Reply Obj. 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 12).
Reply Obj. 2: Temperance and fort.i.tude are in the sensitive appet.i.te, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appet.i.tive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appet.i.te as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fort.i.tude.
Reply Obj. 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 6]
Whether Justice, As a General Virtue, Is Essentially the Same As All Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the mult.i.tude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2) that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.
Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First, by _predication:_ thus "animal" is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general _virtually;_ thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or trans.m.u.ted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A. 5), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign princ.i.p.ally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.
However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.
Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice.
Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue"s proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7]
Whether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.
Obj. 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the mult.i.tude, as shown above (AA. 5, 6).
Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.
Obj. 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.
_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom in his commentary on Matt. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom.
xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fort.i.tude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.
Reply Obj. 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.
Reply Obj. 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the _many_ and the _few,_ but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the _common_ good differs from the aspect of the _individual_ good, even as the aspect of _whole_ differs from that of _part._ Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically."
Reply Obj. 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. _domestic_ justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 6.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 8]
Whether Particular Justice Has a Special Matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on Gen. 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies "fruitful"; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.
temperance, prudence, fort.i.tude and justice;" and he says that "the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.
Obj. 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.
_I answer that,_ Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal pa.s.sions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use.
And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal pa.s.sions that we consider man"s rect.i.tude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.
Reply Obj. 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind of diffusion.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the pa.s.sage quoted: for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the l.u.s.t for fleeting pleasures, fort.i.tude is strength of mind in bearing with pa.s.sing trials, justice is the love of G.o.d and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another."
Reply Obj. 3: A man"s internal pa.s.sions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 9]
Whether Justice Is About the Pa.s.sions?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the pa.s.sions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are pa.s.sions, as stated above [*I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1] when we were treating of the pa.s.sions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the pa.s.sions.
Obj. 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man"s operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the pa.s.sions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the pa.s.sions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus s.e.xual l.u.s.t leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the pa.s.sions.
Obj. 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the pa.s.sions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the pa.s.sions. Therefore justice is about the pa.s.sions.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.
_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not pa.s.sions, as stated above (I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4), for it is only the sensitive appet.i.te whose movements are called pa.s.sions. Hence justice is not about the pa.s.sions, as are temperance and fort.i.tude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man"s relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal pa.s.sions.
Therefore justice is not about the pa.s.sions.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fort.i.tude is about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and pain are the princ.i.p.al end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions"
(Ethic. i, 8).
Reply Obj. 2: External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal pa.s.sions, which are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another"s property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another"s property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the pa.s.sions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the pa.s.sions. Hence justice hinders theft of another"s property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not from the internal pa.s.sions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.