"In the absence of roads, I had always calculated on partially using the Ca.n.a.l and railway in sending supplies to the front, but the enemy having blocked the former by two large dams, and the latter by an embankment, and the partial removal of rails, it has been necessary to get these obstructions removed. I have one engine on the line, and expect a second from Suez to-night, and am preparing the land transport companies, some of which are now landing, to supplement the other means above indicated.
"A supply of mules has arrived at Cyprus. I expect 400 more from Malta and Italy to-morrow; and the large supply collected at Smyrna and Beyrout at last released by the Ottoman Government are on their way. In a desert country, like this part of Egypt, it takes time to organize the lines of communication."
By the 2nd September the whole of the Indian Contingent, except the 6th Bengal Cavalry, had reached Suez, and many of its troops had gone to the front.
Except for an occasional reconnaissance, bringing about an interchange of shots and one real attack, the period now entered upon was one merely of preparation for a further advance. With this object, stores first, and then men, were gradually being acc.u.mulated at Ka.s.sa.s.sin.
On the 9th September the Egyptian leaders apparently began to realize the fact that Sir Garnet Wolseley"s force was daily increasing in size and importance, and that if any attempt was to be made to crush him there was no time to be lost. Accordingly an attack was made that day on Ka.s.sa.s.sin.
On this occasion Arabi himself was on the ground, though the attacking forces were commanded by Ali Pasha Fehmi. The Egyptian force turned out in great strength, comprising seventeen battalions of infantry, several squadrons of cavalry, thirty guns, and some thousands of Bedouins.
The Egyptian attack was meant to be from two sides: on the west by an advance of the garrison of Tel-el-Kebir, and on the north by a body, variously estimated at from 1,500 to 5,000 men, from Salahieh.
There is very little doubt that the British force came very near being surprised. Early in the morning Colonel Pennington, of the 13th Bengal Lancers, going out to the westward to post vedettes, found the Egyptians advancing in force. Although he had but fifty men with him he dismounted them behind a ridge, and opened fire on the advancing enemy, and when hard pushed charged some squadrons of cavalry, killing ten men and capturing five horses. Warning of the impending danger was thus given to the camp, enabling a line of battle to be formed.
By 7 a.m. Arabi had succeeded in posting most of his guns on an eminence described in Wolseley"s despatches as "Ninth Hill," 2,000 yards to the British right front, whilst his infantry deployed for attack, with the right resting on the Ca.n.a.l, and then advanced to within 1,200 yards. A few of his troops got south of the Ca.n.a.l, with a view to a flank movement.
No sooner were the Egyptian guns posted than they opened fire. The practice was very accurate, shot after shot falling admirably into the British camp and lines. The sh.e.l.ls, however, burst so rarely as to neutralize the excellence of the aim.
The British artillery batteries and the guns on the railway replied vigorously with sh.e.l.l and shrapnel. The 25-pounders did excellent work on the enemy"s right on both sides of the Ca.n.a.l, sending their projectiles over the heads of the British infantry until the advance was begun. The Horse Artillery batteries shot down the men working two of the guns, and these were seized by the infantry as they advanced; two others were captured by the Marines in their forward march. Their battalion, in regular formation for attack, came upon a battery of four guns which was playing briskly upon the Marines at a distance of 1,400 yards. Without returning the fire they kept on their way until within 400 yards, when they began firing volleys by half companies, still continuing the march. This steady work proved too severe for the Egyptian gunners, who broke and ran, leaving two of the four guns behind.
The infantry also engaged, holding its ground for an hour and a half, no forward movement being permitted until it was ascertained that no danger was to be apprehended from the direction of Salahieh.
At 8.30 it was deemed prudent to a.s.sume the offensive, and the line was ordered to advance, the right being always kept in reserve. The 46th (Duke of Cornwall"s), 84th (York and Lancaster), and 50th (West Kent) Regiments, which had been stationed on the south bank of the Ca.n.a.l to check any flank movement of the enemy, were ordered to retire across the Ca.n.a.l bridge, and, crossing the plain in front of the camp, to form up with the rest. The infantry, with the four batteries of artillery on its right, moved forward about 1,000 yards and re-engaged the enemy, who by this time had retired.
To prevent any attempt to overlap the right of the position, the 46th was advanced in this direction over the hills. The attack in this quarter, however, resolved itself into nothing. At 9.30 the general advance was resumed amid a smart musketry fire, and the enemy broke and retired with precipitation upon Tel-el-Kebir. The cavalry and Royal Horse Artillery ran them very close, the fortifications being approached as near as 6,000 yards.
CHAPTER XXII.
TEL-EL-KEBIR.
On the 9th September, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been to the front during the engagement of that day and had made a reconnaissance towards the enemy"s lines at Tel-el-Kebir, established his head-quarters at Ka.s.sa.s.sin.
The same day the Highland Brigade, under Sir Archibald Alison, commenced its march from Ismailia to the front. The Guards were also brought up.
The 10th, 11th, and 12th were occupied in bringing forward troops and stores, and in making preparations for a general advance.
At 2 p.m. on the 12th, the army was concentrated at Ka.s.sa.s.sin, the Royal Irish Fusiliers being the last battalion to arrive.
To remain behind and guard the line of communication, 800 of the Manchester Regiment and 500 of the Native Infantry were left at Ismailia. At Nefiche, Mahuta, and Mahsameh, small detachments were also stationed, whilst at Ka.s.sa.s.sin 200 of the West Kent Regiment and two companies of the Royal Engineers were told off to form a garrison for the time being. This left available for the forward movement 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 60 guns.
Tel-el-Kebir, properly written "El-Tel-el-Kebir," "The Great Hill," is the name of a peaceful Arab village on the south side of the railway leading from Ismailia to Cairo, and on the banks of the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l. On the opposite side of the railway and Ca.n.a.l stands the "hill,"
an elevation of considerable height, near which Arabi had for some weeks past been intrenching his forces.
Tel-el-Kebir had for many years past been used as a military station and camp, and it was here that Arabi had been exiled with his mutinous regiment in the autumn of 1881.
[Ill.u.s.tration: LINES OF TEL-EL-KEBIR.]
The position selected by the Egyptians for a final stand was by nature the strongest it was possible to find in that flat section of country.[57] Near the station of Tel-el-Kebir there is a general and gradual rise of the ground towards the west, culminating in a range of hills that stretch from a point on the railway about a mile and a half east of the station, northward to Salahieh. Roughly parallel to the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l is a second series of hills intersecting the first about two miles distant from the railway. Viewed from the railway, this east and west range appears as a moderate hill. Its real character, however, is that of a table-land sloping away to the northward with a rather steep descent towards the south. The ground is generally even, and barren almost to desolation, the soil consisting of sand and rock, producing only a small scrub. The Egyptian intrenchments were laid out along the crests of these hills, the lines running north and south, starting from the railway and ca.n.a.l (see plan), and running in a northerly direction for over two miles beyond the intersection, making a total frontage to the eastward of nearly four miles. The plan included a dry ditch from eight to twelve feet wide, and from five to nine feet deep, in front of a breastwork from four to six feet high with a "banquette" in rear. The trace was broken by occasional salients, where were placed well-designed redoubts, possessing a wide command on either flank.
In the rear were frequent shelter trenches. Pa.s.sages through the parapet were provided for field-pieces and vehicles in various places, and were guarded by traverses and breastworks. The revetment differed mainly in the care which had been bestowed upon it, and consisted mostly of reeds, gra.s.s, &c. The interior slopes were the only ones thus treated.
The southern portion of the defences was practically completed at the time of the battle. Here the revetment was neatly finished. Work was in progress on the northern and western lines, their extremities being scarcely more than laid out. The extent of these defensive works, which was enormous in comparison with the number of troops at Arabi"s disposal, would seem to imply an inordinate reliance upon mere ditches and breastworks to keep out an enemy however vigorous. It led as a necessary consequence to the excessive spreading out of the defenders, and the fatal weakening of the force which could be gathered at any given point. Had the same amount of labour been expended in several concentric lines, it would have resulted in a position of great strength, permitting the retiring, if necessary, from one line to the next, and an almost indefinite prolongation of the fight.
The batteries were along the front, and were thus distributed. At the southern end of the line there were two well-built redoubts, mounting each three guns, on either bank of the Ca.n.a.l. Connecting the two, and stopping the flow of water in the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l, was a stout dam. On each side of the railway was one gun, in a small earthwork.
In front of the lines running north and south, and distant about 1,100 yards, was a formidable outwork standing on rising ground. This was a polygonal redoubt, and mounted six guns. In the rear of this redoubt and on the lines was a 4-gun battery, behind which was a look-out and telegraph station, the wire running back to Arabi"s head-quarters near the railway station, and in the midst of a large camp. The diminished size of the ditch from this point northwards is very noticeable. The attack was evidently hoped for at and near the railway.
Following the lines in a northerly direction, the next battery was at the intersection of the two lines of intrenchments. This was the most elaborately finished of all the redoubts, and mounted five guns. Still further in the same direction was another formidable battery of five guns.[58] Beyond this there were two other incomplete redoubts, further still to the northward, but this part of the line was hardly begun.
As regards the east and west line, intersecting the lines running north and south, its object was to afford a defence in the event of the enemy succeeding in breaking through those lines at the northern end, their weakest part.[59]
To the eastward of the lines and in the direction of Ka.s.sa.s.sin was a tolerably level desert with smooth sand and pebble.
The information, received from spies and prisoners, was to the effect that the enemy"s force at Tel-el-Kebir consisted of from 60 to 70 guns, twenty-four battalions of infantry (18,000 men), and three regiments of cavalry, together with about 6,000 Bedouins, besides a force of 5,000 men with 24 guns at Salahieh,[60] all under the immediate command of Arabi himself.
The general character of the ground lying between the two armies was that of gently undulating, pebbly slopes, rising gradually to an open plateau from ninety to a hundred feet above the valley through which the railway and ca.n.a.l ran. To have marched over this plateau upon the enemy"s position by daylight, the British troops would have had to advance over a glacis-like slope, absolutely without cover, in full view of the enemy, and under the fire of his artillery, for about five miles.
Such an operation would have entailed heavy loss from an enemy with men and guns protected by intrenchments from any artillery fire which the attacking force could have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the Egyptian position, either by the right or left, was an operation which would have entailed a wide turning movement, and, therefore, a long, difficult and fatiguing march, and moreover would not have accomplished the object Wolseley had in view, namely, that of grappling with the enemy at such close quarters that he would be unable to shake himself free, except by a general fight of all his army. The object was to make the battle a final one, whereas a wide turning movement would probably only have forced Arabi to retreat upon the cultivated country in his rear, where, the land being irrigated and cut up in every direction by deep ca.n.a.ls, it would have been difficult for a regular army to follow him. Influenced by these considerations, and also by the information that the enemy did not push his outposts far beyond his works at night, Wolseley determined upon the difficult operation of a night march, to be followed by an attack on the Egyptian position before daylight.
As soon as it was dark on the evening of the 12th September, the camp at Ka.s.sa.s.sin was struck, and all the tents and baggage were stacked alongside the railway. The camp fires were left burning. The troops then moved into position near a spot described as "Ninth Hill." There they formed in order of battle and bivouacked--no fires were allowed, even smoking was prohibited, and all were ordered to maintain the utmost silence.[61]
The formation of the troops was as follows:--
On the right, the 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Willis, and consisting of two brigades, viz., the 2nd, under Major-General Graham, in front, and the 1st, or Guards Brigade, under the Duke of Connaught, in the rear; on the left, the 2nd Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hamley, and consisting of two brigades, viz., the 3rd, or Highland Brigade, under Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, in front, and the 4th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ashburnham, in the rear. Between the two Divisions was placed the Artillery Brigade under Brigadier-General Goodenough. On the extreme right was the Cavalry Division under Major-General Drury-Lowe, and on the extreme left, under Major-General Sir Herbert Macpherson, were the Indian Contingent and the Naval Brigade.
At 1.30 on the morning of the 13th, the order was given for the advance of the 1st and 2nd Divisions simultaneously, and the celebrated march on Tel-el-Kebir began. The Indian Contingent and the Naval Brigade did not move until an hour later, to avoid giving the alarm to the enemy, by the pa.s.sing of the force through the numerous villages in the cultivated land south of the Ca.n.a.l.
The night was dark, and it was very difficult to maintain the desired formation. More than once the advancing lines, guided only by the light of the stars, formed somewhat of a crescent shape, and there was danger of the advancing force mistaking their comrades for parties of the enemy. Several halts had to be made, as well for the purpose of resting the men as for that of correcting the formation. The final halt was made at 3 a.m., and lasted nearly an hour. Daybreak was the time fixed for the arrival at the enemy"s lines, and it would have been as undesirable to have reached them too early as too late.
There were practically three separate but nearly simultaneous infantry attacks, by the 1st Division under General Willis; by the 2nd Division under General Hamley, and away on the extreme left, south of the Ca.n.a.l, by the Indian Contingent, under General Macpherson. In point of time, General Hamley"s was somewhat earlier than the others, and General Macpherson"s the last of the three.
The action began at early dawn. Willis"s leading brigade,[62] commanded by General Graham, was about 900 yards from the intrenchments. Partly owing to the difficulty of keeping a proper alignment during the night march, partly to the fact that the line of march was oblique to the line of the earthworks, and partly to the confusion created by an Egyptian scout who galloped into the lines, Willis was obliged to form again under fire, changing front forward on the left company, before a.s.saulting. Adopting the regular attack formation at 300 yards distance, his men fired a volley, after which they rushed up to 150 yards distance, fired a second volley, and then reached the ditch.[63]
Here the fighting line was joined by the supports (the 1st Battalion of the Grenadiers, the Scots and Coldstreams), a last volley delivered, the ditch jumped, and amid the cheers of the soldiers the works cleared at the point of the bayonet.
As soon as the brigade reached the parapet, the Egyptians broke and ran, some stopping occasionally to fire back on their pursuers, who chased them until the artillery had got inside the works and had begun sh.e.l.ling the fugitives.
This brigade struck the trenches not 100 yards from the point aimed at.
It was longer exposed to the Egyptian fire than were the Highlanders, whose attack had begun a few minutes before and had fully aroused the whole line of the defence, which had been sleeping on their arms behind the parapets.
To the Highland Brigade,[64] under General Alison, fell the task of carrying the lines to the left. The first shots were fired at them at 4.55 a.m. from an Egyptian picket posted about 150 yards in front of the intrenchments, then visible 300 yards distant from the Highlanders.
Immediately afterwards the enemy opened with artillery and then with musketry. Without returning this fire, the brigade advanced steadily for about 100 yards further, when the fire became a perfect blaze. At 150 yards bayonets were ordered to be fixed, and the bugle sounded the advance, when with a yell the Scotchmen charged in the dim light through the smoke, carrying the lines in splendid style in the face of determined opposition. So stoutly was the position defended that in many places the a.s.sailants, after mounting the parapets, were forced back into the trenches below, only, however, to return and renew the a.s.sault.
The left battalion, composed of the Highland Light Infantry, struck the battery already described as situated at the intersection of the two lines of intrenchments. This redoubt had a high scarp, which held the centre companies for some moments till the flank companies got round it and took it. The enemy did not run far, but halted about 60 yards in the rear of the works and delivered a heavy cross fire. The rest of the brigade pushed steadily on, driving the enemy before it and capturing three batteries of field guns. The advance was continued, and Arabi"s head-quarters and the Ca.n.a.l bridge were seized at 6.45 a.m. The Highland Light Infantry, which had suffered severely, soon after joined the rest of the brigade. The gallant Highlanders" attack was made entirely with the bayonet, not a shot being fired until the men were within the enemy"s lines.
In the centre, between the two infantry attacks, marched the seven batteries of artillery, under General Goodenough--and after the capture of the enemy"s works did good service and inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy, in some instances firing canister at short ranges.
On the extreme left the Indian Contingent[65] and the Naval Brigade, under General Macpherson, advanced steadily and in silence, the Seaforth Highlanders leading, until an advanced battery of the enemy was reached.