describe the subsequent events.
FOOTNOTES:
[60] This Order in Council was pa.s.sed on the 9th July, 1864. See "Copy of all Ordinances relating to Neutrality in China," issued in return to an address of the House of Commons, dated May 30, 1864. (Colonel Sykes"
motion.)
[61] Tien-chw.a.n.gs, colonels of regiments.
[62] Italics are by the Author.