At the time of which I am speaking occurred also the much discussed Bolo affair. It is quite astonishing how many lies were told before the commission of inquiry of the American Senate with regard to this affair. Among others, hotel servants, chauffeurs, etc., were sworn, and gave evidence that I had met Bolo in the apartments of Mr. Hearst. True, I have often visited Mr. Hearst, which goes without saying, as he was the only important newspaper proprietor who maintained a neutral att.i.tude throughout the war. I did not, however, meet Bolo, either there or anywhere else; I have never made his acquaintance, or even seen him in the distance. I heard his name for the first time when he was brought up for trial in Paris.
If the statements made before the commission of inquiry are to be relied on in any point at all, it is to be a.s.sumed that Bolo first came to America to arrange a combine between the _Journal_ and the Hearst Press. This combine was to support the cause of Pacifism after the war. Who Bolo"s princ.i.p.al was I do not know, but so much seems to be established, that he was connected with the _Journal_. Apparently, Bolo wanted to sell shares in this paper to Mr. Hearst, in order to acquire funds for the Pacifist agitation.
This theory seems justified since Bolo, on the voyage to America, got into touch with Mr. Bartelli, Hearst"s representative in Paris.
The latter did fall in with Bolo"s ideas.
Later--whether intentionally or not I do not know--Bolo met the co-proprietor of the firm Amsinck and Co., Herr Pavenstedt, who was one of the most respected, if not _the_ most respected, Imperial German in New York, and intimately acquainted with all the members of the Emba.s.sy. Herr Pavenstedt, who as a private citizen was not in a position to accept Bolo"s suggestions, then travelled to Washington to lay the matter before me. He gave me to understand that a French acquaintance of long standing, for whose good faith he could vouch, had come to America to raise funds for a Pacifist agitation in France. He said that national feeling in that country had reached a point which promised success for such a movement, if the prospect could be held out of a peace by negotiation. Herr Pavenstedt said that he could not, under any circ.u.mstances, disclose the gentleman"s name. As the plans of the Frenchman recommended by Herr Pavenstedt coincided with my policy for bringing about a peace by negotiation, and I had absolute confidence in Herr Pavenstedt, I communicated the matter to Berlin, where the necessary money was granted. Later, the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the United States interrupted the policy I had initiated, and also put an end to any prospect of effecting a change of feeling in France, where the hope of American a.s.sistance revived enthusiasm for the war.
I do not know how Bolo"s enterprise came to the knowledge of the French Government. In any case this cannot have been due to the deciphering of my telegrams to Berlin, as I did not know Bolo"s name. Owing to this ignorance on my part it was arranged between Herr Pavenstedt and myself, at a second interview, that the anonymous Frenchman should at a given time address further communications on the progress of the movement to our Emba.s.sy at Bern under the pseudonym "St. Regis."
At the time of the _Suss.e.x_ crisis a further awkward incident occurred which took us back to the days of conspiracies. In consequence of the Welland Ca.n.a.l case the American secret police came down upon Herr von Igel, the representative of the Military Attache, in his New York office, for alleged complicity, arrested him by force and seized papers which were found on his table. I immediately laid a protest before the State Department, whereupon Herr von Igel was set at liberty and a long international controversy arose which had not come to an end when Herr von Igel returned with me to Germany. The American Law Department maintained that Herr von Igel was suspected of complicity in a legal offence, that he could not therefore plead extra-territoriality, and must stand his trial before an American Court. The State Department, it is true, had doubts as to whether an office in New York could be recognized as extraterritorial, but for the rest maintained a correct att.i.tude and refused to agree to the opening of proceedings against Herr von Igel.
The seized doc.u.ments were handed over to the State Department, where they probably still lie. The State Department declared to me their readiness to hand back the papers if I wished to declare them Emba.s.sy doc.u.ments. I, however, thought that an attempt might be made later to use such a declaration against me as a trap and I rejected the offer to return the papers on these conditions, as they were of no further importance to us. If there was among them material which could be used against the former Attaches it might be a.s.sumed that the Law Department would long ago have had the doc.u.ments copied.
The Igel affair had no definite political result, as the American Government dropped all controversies when they began to take up the question of mediation.
To return to the settlement of the _Suss.e.x_ incident it should be mentioned that our surrender on the submarine question was widely resented in Germany. Further, it caused a check in submarine construction. At least, Secretary of State von Capelle has declared before the Commission of the National a.s.sembly that an extensive submarine construction programme had to be abandoned because it would have been too sharp a contrast with Germany"s att.i.tude after the settlement of the _Suss.e.x_ affair. As a matter of fact, submarine construction was never carried on with full vigor after 1916 as has been pointed out by Messrs. Struve, Gothein and Co. In the light of this the gravity of the decision in 1917 to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare is doubled. It will be seen clearly here how our divided policy on the one hand permanently crippled the submarine policy and on the other that of mediation.
To conclude the _Suss.e.x_ question, I will add one more telegram which I sent to the Foreign Office after Secretary of State Lansing had publicly mentioned an Anglo-American agreement--a remark which in Berlin was taken to mean that America had formed an alliance with England. It is well known that during the war such a statement has frequently been made.
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 21st May, 1916.
"I am working confidentially in co-operation with House for the settlement of such still unsettled questions as the _Lusitania_ and the Igel cases, so as to clear the air completely. Feeling here now more favorable owing to the influence of the Irish executions.
Wilson regards conflict with us as a thing of the past and desires to let things rest and soon to lay the foundations of peace. Lansing"s speech as to Anglo-American agreement refers to the Bryan agreement.
He desired to make clear that war with England because of the blockade is out of the question, and therefore there is no means of bringing pressure to bear. The speech coincides with the American view I have already reported that it would be easier to bring the war to an end than to force England to raise the blockade."
Hitherto I have not mentioned the different German vessels which visited United States ports during the war. Besides their history is well known. I will therefore only describe their psychological influence and my own experiences.
The auxiliary cruisers _Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm_ and _Eitel Friedrich_ were the first German ships to enter Hampton Roads, there to be interned.
Much more interest was aroused by the arrival on the 15th February, 1916, of the _Appam_, because it was then a long time since the German flag had been seen on the American side of the Atlantic.
The facts are familiar to German readers from Count Dohna"s _Move_ book. Lieutenant Berg"s exploit met with general appreciation in the United States, especially as his conduct was completely in accord with the American conception of international law. Even to-day I can hear the tone of absolute conviction in which Secretary of State Lansing told me at the Metropolitan Club that the voyage of the _Appam_ was a "marvellous achievement."
In the far-off future, students of international law will quote the _Appam_ case as a cla.s.sic. At the German Emba.s.sy in Washington volumes were filled with the opinions of eminent lawyers, for the incident was not treated politically by the American Government, but submitted to the courts. Meanwhile the _Appam_ remained interned in Hampton Roads as a prize. The case was not settled until after the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, when it was no longer of any importance to us.
The interest roused by the _Appam_ shrank into nothing before the excitement caused by the arrival of the submarine _Deutschland_ on the 8th July, 1916. Apart from those that followed the agreement on the _Arabic_ incident, the few days after the arrival of the _Deutschland_ were the pleasantest I experienced in America during the war. Feeling on all sides was openly friendly, and Captain Konig was the most popular man in the United States. If we had sent ten such merchant submarines to America and for the rest had carried on the submarine campaign according to the principles laid down for cruiser warfare, we should have attained far greater political results than has been the case.
The arrival of the submarine _Deutschland_ at Baltimore and Captain Konig"s first visit to the town resembled a triumphal procession.
I had intended to go there at once to welcome the hero of the day and his bold seamen, but thought it better to wait and see what would be the American att.i.tude towards the protests of the English and French Amba.s.sadors, who had both claimed that the _Deutschland_, as a submarine, should be regarded without hesitation as a ship of war. On the 13th July a most minute inspection of the _Deutschland_ was made by an American Government Commission consisting of three naval officers, and she was recognized as a genuine merchant vessel.
In consequence the _Deutschland_ had a right to lie at Baltimore as long as was necessary to take a cargo on board for the return journey. It was now possible for me to pay an official visit to Baltimore and to view the _Deutschland_. The Mayor of the town accompanied me and went down with me, in spite of the terrific heat of about 40 centigrade, into the lowest parts of the submarine, which cost the stoutly-built gentleman considerable effort and a good deal of perspiration. In the evening the Mayor gave a banquet which pa.s.sed off as in the good days before the war. The rooms were decorated with German and American flags, the band played the "Wacht am Rhein," and many speeches were made on the good relations between the two countries.
Again on her second visit, which took place in October in New London (Connecticut), the _Deutschland_ met with a very friendly reception, even though the atmosphere was appreciably cooler. Feeling in the New England state has always been particularly unfavorable to us.
But there, to, I pa.s.sed a very pleasant day with Captain Konig.
In contrast to the moral gain of the visit of the _Deutschland_ was the generally unfavorable impression created by the visit at the same time of the U53. Quite unexpectedly I received the news that a German submarine had arrived at Newport, the captain of which had reported himself to the American commandant and had handed him a letter addressed to me. The letter attracted a good deal of attention in the Press, but it actually contained nothing further than the introduction of the captain. The episode of the U53 was, from a political point of view, most undesirable and of no military value. When, moreover, a few days later the news arrived that the U53 had sunk several ships off the American coast--always, it is true, according to international law--the incident a.s.sumed a fairly serious aspect. Meanwhile I travelled direct to Shadow Lawn, the President"s beautiful summer residence on the New Jersey coast, to hand to Mr. Wilson a letter from the Emperor. The President had appealed to the Heads of all the combatant States to urge them to permit relief to starving Poland, as had been done for Belgium.
As was to be expected, the Entente rejected the proposal while the Central Powers agreed to it. The Emperor"s approval was contained in the letter which I brought to Mr. Wilson.
The President took this opportunity to speak to me very seriously on the cruise of the U53, and urged me to see to it that this incident was not repeated. Otherwise he could not be responsible for public feeling in the United States, which might again become very bitter.
The affair was very disagreeable to me personally, because I was building hopes on Mr. Wilson"s mediation and because I feared that the cruise of the U53 would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to put difficulties in the way of the President"s re-election.
It might be a.s.sumed that his Republican opponents would say that Germany could now do what she liked, as Mr. Wilson had never adopted energetic measures.
On the subject of this conversation with Mr. Wilson I sent the following telegram to the foreign office:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 11th October, 1916.
"I had a conversation with Mr. Wilson on the occasion of handing over the Emperor"s autograph letter with regard to Polish relief.
The President is anxious to carry the matter further and asked me how this could best be done. I replied that the difficulties lay exclusively on the English side.
"The cruiser warfare undertaken by our submarines off the American coast is naturally regarded by Mr. Wilson with anxiety, because all his hopes of re-election are based exclusively on the fact that according to the opinion held over here he has kept the United States out of the war and in spite of that has put an end to our so-called illegal attacks on American lives. His whole position falls to pieces if American lives are lost now, or if indignation is aroused by a submarine campaign off the American coast. So far this has not occurred. The exploit of U53 is even hailed as a sporting achievement. This view will, however, be changed if the incident is repeated. For this reason Wilson spoke plainly about a continuance of the submarine campaign off the American coast. He regarded as particularly serious the fact that two neutral ships were sunk, as well as a Canadian pa.s.senger vessel making for the United States.
He said that such incidents could not be understood by the American public."
To this telegram I received from the Imperial Chancellor the following reply:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 4th October, 1916.
"England entirely responsible for difficulties with regard to Polish relief. For Your Excellency"s exclusive information it is not intended to continue submarine campaign off American coast. Final decision as to activity of U53 not possible until she returns. Our concessions to America are being strictly observed and will be until explicitly revoked.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
CHAPTER X
AMERICAN MEDIATION
At midsummer, 1916, the political lull desired by Colonel House actually set in. The Colonel betook himself to one of the beautiful lakes of New Hampshire, in the far north of the United States, where in the ordinary way I could only reach him by letter or telegram. How secret we kept our communications is shown by the fact that, according to agreement, I wrote and telegraphed to Colonel House under the pseudonym "Martin." This caution proved to be fully justified, as the inquiry by the Senate Committee has shown that the letters from the Emba.s.sy were frequently opened by agents of the Entente propaganda, whether with or without the connivance of the American secret police I will not definitely say. I have already had occasion to mention this question in connection with the robbing of Mr.
Albert. There are in the secret police of all countries men of doubtful honor. It might be taken as certain that there were such men in the pay of the Entente agents.
Soon after the settlement of the _Suss.e.x_ incident--on 27th May--Mr.
Wilson made public, for the first time, his plan for the League of Nations. This idea was to const.i.tute the foundation-stone of his mediation and fulfil all the hopes of the American pacifists for a compulsory court of arbitration in international disputes and general disarmament. Before the war many shrewd men in the United States thought that the arbitration system initiated by the American Government would exclude the possibility of great wars.
The outbreak of the World War showed that this was an illusion, and the question arose what precautions could be taken to prevent a recurrence of the world catastrophe. Mr. Wilson was one of the first in whom the idea matured that the scheme, hitherto regarded as utopian, of a league binding all civilized nations to a peaceful settlement of their disputes was capable of being made a practical proposition if backed, as a means of compulsion, by a commercial boycott, similar to that which the Entente, in contravention of international law, employed with such terrible results against Germany.
The most important sentences of the speech which the President addressed to the American peace league ran as follows:
"When the invitation for me to be here to-night came to me, I was glad to accept,--not because it offered me an opportunity to discuss the programme of the League,--that you will, I am sure, not expect of me,--but because the desire of the whole world now turns eagerly towards the hope of peace, and there is just reason why we should take our part in counsel upon this great theme....
"With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore....
"And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seek to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at least in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that nations must in future be governed by the same high code of honor that we demand of individuals....