With a view to having my divisions thoroughly efficient and mobile for the service they were expected to perform, I had largely replenished the numbers of my transport animals, which had suffered greatly from the strain put upon them in supplying the troops with food and other necessaries during the winter months; they had been continuously at work in the most inclement weather, numbers had died, and those that remained required to be carefully looked after and given complete rest to render them fit for the contemplated operations. Major Mark Heathcote, who had taken, at my particular request, the arduous charge of this department, wished to revert to regimental duty, so I applied for, and obtained, the services of Lieutenant Colonel B. Low[4]
as Director of Transport, under whose energetic and intelligent management the transport service was rendered as perfect as it was possible to make it. In the end, circ.u.mstances prevented the concerted movements for which these preparations were made being carried out, but I reaped the benefit of them when later in the year I was required to undertake a rapid march to Kandahar, which could not possibly have been successfully accomplished had my transport not been in such admirable condition.
In order to relieve the great pressure put upon the Commissariat Department by having to provide for the increased number of troops at Kabul, and with a view to opening up the roads upon which traffic had been more or less impeded for some months, it was considered desirable to send a strong brigade towards Maidan, which I accompanied, and remained away from Kabul for some weeks. On my return, I found a considerable change had taken place in the political situation. The Mustaufi had been deported to India; the correspondence between Abdur Rahman and Mr. Griffin had taken rather an unsatisfactory turn, and the Sirdar"s dealings with the leading Chiefs and tribesmen had given cause to fear that, if he came to Kabul during our occupation, it might be as an enemy rather than a friend.
The Mustaufi was a firm adherent of the Sher Ali faction, and, finding there was no hope of Yakub Khan being reinstated, and that we were negotiating with Abdur Rahman, he had espoused the cause of Yakub"s younger brother, Ayub Khan, and had been proved guilty of inciting the Sirdars and Chiefs to oppose us. For this he was very properly sent out of Afghanistan; nevertheless, I looked upon his removal as a misfortune, for it broke up the only party that could possibly be formed to counterbalance Abdur Rahman, who was astute enough to see that the weaker our position became, the more chance there was of his being able to get his own terms from us.
From the letters he had written to his friends and relations in northern Afghanistan (the majority of which had fallen into our hands), it was evident that he was doing all he could to strengthen himself, even at our expense, and that he greatly disliked the idea of Kandahar being separated from the kingdom of Kabul. Indeed, in one of his communications to Mr. Griffin he had made it clear that he expected the whole inheritance of his grandfather, Dost Mahomed Khan, to be made over to him.
The uncertainty as to the result of the correspondence with Abdur Rahman, the rumours in circulation regarding his real disposition and plans, and the general excitement throughout the country, suggested such grave doubts of the Sirdar"s good faith that, in some quarters, the question was seriously discussed whether it might not be necessary to break off negotiations with him, and reinstate Yakub Khan, or else set up his brother, Ayub Khan, as Amir.
I myself was altogether opposed to Yakub Khan"s restoration, and as to Ayub Khan, we were in total ignorance of his character and proclivities, even if he had been near enough to treat with. It appeared to me, moreover, that we had gone too far with Abdur Rahman to throw him over because, in conformity with Afghan character and tradition, he was not running quite straight. I, therefore, gave it as my opinion that we should not change our tactics unless it was found impossible to come to terms with him, or unless it was made evident on his nearer approach to Kabul that the majority of his countrymen were averse to have him as their Ruler.
Soon after this the situation began to improve, and early in July Mr. Griffin was able to inform the Government of India that "the probabilities of a settlement with Abdur Rahman appear far more favourable than they did last week...." "Abdur Rahman has seen that we have been fully informed of the game he has been playing, that trickery and treachery would not be tolerated, and that, if he intends coming to a settlement with us at all, he must be prepared to accept our terms rather than dictate his own."
A few days later a letter was received from Abdur Rahman, announcing his arrival in Kohistan. His near approach, and the report that he was willing to accept our terms, excited a keen and hopeful interest throughout the country, for the Afghans had at length become convinced that the only chance of getting rid of us was by agreeing to any form of settled government we might establish, and they had grown heartily tired of perpetual fighting and of having to maintain bands of _ghazis_ to oppose us, who were eating them out of house and home.
With the exception of the Sher Ali faction, therefore, whose interests were directly opposed to his, Abdur Rahman"s advent was welcomed by the people, and several of the most influential amongst them went to meet him.
Towards the end of July Sir Donald Stewart was empowered to conclude all political and military arrangements preparatory to withdrawing from northern Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman was to be recognized as "Amir of Kabul"; he was to be provided with a sufficient number of guns to strengthen effectively his occupation of the city, and he was to be given as much money (within a maximum of ten lakhs) as was thought necessary to meet his present wants. It was to be clearly explained to Abdur Rahman that the Government of India would not engage to give him a regular subsidy, or a continuous supply of arms or money, and that after he had taken possession of his capital he would have to rely upon his own resources for holding it. There was to be no treaty, and all questions of reciprocal engagements between the two Governments were to be postponed until some settled and responsible administration had been consolidated.
General Stewart was directed to make the best arrangements he could with Abdur Rahman for the protection of the tribes and individuals who had a.s.sisted us, and the Sirdar was to be informed that, if he desired our goodwill, he could give no better proof of his friendly disposition than by his behaviour towards those of his own nation in whom the British Government were interested.
Sir Donald Stewart considered that the best way of giving effect to these instructions was to publicly proclaim Abdur Rahman as Amir of Kabul; for this purpose he held a durbar on the 22nd July, at which the Sirdar"s representatives were received. Sir Donald, in a few words, gave his reasons for summoning them to meet him, and Mr.
Griffin then explained more fully the motives by which the Government of India were actuated in acknowledging the claims of Abdur Rahman.
Immediately after the durbar orders were issued for an early retirement.
I was to withdraw my column by the Kuram route; but being anxious to see something of the Khyber line while I had the opportunity, I started off the following day to ride through the Jagdalak Pa.s.s to Gandamak, where I was entertained by General Bright and his staff.
The next day I went on to Jalalabad, and was greatly interested in wandering over the place where Sir Robert Sale in some measure redeemed the lamentable failures of the first Afghan war.
My intention, when I left Kabul, was to ride as far as the Khyber Pa.s.s, but suddenly a presentiment, which I have never been able to explain to myself, made me retrace my steps and hurry back towards Kabul--a presentiment of coming trouble which I can only characterize as instinctive.
The feeling was justified when, about half-way between Butkhak and Kabul, I was met by Sir Donald Stewart and my Chief of the Staff,[5]
who brought me the astounding news of the total defeat by Ayub Khan of Brigadier-General Burrows"s brigade at Maiwand, and of Lieutenant-General Primrose,[6] with the remainder of his force, being besieged at Kandahar.
[Footnote 1: Sir Donald Stewart"s division was replaced at Kandahar by troops from Bombay.]
[Footnote 2: The part of the report which deals with economic details is given in the Appendix (see Appendix X.); the military portion is omitted, as it was only intended for Sir Donald Stewart"s information at the time.]
[Footnote 3: Of these, more than 3,000 were doolie-bearers, and nearly 8,000 were _saices_ of Native Cavalry regiments, and men belonging to the Transport and other Departments.]
[Footnote 4: Now Major-General Sir Robert Low, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 5: Colonel Macgregor and Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman had changed places, the former joining Sir Donald Stewart as Chief of the Staff, and the latter taking up the same position with me.]
[Footnote 6: Lieutenant-General Primrose succeeded Sir Donald Stewart in command of the troops at Kandahar.]
CHAPTER LX.
1880
Affairs at Kandahar--The Maiwand disaster --Relief from Kabul suggested--A force ordered from Kabul --Preparations for the march--The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force --Commissariat and Transport
For more than six months rumours had been afloat of Ayub Khan"s determination to advance on Kandahar; but little attention was paid to them by the authorities at that place until towards the end of May, when a Sirdar, named Sher Ali,[1] who had been a few days before formally installed as Wali, or Ruler, of Kandahar, informed the political officer, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, that the British occupation of Kabul had had the effect of bringing about a reconciliation between the various chiefs at Herat, who had placed themselves under the leadership of Ayub Khan and induced him to proclaim a _jahad_. Sher Ali, who evidently considered this news authentic, declared his belief that his own troops,[2] who were then engaged in collecting revenue in Zamindawar, would desert to Ayub Khan as he approached Kandahar, and he begged that a brigade of British soldiers might be sent to Girishk to support him.
On General Primrose communicating this information to the Commander-in-Chief in India, he recommended to the Government that the Bombay reserve division, located at Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and Karachi, should be mobilized so soon as it became certain that Ayub Khan really contemplated this move, as in his opinion the garrison at Kandahar would be left dangerously weak after a brigade had been detached for Girishk.
Ayub Khan"s movements, however, were not ascertained until the 27th June, when he had advanced halfway to the Helmand; it was too late then to mobilize troops so far off as Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and Karachi with any chance of their being in time to check his onward march. The news of his approach spread rapidly, and had the most disturbing effect in Kandahar and its neighbourhood. The Governor"s authority daily diminished, and many of the inhabitants left the city.
Ayub Khan had with him, when he started from Herat on the 15th June, 7,500 men and ten guns as the nucleus of an army, which he calculated, as he moved forward, would be strongly reinforced by tribesmen, levies, and _ghazis_.
On the 4th July a brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, started from Kandahar, and reached the Helmand on the 11th, encamping on the near bank of the river opposite Girishk. On the further bank Sirdar Sher Ali"s troops were located, having with them six guns. Two days afterwards these troops deserted in a body to the enemy, but did not succeed in taking their Artillery with them, as Burrows, on perceiving their intention, crossed the river and captured the guns.
Brigadier-General Burrows"s position had now entirely changed; instead of there being a loyal force under the Wali, with which to co-operate and prevent Ayub Khan crossing the Helmand, he found himself with an inadequate number of troops, the Wali"s men gone over to the enemy, and the Wali himself a fugitive in the British camp. The Helmand was fordable everywhere at that season, making it easy for Ayub to cut off Burrows"s retreat; the first twenty-five of the eighty miles by which he was separated from Kandahar was a desert, and no supplies were forthcoming owing to the hostile att.i.tude of the people. Burrows therefore determined to retire to Khushk-i-Nakhud, an important position half-way to Kandahar, covering the road from Girishk, and where supplies and water were plentiful.
Burrows reached Khushk-i-Nakhud on the 16th July. On the 22nd the Commander-in-Chief in India, who had been inquiring from General Primrose whether there were "any routes from the Helmand pa.s.sing by the north to Ghazni, by which Ayub Khan might move with his guns,"
telegraphed to Primrose: "You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayub, if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government consider it of the highest political importance that his force should be dispersed, and prevented by all possible means from pa.s.sing on to Ghazni."
On the afternoon of the 26th information was received by Brigadier-General Burrows that 2,000 of the enemy"s Cavalry and a large body of _ghazis_ had arrived at Maiwand, eleven miles off, and that Ayub Khan was about to follow with the main body of his army.
To prevent Ayub Khan getting to Ghazni, General Burrows had to do one of two things, either await him at Khushk-i-Nakhud, or intercept him at Maiwand. After consulting with Colonel St. John, he determined to adopt the latter course, as he hoped thus to be able to deal with the _ghazis_ before they were joined by Ayub Khan.
The brigade started soon after 6 a.m. on the 27th. It was enc.u.mbered by a large number of baggage animals, which Burrows considered could not be left behind because of the hostile state of the country, and the impossibility of detaching any part of his already too small force for their protection.
At 10 a.m., when about half-way to Maiwand, a spy brought in information that Ayub Khan had arrived at that place, and was occupying it in force; General Burrows, however, considered it then too late to turn back, and decided to advance. At a quarter to twelve the forces came into collision, and the fight lasted until past three o"clock. The Afghans, who, Burrows reported, numbered 25,000, soon outflanked the British. Our Artillery expended their ammunition, and the Native portion of the brigade got out of hand, and pressed back on the few British Infantry, who were unable to hold their own against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Our troops were completely routed, and had to thank the apathy of the Afghans in not following them up for escaping total annihilation.
Of the 2,476 men engaged at Maiwand, 934 were killed and 175 were wounded and missing;[3] the remnant struggled on throughout the night to Kandahar, where the first of the fugitives arrived early on the morning of the 28th. Brigadier-General Burrows, who had two horses shot under him during the engagement, was amongst the last to reach Kandahar.
This lamentable story imparted to me by Stewart almost took my breath away, and we eagerly discussed the situation as we rode back together to Sherpur. It was impossible to predict how the news would affect the recent arrangements entered into with Abdur Rahman, or what the att.i.tude of the tribesmen would be; but we agreed that, whatever might happen in our immediate neighbourhood, the only means of affording speedy relief to the Kandahar garrison was by sending a force from Kabul.
It soon, however, became apparent, by telegrams received from Simla, that the Government were in doubt as to the best course to pursue, and looked to Quetta rather than Kabul as the place from which Kandahar could be most conveniently and rapidly succoured. This was not altogether surprising, for the authorities naturally hesitated to weaken Kabul until matters had been finally settled with Abdur Rahman, and it was only to be expected that, after what had occurred at Maiwand, they should be alarmed at the idea of a force being cut off from all communication with India during the four weeks, or thereabouts, it would take to reach Kandahar. But there was really no alternative, for, as Major-General Phayre[4] (commanding in Baluchistan) reported,[5] the troops available for Field Service were but few in number, it would require at least fifteen days to equip them, and there was no organized transport at hand, the animals having been sent to distant grazing grounds on account of the scarcity of water and forage.
I knew nothing as to the actual condition of the troops in Baluchistan, except that, as belonging to the Bombay Presidency, they could not be composed of the best fighting races, and I had a strong feeling that it would be extremely unwise to make use of any but the most proved Native soldiers against Ayub Khan"s superior numbers, elated as his men must be with their victory at Maiwand.
The disaster to our arms caused, as was to be expected, considerable excitement all along the border; indeed, throughout India the announcement produced a certain feeling of uneasiness--a mere surface ripple--but enough to make those who remembered the days of the Mutiny anxious for better news from the north.
To me it seemed of such supreme importance that Kandahar should be relieved without delay, and the reverse to our arms retrieved, that I made up my mind to communicate my views to the Viceroy through the Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that, when he realized that a thoroughly efficient force was ready and willing to start from Kabul, he would no longer hesitate as to what was best to do.
On the 30th July, I dined with Stewart, and, leaving his mess-tent at an early hour, I retired to my own quarters, and wrote out the following telegram in cipher, but, before despatching it, I showed it to Stewart, for, although I knew that his views were in accord with mine, I could not with propriety have sent it without his knowledge:
"To Major-General Greaves,[6] Adjutant-General in India, Simla.
"Kabul, "_30th July,_ 1880.