Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, in his book "What Wilson Did in Paris," says:
Of all the important decisions at the Peace Conference none worried the President so much as that relating to the disposition of the Shantung peninsula--and none, finally, satisfied him less. Not one of the problems he had to meet at Paris, serious as they all were, did he take more personally to heart than this. He told me on one occasion that he had been unable to sleep on the previous night for thinking of it.
Those last days before the Treaty was finished were among the hardest of the entire Conference. As I have said before, the most difficult and dangerous problems had inevitably been left to the last, and had all to be finally settled in those crowded days of late April.
Consider, for a moment, the exact situation at Paris on April 29th, when the j.a.panese-Chinese crises reached the explosive point.
It was on that very day that the German delegates were coming morosely into Versailles, ready for a treaty that was not yet finished. The Three--for Orlando had then withdrawn from the Conference--had been gradually lengthening their sessions, the discussions were longer and more acrimonious. They were tired out. Only six days before, on April 23rd, the High Council had been hopelessly deadlocked on the Italian question. The President had issued his bold message to the world regarding the disposition of Fiume and the Italian delegation departed from Paris with the expectation that their withdrawal would either force the hands of the Conference, or break it up.
While this crisis was at its height the Belgian delegation, which had long been restive over the non-settlement of Belgian claims for reparations, became insistent. They had no place in the Supreme Council and they were worried lest the French and British--neither of whom could begin to get enough money out of Germany to pay for its losses--would take the lion"s share and leave Belgium unrestored. The little nations were always worried at Paris lest the big ones take everything and leave them nothing! Very little appeared in the news at the time concerning the Belgian demands, but they reached practically an ultimatum: if Belgium were not satisfied she also would withdraw from the Conference and refuse to sign the Treaty.
It was at this critical moment that the Chinese-j.a.panese question had to be settled. It had to be settled because the disposition of German rights in China (unlike Italian claims in the Adriatic) had to go into the German Treaty before it was presented to Brockdorff Rantzau and his delegates at Versailles; and because the j.a.panese would not sign the Treaty unless it was settled. The defection of j.a.pan, added to that of Italy and the possible withdrawal of Belgium, would have made the situation desperate.
The two princ.i.p.al things that j.a.pan wanted at the Peace Conference were: first, a recognition in the Covenant of the League of Nations of the "equality of the nations and the just treatment of their nationals"; and, second, the recognition of certain rights over the former German concessions in China (Shantung.)
After a struggle lasting all through the Conference, j.a.pan had finally lost out, in the meeting of the League of Nations Commission on April 11th, in her first great contention. She was refused the recognition of racial or even national equality which she demanded although a majority of the nations represented on the League of Nations Commission agreed with her that her desire for such recognition was just and should find a place in the Covenant....
Few people realize how sharply the j.a.panese felt this hurt to their pride: and few people realize the meaning of this struggle, as a forerunner of one of the great coming struggles of civilization--the race struggle....
Having lost out in their first great contention the j.a.panese came to the settlement of their second demand with a feeling of irritation but with added determination. The j.a.panese delegates were the least expressive of any at the Conference: they said the least: but they were the firmest of any in hewing to the line of their interests and their agreements. It must not be forgotten also, in all fairness, that the j.a.panese delegates, not less than the British, French, and American, had their own domestic political problems, and opposition, and that there was a powerful demand in j.a.pan that, while all the other nations were securing some return for their losses and sacrifices in the war, j.a.pan should also get some return.
At the same time j.a.pan was in a stronger position than any other of the Allied and a.s.sociated Powers except the United States. She had been little hurt, and much strengthened by the war. She was far distant from danger; she did not need the League of Nations as much as did the countries of Europe; and, more than anything else, she occupied a strong legal status, for her claims were supported by treaties both with China and the Allies; and she was, moreover, in a position, if she were rendered desperate, to take by force what she considered to be her rights if the Allies refused to accord them.
At a dark moment of the war, the spring of 1917, the British and French, in order to sharpen j.a.panese support of the allied cause, made private agreements to sustain the claims of j.a.pan at the Peace Conference to German rights in Shantung. It thus happened, in the Council of Three, for Orlando had then gone home, that two of the powers, Great Britain and France, were bound by their pledged word to j.a.pan. Indeed, the British argued that they felt themselves indebted to the j.a.panese not only as a long-friendly ally but for helping to keep the Pacific free of the enemy while Australian troops were being transported to Europe and thus relieving a great burden for the British fleet. It must not be forgotten that China was also bound by the Treaty and Notes of 1915 and the Notes of 1918 with j.a.pan-- although China vigorously a.s.serted that all of these agreements were entered into upon her part under coercion by j.a.pan. In fact, one of the Chinese delegates at Paris had actually signed one of the agreements which he was now asking the Conference to overthrow.
It was not only this wire entanglement of treaties which Mr. Wilson found in his advance, but it must be said, in all frankness, that, in opposing j.a.pan"s demands for economic privileges and a "sphere of influence" in China, he was also opposing a principle which every other strong nation at the Conference believed in and acted upon, if not in China, then elsewhere in the world. j.a.pan a.s.serted that she was only asking for the rights already conceded to other nations. j.a.pan was thus in a very strong position in insisting upon her claims, and China in a very weak position.
In this crisis Mr. Wilson was face to face with difficult alternatives. If he stood stiffly for immediate justice to China, he would have to force Great Britain and France to break their pledged word with j.a.pan. Even if he succeeded in doing this, he still would have had to face the probability, practically the certainty, that j.a.pan would withdraw from the Conference and go home. This would not only keep j.a.pan out of the League, but it would go far toward eventually disrupting the Peace Conference, already shaken by the withdrawal of Italy and the dangerous defection of Belgium. Such a weakening of the Peace Conference and of the Alliance of the Great Powers would have the immediate effect of encouraging the Germans not to sign the Treaty and of holding off in the hope that the forces of industrial unrest then spreading all over Europe might overwhelm France or Italy. It would also have a highly irritating effect upon all the bolshevist elements in Europe--increasing uncertainty, and the spread of anarchical conditions. With j.a.pan out of the a.s.sociation of western nations there was also the possibility, voiced just at this time in both French and British newspapers, that she would begin building up alliances of her own in the East--possibly with Germany and Russia. Indeed, if the truth were told, this was probably the most important consideration of all in shaping the final decision. It was the plain issue between the recrudescence, in a new and more dangerous form, of the old system of military alliances and balances of power, and the new system of world organization in a league of nations. It was the militaristic Prussian idea against the American Wilsonian idea.
No statesman probably ever had a more difficult problem presented to him than did Mr. Wilson upon the momentous 29th of April, 1919. At that moment three things seemed of extreme importance if anything was to be saved out of the wreckage of the world. The first was a speedy peace, so that men everywhere might return to the work of production and reconstruction and the avenues of trade everywhere be opened.
Peace and work! The second was of supreme importance--keeping the great Allies firmly welded together to steady a world which was threatened with anarchy. It was absolutely necessary to keep a going concern in the world! The third was to perpetuate this world organization in a league of nations: this the most important of all, for it had reference to the avalanche of new problems which were just ahead.
If the Conference were broken up, or even if Italy remained out, and j.a.pan went out, these things would be impossible. On the other hand, if the Allies could be kept firmly together, peace established, and a league of nations brought into being, there was a chance of going forward with world reconstruction on the broadest lines, and of the full realization of the principles of justice laid down in the Armistice terms and accepted by all nations. The Treaty, after all, is no final settlement; it is only one step in the great process of world reconstruction.
It was with all these considerations in view that the Shantung settlement was made by the Council of Three sitting in the President"s house in the Place des etats-Unis--with the j.a.panese in full agreement.
This settlement was in two parts, the first set forth in the Treaty itself, and the second a special agreement of the three Great Powers with j.a.pan. I find that this fact is not clear to many people, who look for the entire settlement in the Treaty itself.
Under sections 156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty all the rights at Kiauchow and in Shantung Province formerly belonging to Germany are transferred without reservation to j.a.pan. This conforms broadly with the various treaties, and gives a proud nation what it considered its full rights.
On the other hand, the j.a.panese delegates at the Conference, on behalf of their government, made a voluntary agreement "to hand back the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao."
Under this agreement, by which j.a.pan makes an unqualified recession of the sovereign rights in Shantung to China, she also agrees to remove all j.a.panese troops remaining on the peninsula "at the earliest possible time."
j.a.pan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are already possessed by one or two great powers and the whole future relationship between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations, by the provisions of which the territorial integrity and political independence of China will be insured.
If the President had risked everything in standing for the immediate and complete realization of the Chinese demands, and had broken up the Conference upon that issue, it would not have put j.a.pan either politically or economically out of China. Neither our people nor the British would go to war with j.a.pan solely to keep her out of Shantung.
The only hope of China in the future--and Wilson looks not only to the removal of the sphere of influence which j.a.pan controls but to the removal of all other spheres of foreign influence in China--is through a firm world organization, a league of nations in which these problems can be brought up for peaceful settlement.... "The settlement, of course, was a compromise: a balance of considerations.
It was the problem of the President, all through the Conference, when to "accommodate" and when to use decided policies. "The wisdom of the statesman," said Cavour (quoted by Thayer in his admirable "Life"), "consists in discerning when the time has come for the one or the other.""
"The Shantung decision is about as good a settlement as could be had out of a dirty past."
Even I felt bitterly critical of what seemed to me to be the President"s surrender to j.a.pan in the matter of Shantung. But when he returned and told me the whole story and explained the complicated and delicate world situation which confronted him, I agreed with him that he had obtained out of a bad mess the best possible settlement.
In addition to the various cabled messages which pa.s.sed between the President and myself, which will be found in Appendix "C," was the following:
Received at The White House, Washington, April 30, 1919.
Paris TUMULTY, White House, Washington.
The j.a.panese-Chinese matter has been settled in a way which seems to me as satisfactory as could be got out of the tangle of treaties in which China herself was involved, and it is important that the exact facts should be known. I therefore send you the following for public use at such time as the matter may come under public discussion. In the Treaty all the rights at Kiao-Chau and in Shantung Province belonging to Germany are to be transferred without opposition to j.a.pan, but j.a.pan voluntarily engages, in answer to the questions put in Conference, that it will be her immediate policy to _Quote_ hand back the surveyed peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtau. Owners of the railway will use special police only to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose. The police force will be composed of Chinese and such j.a.panese instructors as the directors of the railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese government _End quote_.
It was understood in addition that inasmuch as the sovereign rights receded to China were to be unqualified, all j.a.panese troops remaining on the peninsula should be withdrawn at the earliest possible time.
j.a.pan thus gets only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are possessed by one or two other great powers and are only too common in China, and the future relationship between the two countries falls at once under the guarantee of the League of Nations of territorial integrity and political independence. I find a general disposition to look with favour upon the proposal that at an early date throughout the mediation of the League of Nations all extraordinary foreign rights in China and all spheres of influence should be abrogated by the common consent of all the nations concerned. I regard the a.s.surances given by j.a.pan as very satisfactory in view of the complicated circ.u.mstances. Please do not give out any of the above as a quotation from me, but use it in some other form for public information at the right time.
WOODROW WILSON.
CHAPTER x.x.xIX
IRELAND
To one standing on the side-lines in the capital of the nation and witnessing the play of the ardent pa.s.sions of the people of the Irish race, demanding that some affirmative action be taken by our government to bring about the realization of the right of self-determination for Ireland, it seemed as if the American President, Woodrow Wilson, who first gave utterance to the ideal of self-determination for all the oppressed peoples of the world, was woefully unmindful of the age-long struggle that Irishmen had been making to free their own beloved land from British domination. But to those, like myself, who were on the inside of affairs, it was evident that in every proper and legitimate way the American President was cautiously searching for efficient means to advance the cause of self-government in Ireland and to bring about a definite and satisfactory solution of this complicated problem.
Embarra.s.sed as he was by a delicate diplomatic situation, which to a great extent governed his conduct, he was not free openly to espouse the cause of Ireland. To have done so would have been to add difficulties to an already chaotic world situation. He was compelled in what he was seeking to do for Ireland to move quietly and by informal conferences impressively to lay the case of Ireland before those who sought his counsel in the matter. Unfortunately, these quiet methods of helpfulness which he brought to the task were the things that drew the fire of criticism and even distrust of many men of the Irish race in America, who in their pa.s.sionate devotion to the cause which lay so close to their hearts could see only a direct route to accomplishing what they had in mind.
Long before the European war the President and I had often discussed the Irish cause and how to make his influence felt in a way that would bring results without becoming involved in diplomatic snarls with Great Britain.
He was of the opinion that the Irish problem could not be settled by force, for the spirit of Ireland, which for centuries had been demanding justice, was unconquerable. He pointed out to me on many occasions when we discussed this delicate matter, that the policy of force and reprisal which the English Government had for centuries practised in had but strengthened the tenacious purpose of the Irish people and had only succeeded in keeping under the surface the seething dissatisfaction of that indomitable race.
I recall that at the conclusion of one of our talks after a Cabinet meeting, shaking his head as if he despaired of a settlement, the President said: "European statesmen can never learn that humanity can be welded together only by love, by sympathy, and by justice, and not by jealousy and hatred." He was certain that the failure of England to find an adjustment was intensifying feeling not only in our own country, but throughout the world, and that the agitation for a settlement would spread like a contagion and would inevitably result in a great national crisis.
An interesting comment on the President"s att.i.tude toward the Irish question appears in an article in the _Atlantic Monthly_ for October, 1921. The article is by Joseph Fort Newton, in his series, "Preaching in London." The comment is as follows:
To-day a distinguished London minister told me a story about the President, for which he vouches. He had it from the late Sylvester Horne--Member of Parliament and minister of Whitefield"s Chapel--who had known the President for years before he was elevated to his high office. Home happened to be in America--where he was always a welcome guest--before the war, shortly after the President was inaugurated, and he called at the White House to pay his respects. In the course of the talk, he expressed satisfaction that the relations between England and America would be in safe hands while the President was in office.
The President said nothing, and Horne wondered at it. Finally he forced the issue, putting it as a question point-blank. The President said, addressing him in the familiar language of religious fellowship: "Brother Horne, one of the greatest calamities that has befallen mankind will come during my term of office. It will come from Germany.
Go home and settle the Irish question, and there will be no doubt as to where America will stand."
In discussing the matter with me, he said: "The whole policy of Great Britain in its treatment of the Irish question has unfortunately been based upon a policy of fear and not a policy of trusting the Irish people.
How magnificently the policy of trust and faith worked out in the case of the Boers. Unfortunately, the people of Ireland now believe that the basis of England"s policy toward them is revenge, malice, and destruction. You remember, Tumulty, how the haters of the South in the days of reconstruction sought to poison Lincoln"s mind by instilling into it everything that might lead him in his treatment of the South toward a policy of reprisal, but he contemptuously turned away from every suggestion as a base and ign.o.ble thing. Faith on the part of Great Britain in the deep humanity and inherent generosity of the Irish people is the only force that will ever lead to a settlement of this question. English statesmen must realize that in the last a.n.a.lysis force never permanently settles anything. It only produces hatreds and resentments that make a solution of any question difficult and almost impossible. I have tried to impress upon the Englishmen with whom I have discussed this matter that there never can be a real comradeship between America and England until this issue is definitely settled and out of the way."
Many times in informal discussions with British representatives that came to the White House the President sought to impress upon them the necessity for a solution, pointing out to them how their failure was embarra.s.sing our relations with Great Britain at every point. I am sure that if he could with propriety have done so, Woodrow Wilson would long ago have directly suggested to Great Britain a settlement of the Irish question, but, unfortunately, serious diplomatic obstacles lay in the way of an open espousal of the Irish cause. He was sadly aware that under international law no nation has the right to interest itself in anything that directly concerns the affairs of another friendly nation, for by the traditions of diplomacy such "interference" puts in jeopardy the cordial relations of the nations involved in such controversy.
Long before he became president, Woodrow Wilson had eloquently declared his att.i.tude with reference to self-government for Ireland and had openly espoused the cause of Irish freedom. In a speech delivered at New Brunswick, New Jersey, on October 26, 1910, he said:
Have you read the papers recently attentively enough to notice the rumours that are coming across the waters? What are the rumours? The rumours are that the English programme includes, not only self- government for Ireland, but self government for Scotland, and the drawing together in London or somewhere else of a parliament which will represent the British Empire in a great confederated state upon the model, no doubt, of the United States of America, and having its power to the end of the world. What is at the bottom of that programme? At the bottom of it is the idea that no little group of men like the English people have the right to govern men in all parts of the world without drawing them into real substantial partnership, where their voice will count with equal weight with the voice of other parts of the country.