THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).
PLATO.
We have seen that the advent of Socrates marks a new era in the history of speculative thought. Greek philosophy, which at first was a philosophy of nature, now changes its direction, its character, and its method, and becomes a philosophy of mind. This, of course, does not mean that now it had mind alone for its object; on the contrary, it tended, as indeed philosophy must always tend, to the conception of a rational ideal or _intellectual system of the universe_. It started from the phenomena of mind, began with the study of human thought, and it made the knowledge of mind, of its ideas and laws, the basis of a higher philosophy, which should interpret all nature. In other words, it proceeded from psychology, through dialectics, to ontology.[487]
[Footnote 487: Cousin"s "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i.
p. 413.]
This new movement we have designated in general terms as the _Socratic School_. Not that we are to suppose that, in any technical sense, Socrates founded _a_ school. The Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, and the Garden, were each the chosen resort of distinct philosophic sects, the locality of separate schools; but Athens itself, the whole city, was the scene of the studies, the conversations, and the labors of Socrates. He wandered through the streets absorbed in thought. Sometimes he stood still for hours lost in profoundest meditation; at other times he might be seen in the market-place, surrounded by a crowd of Athenians, eagerly discussing the great questions of the day.
Socrates, then, was not, in the usual sense of the word, a teacher. He is not to be found in the Stoa or the Grove, with official aspect, expounding a system of doctrine. He is "the garrulous oddity" of the streets, putting the most searching and perplexing questions to every bystander, and making every man conscious of his ignorance. He delivered no lectures; he simply talked. He wrote no books; he only argued: and what is usually styled his school must be understood as embracing those who attended him in public as listeners and admirers, and who caught his spirit, adopted his philosophic _method_, and, in after life, elaborated and systematized the ideas they had gathered from him.
Among the regular or the occasional hearers of Socrates were many who were little addicted to philosophic speculation. Some were warriors, as Nicias and Laches; some statesmen, as Critias and Critobulus; some were politicians, in the worst sense of that word, as Glaucon; and some were young men of fashion, as Euthydemus and Alcibiades. These were all alike delighted with his inimitable irony, his versatility of genius, his charming modes of conversation, his adroitness of reply; and they were compelled to confess the wisdom and justness of his opinions, and to admire the purity and goodness of his life. The magic power which he wielded, even over men of dissolute character, is strikingly depicted by Alcibiades in his speech at "the Banquet."[488] Of these listeners, however, we can not now speak. Our business is with those only who imbibed his philosophic spirit, and became the future teachers of philosophy. And even of those who, as Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes the Cynic, and Aristippus of Cyrenaica, borrowed somewhat from the dialectic of Socrates, we shall say nothing. They left no lasting impression upon the current of philosophic thought, because their systems were too partial, and narrow, and fragmentary. It is in Plato and Aristotle that the true development of the Socratic philosophy is to be sought, and in Plato chiefly, as the disciple and friend of Socrates.
[Footnote 488: "Banquet," ---- 39, 40.]
Plato (B.C. 430-347) was pre-eminently the pupil of Socrates. He came to Socrates when he was but twenty years of age, and remained with him to the day of his death.
Diogenes Laertius reports the story of Socrates having dreamed he found an unfledged cygnet on his knee. In a few moments it became winged and flew away, uttering a sweet sound. The next day a young man came to him who was said to reckon Solon among his near ancestors, and who looked, through him, to Codrus and the G.o.d Poseidon. That young man was Plato, and Socrates p.r.o.nounced him to be the bird he had seen in his dream.[489]
[Footnote 489: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. iii.
ch. vii.]
Some have supposed that this old tradition intimates that Plato departed from the method of his master--he became fledged and flew away into the air. But we know that Plato did not desert his master whilst he was living, and there is no evidence that he abandoned his method after he was dead. He was the best expounder and the most rigid observer of the Socratic "organon." The influence of Socrates upon the philosophy of Plato is everywhere discernible. Plato had been taught by Socrates, that beyond the world of sense there is a world of eternal truth, seen by the eye of reason alone. He had also learned from him that the eye of reason is purified and strengthened by _reflection_, and that to reflect is to observe, and a.n.a.lyze, and define, and cla.s.sify the facts of consciousness. Self-reflection, then, he had been taught to regard as the key of real knowledge. By a completer induction, a more careful and exact a.n.a.lysis, and a more accurate definition, he carried this philosophic method forward towards maturity. He sought to solve the problem of _being_ by the principles revealed in his own consciousness, and in the _ultimate ideas of the reason_ to find the foundation of all real knowledge, of all truth, and of all cert.i.tude.
Plato was admirably fitted for these sublime investigations by the possession of those moral qualities which were so prominent in the character of his master. He had that same deep seriousness of spirit, that earnestness and rect.i.tude of purpose, that longing after truth, that inward sympathy with, and reverence for justice, and purity, and goodness, which dwelt in the heart of Socrates, and which constrained him to believe in their reality and permanence. He could not endure the thought that all ideas of right were arbitrary and fact.i.tious, that all knowledge was unreal, that truth was a delusion, and certainty a dream.
The world of sense might be fleeting and delusive, but the voice of reason and conscience would not mislead the upright man. The opinions of individual men might vary, but the universal consciousness of the race could not prevaricate. However conflicting the opinions of men concerning beautiful things, right actions, and good sentiments, Plato was persuaded there are ideas of Order, and Right, and Good, which are universal, unchangeable, and eternal. Untruth, injustice, and wrong may endure for a day or two, perhaps for a century or two, but they can not always last; they must perish. The _just_ thing and the _true_ thing are the only enduring things; these are eternal. Plato had a sublime conviction that his mission was to draw the Athenian mind away from the fleeting, the transitory, and the uncertain, and lead them to the contemplation of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Justice, an Eternal Beauty, all proceeding from and united in an Eternal Being--the ultimate ??a???--_the Supremely Good_. The knowledge of this "Supreme Good" he regarded as the highest science.[490]
[Footnote 490: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xvi. p. 193.]
Added to these moral qualifications, Plato had the further qualification of a comprehensive knowledge of all that had been achieved by his predecessors. In this regard he had enjoyed advantages superior to those of Socrates. Socrates was deficient in erudition, properly so called. He had studied men rather than books. His wisdom consisted in an extensive _observation_, the results of which he had generalized with more or less accuracy. A complete philosophic method demands not only a knowledge of contemporaneous opinions and modes of thought, but also a knowledge of the succession and development of thought in past ages. Its instrument is not simply psychological a.n.a.lysis, but also historical a.n.a.lysis as a counterproof.[491] And this erudition Plato supplied. He studied carefully the doctrines of the Ionian, Italian, and Eleatic schools.
Cratylus gave him special instruction in the theories of Herac.l.i.tus.[492] He secured an intimate acquaintance with the lofty speculations of Pythagoras, under Archytas of Tarentum, and in the writings of Philolaus, whose books he is said to have purchased. He studied the principles of Parmenides under Hermogenes,[493] and he more than once speaks of Parmenides in terms of admiration, as one whom he had early learned to reverence.[494] He studied mathematics under Theodoras, the most eminent geometrician of his day. He travelled in Southern Italy, in Sicily, and, in search of a deeper wisdom, he pursued his course to Egypt.[495] Enriched by the fruits of all previous speculations, he returned to Athens, and devoted the remainder of his life to the development of a comprehensive system "which was to combine, to conciliate, and to supersede them all."[496] The knowledge he had derived from travel, from books, from oral instruction, he fused and blended with his own speculations, whilst the Socratic spirit mellowed the whole, and gave to it a unity and scientific completeness which has excited the admiration and wonder of succeeding ages.[497]
[Footnote 491: Cousin"s "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i.
p. 31.]
[Footnote 492: Aristotle"s "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 493: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. iii.
ch. viii. p. 115.]
[Footnote 494: See especially "Theaetetus," -- 101.]
[Footnote 495: Ritter"s "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p.
147.]
[Footnote 496: Butler"s "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p.
22.]
[Footnote 497: Encyclopaedia Britannica, article "Plato."]
The question as to _the nature, the sources, and the validity of human knowledge_ had attracted general attention previous to the time of Socrates and Plato. As the results of this protracted controversy, the opinions of philosophers had finally crystallized in two well-defined and opposite theories of knowledge.
1. That which reduced all knowledge to the accidental and pa.s.sively receptive quality of the organs of sense and which a.s.serted, as its fundamental maxim, that "_Science consists in_ a?s??s??--_sensation_."[498]
This doctrine had its foundation in the physical philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus. He had taught that all things are in a perpetual flux and change. "Motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation."
"Nothing _is_, but is always a _becoming"_[499] Material substances are perpetually losing their ident.i.ty, and there is no permanent essence or being to be found. Hence Protagoras inferred that truth must vary with the ever-varying sensations of the individual. "Man (the individual) is the measure of all things." Knowledge is a purely relative thing, and every man"s opinion is truth for him.[500] The law of right, as exemplified in the dominion of a party, is the law of the strongest; fluctuating with the accidents of power, and never attaining a permanent being. "Whatever a city enacts as appearing just to itself, this also is just to the city that enacts it, so long as it continues in force."[501]
"The just, then, is nothing else but that which is expedient for the strongest."[502]
[Footnote 498: "Theaetetus," -- 23.]
[Footnote 499: Ibid., ---- 25, 26.]
[Footnote 500: Ibid., ---- 39, 87.]
[Footnote 501: Ibid., -- 87.]
[Footnote 502: "Republic," bk. i. ch. xii.]
2. The second theory is that which denies the existence (except as phantasms, images, or mere illusions of the mind) of the whole of sensible phenomena, and refers all knowledge to the _rational apperception of unity_ (t? ??) _or the One_.
This was the doctrine of the later Eleatics. The world of sense was, to Parmenides and Zeno, a blank negation, the _non ens_. The ident.i.ty of thought and existence was the fundamental principle of their philosophy.
"Thought is the same thing as the cause of thought; For without the thing in which it is announced, You can not find the thought; for there is nothing, nor shall be, Except the existing."[503]
[Footnote 503: Parmenides, quoted in Lewes"s "Biog. History of Philosophy," p. 54.]
This theory, therefore, denied to man any valid knowledge of the external world.
It will at once be apparent to the intelligent reader that the direct and natural result of both these theories[504] of knowledge was a tendency to universal skepticism. A spirit of utter indifference to truth and righteousness was the prevailing spirit of Athenian society.
That spirit is strikingly exhibited in the speech of Callicles, "the shrewd man of the world," in "Gorgias" (--85, 86). Is this new to our ears?" My dear Socrates, you talk of _law_. Now the laws, in my judgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous; in framing them they never thought but of themselves and their own interests; they never approve or censure except in reference to _this._ Hence it is that the cant arises that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for eminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish to preach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the stronger.... We surround our children from their infancy with preposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense tramples on such impositions, and shows what Nature"s justice is.... I confess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study--in moderation, and for boys. But protracted too long, it becomes a perfect plague. Your philosopher is a complete novice in the life _comme il faut_.... I like very well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace about it when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of the child, is absurd. Just so with your philosophy." The consequence of this prevalent spirit of universal skepticism was a general laxity of morals.
The Aleibiades, of the "_Symposium_," is the ideal representative of the young aristocracy of Athens. Such was the condition of society generally, and such the degeneracy of even the Government itself, that Plato impressively declares "that G.o.d alone could save the young men of his age from ruin."[505]
[Footnote 504: Between these two extreme theories there were offered two, apparently less extravagant, accounts of the nature and limits of human knowledge--one declaring that "_Science_(real knowledge) _consists in right opinion_" (d??a ??????), but having no further basis in the reason of man ("Theaestetus," -- 108); and the other affirming that "_Science is right opinion with logical explication or definition_"
(et? ?????), ("Theaetetus," -- 139). A close examination will, however, convince us that these are but modifications of the sensational theory.
The latter forcibly remind us of the system of Locke, who adds "reflection" to "sensation," but still maintains that all on "simple ideas" are obtained from without, and that these are the only material upon which reflection can be exercised. Thus the human mind has no criterion of truth within itself, no elements of knowledge which are connatural and inborn.]
[Footnote 505: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. vii.]
Therefore the grand, the vital, the most urgent question for his times, as indeed for all times, was, _What is Truth? What is Right_? In the midst of all this variableness and uncertainty of human opinion, is there no ground of certainty? Amid all the fluctuations and changes around us and within us, is there nothing that is immutable and permanent? Have we no ultimate standard of Right? Is there no criterion of Truth? Plato believed most confidently there was such a criterion and standard. He had learned from Socrates, his master, to cherish an unwavering faith in the existence of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Order, an Eternal Good, the knowledge of which is essential to the perfection and happiness of man, and which knowledge must therefore be presumed to be attainable by man. Henceforth, therefore, the ceaseless effort of Plato"s life is to attain a standard (???t?????)[506]--a CRITERION OF TRUTH.
[Footnote 506: "Theaetetus," -- 89.]
At the outset of his philosophic studies, Plato had derived from Socrates an important principle, which became the guide of all his subsequent inquiries. He had learned from him that the criterion of truth must be no longer sought amid the ever-changing phenomena of the "sensible world." This had been attempted by the philosophers of the Ionian school, and ended in failure and defeat. It must therefore be sought in the metaphenomenal--the "intelligible world;" that is, it must be sought in the apperceptions of the reason, and not in opinions founded on sensation. In other words, he must look _within_. Here, by reflection, he could recognize, dimly and imperfectly at first, but increasing gradually in clearness and distinctness, two cla.s.ses of cognitions, having essentially distinct and opposite characteristics. He found one cla.s.s that was complex (s???e??????), changeable (??te???), contingent and relative (t? p??? t? s??s?? ????ta); the other, simple (?e????s????), unchangeable (?????t??), constant (ta?t??), permanent (t? ?? ?e?), and absolute (???p??et?? = ?p????). One cla.s.s that may be questioned, the other admitting of no question, because self-evident and necessary, and therefore compelling belief. One cla.s.s grounded on sense-perception, the other conceived by reason alone. But whilst the reason recognizes, it does not create them. They are not particular and individual, but universal. They belong not to the man, but to the race.
He found, then, that there are in all minds certain "principles" which are fundamental--principles which lie at the basis of all our cognitions of the objective world, and which, as "mental laws," determine all our forms of thought; and principles, too, which have this marvellous and undeniable character, that they are encountered in the most common experiences, and, at the same time, instead of being circ.u.mscribed within the limits of experience, transcend and govern it--principles which are _universal_ in the midst of particular phenomena--_necessary,_ though mingled with things contingent--to our eyes _infinite_ and _absolute_, even when appearing in us the relative and finite beings that we are.[507] These first or fundamental principles Plato called IDEAS (?d?a?).