But if the question put to him is unlawful, he may evade an answer. It is commonly held that lies told in giving testimony or evidence are not necessarily mortal sins, as there may be no perjury committed or grave harm done another by reason of them (e.g., when an innocent man "doctors" a paper and thereby without harming anyone escapes from an unjust sentence).
(b) In Reference to the Opponent or His Witnesses.--The accused has the right to disclose secret but real crimes of the accusers, when this is an exercise of his legal right of taking exception to the witnesses as incompetent, or of his natural right of clearing himself of the charge against him. It makes no difference whether the evidence of the accusers is true or false, whether given according to the order of law or not. But he must not go beyond the limits of moderate self-defense (see 1826). Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is probable that calumny may be used without mortal sin as a defense of one"s justice or honor (Denzinger, n. 1194).
1981. If the accused objects secret crimes of the opposition, he must beware of injustice or uncharitableness. (a) Thus, it is unjust to disclose crimes that cannot be proved, or that are irrelevant (e.g., it may be irrelevant to prove that the person who testifies that the accused committed murder is himself a fornicator, but it would be relevant to show that this witness is a liar, or dishonest, or an enemy of the accused), or that need not be revealed (e.g., if the witness"s testimony can be overcome by showing that the witness is weak-minded or under obligations to the opposition, it is not necessary to defame him).
(b) It is uncharitable to disclose a crime, if the witness will suffer far more from this defamation than the accused would suffer from the testimony. If, however, the witnesses are giving false evidence of their own accord, they take the risk of revelations by the defense.
1982. Rights and Duties of an Accused Who Has Been Found Guilty.--(a) Appeals.--It is lawful to appeal from a sentence that is unjust (whether because of the innocence of the accused, or of the illegality of the process), because appeal is a means of self-defense granted to the innocent. It is not lawful to appeal from a sentence that is certainly just, merely in order to cause delay or to defeat an adversary; but one may make an appeal when there are just reasons (e.g., in criminal cases the hope of getting an easier sentence or of prolonging life, in civil cases the discovery of new proofs, or of probable arguments against the sentence given). But one who has pledged his word not to appeal from the decision of an arbitrator should abide by his promise, and there is no appeal from the final decision of the highest court, which in the Church is the Roman Pontiff (Canon 1880), and in the State the Supreme Court.
(b) Escape from Prison.--If the sentence was unjust, it is lawful to escape, unless the means employed are intrinsically evil (e.g., killing of guards), or the results will be more harmful than continuance in prison (e.g., the overthrow of public order, the too great risk of the attempt to escape). If the sentence was just, there are various opinions on the lawfulness of flight. Some think it is never lawful, because a just sentence is a precept of authority and should be obeyed; others think that flight is lawful in grave cases (e.g., when the prisoner has been sentenced to death or to life imprisonment, or when the conditions of prison life are unbearable, because human law cannot impose as a normal regulation what is too difficult for human nature); still others think that flight is always lawful, because the court sentence is that the prisoner be forcibly confined, not that he remain in prison voluntarily. But one is not necessarily bound to escape (see 1857).
(c) Resistance to Sentence.--If the sentence is unjust, resistance is not unlawful _per se_, because one has the right of self-defense against unjust aggression (Ezech. xxii. 27). Hence, if one were condemned to execute oneself (e.g., by taking poison), the common opinion is that the sentence would be unjust (see 1856), and therefore not obligatory.
If the sentence is just, even though it be a capital sentence, resistance is not lawful, for the judge who duly p.r.o.nounces sentence on a guilty man has the right to obedience (Rom., xiii. 1-5).
1983. Jail-Breaking and Rest.i.tution.--If one does not sin by jail-breaking, is one bound to rest.i.tution for the damages connected with the escape?
(a) If the damages are not caused by, but only follow accidentally on the flight (e.g., escape of other prisoners, dismissal of guards), there is no obligation to make rest.i.tution for them; for the flight would not be the efficacious or the unjust cause of such damages.
(b) If the damages result from the flight as from their efficacious and unjust cause, there is an obligation of rest.i.tution (see 1763), as when a prisoner, in order to escape, does needless damage, or damage out of all proportion to the evil from which he seeks to escape. But ordinary property damage, such as a hole cut in a wall, does not seem unjust, if there is no other way to get out.
1984. Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony.--A witness in court is a person who declares during a judicial proceeding that he knows some statement, deed or omission in reference to the matters at issue. The testimony of witnesses has proving force only in so far as these persons appear to have knowledge of the matters on which they testify and appear to be truthful. Hence, certain kinds of witnesses and certain kinds of testimony are unreliable.
(a) Thus, a witness is unreliable either through his own fault (e.g., if he is regarded in his community as below the standard in truthfulness, or has the reputation of being a calumniator) or without his own fault (e.g., if his powers of observation or his memory are subnormal, or he is devoted or hostile to or dependent on one of the contending parties). It is a duty, indeed, to presume good of a person in whom the opposite does not appear, if he is the only one whose interests are concerned; but when there is danger to a third party, one must be on one"s guard (see 1744). Hence, St. John admonishes not to believe every spirit (I John, iv. 1).
(b) Testimony is unreliable because of the number of the witnesses (e.g., one witness is often legally insufficient to prove, especially in graver matters), or the quality of their evidence (e.g., because in substantial points a witness contradicts himself or is contradicted by his co-witnesses, or because there are signs of collusion or conspiracy), or the counter-evidence of the opposition.
1985. Obligation of Freely Appearing as a Witness.--(a) There is an obligation of commutative justice to offer testimony, if one is under contract to do this, as when one is hired as a detective or agent to gather evidence against lawbreakers.
(b) There is an obligation of legal justice to testify, even at the cost of serious inconvenience, if the testimony is necessary for averting a serious evil that threatens the common welfare. A person who knows of a plot against the peace of the State should bring this to the notice of the authorities, even at the risk of his life. But a person who knows that a crime has been committed, is not bound to give witness about it, if the escape of its author will not be a serious detriment to public or private welfare (e.g., if one knows that an apparent case of suicide was really a homicide committed by accident).
(c) There is an obligation of charity to testify (but not at the cost of serious inconvenience), if the testimony is necessary for averting a serious evil that threatens a private person. A person who can prove that the evidence which is about to hang an innocent man is false should testify for the accused, unless the testimony will bring an equal evil upon himself.
1986. Obligation of Appearing under Lawful Citation to Give Testimony.--(a) He who avoids citation (e.g., by flight into another jurisdiction, by concealment of his person when the subpoena is being served), more probably does not violate legal justice by this act, since a precept that has not been received cannot be violated. (b) He who disregards citation offends legal justice, since the summons to appear has a claim on his obedience. But it does not seem that he violates commutative justice, unless the party for whom he could testify has a strict right to the testimony.
1987. Obligation of Witness to Answer Truthfully.--A witness who is questioned legitimately (i.e., by one who has the authority to question him) and juridically (i.e., according to the form and order prescribed in law) is obliged _per se_ to answer according to the truth as he knows it, for one is bound to obey a superior when he gives a lawful command. But there are exceptions to this rule _per accidens_, that is, when a higher law exempts one from the necessity of divulging a certain matter, or when the question asked refers only to what one knows juridically. In all these cases the witness may answer that he does not know, for he has no knowledge that he may, or should, or must use.
(a) Thus, the natural law permits reticence when a revelation would work notable damage to the witness or those closely related to him, for the command of a superior does not oblige under such great inconvenience. This supposes, of course, that the revelation is not required in order to prevent a great harm to the commonwealth or a far greater harm to a private person than that which threatens the witness.
A person who knows that he will be a.s.sa.s.sinated if he testifies against a powerful criminal is not ordinarily bound to make the sacrifice.
Canon and civil law excuse witnesses from making disclosures that would expose them to prosecution or penalties (see Canon 1755, 2, n. 2).
(b) The natural law commands reticence when a revelation would be injurious to divine, public or private rights.
1988. Matters Regarding Which a Witness Should Not Testify.--There are certain cases in which natural law forbids a witness to make known a fact about which he is questioned.
(a) A witness may never testify to matters known to him only from Sacramental Confession, for to break the seal of confession is an injury to the rights of G.o.d. In an ecclesiastical process a priest may not testify from Sacramental knowledge, even though he has the penitent"s permission (Canon 1757, 3, n. 2).
(b) A witness may not testify as a rule to matters that are known to him only in a confidential way, such as the communications between lawyer and client, physician and patient; for the public interest as well as the interest of individuals requires that generally there be security against defamation for those who give their confidence to others, especially if they are in great need of professional a.s.sistance. Privileged communications are recognized both in Canon Law (Canon 1755, 2) and in civil law. But knowledge obtained as a secret may be used when this is necessary in order to avert a great evil that threatens the public welfare or the welfare of an innocent person, whether this person be the giver of the secret, or a third party, or oneself; for to oblige to secrecy in these cases would be to throw protection around crime. Thus, a lawyer may make disclosures of confidential knowledge, if this is necessary in order to defend himself against the false accusations of a client, or to prevent a crime which the client intends to commit.
(c) A witness may not testify to matters about which he has unjust knowledge (e.g., by wire-tapping, by unjust coercion, by intoxicating another person, by reading private papers without permission), for, as the knowledge was unjustly acquired, it cannot be justly used (see 2420).
1989. There are also certain cases in which a question refers only to what the witness knows juridically, or in which he is called upon to answer according to the mind of the questioner.
(a) If the witness is asked to state what he knows about a case, he is not obliged to mention what he merely thinks or what he is uncertain about; and if he is asked what he has heard, he is not obliged to state what was told him by persons of poor authority.
(b) If he is asked whether the accused was to his knowledge guilty of a crime, he is not obliged to mention an act of the accused that was unlawful but done in good faith. But in a civil case, in which inquiry is made about juridical faults, the witness should testify even to the existence of delinquencies in which there was no element of theological fault.
(c) If he is the only one who has knowledge of a delinquency and it will be certainly useless for him to testify about the matter without corroboratory evidence, it seems that he may keep silence about what he knows. But if the testimony of one witness is sufficient according to law, then the witness should speak of the facts known to him.
1990. Sinfulness of False Testimony.--When we speak of false testimony, we mean testimony which the witness knows to be false.
(a) By reason of his false oath, the witness is guilty of perjury, which is a grave sin against the virtue of religion.
(b) By reason of the injury done by the testimony, the witness is guilty of injustice, which from its nature is a grave sin. In the Decalogue (Exod., xx. 16) false testimony is forbidden among the sins against justice: "Thou shalt not bear false testimony against thy neighbor." Legal justice is offended, since false testimony is an act of disobedience to lawful authority, and usually commutative justice is also violated, since by false testimony one of the litigants as a rule suffers loss.
(c) By reason of the deliberate falsehood, the witness is guilty of lying, which, however, is not always a grave sin.
1991. It may happen then, though rarely, that false testimony is only a venial sin, for example, when the witness is not under oath and he gives false testimony in a matter of small importance, or without full deliberation on what he is saying, or when he forges or corrupts a doc.u.ment to supply for another that has been lost and from which his certain right could be proved.
1992. Obligation of Witness to Make Rest.i.tution.--The obligations of rest.i.tution by a witness on account of failure to perform his duties properly are as follows:
(a) if the witness has not sinned against commutative justice, there is no obligation of rest.i.tution (see 1753). Hence, if he has evaded testimony to which he was bound in legal justice or charity alone, he is guilty of sin, but he is not held to rest.i.tution. Similarly, if he has given false testimony and thereby deprived the State of a fine under a penal law, or saved a guilty party from punishment, he has sinned against legal justice, but is not obliged to make good the fine or pay damages;
(b) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice, materially but not formally, he is not the gravely guilty cause of damage, and hence is not obliged from justice (but there may be an obligation from charity) to make rest.i.tution (see 1764). But if he perceives that his testimony was materially or venially unjust and will cause serious damage, he is obliged to recall his testimony, or in some other suitable way prevent the damage, if this is possible (see 1769);
(c) if the witness has sinned against commutative justice formally, he is the efficacious and culpable cause of the damage that results, and hence is bound to rest.i.tution, unless there is an excusing cause (see 1797 sqq.). Thus, if false testimony, or testimony about matters which the witness had no right to disclose, has led to the death sentence for an innocent man, the witness who gave that testimony must retract, even at the risk of his own life; for in equal danger the rights of the innocent have the preference. Again, if t.i.tus by false testimony has saved Balbus from paying damages for injury done to public property, t.i.tus must make rest.i.tution for the loss caused, if Balbus will not make reparation.
1993. Is a witness guilty against commutative justice when he unlawfully conceals facts and damage results thereby to another person?
(a) If by concealment is meant the destruction of evidence (e.g., the burning of a will or letter or forging), the witness or other person responsible is guilty of a positive act of commutative injustice and is bound to rest.i.tution. (b) If by concealment is meant silence about material facts that the witness is lawfully called on to disclose, distinction has to be made between the witness who is not obliged from contract to give evidence and the witness who is so bound. The former witness is a negative coperator and sins against legal justice and charity; the latter witness is a negative coperator and sins against commutative justice (see 1780).
1994. Payment of Witnesses.--Is a witness permitted to accept pay for giving true and lawful testimony?
(a) For the testimony itself a witness may not accept pay, for he is bound to tell the truth freely, just as the judge is bound to dispense justice freely.
(b) For the expenses he incurs and the time he loses by reason of his a.s.sistance in court, he may accept pay; since, as St. Paul says, he who does a service for another is not required to meet the expenses of the service (I Cor., ix. 7). Both Canon and civil law make allowances for suitable compensation to be granted to witnesses (see Canons 1787, 1788). But if a witness receives compensation in excess of what is allowed by law, the court and the adverse party have a right to be informed of this.
1995. Lawyers.--Lawyer is the general term used to designate all those who are versed in the law and who give a.s.sistance to others in legal ways during lawsuits or apart from them.
(a) Thus, apart from lawsuits a lawyer may act as legal adviser, giving instruction, information or direction on rights and duties under the law.
(b) During a lawsuit he advises about the case (jurisconsult) or carries on for clients the prosecution or defense in a court of justice. The lawyers who attend to only the more mechanical parts of a suit are sometimes called attorneys, in distinction from counsellors or counsel, who argue and plead in the courtroom, but generally "attorney-at-law" and "lawyer" are synonymous terms. The counsellors are known in England as barristers when they conduct cases in superior courts; they are called solicitors in chancery, and advocates in Roman law. Canon Law distinguishes between the advocate who defends, and the procurator who represents, a litigant; the former argues for his client by invoking the law in his favor; the latter acts merely as the representative of his client and is restricted by his commission.
1996. The Qualifications of Lawyers.--(a) The mental and moral requisites are competency in the knowledge of their profession and devotion to justice, morality, the const.i.tution, and law (see 1943). A lawyer should be zealous for the dignity and reputation of the bar and loyal to a.s.sociates, but not afraid to take action against practices that are detrimental to his honorable profession.
(b) The legal requisites for practising as a lawyer vary with the place or government. In Canon Law, it is necessary that an advocate be a doctor or expert in ecclesiastical jurisprudence, that he be twenty-one years of age, duly approved, etc. (see Canons 1657 sqq.).
1997. The Duties of a Lawyer in Introducing Cases.--(a) He may not stir up litigation, as a means of bringing himself occupation and gain. The Catechism of the Council of Trent, Translated into English with Notes (Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York City, 1923), p. 475, denounces this practice as among the chief violations of the Tenth Commandment. Among lawyers it is regarded as unprofessional, and at common law it is an indictable offense.
(b) A lawyer may not take or a.s.sist an unjust cause--one, namely, that is in opposition to moral or positive law, as when a party comes to him with the request that he conduct a spite case whose purpose is to hara.s.s or oppress an innocent person. He who defends injustice is a coperator, and is therefore guilty (see 1779). But if a case has a good foundation in law, the lawyer is not bound to inquire into the subjective dispositions or the conscience of the client in the matter, and he may take the case even though he does not know that the client is in good faith.